Weitz v. Green Clerk\u27s Record v. 6 Dckt. 33696 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-18-2008
Weitz v. Green Clerk's Record v. 6 Dckt. 33696
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Weitz v. Green Clerk's Record v. 6 Dckt. 33696" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1910.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1910

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
i VOLUME I 
Complaint (February 4,2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
A n ~ w e ~  and Counterclaim of Defendants Greens, Shooks, and Castles 
(MArch 30,2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
Motioii to Amend Counterclaim of Defendants Greens, Shooks, and Castles 
(septe&beT 28,2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Memorandum In Support of Defendants/Counterplaintiffsl Motion to 
Amend (September 28,2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Order Setting Planning and Scheduling Conference Rule 16(b) 
(October 1,2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Order Permitting Defendants/Counterplaintiffs to Amend Counterclaim 
(Novemberl5,2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (November 15,2006) Motion to Amend Counterclaim. 
First Pretrial Order - Order Setting Trial (November 16,2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Withdrawal of Jury Trial Demand (December 3,2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Defendants'-Counterplaintiffs' Application for a Preliminary Injunction 
(March 29,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Notice of Hearing on Application for Preliminary Injunction 
(March 29,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Todd A. Green (April 1,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook (April 1,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants-Counterplaintiffs Application For 
a Preliminary Injunction (April 1,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Amended Notice of Hearing on Application for Preliminary Injunction 
(April1,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion for Enlargement of Time (April 8.2005) 
Order Enlarging Time (April 11.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit of Harold L Osborne (April 12,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit of Gerald E . Weitz (April 1 2  2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit of Consuelo J Weitz (April 12. 2005) 
. . .  Brief in Response to Motion For Preliminary Injunction (April 12.2005) 
Addendum to Memorandum in Support of Defendants-Counterplaintiffs 
Application for a Preliminary Injunction . Additional Case Law 
(April 12.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VOLUME I1 
Court Minutes (April 15. 2005) Motion for Preliminary Injunction . . . . . . . . .  
Evidentiary Order (April 18. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Preliminary &junction I.R.C.P. 65 (April 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Lay Witness Disclosure (May 2. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion and Stipulation to Amend First Pretrial Order Re: Defendants Witness 
Disclosures (May 20.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Amending First Pretrial Order Re: Defendants Witness Disclosures 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (May 24.2005) 
Substitution of Counsel (May 31.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Witness List 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (June 2.2005) 
Motion to Permit Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants that Follow the True 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties (June 3.2005) 
Motion for Order to Examine Disputed Property (June 13.2005) . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles A . Brown in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Examine 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Disputed Property (June 13.2005) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . 2 . 
Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
(June 13.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  275 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion in Limine (June 13.2005) 295 
Affidavit of Ronald J . Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions 
(June 13. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  298 
Motion to Supplement Witness List (June 15.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  301 
Amended Certificate of Service (June 16.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  305 
Response to Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Witness List (June 20.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  308 
Affidavit of Steven R . Shook Re: Weitz'; Adverse Possession Claim; Motion to 
Examine the Disputed Property; Equitable Estoppelclaim (June 20.2005) . . . . .  318 
Affidavit of Todd A . Green; In Response to the Affidavit of Ronald J . Landeck; 
and Motion in Limine (June 20.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A . Green Re: Agreement with Rogers Trust; Re: Weitz 
Equitable Estoppel Claim (June 20.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A . Green Re: Weitz'; Adverse Possession Claim; Motion 
To Examine the Disputed Property; Motion in Limine (June 20.2005) . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs Response to Motions: For Leave to Amend 
to Examine Property in Limine (June 20.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint Due to Typographical Error 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (June 23.2005) 
Acknowledgment of Service By Robert L . Brower. Esq . (June 24.2005) . . . . .  
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert L . Brower. Esq . (June 24.2005) . . .  
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert L . Brower,.Esq. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (June 24.2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena (June 24.2005) 
. . . . . . . . . .  Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (June 24.2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . Affidavit of Robert M Magyar (June 24.2005) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . 3 . 
Additional Attachments to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs Response to 
Motions: For Leave to Amend to Examine Property in Limine 
(June 24,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  434 
Court Minutes (June 27,2005) Motion Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  448 
. . . .  Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Lay Witness Disclosures (July 1,2005). 451 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffsf Expert Witness Disclosures (July 1,2005). . 
. , ; : . : _ ,  ., , .  
455 
' 
VOLUME I11 
Motion to Clarify Order (July 12,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  486 
Motion to Permit Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants Near the True 
Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties Uuly 12,2005). . . . . . . . . . .  489 
. . . . . . . .  Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (July 12,2005). 495 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Addendum to Expert Witness Disclosures 
(July12,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  497 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures 
(July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  500 
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property and 
Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants Within 20 Feet of the 
Disputed Fence (July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  504 
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz in Support of Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' 
Expert Access to the Disputed Property and Upon the Undisputed 
Property of the Defendants Within 20 Feet of the Disputed Fence 
(July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  507 
Affidavit of James Edward Weitz (July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  521 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Allow Access and In Support of 
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property 
and Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants Within 
20 Feet of the Disputed Fence (July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing (July 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  550 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 4 - 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint Due to 
Typographical Error (July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  552 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Witness List 
(July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  554 
Order Denying Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Witness List (July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  556 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena 
(July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  558 
Order Allowing Charles A . Brown to Examine Disputed Property 
(July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  560 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  563 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint 
and Reply to Counterclaim (July 18.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  565 
Court Minutes (July 18. 2005) 'Motion Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  567 
Stipulation to Continue Trial Setting (July 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  570 
Order Continuing Trial Setting (July 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  573 
Notice of Service of First Interrogatories and Requests For Production 
(July 28.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  575 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
(Augustl. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  576 
Affidavit of Consuelo J . Weitz in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim (August 1.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  578 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Clarify Order (August 9.2005) . . . . . .  618 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . .  620 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 5 -  
Affidavit of Todd Green In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to AlIow 
Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 1 2  2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12, 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Ronald P. Monson In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission to go Upon Disputed Property by 
Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (August 15,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Counterclaim (August 15,2005). 
Affidavit of Wayne A. Fox In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 19,2005). 
Affidavit of Willemina Kardong In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Reconsider (August 19,2005). 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffsf Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' 
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 19,2005). . 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Ficus 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit of Charles A. Brown (August 22,2005). 
VOLUME IV 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Wiggins 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Walter Carlson 
(August22,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Allen Drew 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 6 -  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Dale Schoepflin 
(August222005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings -John Goetz 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Tom McKinney 
(August222005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Jack Freeland 
(August22,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Norman Clark 
(August22,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Michael Barber 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Travis Teigen 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Robert Thomas 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Nikki Goetz 
(August22,2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Guy Nearing 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings -Josh Ritter 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Chuck Goetz 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Jeremiah Carlson 
(August 22,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Nancy Flisher 
(August222005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Mary Smetana 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 7 -  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Jeff Schoepflin 
(August 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Dustin Weitz 
(August 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Rockford Weitz 
(August 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Gerald Weitz 
(August22. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Response to First Interrogatories and Requests For Production 
of Documents (August 22.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles A . Brown (August 23.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Homer Ferguson 
(August 24. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Alton Swift 
(August25. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Errata to Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of Motion For Reconsideration 
of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  to Counterclaim (August 25.2005) 
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief (August 25.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Objection to and Motion to Strike Affidavits and "Declarations" Filed 
By Plaintiffs "In Response to Defendants' Pleadings"; Plaintiffs' Reply 
Brief (August 26.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (August 26,2005) . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Susan A . Ripley In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider (August 29.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VOLUME V 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Court Minutes (August 29. 2005) Motion Hearing 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Josh Ritter (September 7.2005) . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . .  Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert L . Brower. Esq . (September 7.2005) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 8 -  
Acknowledgment of Service by Robert L. Brower, Esq. 
(September 7,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert L. Brower, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Esq. (September 7,2005). 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Permission to go Upon Disputed 
Property by Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (Experts) 
(September 8,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Granting Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert (Priest) Access to the 
Disputed Property and Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants 
Within 20 Feet of the Disputed Fence (September 8,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Permission to go Upon Disputed 
Property by Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (September 8,2005). . . . . . .  
Notice of Taking Telephonic Deposition Duces Tecum of Danial T. Castle 
(September 9,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Steven R. Shook 
(September 9,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Todd A. Green 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 9,2005). 
Court Minutes (September 9,2005) AttorneyIClient Privilege During 
DepositionTestimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Providing Notarized Signatures for Affidavits by Declarants 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 12,2005). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Order Setting Pretrial Conference (September 22,2005). 
Supplemental Notice of Providing Notarized Signatures for Affidavits by 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Declarants (September 26,2005). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing (September 26,2005). 
Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Equitable 
Estoppel (September 26,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1088 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - 9 -  
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
To Amend'Complaint to Add Claim for Equitable Estoppel 
(September 26,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1095 
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown (September 26,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1097 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Witness List and Exhibit List for Trial 
(September 26,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1118 
Defendants' Trial Witness List (September 27,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1126 
Supplement to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures 
(September 27,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1128 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
(September 27,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 
Order Permitting Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants Near the True 
Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties (September 27,2005). . . 
Second Supplemental to Defendants/Counterplaintiffsf Expert Witness 
Disclosures (September 27,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (September 27,2005) Pretrial Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Proposed Witness List and Exhibit List for Trial 
(September 30,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Defendants' Trial Exhibit List (September 30,2005). . . . . . . . . . . 
Notice of Service of Defendants' Supplement to Answers to Plaintiffs' 
First Interrogatories and Requests for Production (October 3,2005). . . . . . . 
VOLUME VI 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Trial Memorandum (October 3,2005). . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (October 3,2005) Court Trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration to Amend 
Complaint to Add Claim for Estoppel (October 3,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Amended Complaint (October 3,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -10- 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Supplement to Trial Memorandum 
(October 4,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (October 4,2005) Court Trial - Day Two, 
Court Minutes (October 5,2005) Court Trial - Day Three. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (October 6,2005) Court Trial - Day Four. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Claim That Defendants Are Not 
Bona Fide Purchases for Value (October 6,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants' Claims of Trespass 
and Slander of Title (October 6,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Boundary by Agreement Claim 
(October 6,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Quasi Estoppel Claim 
(October 6,2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (October 7,2005) Court Trial - Day Five. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Memorandum Decision (January 9,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Defendantsr/Counterplaintiffs' Motion to Clarify, Correct and Reconsider 
(January 23,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Reasonable 
Attorney Fees Included in the Memorandum of Costs (April 3,2006). 
Affidavit of Andrew Schwam Re: Attorney Fees (April 3,2006). . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar Re: Attorney Fees (April 3,2006). . . . . . . . . . 
VOLUME VII 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs1 Brief in Support of Motion to Clarify, 
Correct and Reconsider; In Support of the Request for Attorney Fees and 
In Support of the Memorandum of Costs (April 3,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (April 3,2006). 
Supplemental to Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
(April 5,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -11 - 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees (April 17,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Defendants' 
Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 17,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees and In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Clarify, Correct and 
Reconsider (April 17,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Clarify, Correct, 
and Reconsider (April 17,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Danial T. Castle In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
. . . . . . .  Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006). 
VOLUME VIII 
Affidavit of Todd A. Green In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006). . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006). . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Todd A. Green, Steven R. Shook, 
and Danial T. Castle (April 25,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time (April 25,2006). 
Court Minutes (April 25,2006) Post Trial Motions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles L. Graham in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006). . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006). . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Rockford Weitzin Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006). . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006). . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Affidavit of Steven R. Shook (May 5,2006). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -12- 
Affidavit of Todd A. Green (May 5,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Danial T. Castle (May 5,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Gerald E. Weitz (May 8,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Court Minutes (May 9,2006) Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (May 10,2006) Counsel's Concerns About Ex Parte 
Communication with Law Clerk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Amended Memorandum Decision (June 28,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Order Awarding Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
(June 28,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Defendantsf/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Additional Attorney 
Fees as Special Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action 
(Included in a Supplemental Memorandum of Costs) (July 19,2006). . . . . . . . . . 
Defendants1/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Costs as Special 
Damages Under Their Slander to Title Cause of Action (July 19,2006). . . . . . . 
Supplemental verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
(July 19,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar Re: Additional Attorney Fees (July 19,2006). . . 
Affidavit of Andrew Schwam Re: Additional Attorney Fees (July 19,2006). 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffsl Motion to Release Their Bond and to Make 
the Preliminary Injunction Issued by the Court Against Plaintiffs Permanent 
(July 19,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Objection to Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Motion to Release Their Bond 
and to Make the Preliminary Injunction Issued by the Court Against Plaintiffs 
Permanent (July 28,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Plaintiffs'/Counterdefendants' Motion to Disallow Defendants' Motion to 
Disallow Defendantsl/Counterplaintiffs' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees as Special Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action 
(July 28,2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -13- 
Plaintiffs'Counterdefendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees as Special 
Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action (July 28.2006) . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (August 2. 2006) Motion for Release of Bond. Motion to Make 
Injunction Permanent and Motion for Additional Costs and Attorney Fees . . .  
Order Terminating Preliminary Injunction and Denying 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Motion to Make Preliminary Injunction 
Permanent (August 7.2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Exonerating Bond and Releasing Bond to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs 
(August 7.2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Opinion and Order (September 28.2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Judgment Against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Quieting Title In 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs and Awarding Damages and Costs 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (October 17.2006) 
Notice of Appeal (November 16.2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Supersedeas Bond (November 16.2006) 
Motion For Stay of Execution Upon Appeal (November 16.2006) . . . . . . . . . .  
Objection to Bond and Motion to Require PIaintiffs/Counterdefendants/ 
. . . . . . . .  Cross-Respondents to Post Adequate Bond (November 29.2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Notice of Cross-Appeal (December 4.2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Clerk's Certificate 
Clerk's Certificate . Re: Exhibits Missing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Clerk's Certificate Re: Exhibits 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Certificate of Service 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -14- 
INDEX 
Acknowledgment of Service by Robert L. Brower, Esq. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 7,2005). . .  VOLUME V. 
Acknowledgment of Service By Robert L. Brower, Esq. (June 24,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME 11. 
Addendum to Memorandum in Support of Defendants-Counterplaintiffs 
Application for a Preliminary Injunction - Additional Case Law 
(April 12,2005). . .VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Additional Attachments to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs Response to 
Motions: For Leave to Amend to Examine Property in Limine 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (June 24,2005). . .  VOLUME 11. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Allen Drew 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). . .  VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Alton Swift 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 25,2005). .. VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Dustin Weitz 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). .. VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Ficus 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  (August 22,2005). VOLUME I11 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Gerald Weitz 
. . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August22,2005) VOLUMEIV 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Homer Ferguson 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 24,2005) . . .  .VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Jack Freeland 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). . . .  .VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Jeff Schoepflin 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  (August 22,2005). .VOLUME IV. 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Mary Smetana 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  (August 22,2005). .VOLUME IV. 
INDEX - 1 -  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Nancy Flisher 
(August 22,2005). . .  .VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Nikki Goetz 
(August22,2005) . . . .  VOLUMEIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Norman Clark 
(August 22,2005). . . .  .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Robert Thomas 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August22,2005) . . . . .  VOLUMEIV 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Rockford Weitz 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22,2005). . . . .  VOLUME IV 
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Tom McKinney 
(August 22,2005). . . . .  VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Wiggins 
(August 22,2005). . . . .  VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Andrew Schwam Re: Additional Attorney Fees (July 19,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VIII. 
Affidavit of Andrew Schwam Re: Attorney Fees (April 3,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VI. 
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown (August 22,2005). .VOLUME 111. . .  
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown (August 23,2005). . .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown (September 26,2005). . VOLUME V. . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees and In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Clarify, Correct and 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  Reconsider (April 17,2006). VOLUME VII. 
Affidavit of Charles A. Brown in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Examine 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Disputed Property (June 13,2005). . .  .VOLUME I1 
Affidavit of Charles L. Graham in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUMEVIII 
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz (April 12,2005) . .  .VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz in Support of Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' 
Expert Access to the Disputed Property and Upon the Undisputed 
Property of the Defendants Within 20 Feet of the Disputed Fence 
(July 15,2005). . .  VOLUME I11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
. Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim (August 1,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. 
Affidavit of Consuelo J. Weitz in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006) 
VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Danial T. Castle (May 5,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Danial T. Castle In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VII. 
Affidavit of Gerald E. Weitz (April 12,2005). . .  VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Gerald E. Weitz (May 8,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Harold L. Osborne (April 12,2005). . .  VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of James Edward Weitz (July 15,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar (June 24,2005). . .  .VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar Re: Additional Attorney Fees (July 19,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VIII. 
Affidavit of Robert M. Magyar Re: Attorney Fees (April 3,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VI. 
Affidavit of Rockford Weitz in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006) 
VOLUMEVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (May 2,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VIII. 
INDEX - 3 -  
Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions 
(June 13,2005) . . .  VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Ronald P. Monson In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
. . . . .  to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12,2005). . .VOLUME 111. 
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook (April 1,2005). .. VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook (May 5,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12,2005). . .VOLUME 111. . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006) 
VOLUMEVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Steven R. Shook Re: Weitz'; Adverse Possession Claim; Motion 
to Examine the Disputed Property; Equitable Estoppelclaim (June 20,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME11 
Affidavit of Susan A. Ripley In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
. Reconsider (August 29,2005). .VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A. Green (April 1,2005). . .  VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A. Green (May 5,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A. Green In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow 
Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 19,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VIII. 
Affidavit of Todd A. Green Re: Agreement with Rogers Trust; Re: Weitz 
Equitable Estoppel Claim (June 20,2005). . .  VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Todd A. Green Re: Weitz'; Adverse Possession Claim; Motion 
To Examine the Disputed Property; Motion in Limine (June 20,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME 11. 
Affidavit of Todd A. Green; In Response to the Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck; 
and Motion in Limine (June 20,2005). . .VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  321 
INDEX - 4 - 
Affidavit of Todd Green In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Allow 
Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12.2005) . . .  VOLUME 111 . . . . . . . .  
Affidavit of Wayne A . Fox In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 19.2005) . . .  VOLUME I11 . 
Affidavit of Willemina Kardong In Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider (August 19.2005) . . .  VOLUME I11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Amended Certificate of Service (June 16.2005) . . .  .VOLUME I1 . . . . .  
Amended Complaint (October 3.2005) . . .  .VOLUME VI . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . .  . . .  Amended Memorandum Decision (June 28.2006) VOLUME VIII 
Amended Notice of Hearing on Application for Preliminary Injunction 
(Aprill. 2005) . .  VOLUME1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert L . Brower. 
Esq . (September 7.2005) . . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Answer and Counterclaim of Defendants Greens. Shooks. and Castles 
(March 30.2004) . .  .VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Brief in Response to Motion For Preliminary Injunction (April 12. 2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME I 
Certificate of Service . . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Clerk's Certificate . . . . .  .VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Clerk's Certificate Re: Exhibits Missing . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Clerk's Certificate Re: Exhibits . . .  .VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Complaint (February 4. 2004) . . .  VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (April 15. 2005) Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME I1 
Court Minutes (April 25. 2006) Post Trial Motions . .  .VOLUME VIII . 
INDEX . 5 . 
Court Minutes (August 2. 2006) Motion for Release of Bond. Motion to Make 
Injunction Permanent and Motion for Additional Costs and Attorney Fees 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUMEVIII 
Court Minutes (August 29. 2005) Motion Hearing . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (July 18. 2005) Motion Hearing . . .  VOLUME I11 . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (June 27. 2005) Motion Hearing . . .  VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (May 10. 2006) Counsel's Concerns About Ex Parte 
Communication with Law Clerk . . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (May 9. 2006) Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs . . . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (November 15. 2006) Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME I 
Court Minutes (October 3. 2005) Court Trial . . .  VOLUME VI . . . . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (October 4. 2005) Court Trial . Day Two . .  .VOLUME VI . . . . .  
Court Minutes (October 5. 2005) Court Trial . Day Three . .  VOLUME VI . . . . .  
Court Minutes (October 6. 2005) Court Trial . Day Four . .  .VOLUME VI . . .  
Court Minutes (October 7. 2005) Court Trial . Day Five . .  .VOLUME VI . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (September 27. 2005) Pretrial Conference . . .  VOLUME V . . . . . .  
Court Minutes (September 9. 2005) Attorney/Client Privilege During 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Deposition Testimony . . .  VOLUME V 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Chuck Goetz 
. . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22.2005) VOLUME IV 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Dale Schoepflin 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22. 2005) . . .  .VOLUME IV 
I 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Guy Nearing 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22.2005) . . . .  .VOLUME IV 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings . Jeremiah Carlson 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 22.2005) . . . .  .VOLUME IV 
INDEX . 6 . 
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings -John Goetz 
(August 22,2005). . . .  VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Josh Ritter 
(August 22,2005). . . .  .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Michael Barber 
(August 22,2005). . . . .  VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Travis Teigen 
(August 22,2005). . . . .  .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Declaration In Reply to Defendants' Pleadings - Walter Carlson 
(August 22,2005). . . . .  .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Addendum to Expert Witness Disclosures 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (July 12,2005). . . .  VOLUME 111. 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion to Clarify, 
Correct and Reconsider; In Support of the Request for Attorney Fees and 
In Support of the Memorandum of Costs (April 3,2006). VOLUME VII . . 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures (July 1,2005) 
VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Lay Witness Disclosures (July 1,2005) 
VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffsf Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' 
Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 19,2005) 
VOLUME111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property; In 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider (August 12,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME 111. 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Additional Attorney 
Fees as Special Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action 
(Included in a Supplemental Memorandum of Costs) (July 19,2006) 
VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendantsl/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Costs as Special 
Damages Under Their Slander to Title Cause of Action (July 19,2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VIII. 
INDEX - 7 -  
Defendantsl/Counterplaintiffs' Motion for an Award of Reasonable 
Attorney Fees Included in the Memorandum of Costs (April 3,2006) 
VOLUME VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants'/Counterp1aintiffsf Motion to Clarify, Correct and Reconsider 
(January 23,2006). . .VOLUME VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Motion to Make Preliminary Injunction 
(March 29,2005). . .  VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants'jCounterplaintiffs' Motion to Release Their Bond and to Make 
the Preliminary Injunction Issued by the Court Against Plaintiffs Permanent 
(July 19,2006). . .  .VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs Response to Motions: For Leave to Amend 
to Examine Property in Limine (June 20,2005). . VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Supplement to Trial Memorandum 
(October 4,2005). . .  VOLUME VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Defendants/Counterplaintiffsl Trial Memorandum (October 3,2005) 
VOLUME VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Deiendants' Trial Exhibit List (September 30,2005). . .VOLUME VI 
Defendants' Trial Witness List (September 27,2005). . .VOLUME VI . . . . . . . .  
Errata to Plaintiffs' Brief In Support of Motion For Reconsideration 
of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply 
to Counterclaim (August 25,2005). . .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . .  Evidentiary Order (April 18,2005) VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
First Pretrial Order - Order Setting Trial (November 16,2004). . VOLUME I. . 
Judgment Against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Quieting Title In 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs and Awarding Damages and Costs 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (October 17,2006). . .  .VOLUME VIII. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  I Memorandum Decision (January 9,2006). .VOLUME VI. 
I 
Memorandum In Support of Defendants-Counterplaintiffs Application For 
a Preliminary Injunction (April 1,2005) . .  .VOLUME I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INDEX - 8 -  
Memorandum In Support of Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend (September 28,2004). . .  VOLUME I .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion and Stipulation to Amend First Pretrial Order Re: Defendants Witness 
Disclosures (May 20,2005). . .VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion for Enlargement of Time (April 8,2005). . .  VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
(June 13,2005). . . .  VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint Due to Typographical Error 
(June 23,2005). . . .  VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion for Order to Examine Disputed Property (June 13,2005) 
VOLUME11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion For Stay of Execution Upon Appeal (November 16,2006) 
VOLUMEVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion in Limine (June 13,2005). . .VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property and 
Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants Within 20 Feet of the 
Disputed Fence (July 15,2005). .. VOLUME I11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Amend Counterclaim of Defendants Greens, Shooks, and Castles 
(September 28,2004). . .  VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Clarify Order (July 12,2005). . .VOLUME 111. . .  
Motion to Permit Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants Near the True 
Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties (July 12,2005) 
VOLUME111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Permit Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants that Follow the True 
Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties (June 3,2005). .VOLUME 11. . 
Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena (June 24,2005). . VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing (July 15,2005). . .VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing (September 26,2005). . VOLUME V 
INDEX - 9 -  
Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (August 26,2005) 
VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (July 12,2005) 
VOLUME111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Shorten Time For Hearing I.R.C.P. 6(d) (June 24,2005) 
VOLUME11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Motion to Supplement Witness List (June 15,2005). . .VOLUME I1 . .  
Notice of Appeal (November 16,2006). . . .  VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Cross-Appeal (December 4,2006). . .VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Hearing on Application for Preliminary Injunction 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (March 29,2005). . .  .VOLUME I. 
Notice of Providing Notarized Signatures for Affidavits by Declarants 
(September 12,2005). . .  .VOLUME V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Service of Defendants' Supplement to Answers to Plaintiffs' 
First Interrogatories and Requests for Production (October 3,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME V. 
Notice of Service of First Interrogatories and Requests For Production 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (July 28,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Robert L. Brower, Esq. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .. (June 24,2005). .VOLUME I1 
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Steven R. Shook 
(September 9,2005). . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Todd A. Green 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 9,2005). . .  .VOLUME V 
Notice of Taking Deposition of Josh Ritter (September 7,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME V. 
Notice of Taking Telephonic Deposition Duces Tecum of Danial T. Castle 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 9,2005). . .  VOLUME V. 
INDEX -10- 
Objection to and Motion to Strike Affidavits and "Declarations" Filed 
By Plaintiffs "In Response to Defendants' Pleadings"; Plaintiffs' Reply 
. .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Brief (August 26,2005). VOLUME V. 
Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Witness List 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (June 2,2005). . .  VOLUME I1 
Objection to Bond and Motion to Require Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/ 
Cross-Respondents to Post Adequate Bond (November 29,2006) 
VOLUMEVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Objection to Defendants'/Counterplaintiffsl Motion to Release Their Bond 
and to Make the Preliminary Injunction Issued by the Court Against Plaintiffs 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Permanent (July 28,2006). .VOLUME VIII 
Opinion and Order (September 28,2006). . VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Allowing Charles A. Brown to Examine Disputed Property 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (July 18,2005). . .  .VOLUME I11 
Order Amending First Pretrial Order Re: Defendants Witness Disclosures 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . (May 24,2005). .VOLUME I1 
Order Awarding Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . (June 28,2006). .VOLUME VIII 
Order Continuing Trial Setting (July 22,2005). . .VOLUME 111. . . . . .  
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Clarify Order (August 9,2005) 
VOLUME111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Quash Brower Subpoena 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (July 18,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. 
Order Denying Defendants' Objection to and Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Witness List (July 18,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. . . . . .  
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint 
and Reply to Counterclaim (July 18,2005). . .VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (September 27,2005). .VOLUME V. 
INDEX -11- 
Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine (July 18,2005). .VOLUME 111. . 
Order Enlarging Time (April 11,2005). . .  VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Exonerating Bond and Releasing Bond to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs 
(August 7,2006). . .  .VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Granting Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert (Priest) Access to the 
Disputed Property and Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants 
Within 20 Feet of the Disputed Fence (September 8,2005). . .  VOLUME V 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Permission to go Upon Disputed 
Property by Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (Experts) 
(September 8,2005). . .  VOLUME V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion For Permission to go Upon Disputed 
Property by Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (September 8,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME V. 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration to Amend 
Complaint to Add Claim for Estoppel (October 3,2005). . .VOLUME VI 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint Due to 
Typographical Error (July 18,2005). . .  VOLUME 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Supplement Witness List 
(July18,2005) . . . . .  VOLUME111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Order Permitting Access By Defendants and Their Experts to Plaintiffs' 
Property for the Purpose of Dating Fence Remnants Near the True 
Boundary Line Between the Parties' Properties (September 27,2005) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME V. 
Order Permitting Defendants/Counterplaintiffs to Amend Counterclaim 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (November 15,2004). . .  .VOLUME I 
Order Setting Planning and Scheduling Conference Rule 16(b) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (October 1,2004) . . .  VOLUME I. 
Order Setting Pretrial Conference (September 22,2005). . .  VOLUME V. .. 
Order Terminating Preliminary Injunction and Denying 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Application for a Preliminary Injunction 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Permanent (August 7,2006). . .VOLUME VIII. 
INDEX -12-  
Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Clarify, Correct, 
and Reconsider (April 17,2006). . .  VOLUME VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1575 
Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order 
Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to 
Counterclaim (August 15,2005). . VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  642 
Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Equitable 
Estoppel (September 26,2005). . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1088 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants' Claims of Trespass 
and Slander of Title (October 6,2005). . .  VOLUME VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1303 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Todd A. Green, Steven R. Shook, 
and Danial T. Castle (April 25,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1591 
Plaintiffs'Counterdefendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow 
Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Request for Costs and Attorney Fees as Special 
Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action (July 28,2006) 
VOLUME VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1689 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosures 
(July 15,2005). . .  .VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Lay Witness Disclosure (May 2,2005) . .  .VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . . .  253 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Boundary by Agreement Claim 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (October 6,2005). . .  VOLUME VI. 1307 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Claim That Defendants Are Not 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Bona Fide Purchases for Value (October 6,2005). . .VOLUME VI. 1298 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Defendants' 
Request for Costs and Attorney Fees (April 17,2006). . .  VOLUME VII. . . . . . .  1544 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Quasi Estoppel Claim 
(October 6,2005). . .  VOLUME VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1313 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Permission to go Upon Disputed Property by 
. . . . . .  Mr. Brown and Plaintiffs' Witnesses (August 15,2005). . .VOLUME I11 640 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (August 1,2005). .VOLUME 111. 
INDEX -13-  
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
To Amend Complaint to Add Claim for Equitable Estoppel 
(September 26,2005). . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees (April 17,2006). . .  .VOLUME VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time (April 25,2006). . .VOLUME VIII 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Witness List and Exhibit List for Trial 
(September 26,2005). . .  VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Reply Brief (August 25,2005). . .VOLUME IV. . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Response to First Interrogatories and Requests For Production 
of Documents (August 22,2005). . .VOLUME IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Proposed Witness List and Exhibit List for Trial 
(September 30,2005). . .  VOLUME V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Plaintiffs'/Counterdefendantsl Motion to Disallow Defendants' Motion to 
Disallow Defendants'/Counterplaintiffs' Request for Costs and Attorney 
Fees as Special Damages Under Their Slander of Title Cause of Action 
(July 28,2006). . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Preliminary Injunction I.R.C.P. 65 (April 18,2005) . .  VOLUME 11. . . . . . .  
Reply (April 23,2004). . .  VOLUME I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Response to Defendants' Motion to Allow Access and In Support of 
Motion to Allow Plaintiffs' Expert Access to the Disputed Property 
and Upon the Undisputed Property of the Defendants Within 
20 Feet of the Disputed Fence (July 15,2005). . .  VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Response to Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Witness List (June 20,2005). .. .VOLUME 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Second Supplemental to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Expert Witness 
Disclosures (September 27,2005). . .  VOLUME V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Stipulation to Continue  rial Setting (July 22,2005). .. VOLUME 111. . . . . . . . .  
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert L. Brower, Esq. (June 24,2005) 
VOLUME11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INDEX - 14 - 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to Robert L . Brower. Esq . (September 7. 2005) 
VOLUMEV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Substitution of Counsel (May 31.2005) . . .  VOLUME I1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Supersedeas Bond (November 16.2006) . . .  VOLUME VIII . . . . . . . . .  
Supplement to Defendants/Counterplaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures 
(September 27.2005) . . .  .VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Supplemental Notice of Providing Notarized Signatures for Affidavits by 
Declarants (September 26.2005) . . .  .VOLUME V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Supplemental to Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
(April 5.2006) . . .  .VOLUME VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Supplemental Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . .  (July 19.2006) .VOLUME VIII 
Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (April 3. 2006) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  VOLUME VII 
Withdrawal of Jury Trial Demand (December 3.2004) . . .  VOLUME I . . . . . . . .  
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idalio 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Scliwam #I573 
5 14 So~~tl i  Pollc Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants/Co~mterplaintiffs: Greens, Shoolts and Castles. 
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) 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
liusband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATH~RNE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
Defendants/Co~~nterplaintiffs. 
\ 
Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) submit the followillg 
Trial Memorandum. 
I. NOTICE REQUIREMENT - BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT. 
Like adverse possession, boundary by agreement requires notice of the fence which is claimed 
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1 1 4 3  
to be the boundary, sufficient to put a bona fide purchase? on notice that such an agreement may exist. 
In Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 35 1, at page1 17, the Court indicated the type of notice a 
claimed boundary fence would need to provide. 
16-81 As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such arz agreed 
boundary wvuldnlso be bbinding upon c i  successor in interest of tlze 
s e l h ,  who purchased with notice of the agreement. The boundary, 
which defendants claim, was clearly marked by "a tight beard 
fencei1, four orfive feet in height, and the area On defeeulrlnrzts'side 
of the ferzce was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would 
constitute aotice to an intendiitg purchaser, of defendants' 
possession. One buying property in the possession of a third party is 
put on notice of any claim of title or right of possession by such third 
party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal. N a w a  & 
Meridian Ir?. Dist. v. Bri~es,  27 Idaho 84, 147 P. '75; Nelms v. Miller, 
56 N.M. 132,241 P.2d 333; Waltrip v. CathcaM,.207 OM. 404,250 
P.2d 43; J. R. Garrett Co, v. States, 3 Cal.2d 379, 44 P.2d 538; 
. . 
. 
Marlenee 
Page 
118 
v. Brown, Cal.App., 128 P.2d 137; Three SixtVFive Club v. Shostak, 
104 Cal.App.2d 735, 232 P.2d 546; 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and 
Purchaser, § 712; 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, $ 1012. Moreover, 
pi.&litiffPauiley testified in effect thaihe saw the fence and knew of 
defendants' occupaixy of the disputed &ea before he contracted to 
buy the south half. Ifstrch facts are suflcieittly established, the 
pla21ztiffs would not be inrzocentpurclzasers, and their rights would 
be subject to the same defense available against their grantor. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
The fence that Weitz claims demarcates the boundary by agreement provides no such notice 
to Green, a bona fide purchaser. Green has testified he saw ao fence when he pwchased his property 
from Rogers. In fact, Green did see the pink IDL marlcer that marked the NE corner of his property. 
Green therefore talces his property free of any claim of boundary by agreement by Weitz. 
A boundary by agreement can be fixed by either an express agreement, or proved 
circumstantially by surrounding circumstances and conduct of tile parties. There certainly is no express 
agreement claimed by Weitz. 
The recent Idaho case that deals with facts very similar .to ours is Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 
492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002). With facts eerily parallel to ours, both the District Court and the Idaho 
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Supreme Court found a substantial fence in the condition as when it "was hastily put up to contain 
cattle" was not a boundary fence. Both courts further found that no express or implied agreement 
existed, and neither the parties nor their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence 
representing the boundary between the properties. In Cox, at page 492, the COLIIT stated, 
Although the first element necessary to prove boundary by agreement 
was met, the district court found that there was no evidence in the 
record to support the appellants' contention that the fence line 
constituted a subsequent agreement or acquiescence by the parties or 
that there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances of 
the fence's original location. In fact, the opposite was true-a previous 
owner, Nina, provided evidence of the circ~cmstnhces urrou~zlding 
the erection of tl2e feiice, which denio~lstrated that the fence was 
hastily put up to contain cattle. Her testifiroizy showed that the 
purpose of the fence was not to establish a boundnry between the 
properties. She stated that no agreeinenl existed between the 
Anderson family and the neighboring landowners to treat the fence 
line as the boundary. Appellants urge this C o w  to adopt the theory of 
bour~dary by acquiescence as a separate theory that does not require 
the element of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates 
that an agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a 
boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although the actual 
boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the 
existence of an express or implied agreement to treat the fence as the 
boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the time 
they were making the improvements, the fence was still being used to 
contain cattle; appellants h e w  this because they damaged the fence 
while worlting, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified that her 
family used the land outside the fence to access recreation areas 
and that fzer family never treatedthe fence cis the bourtrillry to the 
properfy. AAKidavits from predecessors iil interest submitted by the 
appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement to 
treat the fence as a boundary. (Empliasis Added.) 
As in the Cox case, Weitz believing or claiming the old fence was a boundary is not 
sufficient to establish boundary by agreement when Rogers never treated the fence as being the 
boundary to their property. Further, Rogers will testify that Rogers used their land outside the fence 
to access other recreatioil areas on Moscow Mountain and to harvest timber. 
Weitz has claimed specific usage ofthe disputed area, and that such usage somehow entitles 
then1 to own the disputed area up to the fence remnants. Weilz misunderstands the type of usage 
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required to establish notice such that the owner of property is alerted that someone else claims 
ownership of his property, and thus is treating the fence as a boundary. The case of Herrmann v. 
Woodell, 107 Idaho 916,693 P.2d 11 18 discusses the type of usage required to give notice to an 
owner that an ownership claim is being made against his property. The Court stated at Page 921: 
Further, the Herrmanns and their predecessors had possessed, 
cultivated and grazed the land up to the fence. A witness for the 
Herrmanns testified that in 1927 and 1928, when he and his father 
leased the land, which is now owned by the Herrmanns, they grew 
hay and grazed horses right up to the fence line. 
In an argument where boundary by agreement is alleged, with the agreement being proved 
circumstanTially by alleging that there was acquiescence in a fence being a boundary, what must be 
shown by the plaii~tiff is not mere acquiescence in plaintiff's use of the land being claimed, but 
acquiescence by the owner in specific uses by plaintiff cry to the fence - uses such that the owner's 
silence is logically accepted as acquiescence in ihe fence being a boundary that separates the uses by 
each party up to the fence. Thus, the use by the party claiming boundary by agreement must put the 
owner on notice that the use is sucli that it rises to a claim of ownerslup, with the fence as the 
boundary for the different ownerships. Tllis use rising to a claim of ownership must actually go up 
to the fence - for example, farming up to the fence; building up to the fence; landscaping up to the 
fence. The use itself must let the owner know that the user is claiming ownership of owner's 
property up to the feace, with the fence serving as a bo~lndary between ownerships. Then 
acquiescence could be circumstantial evidence that an agreement to set the boundary existed. 
If use rising to a claim of ownership is not present, silence by the owner only shows 
permissive use ofthe properly by the claimant. Roge~s was nice enough to permit Weitz, and others, 
to hike, snowmobile, ivountain bike, snowshoe, etc., on their property. Such use on the perimeter 
trail would never be a use that would put Rogers on notice that any such user was clainling 
ownership of Rogers' property up to tlze fence. So while Rogers acq~~iesced in such recreational use 
of their property, they certainly did not acquiesce in the old fence remnants being a boundary. The 
acquiescence must be in the fence being a boundary, not in the mere existence of the fence. 
For Weitz to prevail on a boundary by agreement claim, the uses by Weitz on the north side 
of the fence remnants must have been such to p ~ ~ t  Rogers on notice that the fence was claimed as the 
boundary by Weitz. And, those uses must have made use of the fence as the boundary, i.e., Weitz 
used the property up to tlze fence, delineating the fence as the boundary. Tile circunlstantial 
evidence must show that Weitz treated the fence as being the boundary, and used the land up to tlze 
fence, and all along the fence, in a manner that alerted Rogers to that claim. 
Instead, the "use$ claimed by Weitz have no bearing to the fence. 
Weitz has claimed to utilize the perimeter trail over many years for recreational purposes. 
The perimeter trail does not travel along the fence. Its use by anyone would not alert Rogers 
that such a user claimed to own Rogers property up to and all along the fence! 
k The radio shack is nowhere near the fence. Its use by anyone would not alert Rogers that 
such a user claimed to own Rogers property up to and all aloag tlze fence! 
9 Weitz taking firewood from the disputed area is not a use up to the fence. Such activities by 
anyone would not alert Rogers that they claimed to ownRogers property up to and nll along 
the fence! 
The use by claimant must be such to put the owner on notice that the claimant actually claims 
ownership of the property up to the fence, and the use must be along the entire line of the fence. 
The use itselfmuslsf demarcate the fence ns being the boundary. That is the type of notice required 
to the owner. Furtheymore, if it were otherwise, every claim for a prescriptive easement within an 
area would turn illto a claim of boundary by agreement up to the nearest fenceline. 
The Herrmml case also addresses the bona fide purchaser status of Green. The Court stated at 
page 92 1 : 
[12,13] An agreed boundary is binding upon a successor in interest of 
the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement. Paurley v. 
supra. A boundary marlred by a fence, with the land on the 
Herrmau~s' side of the fence being grazed and cultivated would 
constitute notice. Mr. Woodell testified that he wallced all over the 
property and noticed the barbed wire fence. Therefore, the Woodells 
were on notice of the agreed boundary. Accordingly, we hold in this 
case that the line marked by the fence constitutes the lawful boundary 
between the adjacent properties according to the doctrine of boundary 
by agreement. 
In the case at bar, the opposite is true. Green had no notice of any fence, and therefore even had 
there been an agreed boundary with Rogers, it would not be binding upon Green, who purchased 
without notice of any claimed agreement. 
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Persvn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 154,804 P.2d 327, is an "adverse possession case. Iiowever, as 
Weitz has asked the Court to quiet title to the disputed property in Weitz, the disc~~ssion by the Court 
at pages 157 and 158 regarding Persyn's adverse possession claims as they related to 
"improvements," "open and notorious hostile intes~tlt," "burden of proof," and "notice" requirements 
are appropriate to our case. 
[3] The district judge held that the fence did not constitute a 
substantial ei~closure under LC. 5 5-210(1). Be was persuaded that 
tlze fence had not been erected by Persyn or PerSyn 's grantors ahd 
that ii3purpose never was to enclose nrtypart of Persyn 'sproperty: 
See Loomisv. Union Pacific Railroad Compa~ip~ 97 Idaho 341, 5.14 
P.2d 299 (1975); Schuttqnv. Beck, 757P.2d 1139 (Colo.App.1988). 
When the Cowity owned the property now belonging to the Favreaus, 
the County perlnitted an employee to erect the fence to coistain the 
employee's horses within the property owned by the County. At no 
tivae was the fence regarded as tlte boundnry between the two 
pdrcels. 
[4] The district judge also ruled that' the sctions of Persyn's 
predecessor in clearing brush from the fence area a ~ d  mnintnirzirzg 
tB:e fence up until 19'79, and any aciions by Persyn tlzereafir, were 
insal3pfieient to be covlsirlered "improvemet.ltV ~rs required by I,C 8 
5-ZIP@). Finally, tlie district ju&ge concluded that neither Persyn nor 
her predecessors "in any way indicated an open and notorious Izostile 
intent which brougl$t h6me to the [Fnvrem/or their predecessors 
in title tlzat [Persyn] wm chiming title to tlze real estate in dispute." 
The last issue raised by Persyn was essesltially one of notice.Persyn 
contended that the existence of the fence line imparted notice of an 
adverse claim, such that when the Favreaus bought the property in 
1983, they had a duty to inquire as to the extent of such claim because 
the fence line was sot on the survey line. The district court made a 
finding that after 1979, flte fence felt into disrepair, wit12 ~ u t l z  of
tlze barbed wire and many of the posts down nt the time Favreaus 
6ouglzt the anjacent property. Then, in its coilclusions of law, the 
district court rejected Persyn's argtunent and authority as unfounded. 
It has long been held in Idaho that "theparty seeking to quiet title 
ngairzsf aitotlzer mast succeed on the strengtlz of his own title, and 
ilut on tlze weakness of tlznt of his adverSary." pin cock.^. Pocatelio 
Gold & Cup~erMil~eaCo. ,  100 Idaho 325,331, 597 P.2d211,217 
(1979) (citations omitted). Per'syn cnnnot  sort to pro~~iizg her 
arlve?sepossessio~z claim by transferring the burden ofproof to tlze 
party against whom the claim is 6eing nznde. 
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The decree of the district court in favor of the Favreaus and against 
Persyn is affirmed. (Emphasis Added.) 
/ 
11. NOTICE REQUIREMENT - PTUESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. 
A boiia fide purchaser without notice of a prescriptive easement claim talces his propelty fiee 
of any such claim. See ICaupp v: City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 337,715 P.2d 1007. 
The Court states at 340 - 341, 
[2] As previously mentioned, proof of the Kaupps' knowledge is 
necessaq to establish a prescriptive easement. The court found the 
presence of a manhole in a city street and the occasional use of this 
manhole were sufficient to impute lcnowledge to the landowner of a 
concealed pipeline buried under the property. We disagree. We believe 
tlze mere existeftce of tlze manhole does not create a duty to inquire. 
This case also raises another issue which should be considered on 
remand. No prescriptive easement can be acquired if the use, instead of 
being adverse, is with the permission of the subservieilt landowner. 
107 Idaho at 803, 693 P.2d at 449; Memll v. Penrod, 109 
Idaho at 51,704 P.2d at 955. (emphasis Added.) 
The Court in Baxter v. Crahey, 135 Idaho 166,16 P.3d263, also discQssedthe reqtireinents for 
prescriptive easement, citing and m, supra. III w, the Court stated: 
(At 173) 
[17] The Baxters argue that Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in 
interest, ha& tictual lcnowledge tliat the Baxters' cattle usedtrails on land 
east of the fence to reach the spring for water. The district court, 
however, noting that there was conflicting testimony that the trails were 
also used by deer and elk wandering off the BLM lands, concluded that 
tlze Baters failed to provide clear and convincing evideizce tlznt tlze 
tmik were sufficiatt to put Esterhold? on notice of their use as a 
means for the Baxters' cattle to get to tlie spring. We agree. 
The record, however, indicates that Esterholdt was ill and was oidy able 
to visit the property two or three times per year. Because a landowner 
need only Maintain reasonable supervision over lzis property, see 
110 Idaho at 340,715 P.2d at 1010, we agree with the district 
cowt that the presence of the tvnils on Esfe~lzolrlt's larzrl, witlzout 
nzore, was insuffient foplace EsferIzoldt orz notice of their use by the 
Baxters' cattle. 
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(At 174) 
It is therefore logical to assume that even if Esterholdt was on notice 
that the Baxters' cattle were crossing his land to reach the spring, he 
was simply being neighborly by allowing the fence to be moved and 
giving the Baxters' cattle access to water. Because a prescriptive right 
camot be established where the use was permissive, see Hmter v. 
Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998), we reject the 
Baxters' assertion. 
1221 The Baxters also contend that the Craneys tookpossession of 
the land with knowledge of the easement. As evidence of their 
knowledge, the Baxters point to testimony that the Craneys inspected 
the land prior to their purchase and obseived the trails. An 
examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely 
establishes that the Craneys were aware of the hails at the time of 
purchase. The Craneys' mere appreciation of the abundant trails, 
witlzoztt more, is insufficient to estnblish that the Craneys wereput 
on notice of aprescriptive easenzent across their land Accordingly, 
because the district court's decision is supported by substantial and 
competent, although coi~flicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb 
its conclusion. See Hunter, 131 Idaho 148, 9.53 P.2d 588 (1998). 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Rogers and Green did not have actual or imputed lmowledge of any prescriptive easement cclailn 
by Weitz, or anyone else, prior to purchasing his property. It was not until Weitz b~zlldozed the trail 
across Green's propel@ that he became aware of any claim by Weitz. Green is a bona fide purchaser, 
without notice of any claim of prescriptive easemeBt by Weitz. 
111. DOWN FENCE. 
In Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152,525 P.2d 347, in an action to quiet title, the Cotut refi~sed 
to allow a downed fence to establish an adverse possession claim, stating at pages 155 and 15G, 
The trial court found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record 
fully sustains the trial court's determination that Uie bbared wire fence 
the Teaters contended bounded the area claimed by them was down 
and cattle could cross and recross the area. This finding, supported by 
substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence, will not be 
disturbed by this court. 
As stated in Griffel v. Remolds, 136 Idaho 397,34 P.3d 1080, at 397, 
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Furtliermore, because the fences were no longer in existence wheli 
Stegelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the old 
fence lilies to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof 
with other evidence. 
These cases hold that a claimant can not rely upoii a fence that is "down". Weitz should also be 
precluded from asserting m y  clainls based upon a feehce that, by their own testimony, has not been 
maintained since the mid 1970's or earlier. This domed fence could in no way impart any notice or 
knowledge of any claim by Weitz to Green prior to his p~~chase.  Green is a bona fide purchaser, 
without knowledge of any claims by Weitz. 
IV. MEANDERING CATTLE FENCE. 
Although -da 117 Idaho 614,790 P.2d 395, is an adverse possession case, the 
Court discussed the nature of a meandering barbed wire fence. It is appropriate for our case, as it 
sets out the reason for the requirement of an enclosure -to indicate the extent of the adverse claim. 
The Court stated at page 619, 
[lo, 111 One of the findings made by the district court, which was not 
challe~iged on the appeal i n m  was that the Capps never built or 
maintained any enclosure around the subject pfoperty. See I.C. $9 5 -  
20S(2), 5-210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed a 
meabdering barbed wire fence on the property, built by employees of 
the defendants' predecessor, Burton, to separate livestock. It is well 
settled that persolls claiming title by adverse possessioll inust 
establish-as one of the elements of such claims-that they construc?ed 
or maintained an ei~closure on the di~~utedpardel'of land to incltcnte 
the extent o f  their cl~irn. Loomis v,. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 97 
Idaho 341,544 P.2d 249 (1975); Christle v. Scog 1 loIdaho 829,718 
P.2d 1267 (Ct.App. 1986). A fence erected by a neighbor fo? the 
pLEpose of containing live~toclc or to restrain livestock f ~ i a  enteriilg 
the neighbor's property will not suflice to satisfy the enclos~tre 
requirement for adverse possessioll by a claimant adjacent to the 
neighbor's property. (Emphasis Added.) 
In Henmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 693 P.2d 1118, at page 921, the Court stated 
regarding Woodell's claim: 
they contend the fence was constructed by their predecessors-in- 
interest in order to lceep animals from the roadway. This implies that 
the fence was erected as a barrier and not as a boundary to divide the 
adjacent properties. Therefore, if this assertion were proven, the 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 9 
presumption of an agreement would be overcome and a bounday by 
implied agreement or acquiescence could not be found. 
The natnse of the disputed fence in our case exactly rnatchiig the description from the 
Wyoining case cited below shows that it was constructed as a barrier, not a boundary. Thus 110 
presumption or implication arises. See ICimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303; 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 196, 
copy attached hereto for the convenience of the COW, with relevant portions l~ighlighted. 
V. TIMBER TRESPASS. 
DeEendantslCounterplaintiffs are entitled to the costs to place their property into the same 
condition it was immediately prior to the trespass by PIaintiffslCounterdefendants. 
See Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321. Also see Raide v. Dollar, 34 
Idaho 682, 203 Pac. 469; pow ell,^. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 937 P.2d 434, copies of which are 
attached hereto for the convenience of the Court, with relevant portions highlighted. 
VI. SLANDER OF TITLE. 
DefendantslComterplaintiffs are entitled to recover all damages resulting from 
PlaintiffslCouriterdefendafits slmder of title. 
See Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691,8 P.3d 1234 and Ray1 v. Shull Entemrises Inc., 108 
Idaho 524,700 P;2d 567, copies ofwhich are attached hereto f6r the conveaience of the Court, with 
relevant pottions highlighted. 
DATED this 31d day of October, 2005. 
&A+ 
Robert M. ~ a g v a s f l  / 
Attorney for 6kendants - Counterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby celtif'y that on this 31d day of October, 2005, I caused a true and corlect copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM to be served on the following in the ]Banner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown ( ) Overnight Mail 
Attoriley at Law ( ) U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1225 ( ) Facsilnile 
Lewiston, ID 83501 DQ I-Iand Delivery 
AJ'VfiA- 
Robert M. Magyar 6' 1 
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75 Idaho 112; Paurley v. Harris; 268 P.2d 351 
--"----- --- Page 112 .--- .-----"- 
PAURLEY et ux. v. HARRIS et ux. 
[Cite as Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 1121 
No. 7927. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
March 16, 1954. 
Action in ejectment arising out of a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners. The District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, Ada County, Charles E. Winstead, J., entered judgment of ejectment for plaintirfs, and 
defendants appealed, claiming error in action of court in striking certain affirmative allegations from answer and 
in rejecting certain ofrered proof. The Supreme Court, Taylor, J., held that defendants' pleading of fraud or 
mistake was sufficient to permit admission of offered evidence to effect that the parties' vendor, and 
her agent, at time sale to defendants was proposed, pointed out division line as contended for by defendants, and 
that stakes were driven to mark the line. 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
Keeton, J., and Beclwith, District Judge, dissented. 
.~-*-- page 114 ---------.---. 
Fairchild & Fairchild, Boise, for appellants. 
Par01 evidence may be resorted to, not to vary the words ofthe grant, but to show from the situation and 
condition of the subject-matter what meaning the parties attached to the words used, especially in matters of 
subsequent made description and declaration of the grantor. Devliil on Real Estate Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect. 
1015 A, Page 1937. 
A boundary line may be established by adjoining landowners, when they so agree upon a boundary line, 
enter into possession, and improve the lands according to the line thus accepted, and they will not thereafter be 
permitted to claim the line agreed upon is not the true line, although the statute of limitations has not attached. 
Devlin on Real Estate, Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect. 1086. McNanara v. Seaton, 82 Ill. 498; Cutler v. Callison, 72 
Ill. 113; Ebert v. Wood, 1 Bin., Pa., 216,2 Am.Dec. 436; Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307,308; Sneed v. Osborn, 
25 Cal. 619; Sawyer v. Fellows, 6 N.H. 107,25 Am.Dec. 452. 
Where a boundary is established by agreement, followed by acquiescence and possession, and particularly 
possession lor the full statutory period for establishing title by prescription, the line thus established determines 
the location of the estate and establishes the tnie line of division. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463. 
Where a boundary line is pointed out, staked, or marked out by monuments plainly visible, the purchaser is 
entitled to take as so indicated to him. Taylor v. Reising, 13 Idaho 226,243,89 P. 943. 1153 
If a purchaser of real property has notice of defendants' claim to the property and his equity therein, such 
- 
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purchaser cannot be considered to be an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration. Froman v. Madden, 13 
Idaho 138,88 P. 894. 
Maurice 13. Greene and Raymond D. Givens, Boise, for respondents. 
Mutual mistake between one party and the agent of another does not show mutual mistake in the absence of 
a showing of the authority of the agent to make the stipulation claimed to be omitted. 45 Am. Jur., Reformation, 
Sec. 56; Mills v. Schulba, 1950, 95 Cal.App.2d 559,213 P.2d 408. 
The motion to strike is the proper method of reaching matter in an answer setting 
up no defense to an action or containing recitations and negotiations prior to the execution of a written 
agreement in absence of pleading of ambiguity. Brown v. Jones, 49 Idaho 797,292 P. 235; Cowen v. 
Harrington, 5 Idaho 329,48 P. 1059; Fraliclc v. Mercer, 27 Idaho 360, 148 P. 906. 
Par01 evidence may not be admitted to vary the terms of a written agreement in the absence of allegation of 
fraud or mistake. Udelaviiz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232 
P. 581. 
TAYLOR, Justice 
Lots 1,2 and 3 in Bloclc 2 of Lover's Lane addition to Boise City constitute a parallelogranam, the lines of 
which do not run true north and south or true east and west. The side lines on the east and west run some few 
degrees to the east of true north and to the west oftrue south. The lots were owned by one Lillian Ferrell. On 
June 30, 1947, she entered into a contract with the defeiidants for the sale to them of the north one-half of the 
property, described in the contract as the "North One Half of lots 1,2, and 3 * * *.." March 10, 1950, she 
contracted to sell to the plaintiffs the remainder, described as the "South Half of Lots 1,2, and 3 * * *." About a 
month after entering into possession. some time in July or August, 1947, the defendants erected a board fence 
on what they claim to be the dividing line between the property purchased by them and that retained by tlte 
seller. This fence is somewhat to the south of a line, drawn parallel to the north and south end lines of the 
parallelogram, which would divide the property in equal parts. 
Plaintiffs, claiming to this center line, brought this action in ejectment to obtain possession of the area lying 
between the fence and the center line. After certain denials and admissions, the defendants in their answer 
allege their contract, a description of the property claimed by them thereunder, then follows lengthy allegations 
concerning prior occupancy of the respective tracts, and negotiations between defendants and the former owner 
leading up to the sale. They further allege that prior to their contract there was no division line, mark or 
monument separating the two portions of the property; that the owner Fenell, acting through an agent, 
represented to them that the dividing line was located as now claimed by them; and that the agent pointed out 
and indicated the course of the division line; that they believed, and relied on, these representations in 
contracting to buy; that almost immediately after taking possession they built the fence referred to, leveled the 
ground, planted lawn, trees and shrubbery thereon and have since continuously occupied same; that at the time 
plaintiffs contracted to purchase the south onehalf of the property they h e w  that defendants occupied .and 
claimed the property enclosed by the fence; that defendants' contract of purchase was drawn by the 
owner Ferrell; that the description of the property therein contracted for is erroneous and does not properly 
describe the property sold to them; that the mistake went unnoticed by defendants; that they believe the mistake 
was mutual and, if not, then, in that event, the seller perpetrated a fraud upon them. 1160 
" 
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On plaintiffs1 motion the court struck from the answer paragraphs four through eighteen, containing the 
foregoing and other affirmative allegations, on the ground that the same are immaterial, sham and frivolous. On 
the trial, defendants offered evidence to the effect that MIS. Ferrell, accompanied by a real estate agent, came to 
their house and proposed the sale; that she and her agent pointed out the division line to be established, and that 
stakes were driven to mark the line. The court sustained the objection that this offered evidence was 
incompetent; involved matters merged in the contract; and that the contract could not be varied by such proof. 
[I, 21 The strilting of the affirmative allegations from the answer and the rejection of this offered proof 
presents the controlling issue on this appeal. The general rules applicable are not in question. Oral stipulations, 
agreerneilts and negotiations, preliminary to a written contract, are presumed merged therein, and will not be 
admitted to contradict or vary its plain terms. Hurt v. Monumental Mercury Mining Co., 35 Idaho 295,206 P. 
184; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232 P. 581; Larsen v. Buys, 49 Idaho 615,292 P. 239; Fidelity 
Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058. Fraud or mistake may be shown, in any case, to void or reform 
a contract. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Gould v. Frazier, 48 Idaho 798,285 P. 673; 
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160,4 P.2d 657; Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 56 
Idaho 529, 56 P.2d 762; Utilities Engineering- Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981. 
[3,4] Although burdened and commingled with much that is sham and redundant, we think defendants' 
imperfect pleading of fraud or mistake was sufficient for the admission of the evidence offered, and should not 
have been stricken. 
"The particular rule applicable here is that where the seller and the buyer go upon the land and 
there agree upon and mark the boundary between the part to be conveyed and the part to be retaine8 
by the seller, .the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances set out in the deed executed to 
effectuate the division agreed upon." Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, at page 89, 245 P.2d 
1052, at page 1057. 
[5] Applying that rule here, and assuming that defendants' proof would establish the [acts, if the former 
owner and the defendants went upon the property prior to the execution of the contract, and there agreed 
upon a dividing line which was marked upon the ground, and the defendants thereafter contracted to buy, 
relying upon the agreed boundary, took possession, and occupied and enclosed the property up to the line 
agreed upon, and such possession was known to the seller, who acquiesced therein for a considerable period of 
time, such a state of facts would support the conclusion that the seller is bound by the dividing line agreed upon, 
even though it varies from the description written in the contract. Atwell v. Olson, 30 Wash.2d 179, 190 P.2d 
783; Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal.App.2d 15,204 P.2d 97; Angel1 v. Hadley, 33 Wash.2d 837,207 P.2d 191; 
Lake, for Use and Benefit of Benton v. Crosser, 202 Okl. 582,216 P.2d 583; Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 30, 
221 P.2d 337; Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App.2d 759,248 P.2d 949; Pacific Gas & Electric Co, v. Minnette, 
115 Cal.App.2d 642,252 P.2d 642; Appeal of Moore, 173 Kan. 820,252 P.2d 875; Millikin v. Sessoms, 173 
N.C. 723,92 S.E. 359; 170 A.L.R. Annotation 1144. Cf. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller 
v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006. 
What is here said of acquiescence by the seller is not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence 
alone for the period here involved would be sufficient to establish title by "acquiescence". See Lewis v. Smith, 
187 Okl. 404, 103 P.2d 512. Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P.2d 772; Willie v. Local Realty Co., 
110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718; Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308; Dragos v. Russell, Utah, 
237 P.2d 831; Martin v. Lopes, Cal.App., 164 P.2d 321; Id., 28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P.2d 881. Here the seller's 
acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement and of the fraud or mistalte by reason 
of which the contract, subsequently drawn by the seller, did not conform to the agreement. Edgeller v. Johnston, 
74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006; Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal.2d 456,224 P.2d 691; Crook v. Leinenweaver, 100 
Cal.App. 2d 790,224 P.2d 891; Rahlves Rahlves, Inc., v. Ainbort, 118 Cal.App.2d 465,258 P.2d 18. 1161 
- 
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[6-81 As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such an agreed boundary would also be binding upon a 
successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement. The boundary, which defendants 
claim, was clearly marked by "a tight board fence", four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants' side 
of the fence was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would constitute notice to an intending purchaser, of 
defendants' possession. One buying property in the possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of 
title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal. Nanpa & 
Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75; Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132,241 P.2d 333; Waltrip v. 
Cathcart, 207 Okl. 404, 250 P.2d 43; J. R. Garrett Co. v. States, 3 Cal.2d 379,44 P.2d 538; Marlenee 
-,*". Page 118 "----,- -. 
v. Brown, Cal.App., 128 P.2d 137; Three Sixty Five Club v. Shostak, 104 Cal.App.2d 735,232 P.2d 546; 55 
Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 712; 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, § 1012. Moreover, plaintiff Paurley 
testified in effect that he saw the fence and knew of defendants' occupancy of the disputed area before he 
contracted to buy the south half. If such facts are sufficiently established, the plaintiffs would not be innocent 
purchasers, and their rights would be subject to the same defense available against their grantor. 
We find no merit in other assignments made. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellallts 
PORTER, C. J., and THOMAS, J., concur. 
KEETON, Justice (dissenting). 
The fact that the plaintiff Paurley saw the fence now claimed by defendants to be the boundary line dividing 
the land would not in my opinion put the plaintiffs on inquiry as to the agreement, if there were one, between 
the common grantors and defendants as to what the true boundary line should be. In other words the boundary 
fence claimed by defendants to be the boundary would not in itself be sufficient to establish knowledge of 
plaintiffs that an agreement as to the boundary line existed, if it did. The fence alone would not establish the 
hue line dividing conterminous properties. 
In Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, the boundary line in dispute was not only uncertain, 
but it could not be, and was not, determined with certainty. Hence, this court held that the agreed boundary 
controlled. Such is not true here. The true line in dispute in the present situation could be, and was, established. 
Hence, I think the judgment should be affirmed. 
BECKWITH, District Judge (dissenting). 
Reluctantly, but most earnestly, do I dissent. The facts contained in the majority opinion are sufficient for 
this dissent, with this additional notation. The agreement between Mrs. Fenell and the defendants was made 
June 30, 1947. Harris built the fence about August of 1947. The complaint was filed December 4, 1950 (thee 
years, six months). 
For sixty-three years this court has consistently maintained and supported the rule that a boundary line 
established by agreement by conterminous owners, followed by acquiescence and possession for the full 
statutory period of time required to acquire title by prescription, operates to establish the true line of the 
respective estates. Idaho Land Co. v. Parsons, 3 Idaho, Hasb., 
Page $19 -------- 
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450,31 P. 791; Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066; O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P. 797; 
Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366; Woll v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569, 85 P.2d 679; Mulder v. Stands, 71 
Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller, v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006. 
Conversely, that such an agreement existing for only two years and four days, does not make the line so 
established binding or conclusive upon owners of land abutting thereon. Woodland v. Hodson, 28 Idaho 45, 152 
P. 205, cited with approval in Carnpbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052. 
While Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, decided in 1952, and upon which a majority opinion rests, announced a 
new rule, that where a buyer and seller agree and mark the boundary, the line thus fixed controls the courses and 
distances set out in the deed subsequently executed to effectuate the division agreed upon. While the rule as 
announced does not require any lapse of time by acquiescence therein by the parties, the court in this case 
leaves no doubt that there must be, in addition to the agreement, an acquiescence by the parties for in explaining 
the rule the court says there must be both an agreement to fix the boundary, and that the seller must acquiesce 
therein for a considerable period of time to be estopped, and what has been said of acquiescence by the seller is 
not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence alone for the period involved would be sufficient to 
establish title by "acquiescence", but that the seller's acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the 
agreement. All of the authorities cited in the majority opinion to support the above rules of law were cases 
involving a period of acquiescence for more than five years, our statutory period of time required to establish a 
prescriptive right, $5 5-207 and 5-210, I.C., except the case of Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P. 2d 
772, in which the line was established four years, m~d Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308, 
where the line was established for a like period of four years, which cases were decided on the rule that where 
the property is improved to such an extent that a substantial loss would result if the position of the line was 
changed, both parties would be estopped to have the line changed, which are not the facts in this suit. Appeal of 
Moore, 173 ICan. 820,252 P.2d 875, where the line had been established for seven years, the court in citing 
Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607,75 P. 1019, a case where the line had been established for fourteen years, 
did announce the rule that where the parties agreed and acquiesced in an established line, even though the 
period of acquiescence falls short of the time fixed by the statute for gaining title by adverse possession, it 
becomes an established line. All of the authorities cited by the majority opinion on these rules support this 
dissent rather than the majority opinion. 
--- -* Page 120 ----- 
The court has by the language used in the opinion in announcing the above rules, namely, where seller 
acquiesced therein for a considerableperiod of time, and that "seller's acquiescence is merely regarded as 
competent evidence of the agreement", has for all effects overruled all of the cases of this court for the past 
sixty-three years, which required agreement followed by acquiescence for at least five years to estop either 
party, including Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006, decided November 3, 1953, which 
corrected the error in Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, by re-establishing the former 
precedent. In effect the court announces that henceforth three years, six months of acquiescence is a 
considerable period of time, sufficient to estop one of the parties from ejecting the other. 
The only reason to incorporate such a phrase in the opinion as "who acquiesced therein for a considerable 
period of time" (emphasis added), was to leave the law so flexible that it would take care of any future 
conditions and it most certainly will, because it destroys all security of real property titles in Idaho, and malces 
chaos, uncertainty and confusion, concerning real property interests, the law in Idaho. Such a phrase is relative 
only and indefinite in itself, because to the very young time passes very slowly, while to those who have 
reached that stage in life where the mental and physical faculties begin to slow down, time passes with ever 
increasing rapidity, hence what may constitute a considerable period of time, depends entirely upon the outloolc 
of the individuals involved, unless it is established by this court that a considerable period oftime must 
logically mean five years, as set forth in our statutes of limitations, to establish title by prescriptive rights, which 
rule was so definitelv established in Kesler v. Ellis. 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366, wherein the court said: 
- .  
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"* * * it is but logical to say that such acquiescence must continue for a period of not less than 
five years, thus conforming to the period established by the statute of limitations in cases of adverse 
possession." At page 744 of 47 Idaho, at page 367 of 278 P. 
The opinion sets forth no guidance for the trial courts, and no indication of what this court will hold to be a 
considerable period of time necessary to establish estoppel by acquiescence in fi~ture litigation of this nature. It 
has always been, and I venture to say still is, the prerogative of a trial judge to exclude all incompetent evidence 
from a case, The trial court was correct in excluding from evidence any and all offered testimony regarding the 
oral contract and acquiescence of the parties, first, for the reason that the contract being oral and made prior to 
the execution of the contract to purchase by defendants, is merged in that instrument, and hence, any 
such evidence is incompetent, as held by the court. Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058, 
and authorities cited in the majority opinion on this point. Secondly, such an agreement would constitute an 
attempt to convey land by an oral agreement in violation of our statute of frauds, and would in itself be void. 
Kunkle v. Clinkingbeard, 66 Idaho 493, 162 P.2d 892, based on the long established precedent of this court that 
in order to effect an estoppel, the agreement coupled to the acquiescence, must have existed for five full years. 
Because the trial court did not base the exclusion of this evidence on the last-mentioned ground, is in itself no 
reason for reversing the judgment, because this court in arriving at a correct solution of the case, which agrees 
with the erroneous conciusio~~ reached by the trial court, will affirm such judgment. Glander v. Glander, 72 
Idaho 195, 239 P.2d 254. What has been said of the evidence in this case is lilcewise applicable to the pleadings 
and the motion to strike portions of the answer. The entire answer, including those portions excluded, does not 
plead any defense, by estoppel, or otherwise, to this action, under the long-established rule of law above set 
forth. Therefore, the matters excluded in the answer are not sufficient as a defense, neither would any evidence 
of acquiescence during the period involved be competent evidence to prove estoppel against the plaintiffs, 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
--- ------ 
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Michael G. COX and Jennifer Cox, husband and wife, Terry Maupin and Mindy Maupin, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, v. Peggy CLANTON, Thelma Anderson, and Teresa Kruseli, married 
women dealing with their sole and separate property, Defendants-Counterclaimants-Third Party Complainants- 
Respondents. v. Deelane Maupin, and Justin Maupin and Jane Doe Maupin, husband and wife, Third Party 
Defendants-Appellants. 
[Cite as Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 4921 
Supreme Court of Idaho 
Boise, May 2002 Term 
No. 27020. 
July 2,2002. 
Neighbors filed quiet title action against title holders, alleging theories of boundary by agreement and 
boundary by acquiescence. The District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Jefferson County, Brent J. Moss, J., 
quieted title in title holders. Neighbors appealed. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., held that no express or 
implied agreement to heat barbed-wire fence as a boundary existed. 
Affirmed. 
Just Law Office, Idaho Falls, for appellants. Chales C. Just argued. 
Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen & Hoopes PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Teresa L. Sturm argued. 
KIDWELL, Justice. 
The Coxes and the Maupins purchased property and made improvements upon land they believed they 
owned. A subsequent survey of the property revealed that the appellants did not own the land; the respondents 
held title to the disputed property. The appellants filed a quiet title action, and the district court quieted title in 
the respondents. The appellants appeal. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs bought parcels of land in separate purchases hom Merlin Sharp (Sharp). Terry and Mindy 
Maupin purchased land from Sharp in December of 1998; the Coxes' purchase occurred in February of 1999. 
Sharp had acquired the land fiom his parents in 1996, and his parents apparently had acquired it from Julius 
Carsten who owned it for approximately thirteen years. The plaintiffs were given recorded deeds to the 
property 
The defendants received their property by a recorded deed on May 11, 1999, fiom their mother, Nina 
Anderson. Nina and her husband Warren owned the land since 1956, acquiring it from Martin Anderson. In 
1967, Warren hastiIy erected a fence on their property to contain cattle. It is in substantially the same condition 
as it was then, consisting of evenly-spaced steel fence posts with three or four strands of barbed wire connecting 
them, and is still used to contain cattle. After observing the property, the district court determined 
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on either side of the fence was "indistinguishable." 
The plaintiffs believed that the fence represented the boundary between the properties. Acting under that 
belief, they graded and graveled a road, bridged a canal, removed trees, and dug a trench in which power and 
cable lines were placed. These improvements were made in conjunction with the construction of two homes, 
one for Terry's brother, DeeLane Maupin, and one for DeeLane's son, Justin Maupin. Only after having the land 
surveyed did the plaintiffs realize that the fence did not represent the boundary line contained in the recorded 
deeds, and that the improvements had been made on land they did not own. 
The plaintiffs notified the defendants of the problem; prior to that, the defendants were unaware of any 
improvements on the land because they rented the land to ranchers. The parties were unable to reach a 
compromise on the approximately one-acre strip of land in dispute, and plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title. 
The defendants counterclaimed and filed a third party complaint against DeeLane, Justin, and his family for 
trespass, conversion, and to quiet title. Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment supported by 
briefs and affidavits. Plaintiffs argued that the boundary line should be the fence line, based on the theories of 
boundary by acquiescence, boundary by agreement, adverse possession, or estoppel. Defendants argued that the 
boundary lines in all of the recorded deeds should stand, and that the elements required for the above-mentioned 
theories were not established. Nina testified as to the circumstances surroundiig the erection of the fence, 
stating that the fence was put up hastily to contain cattle. She stated that she and her family had used the land 
outside the fenced land and had not treated it as a boundary to the property. She further stated that there was 
never an agreement or acquiescence on her part with former neighboring predecessors in interest to change the 
boundary lines provided in the recorded deeds. 
On August 8,2000, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court 
found no evidence in the record of an agreement or acquiescence between the parties or their predecessors in 
interest to treat the fence as a common boundary. The court found that the plaintiffs had not established the 
required elements of the theory of boundary by agreement or boundary by acquiescence. Appellants filed this 
timely appeal on October 20,2000. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." 
Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Sew., 136 Idaho 835,838,41 P.3d 263,266 (2002) (citing S. Gr@n 
Constu., Inc, v. City oflewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). Where the facts are undisputed 
and the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict 
between those inferences." Id 
ANALYSIS 
A. The District Court Did Not Err By Pid ing  That Appellants Had Not Established Boundary By 
Agreement Or Boundary By Acquiescence. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred by quieting title in the respondents. Their position is based 
on the premise that the theories of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence are different, but 
related theories. Although Idaho case law treats the two theories interchangeably, appellants respectf 1 ssgsl YIbb 
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that the two theories should be separate, as they each have different necessary elements. The appellants cite to 
treatises and cases from other jurisdictions to support their position that acquiescence should not he considered 
an element of boundary by agreement. The appellants urge this Court to recognize boundary by acquiescence as 
a separate theory because public policy has caused a shift away from the necessity of an agreement and towards 
more equitable concepts such as good faith and fair dealing. Appellants argue they have established boundary 
by acquiescence based on the facts that the fence had been erected in 1967 and had not been moved since that 
time, and that the appellants and their predecessors in interest had all believed the fence to be the boundary. 
Additionally, appellants contend that they have also met the requirements for boundary by agreement under 
current Idaho case law. 
"In Idaho, the phrase 'boundary by acquiescence' is often used interchangeably with 'boundary by 
agreement,' although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine." Grgel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,400, 
34 P.3d 1080,1083 (2001) (citing Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,950 P.2d 1237 (1997)). "To prove 
boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and 
conduct of the parties." Id. (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990); Edgeller v. 
Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953)). "[Tlhe long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, 
in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that 
the fence was located as a boundary by agreement." Cameron, 130 Idaho at 901,950 P.2d at 1240 (citing 
Beneficial Life Ins Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830,835 (1954)). "Acquiescence is merely 
regarded as competent evidence of the agreement." Grflel, 136 Idaho at 400,34 P.3d at 1083 (citing Paurley v. 
Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117,268 P.2d 351 (1954)). "[Aln agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or 
implied, is essential to a claim of boundary by acquiescence." Id. at 401, 34 P.3d at 1084 (citation omitted). 
In the present case, the district court found that, prior to the survey, none of the parties or their predecessors 
in interest knew the exact location of the boundary lines. Al$ough,the ,.st:. .. z... . first element necessary to prove . 
boundary by agreement was met, the district court found that there was no evidence in the record to supportthe 
appellants1 contention that the fence line constituted a subsequent agreement or acquiescence by the parties or 
that there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances of the fence's original location. In fact, the 
opposite was true-a previous owner, Nina, provided evidence of the circumstances surrounding the erection a f  
the fence, which demonstrated that the fence was hastily-put up to contain cattle. Her testimony showed that the 
purpose of the fence was not to establish a boundary between the properties. She stated that no agreement 
existed between the Anderson family and the neighboring landowners to treat the fence line as the boundary. 
Appellants urge this Court to adopt the theory of boundary by acquiescence as a separate theory that does 
not require the element of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates that an agreement, either 
express or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although the actual 
boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the existence of an express or implied agreement to 
treat the fence as the boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the time they were making the 
improvements, the fence was still being used to contain cattle; appellants knew this because they damaged the 
fence while working, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified that her family used the land outside the fence to 
access recreation areas and that her family never treated the fence as the boundary to the property. Affidavits 
from predecessors in interest submitted by the appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement to 
treat the fence as a boundary. 
The district court found that the appellants had not established that an express or implied agreement existed 
or that the parties or their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence representing the boundary 
between the properties. We affxm the district court's decision. 
B. The Parties Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant To 1.C.s~ 12-120(3) or 12-121. 
All of the parties have requested attorney fees on appeal. The appellants have requested attorney fees on 
appeal pursuant to LC. s 12-121. The respondents have requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant 
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120(3) or 12-121. 
An award under I.C. s 12-120(3) is justified only if a "commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of 
the lawsuit." Browev v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). In 
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 13 1 Idaho 657,663,962 P.2d 1041,1047 (1998), this Court 
declined to award attorney fees under LC. s 12-120(3). Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. involved a dispute 
over ownership of real property, and this Court held that it did not "fall within the meaning of a commercial 
transaction ...." Id. This case minors Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are 
not awarded to the respondents under s 12-120(3). 
An award of attorney fees under I.C. s 12-121 is proper only when the case was brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Northwest Bec-Corp. v. Home Living Sewice, 136 Idaho 835, 842,41 P.3d 
263,270 (2002) (citing Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,630, 903 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1995)). The 
appellants' argument was based on their good-faith belief that the fence line represented the boundary line 
between the properties. Their position that boundary by agreement and by acquiescence are two separate, yet 
related, doctrines was supported by case law and treatises. This Court is not left with the abiding belief that the 
appellants pursued their claim frivolously or without foundation. Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are not 
awarded to the respondents under I.C. s 12-121. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have not established the required elements of boundary by agreement. This Court affirms the 
decision of the district court quieting title in the respondents. No attorney fees on appeal are awarded. Costs to 
respondents. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SCHROEDER, WALTERS and EISMANN concur. 
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Joe HERRMANN and Thelma Herrmann, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, v. 
Arthur A. WOODELL and Neola L. Woodell, husband and wife; James A. Scharfe and Felipa M. Scharfe, 
husband and wife; Herbert T. Kerst, a single man; and, Jack K. Trine and Norma Trone, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
[Cite as Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 9161 
No. 15067. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
January 3, 1985. 
Landowners brought quiet title action to establish that existing fence was boundary line between their property 
and property owned by neighbors. The First Judicial District Court, Bonner County, Gary M. Haman, J., entered 
judgnient quieting title in landowners, and neighbors appealed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: 
(1) evidence was insufficient to establish that landowners paid taxes assessed upon disputed strip of property, 
and thus, they did not acquire such property by adverse possession; (2) evidence which indicated that 
landowners and their predecessors used land up to fence at least since 1927, and which was inconclusive as to 
whether road ever ran outside of fence and whether fence was used as barrier to road, supported finding of 
acquiescence in fence as boundary line, establishing an unrefuted presumption that boundary agreement had to 
have taken place at some point in past; (3) neighbors were placed on notice of agreed boundary by fence 
marking boundary, with land on landowners' side of fence being grazed and cultivated; thus, line marked by 
fence constituted lawful boundary; (4) actions of landowners or their predecessors was insufficient to invoke 
doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel or waiver; and (5) landowners would not be granted equitable 
relief by requiring neighbors to either replace or to pay for replacement of fence. 
Affirmed. 
Steven C. Verby, Sandpoint, for defendants-appellants, cross-respondents. 
Steve Smith, Sandpoint, for plaintiffs-respondents, cross-appellants. 
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WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This is an appeal involving a dispute over title to a strip of land. The Herrmanns brought a quiet title action 
to establish that an existing fence is the boundary line between their property and property owned by the 
Woodells and the other appellants. The Herrmanns based their claim of ownership of the disputed property, an 
approximate eighteen-foot wide strip of land on the west side of the fence, on adverse possession or, 
alternatively, on agreed boundary by acquiescence. The district court entered judgment quieting title in the 
Herrmanns. The Woodells, and the other appellants who claimed legal title to portions of the disputed strip, 
I169 
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have appealed. They primarily question whether the finding by the trial court-that the Herrmanns were owners 
of the disputed property under the theories of adverse possession and boundary by agreement-is supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. While we agree that the trial court erred in finding that all of the elements of 
adverse possession were established, we affirm the trial court's decision establishing the Herrmanns' ownership 
based on boundary by acquiescence or implied agreement. 
The relevant facts are as follows. The parties stipulated that for at least twenty-five years before this action 
was brought there existed in the same location a fence between the property possessed by the Herrmanns and 
the property possessed by the appellants. In December, 1963, the Herrmanns had purchased a 160 acre parcel 
described by division of quarter sections rather than by metes and bounds, the description being: 
The east half of the southwest quarter and the south one-half of the northwest quarter of section 29, 
Township 56 North, Range 2 West of the Boise-Meridian, in Bonner County, Idaho. 
In 1975, the Herrmanns filed a plat for the Herrmann Subdivision which included approximately 120 of their 
160 acres. A road was constructed to serve the subdivision. Excluded from this subdivision plat was the 
Herrmanns' tract of approximately forty acres lying west of the proposed subdivision. Also excluded was the 
disputed strip of land between the east edge of the subdivision road and the fence. When the Herrmanns formed 
the subdivision they were advised by their surveyor that the quarter section line bisecting section twenty-nine 
from north to south, and which had been thought to be the fence line, was actually approximately eighteen feet 
west of the fence. Mr. Henmann testified that he disagreed with the surveyed boundary line but decided to 
utilize the surveyed metes and bounds description for the subdivision plat filing and retain the land between the 
surveyed line and the fence as a "buffer zone" for the subdivision. Subsequently, the Woodells, after obtaining 
the preliminary results of their own survey of the disputed boundary, tore down portions of the fence in an 
effort to gain access to the Herrmann subdivision road. 
[I] The Woodells and the other appellants-contending they are the title holders of the disputed property- 
assert that the trial court's finding that the Herrmanns had established ownership of the disputed property by 
adverse possession is not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The trial court found that the 
Herrmanns met the burden of proof on the non-tax and the tax elements of adverse possession. Our review of 
the record convinces us that the court's findings regarding the non-tax elements are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. However, the evidence is insufficient to establish that the tax requirement of I.C. 5 5-210 
had been satisfied. This section requires the adverse claimant to have paid taxes assessed upon the property 
claimed by adverse possession. 
The record establishes that the Herrmanns paid all taxes assessed against their described property. As noted, 
the Herrmanns' property is described as the east half of the southwest quarter and the south one-half of the 
northwest quarter of section 29. The problem arises from the fact that the county assessor's records have never 
shown the eighteen-foot strip to 
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be part of the property assessed to the Herrmanns. Rather those records show the disputed property is part of 
land described as the northeast and southeast quarters of section 29. A deputy county assessor testified that 
taxes on the disputed strip were not assessed to the Herrmanns, rather, the taxes were assessed to the owners of 
the property to the east, which would have been the Woodells and the other appellants and their predecessors- 
in-interest. 
There is no evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found that the Herrmanns actually 
paid taxes assessed against the disputed property. Therefore, adverse possession is not available to the 
Hel~manns because the Woodells and their predecessors-in-interest, who have record title, were assessed the 
taxes on the disputed strip. 
-, 
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[2-41 However, the trial court also quieted title in the Herrmanns under a theory of "boundary by implied 
agreement." The doctrine of boundary by agreement does not require payment of taxes as a prerequisite. 
Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527,633 P.2d 592 (1981). The doctrine of boundary by agreement requires that 
there be a dispute, uncertainty or ignorance of the true boundary line which was resolved by an agreement 
establishing the boundary that would be recognized. See Norwood v. Stevens, 104 Idaho 44,655 P.2d 938 
(Ct.App. 1982). The existence of an agreement relating to a boundary must be established. Such an agreement 
could be established by direct evidence, or could be inferred from the conduct of the parties or their 
predecessors, includ'mg long acquiescence in an existing fence line. O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P. 
797 (1928); 12 Am.Jur.2d BOUNDARIES § 88 (1964); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. 
WNITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 768-69 (1984) (hereinafter referred to as "the Law of Property"). In 
this case, there is no direct evidence of an agreement resolving a dispute, uncertainty or ignorance over the true 
boundary, The evidence indicates that the fence has been in existence for so many years that there are no 
witnesses available to establish that an actual agreement to fix an unknown or uncertain boundary line occurred. 
15-81 However, "[s]uch an agreement may be presumed to arise between adjoining landowners where such 
right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or other monument on the line followed by such 
adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such length of time that neither ought to be allowed 
to deny the correctness of its location." Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953) 
(citations omitted). Further, "[qrom the long existence and recognition of the original fence as the boundary, 
and the want of any evidence as to the nlanner or circumstances of its original location, the law presumes that it 
was originally located as a boundary by agreement ...." Benejcial Lije Znsumce Company v. Mrakamatsu, 75 
Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979); Baum v Defa, 
525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, the period of acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the 
agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 351 (1954). In addition, a specific time period of 
acquiescence is not required. Trappett v. Davis, supra. In this case, there is no evidence presented as to who 
constructed the fence or what function the fence was originally to serve. Acquiescence can then be relied upon 
to show that a settlement agreement must have taken place sometime in the past and was memorialized by the 
placement of the fence. McKinney v. Kull, 118 Cal.App.3d 951,173 Cal.Rptr. 696 (1981); Kraemer v Superior 
Oil Co., 204 Cal.App.2d 642,49 Cal.Rptr. 869 (1966). 
[9] There is substantial evidence that the Woodells and their predecessors-in-interest acquiesced for many 
years in the fence line being the boundary line. One of the Woodells' predecessors-in-interest testified that he 
considered the fence to be the boundary line between the two adjacent properties when he purchased the 
property 
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in 1951. Evidence was introduced showing that the State Highway Department had placed brass cap 
monuments along the fence line. These brass cap monuments were used in subsequent deeds concerning the 
property to describe the boundary line between the southwest and southeast quarters of section 29. Further, the 
Herrmanns and their predecessors had possessed, cultivated and grazed the land up to the fence. A witness for 
the Hemanns testified that in 1927 and 1928, when he and his father leased the land, which is now owned by 
the Herrmanns, they grew hay and grazed horses right up to the fence line. In addition, the evidence indicates 
that the Woodells made no claims to the disputed property until the survey was completed. See Sorenson v. 
Knott, 320 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa App.1982); Hausner v. Melia, 212 Neb. 764,326 N.W.2d 31 (1982) (for a 
discussion of acquiescence) and cases collected at 7 A.L.R.4th 53 (1981). 
[lo] The Woodells claim the disputed property was once a road open to public use. Based on this assertion, 
they contend the fence was constructed by their predecessors-in-interest in order to keep animals from the 
roadway. This implies that the fence was erected as a barrier and not as a boundary to divide the adjacent 
properties. Therefore, if this assertion were proven, the presumption of an agreement would be overcome and a 
boundary by implied agreement or acquiescence could not be found. The Law of Property, supra, 769 n. 36. In 
support of this assertion, tile Woodells introduced into evidence a warranty deed, dated in 1914, which 1176  
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conveyed the property in question. The deed resefied a right-of-way in the general location of the disputed 
property for roadway purposes. The Woodells further introduced into evidence a photograph taken in 1935 
purporting to show a road along the disputed property. Another witness testified that there was a two-track road 
on the west side of the fence during the summers of 1948 and 1949, but knew nothing about such a road beyond 
those two summers. 
[ll] However, on cross-examination, the witness who testified as to the 1935 photograph declared that 
because of the scale of the photograph he was unable to see a fence line adjacent to the purported roadway and 
was, therefore, unable to testify as to the location of the roadway. In addition, a witness for the Herrmanns 
disputed the presence of such a road. He testified that in 1927 and 1928 when he and his father leased the land, 
which is now owned by the Hemnanns, there was no road. Further, there was no evidence to show that the area 
of the purported roadway had not been plowed and cultivated in the years prior to 1934 or after 1949. The trial 
judge found from the evidence presented that the Woodells had failed to establish that the road was actually 
constructed or the location of the purported road. We will not disturb this finding. The evidence of any road 
running along the west side of the fence is inconclusive. Therefore, we hold that the evidence supports a finding 
of acquiescence. This acquiescence establishes a presumption, not refuted in this case, that a boundary 
agreement must have taken place at some point in the past. The Law of Property, supra. 
[12,13] An agreed boundary is binding upon a successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice 
of the agreement. PaurZey v. Harris, supra. A boundary marked by a fence, with the land on the Herrmanns' 
side of the fence being grazed and cultivated would constitute notice. Mr. Woodell testified that he walked all 
over the property and noticed the barbed wire fence. Therefore, the Woodells were on notice of the agreed 
boundary. Accordingly, we hold in this case that the line marked by the fence constitutes the lawful boundary 
between the adjacent properties according to the doctrine of boundary by agreement. 
[14J The Woodells finally contend that the trial court erred by failing to apply the equitable doctrines of 
laches, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and waiver. It is claimed that since the FIerrmanns did not include the 
disputed eighteen-foot strip of 
property in their subdivision plat they cannot now claim legal title to it. It should first be noted that the defense 
of laches was raised for the first time on appeal, therefore, we will not consider it. Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 
Idaho 147,676 P.2d 722 (Ct.App.1984). See I.R.C.P. 8(c). 
[15-171 For equitable estoppel to apply, the Herrmanns must have made a false representation or 
concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 
719,662 P.2d 1163 (Ct.App.1983). For quasi-estoppel to be applicable, the Herrmanns must have previously 
taken an inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and their rights, to the detriment of the Woodells. 
KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,486 P.2d 992 (1971). Finally, for waiver to apply the Henmanns must 
have voluntarily and intentionally relinquished their title to the disputed property and the Woodells must have 
acted in reliance upon such a waiver and altered their position. Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 73 1, 639 P.2d 
429 (1981). 
1181 However, no evidence was presented to establish these claims. The record indicates that the Herrmams' 
actioils were consistent and gave actual, objective notice of their continued claim to the disputed property. In 
fact the transcript shows that the Woodells met with the H e n m m s  in an attempt to purchase an easement 
through the disputed properly. This indicates the Woodells were aware that the Henmanns claimed title to the 
disputed property. The record does not present evidence of any false representations, inconsistent conduct or 
relinquishment of title to the disputed property by the Hemnanns. They grazed and cultivated the disputed 
property, they maintained the fence and, on the subdivision plat, they made a notation of a five-foot buffer zone 
around the subdivision. From our examination of the record, we find no allegations of conduct on the part of the 
Herrmanns or their predecessors sufficient to invoke the doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel or 
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waiver. See Curry v. Ada Counly Highway Districf, 103 Idaho 818,654 P.2d 911 (1982) 
[19,20] The Henmanns have cross-appealed the district court's failure to grant damages or other relief for 
h e  Woodells' destruction of part of the fence. However, the Herrmanns' original complaint did not allege that 
the Woodells caused the damage to the fei~ce. The trial judge refused to allow a motion to amend the complaint 
at the start of the trial. The Henmanns now request our Court to afford the Hemmanns an equitable remedy by 
requiring the Woodells either to replace, or to pay for the replacement of, the fence. Equitable relief should not 
be invoked to shape a decree which was not reasonably coilternplated by the parties and which involves a 
substantial departure from the pleadings and legal theories relied upon by the parties. Shumate v. Robinson, 52 
Or.App. 199,627 P.2d 1295 (1981). Therefore, we will not grant equitable relief in this matter. 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents, Herrmann. No attorney fees on appeal 
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur. 
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Margaret J. PERSUN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene J. FAVREAU and Ellen M. Favreau, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Persyn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 1541 
No. 18097, 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
November 1,1990. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1990. 
Petition for Review Denied Feb. 6, 1991. 
Property owner brought quiet title action based on a claim of adverse possession. The District Court of the First 
Judicial District, Bonner County, James R. Michaud, J., entered judgment dismissing action, and plaintiff 
appealed, The Court of Appeals, Swanstrom, J., held that: (1) adverse claim to disputed area was not "founded 
upon a written instrument" within meaning of statute goveming adverse possession claims based on written 
instruments; (2) fence did not constitute a "substantial enclosure" under statute governing oral claims of adverse 
possession; and (3) actions of plaintiffs predecessor in clearing brush from fence area and maintaining fence, 
and any actions by plaintiff thereafter, were insufficient to be considered "improvement" as required by adverse 
possession statute. 
Affirmed. 
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Coolte, Lananna, Smith & Cogswell, Priest River, for plaintiff-appellant. Thomas E. Cooke argued. 
Philip Henry Robinson, Sandpoint, for defendants-respondents. 
S WANSTROM, Judge. 
This appeal followed the dismissal of Margaret Persyn's quiet title action by the district court. The court 
held that the elements of adverse possession had not been proven and concluded that a fence line, which was 
alleged to be the easterly boundary of Persyn's property, did not establish the hue boundary of Persyn's 
property. We affirm. 
Persyn contends that the district court applied the wrong statute, I.C. 8 5-210, in analyzing the requirements 
for adverse possession. Therefore, we must determine whether Persyn's claim of adverse possession properly is 
under an oral claim or if it is a claim under a written instrument which is governed by I.C. § 5-208.(fnl) 
Asserting that LC. $ 5-208 is the applicable statute in this case, Persyn raises three subsidiary questions. First, 
are the elements of LC. § 5-208 to be read in the disjunctive so that proof of one element is sufficient to prove 
possession? Second, has possession by Persyn under I.C. § 5-208 been proven? Third, did the Favreaus have 
notice of a1 adverse claim and, therefore have a duty to inquire into the nature of the claim when they 
purchased the adjoining property? We conclude that the district court's choice of I.C. 5 5-210 was correct. Our 
reasons are as follows 
- 
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The parties own adjacent parcels of real estate located in Bonner County, Idaho. The Persyl property lies to 
the west of the Favreau property. For approximately twenty-four years, a fence existed on what Persyn claims is 
the east boundary of her property. The disputed property, a strip varying in width between five and twenty-two 
feet on the west side of the fence line, is the subject of Persyn's quiet title action. 
The Persyns purchased their property in 1979 from Wilbur and Carolee Merritt, who had acquired the 
property from Willie Hoop. The adjacent property was owned by Bonner County until 1980, when the County 
conveyed the property to Connolly, who sold to the Favreaus in 1983. When Persyn's husband attempted to 
replace some of the fenceposts in 1984, he was told by the Favreaus that he was on their property. Mrs. Persyn- 
who succeeded to her husband's interest-filed suit shortly after this incident, claiming title to the property up to 
the fence line. 
[I] Persyn argued that she took title to the disputed propexty pursuant to a written instrument, callillg I.C. $ 
5-208 into play. She cites Gage v. Davis, 104 Idaho 48,655 P.2d 942 (Ct.App.1982), in support of her 
argument. In Gage, the adverse claimant's deed contained a description of the disputed strip, as did the deed of 
the other party who opposed the claim. Unlike Gage, here, there is no overlap of the descriptions of the two 
deeds. Persyn's deed describes a parcel in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of section 34. The 
Favreaus' property is described as being in the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of section 34. As 
described in the deeds, the two parcels share a common boundary: a segment of the line between the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter. A recorded survey, over 
which there is no dispute, establishes the location of this line. Thus, the Favreaus' deed description includes the 
disputed strip but Persyn's deed description does not. The record reflects only that Persyn was told by her 
predecessor in title (Merritt) that her property extended east to the fence. Merritt too had been told, when he 
acquired the property from Willie Hoop, that he was getting the property up to the fence. Upon these facts the 
district court concluded that Persyn's claim of title by adverse possession must meet the requirements of LC. $ 
5-210. We agree. 
A party claiming title by adverse possession may rely upon a written instrument as being "a conveyance of 
the property in question." I.C. $ 5-207; I.C. $5-208. "[Illowever inadequate [such a conveyance may be] to 
carry the true title to such property, and however incompetent might have been the power of the grantor in such 
conveyance to pass a title to the subject thereof, yet a claim asserted under the provisions of such a deed is 
strictly a claim under color of title." Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 50, 54, 15 L.Ed. 280 (1856). In 
reviewing the evidence before the court below, there is no assertion that Persyn's deed purports to convey the 
disputed triangular piece of property. Nevertheless, Persyn's counsel contends that simply because Persyn held a 
deed for property adjacent to-but not including-the disputed parcel, the analysis under I.C. 5 5-208 was 
appropriate. We disagree. 
A comparison of the two statutes which define the distinct claims of title for adverse possession may be 
helpful at this point. Idaho Code $ 5-208, a claim under a written instrument, and LC. $ 5-210, possession under 
an oral claim, have remained virtually intact since their adoption into the 1881 Idaho Code of Civil Procedure. 
The precursor and source of these statutes was the 1872 California Code of Civil Procedure, $ 323 and $ 325 
respectively. 
The Supreme Court of California in Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 Cal. 154 (1866) distinguished between adverse 
possession founded upon a "color of title" and that founded upon a "claim of title." 
Adverse possession is of different kinds: First, where the possession is taken by bow and spear 
without color of title, but with the intent to claim the fee exclusive of any other right and to hold it 
against all comers ...; second, where the possession is taken under a claim of title 
- 
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founded upon a written instrument, as a conveyance, or upon the decree ofjudgment ol'a Court of competent 
jurisdiction. Tlie first is sufficient to put the Statute of Limitations in motion, and, at the expiration of five years, 
vest in the usurper a right, under the statute which is equivalent to title; but until the statute has run he is as to 
the true owner a inere intruder, without right. It cannot be said in any just sense that as between him and the true 
owner a case of conflicting titles is presented until the statute has run; or that until then there can be, as between 
them, any substantial contest as to the title. But as to the other, or second kind of adverse possession, the case is 
otherwise. There the possession is accompanied by at least a colorable title, and an actual and substantial 
contest as to the title must arise whenever the party out of possession undertakes to assert his rights in any kind 
of action, for they occupy the position of coilflicting claimants as to the true title, and not as to the possession 
only. 
Id. at 159. 
We conclude that Persyn's claim to the disputed triangular area west of the fence is not "founded upon a 
written instrument" within the meaning of I.C. 5 5-208, because no written instrument purports to give her 
actual title to or color of title to the disputed strip. Although the district court made no such specific finding, it 
implied the same by proceeding to examine the elements of adverse possession under LC. 8 5-210. 
[2] We now hun to the question whether the elements of adverse possession under 8 5-210 were proven by 
Persyn. The statutory requirements of adverse possession must be established by clear and satisfactory 
evidence. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P.2d 896 (1984). In reviewing the district court's findings, then, 
our standard of review is one of clear error, absent which we will not disturb the findings. Gage v. Davis, supra. 
[3] The district judge held that the fence did not constitute a substantial enclosure under I.C. 5 5-210(1). He 
was persuaded that the fence had not been erected by Persyn or Persyn's grantors and that its purpose never was 
to enclose any part of Persyn's property. See Loornis v. Union Paczj?c Railroad Company, 97 Idaho 341,544 
P.2d 299 (1975); Sclzutten v. Beck, 757 P.2d 1139 (Colo.App.1988). When the County owned the property now 
belongiilg to the Favreaus, the County permitted an employee to erect the fence to contain the employee's 
horses within the property owned by the County. At no time was the fence regarded as the boundary between 
the two parcels. 
[4] The district judge also ruled that the actions of Persyn's predecessor in clearing brush from the fence 
area and maintaining the fence up until 1979, and any actions by Persyn thereafter, were insufficient to be 
considered "improvement" as required by I.C. 5 5-210(2). Finally, the district judge concluded that neither 
Persyn nor her predecessors "in any way indicated an open and notorious hostile intent which brought home to 
the [Favreaus] or their predecessors in title that [Persyn] was claiming title to the real estate in dispute." 
[5,6] We hold that the decision of the district court was well reasoned and founded upon sufficient 
evidence. The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the party seeking 
title thereunder. Berg, supra at 443,690 P.2d at 899. Furlher, under LC. § 5-210, the claimant must either 
substantially enclose the property or cultivate or improve the property to meet the requirements of adverse 
possession. Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 624 P.2d 413 (1981). We agree that Persyn failed in her proof of 
adverse possession of the disputed area, satisfying neither the enclosure element nor the improvement element. 
The last issue raised by Persyn was essentially one of notice. Persyn contended that the existence of the 
fence line imparted notice of an adverse claim, such that when the Favreaus bought the property in 1983, they 
had a duty to inquire as to the extent of such claim because the fence line 
was not on the survey line. The disbict courl made a finding that after 1979, the fence fell into disrepair, with 
much of the barbed wire and many of the posts down at the time Favreaus bought the adjacent property. Then, 
in its conclusions of law, the district court rejected Persyn's argument and authority as unfounded. It has long 
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been held in Idaho that "the party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own 
title, and not on the ~~ealcness of that of his adversary." Pincock v. Pocalello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100 
Idaho 325, 331,597 P.2d 21 1,217 (1979) (citations omitted). Persyn cannot resort to proving her adverse 
possession claim by transfening the burden of proof to the party against whom the claim is being made. 
The decree of the district court in favor of the Favreaus and against Persyn is affirmed. Costs to respondents 
Favreau. No attorney fees awarded on appeal. 
WALTERS, C.J., and WINMILL, J., Pro Tem., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. 5-208. Claim under written Instrument-Possession defined.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by a person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the 
purposes of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the occupant. 
4. Where a known farm or single lot has been partly iinproved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have 
been left not cleared, or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall 
be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated. 
5-210. Oral Claim-Possession defined-Payment of taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessio~l be considered established under the provisions 
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
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110 Idaho 337; Kaupp v. City of Hailey; 715 P.2d 1007 
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Richard KAUPP and Barbara Kaupp, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAILEY, Defendant-Respondent 
[Cite as Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 3371 
No.. 16068. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
March 3, 1986. 
Property owners brought suit against city for dainages and injunctive relief on allegations of trespass and 
inverse condemnation upon learning that sewer and water pipelines ran beneath their property. City claimed it 
had acquired prescriptive ease- 
-----...----- Page 338 --.-.-.-- -----.-- 
ment for lines, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Blaine 
County, Douglas D. Kramer, J., granted summary judgment for city, and property owners appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: (1) presence of manhole in street and occasional presence of city workers 
were not sufficient indices of open and notorious use to give landowners constructive notice of adverse use, and 
(2) adverse use prescription period would not begin to run until property owners revoked license or city notified 
property owners of hostile claim of right. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Monte R. Whittier, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Michael F. Donovan, Ketchurn, for defendant-respondent. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
Richard and Barbara Kaupp brought suit against the City of Hailey, seeking damages and injunctive relief 
on allegations of trespass and inverse condemnation, when they learned that sewer and water pipe lines ran 
beneath their property. In response, the City claimed it had acquired a prescriptive easement for the lines. Both 
the Kaupps and the City moved for summary judgment under their respective theories of the case. The district 
court entered sumnary judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, the Kaupps contend that the district court 
erred in finding that the presence of a manhole adjacent to the Kaupps' property provided sufficient notice of the 
City's adverse use of the underground lines. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
While performing leveling work on his property in the summer of 1984, Richard Kaupp was informed by a 
City official that sewer and water lines running beneath his property would be damaged unless the grading work 
was stopped. The Kaupps were unaware that the lines had been placed upon the property. According to an 
affidavit filed by the City, the water and sewer lines were buried in the summer or early fall of 1978. The lines 
were constructed by the previous owners of the property, Brooks Tessier and Don Valentine. The property was 
conveyed to the Kaupps in February 1983. The affidavit of Richard Kaupp indicated that prior to the purchase 
of the property, the Kaupps obtained a title report. This report did not disclose the existence of any recorded 
easement or restriction concerning the service lines and the City has not disputed this fact. Kaupp further stated 
that there are no markers or other monuments which indicate the existence of the lines beneath the surface of 
the property. 117'8 
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After hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that the City had acquired a 
prescr~ptive easement for the lines. Stating that this was a question of first impression, the court declared the 
sole issue to be deter- 
mined was whether a concealed "pipeline placed under a landowner's property constitutes an open, notorious 
use." The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions had divided opinions when confronted with the question 
of whether a buried pipeline constituted an open and notorious use. See generally 25 AM.JUR.2d Easements 
andLicenses $$60,61 (1966); Annot., 55 A.L. R.2d 1144, at $ 9  (1957). The court found that a manhole 
situated four feet from the Kaupps' property line, and located in the street, constituted sufficient notice 
concerning "the existence of an underground common sewer." The court also noted that City employees had 
used this manhole for servicing the sewer line since 1978. While observing that the element of knowledge is a 
question of fact, the court held, as a matter of law, that the manhole and its use by city worlcers "should give 
notice to the reasonably prudent purchaser [ofi the potential for underground sewer lines or put him on inquiry 
regarding it." Finally, the court determined that the former owners, Tessier and Valentine, possessed actual 
knowledge of the buried lines. 
The Kaupps assert on appeal that the existence of the mmhole does not constitute sufficient notice of the 
City's "open and notorious" use to provide them with knowledge of the City's adverse use. They insist that the 
questions of (1) open and notorious use and (2) whether they possessed the requisite knowledge of the adverse 
use, present genuine issues of material fact inappropriate for summary judgment. The City contends that it has 
met all the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and the Kaupps' suit should now be barred 
because the action was commenced after the running of the five-year staiutory period.(fnI) 
Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions show 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). A motion for summary judgment is granted when, on the basis of evidence before the court, 
a directed verdict would be warranted or when reasonable persons could not disagree as to the facts. Petricevich 
v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969); Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028,695 P.2d 413 
(Ct.App.1985). That both parties here moved for summary judgment does not in itself establish there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Insurance Co (Mutual), 110 Idaho 549,716 P.2d 1321 (Jan. 29, 
1986); Moss v. Mid-American Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 103 Idaho 298,647 P.2d 754 (1982); Casey v 
Highlands Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387 (1979). A party moving for summary judgment 
concedes that no genuine issue of material fact exists under its theory of the case, but does not necessarily 
concede that no controverted facts "remain in the event his adversary seeks summary judgment upon different 
issues or theories." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518 n. 1,650 P.2d 657,660 n. 1 
(1982). "The materiality of a fact is determined by its relationship to legal theories presented by the parties." 
Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,470,700 P.2d 91,92 (Ct.App.1985). 
To establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must "submit 'reasonably clear and convincing' proof of 
open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the 
subservient tenement," for the prescriptive period of five years. Lorang v. Hunt, 107 Idaho 802,803, 693 P.2d 
448,449 (1984), quoting West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973) (footnotes omitted); 
Mer~ill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46,704 P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1985) Hallv. Stuawn, 108 Idaho 111,697 P.2d 451 
(Ct.App.1985); I.C. $ 5-203. The owner of the servient tenement must have actual or imputed knowledge of the 
adverse use. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326,563 P.2d 50 (1977); Smith v. Breen, 26 Wash.App. 
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802,614 P.2d 671 (1980). Specific facts must be presented to prove the elements necessary to establish the 
prescriptive easement. See Steckleiiz v. Montgomevy, 98 Idaho 671,570 P.2d 1359 (1977). Whether these 
elements have been established is normally a question of fact. Smith v. Breen, 614 P.2d at 673. 1179 
- - 
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(11 The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and notorious is to give the owner of the 
servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert his rights. The open and notorious use must rise to the 
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use to a servient landowner maintaining a reasonable 
degree of supervision over his premises. See, e.g., Ciiy of Montgomery v. Couturier, 373 So.2d 625 (Ala.1979); 
Jones v. Harmon, 175 Cal.App.2d 869, 1 Cal.Rptr. 192 (1959); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201,593 P.2d 1138 
(1979); City of Corpus Christi v. Krause, 584 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ.App.1979). In respect to underground 
service lines and facilities, it has been noted: 
Where pipes or other conduits as to which easements are claimed are buried underground and 
their presence is not physically apparent throughout the prescriptive period, the courts generally 
conclude that there is insufficient notoriety of the user to permit prescription to run against the 
servient estate. This result is often reached where there is an absence of substantial evidence that 
the servient owner had any notice or information of the existence of the facility and its user. 
However, circumstances sometimes arise such as to give even buried conduits notoriety adequate to 
base a prescriptive easement. This usually occurs where, even though the pipes themselves are not 
apparent, there are accessory installations on the surface which are plainly apparent. [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
25 AM.JUR.2d Easements and Licenses 3 60, at 469 (1966). 
Here, the City does not dispute the Kaupps' assertion that they did not have actual lcnowiedge of the sewer 
and water lines. Instead, the City attempts to demonstrate that the Kaupps possessed constructive notice of the 
City's adverse use based on the existence of the manhole in the street and on the use of this manhole by city 
employees to service the sewer line. Thus, the question here is whether the manhole and the occasional presence 
of city workers were sufficient indicies of open and notorious use to impute, as a matter of law, that the Kaupps 
should have known of the City's pipelines. 
Imputed or constructive lcnowledge is the law's substitute for actual knowledge. It is a legally postulated 
notice of facts not otherwise perceived and recognized. Such notice may arise from official records and other 
documents by which a person is legally bound, from communications to an agent or predecessor in interest, or 
from knowledge of certain facts which should impart notice of the ultimate fact in issue. It is this third means of 
invoking constructive knowledge which concerns us here. In such situations, extemporaneous facts which are 
sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person upon an inquiry of a possible conflicting interest, will be treated 
as providing constructive notice. See 58 AM. JUR.2d Notice $5 2-1 1 (1971). This is also in accord with the 
open-and-notorious element of prescriptive easement. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 3 458 comments h, i 
and accompanying illustrations (1944). When a property owner possesses knowledge of extemporaneous facts 
which would reasonably indicate the possibility of an adverse use on the property, the owner is required to 
investigate. Annot., 55 A.L. R.2d 1144 (1951) and cases cited therein. 
[2] As previously mentioned, proof of the Kaupps' knowledge is necessw to establish a prescriptive 
easement. The court found the presence of a manhole in a city street and the occasional use of this manhole 
were sufficient to impute knowledge to ihe landowner of a concealed pipeline buried under the property. We 
disagree. We believe the mere existence of the manhole does not create a duty to inquire. 
w*v-pp-."- Page 341 -- -------- 
Cases in which the circumstantial facts prompted the inquiry duty, typically include situations where indicies of 
the buried lines were readily apparent upon the property in question. (E.g., line markers and stakes, above 
ground fixtures and controls, and exposed lines themselves.) Accordingly, no prescriptive easement has been 
established. 
This case also raises another issue which should be considered on remand. No prescriptive easement can be 
acquired if the use, instead of being adverse, is with the permission of the subservient landowner. Lorn Ti89 
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Idaho at 803,693 P.2d at 449; Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho at 51,704 P.2d at 955. The dominant landowner is 
aided by a presumption: "proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the 
prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse 
[as opposed to permissive] and under a claim of right." Lorang, 107 Idaho at 803,693 P.2d at 449, quoting West 
v. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557, 51 1 P.2d at 1333 (footnote omitted); Merrill, 109 Idaho at 51, 704 P.2d at 955. This 
presumption is of no avail to the City in this case because the City's affidavit reveals "how the use began." It 
states that the former owners of the property constructed the lines in 1978. As such, the City has not shown that 
its use of the sewer and water lines was adverse to the interests of the prior owners. Arguably, the lines were 
installed for the specific purpose of permitting the City to use the lines as conduits to transport water and 
sewage. If so, then the City's use of the lines could have resulted from an express or implied license granted by 
Tessier and Valentine when the lines were installed. 
131 As we recently indicated in Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,681 P.2d 1010 
(Ct.App.1984), an easement established by unwritten agreement is merely a license, revocable by the licensor. 
See also Howes v. Barmon, 11 Idaho 64,81 P. 48 (1905). Consequently, only upon the Kaupps revocation of 
the license or upon the City's notice to the Kaupps of its hostile claim of right, would adverse use begin the 
statutory prescription period. Webstev v. Magleby, 98 Idaho at 327, 563 P.2d at 51. Other than the filing of the 
instant suit for trespass and inverse condemnation by the Kaupps, there is no evidence in this case that any 
license given to the City was ever revoked or that the City notified the Kaupps of its claim. However, this Court 
has also recognized that a license may be irrevocable for an extended duration to allow a licensee "who had 
made expenditures of capital or labor in the exercise of his license in reasonable reliance upon representations 
by the licensor as to the duration of the license," to realize the value of his expenditures. Eliopulos v. Kondo 
Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 91 5,918,643 P.2d 1085,1088 (Ct.App. 1982), quoting RESTATEMENT OF 
PROPERTY 5 519(4) (1944). At this juncture in the case, the City has not shown it relied on any 
representations made by the previous owners nor has it shown the amount of expenditures dedicated to any 
purported license. 
The summary judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs to the Kaupps 
and no attorney fees on appeal. 
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur 
Footnotes: 
1. The City of Hailey also maintains on appeal that it should have been granted summary judgment on the 
Kaupps' claims for trespass and inverse condemnation. Because the district court did not rule on these issues, 
we decline to address these issues on appeal. 
-*- -- v ----.- 
Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved. 
The Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is 
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user iicense agreement 
to which all users assent in order to access the  database. 
i- - ( Page 1 of 9 
135 Idaho 166; Baxter v. Craney; 16 P.3d 263 
-,.-.---- ---------.-- Page 166 ----- -.--- 
Tracy BAXTER and Sharon Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. CRANEY and 
Darlene (Dollie) Craney, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 1661 
No. 25549 
Supreme Court of Idaho. Idaho Falls, September 2000 Term. 
December 15,2000 
Claimants brought quiet title suit against adjoining landowners, claiming adverse possession of disputed tract 
and boundary by agreement or, in alternative, prescriptive easement over tract. The District Court, Bear Lake 
County, Don L. Harding, J., entered summary judgment against claimants on issues of adverse possession and 
boundary by agreement and entered judgment against claimants on prescriptive easement claim after bench 
trial. Claimants appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., held that: (I) refusal to allow amendment of 
complaint to add federal agency as new party was not abuse of discretion; (2) claimant did not show requisite 
payment of taxes on disputed parcel to support adverse possession claim; (3) genuine fact issues precluded 
summary judgment on boundary by agreement claim; and (4) claimant did not show prescriptive easement to 
use land for cattle crossing. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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Myers, Thomsen & Larson, LLP, Pocatello, and Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, Kan  & Moeller, Chtd., 
Rexburg, for appellants. A. Bruce Larson argued. 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge &Bailey, Pocatello, for respondents. Randall C. Budge argued. 
WALTERS, Justice 
This action was commenced by Tracy and Sharon Baxter against their neighbors, James and Darlene 
Craney, to quiet title to certain real property. The district court granted sunnnary judgment in favor of the 
Craneys upon the Baxters' theories of title by adverse possession and title tlvough boundary by agreement. 
After a trial before the court without a jury, the district court also found in favor of the Craneys and against the 
Baxters on a claim of easement by prescription. The district court then entered an order awarding attomey fees 
and costs to the Craneys as the prevailing party. 
For reasons to follow, this Court affirms the order granting summary judgmentdon the adverse possession 
claim, but we vacate the order for judgment on the theory of boundary by agreement. We also affirm the 
judgment denying relief on the Baxters' claim to an easement by prescription. Finally, we vacate the award of 
attorney fees and costs in favor of the Craneys, and we remand the action for further proceedings. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
118% 
Tracy and Sharon Baxter and James and Darlene Craney are ranchers who own adjacent parcels of real 
property in Bear Lake County. The Craneys and the Baxters share a common boundary of approximately one- 
quarter mile in length. The Craneys purchased their land in 1996 and subsequently removed a portion of a fence 
I 
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located between the two properties. The Baxters contend that the fence marks the actual boundary between the 
two parcels. The Craneys, on the other hand, contend that the fence was put up for convenience purposes and 
was only intended to keep cattle from wandering onto a portion of their land. They claim the range line to the 
east of the fence forms the boundary between the two properties as established by a number of surveys dating 
back to 1882. 
The Baxters filed tlus action against the Craneys in November of 1997, claiming ownership of the land east of 
the fence but west of the range line under the doctrine of boundary by agreement or by adverse possession. The 
Baxters alternatively claimed a prescriptive easement to cross the land Iying to the east of the fence for the 
purpose of reaching a spring to water their livestock. Later, the Baxters attempted to anend their complaint to 
join the Bureau of Land Management (13LM) as a defendant in the action, asserting that the BLM was an 
integral party. The district court, however, refused to allow the Baxters to add the BLM. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Craneys on the issues of boundary by 
agreement and adverse possession. The court concluded that the Baxlers failed to present genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the existence of a boundary agreement between Tracy Baxter and Grant Esterholdt, the 
Craneys' predecessor in interest, or the payment oftaxes as is required for adverse possession. A trial was held 
on the issue of whether the Baxters acquired a 
prescriptive easement to use the land east of the fence for stock watering. The district court found that the 
Baxters failed to prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement and awarded costs and attorney fees to 
the Craneys. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Baxters raise the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion in denying the Baxters' motion to amend their 
complaint to add the Bureau of Land Management as a party? 
2. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' adverse possession 
claim? 
3. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' claim of boundary by 
agreement? 
4. Was the District Court's denial of the Baxters' prescriptive easement claim at trial based on substantial 
and competent evidence? 
5. Did the District Court properly award attorney fees and costs to the Craneys? 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Amend 
[ I ,  21 A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by this Court under an abuse 
of discretion standard. See Cook v. State Dep't of Tuansp., 133 Idaho 288,296,985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). In 
determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test articulated 
in Sun Valley Shopping Ctu., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The three 
factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether t h e 8  3 
- 
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court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See 
id. at 94. 803 P.2d at 1000. 
Rule l5(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." Id. See also Cook, 133 Idaho at 296,985 P.2d at 1157. This Court, on a number 
of occasions, however, has upheld trial court decisions to deny the plaintiff's amended complaint motion. See 
Daivy Equip. Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301,304,442 P.2d 437,440 (1968) (holding no abuse of 
discretion when the amended complaint was filed five days prior to trial); Jones v.. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,610, 
570 P.2d 284,288 (1977) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to amend filed on the day of 
trial); Cook, 133 Idaho at 297, 985 P.2d at 1158 (holding no abuse of discretion for denial of an eighth amended 
complaint filed on the morning of trial). 
[3] The Baxters attempted to amend their complaint approximately five months after the original coinplaint 
had been filed and after the date for trial had been set. The district court concluded that given the amount of 
time and money the Craneys had expended in defending the action, "it would be unfairly prejudicial at this point 
to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action as it now stands." 
This illustrates that the &strict court recognized it had. the discretion to allow or deny amendment of the 
complaint. Because Rule 15(a) requires the district court to allow amendments only when justice requires, the 
court's decision to deny the amendment was both within the bounds of its discretion and within applicable legal 
standards. In addition, the district court displayed sound reasoning for its conclusion. As the court noted, the 
issues the Baxters sought to resolve with the ELM were not directly related to their action against the Craneys. 
The BLM was neither a necessary party, nor were the Baxters unduly prejudiced by the district court's refusal lo 
allow the Baxters to amend their complaint, as the Baxters are not precluded from bringing a separate action 
against the BLM. Moreover, the potential likelihood of removal to federal court upon the addition of the federal 
agency 
to the action would result in the Craneys expending more time and money so that issues unrelated to their case 
could be resolved. Accordingly, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
refused to allow the Baxters to amend their complaint by adding the ELM as a party defendant. 
B. Summary Judgment Motion 
1. Standard of Review 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the 
standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Paine, 
119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 
670 P.2d 1294 (1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents 
on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of 
fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badell v. Beeks, 
115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The burden ofproving the absence of material facts is upon the 
moving party. See Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse 
party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e); see also Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). In 
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when the ilonmoving party fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the 
burden of proof at trial. See Badell, 115 Idaho at 102,765 P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the district court erred 
in dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession or by the doctrine of boundary by a fy$j?tt. 
- 
- 
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2. Adverse Possession 
[4] Idaho Code section 5-210 defines the elements of adverse possessio~l under an oral claim of right. The 
statute provides as follows: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon 
a written instnunent, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in 
the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the Iand has been occupied and 
claimed for a period of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and 
grantors, have paid all the taxes, state, county or municipal, whicli have been levied and assessed 
upon such land according to law. 
The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the party seeking title 
thereunder and every element of adverse possession must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. See 
Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,690 P.2d 896 
(1984); Loomis v. Union PaciJicRailroad, 97 Idaho 341, 544 P.2d 299 (1975). 
The Baxters argue that they presented a genuine issue of material fact supporting their claim of adverse 
possession concerning the property, including the payment of taxes on the disputed parcel. The Craneys, on the 
other hand, assert that the Baxters failed to fulfill the necessary requirements to establish an adverse use of the 
land, and in particular, that there is no evidence that they paid the taxes on the disputed property. 
[S] Generally, Idaho Code section 5-210 requires actual payment of the taxes that are assessed with regard 
to the disputed property. See Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 
-- . " . - - ----~~".-~---- , - .  Page 171 ----- -- 
633 P.2d 592 (1981); Fry v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740,430 P.2d 486 (1967); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,428 
P.2d 747 (1967); Larson v. Lindsay, 80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 775 (1958); Balmer v. Pollak, 67 Idaho 494, 186 
P.2d 217 (1947). As was noted in Trappett, this Court has, on a number of occasions, "wrestled" with property 
disputes involving the payment of taxes. 102 Idaho at 530,633 P.2d at 595. This has resulted in a signilicant 
amount of what the Court termed 'Ijudicial gloss" whittling away at a literal application of the tax requirement. 
( h l )  Id. The tax rule focuses on the actual payment of taxes as demoilshated by the assessor's valuation. The 
Court, however, "has fashioned several exceptions to the general rule which, when applied, have the effect of 
satisfying the tax requirement." Id. at 530-31,633 P.2d at 595-96. 
[6] The Baxters argue that the "lot number" exception to the tax requirement applies in this case. The lot 
number exception states that: 
(1)n the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one landowner can 
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's 
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, rather than by 
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is 
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the . . . statute. 1185 
Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,443-44, 51 1 P.2d 258,260-61 (1973) (footnote omitted). The Baxters contend 
. 
I - 
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that the property in question is described by government survey designation and not by metes and bounds. 
Without a metes and bounds description, they argue, it is impossible to tell how much properly is being 
assessed with any precision. Thus, they claim the payment of the taxes assessed on their property includes all 
the property within the inclosure, i.e., on the east side of the fence located between the Craney and Baxter 
properties. 
This argument, however, ignores the rationale behind the lot number exception. As the Court stated in Flynn 
v. Allison, "[tlhe primary reason behind the lot number exception is as follows: when taxes are assessed 
according to some generic description, 'it (is) impossible to determine from the tax assessment record the 
precise quantum of property being assessed. . . .' " 97 Idaho 618, 621, 549 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976) (citation 
omitted). Were, the Craneys submitted the affidavit of the Bear Lake County assessor, which clearly describes 
the disputed property and confinns that the Craneys and their predecessors in interest paid the taxes on the 
disputed parcel bounded by the range line. In contrast, the Baxters offered the affidavit of Tracy Baxter. This 
affidavit, however, which comprises the Bauters' sole piece of evidence, merely states that Baxter paid the taxes 
on his property. There is neither any indication as to the extent of the Baxters' property nor evidence as to what 
parcels ofproperty Baxter paid taxes on. Therefore, the affidavit, even when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Baxters, fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the required payment of taxes and is 
insufficient to overcome the Craneys' motion for summary judgment on this issue. 
3 .  Boundary by Agreement 
[7,8] The doctrine of boundary by agreement has long been established in Idaho law. To have a boundary 
by agreement, the location of the true boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a 
subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. See Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237,'1240 
(1997); Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990). The agreement need not be express, 
but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. See Neal, 130 Idaho at 901, 
950 P.2d at 1240; Williamson, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at 630. The Craneys assert that the Baxters carnot 
show that the boundary line between their respective properties is uncertain or has been disputed in the past, or 
that there has been any sort of agreement fixing the boundary. In 
support of their position, the Craneys presented an affidavit by Ivan Kunz who said that his father had 
homesteaded the Craney property in the early 1900's; that he and his brother had helped his father install the 
fence prior to 1940 for the purpose of keeping cattle f ~ o m  wandering on to their meadow; and that the fence was 
not intended or agreed to establish a boundary line. The Baxters, on the other hand, represent that Tracy Baxter 
and Grant Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had an agreement as to the location of the boundary 
between their adjoining properties. The Baxters contend that the actual location of the boundary line was 
uncertain for a considerable amount of time and that Baxter and Esterholdt orally agreed that the fence 
constituted the boundary between their properties. 
In support of their argument, the Baxters rely in part on Tracy Baxter's affidavit. In the affidavit, Baxter 
relates two separate conversations with Esterholdt-one in 1991 and another in 1992-where Esterholdt 
purportedly acknowledged that the fence line constituted the boundary between their properties. When 
examining Baxter's affidavit, however, the district court noted that it was "uncomfortable giving serious 
credibility to portions of Mr. Baxter's affidavit given their hearsay nature." 
The Baxters also offered the affidavits of Marcia Singleton, who is Esterholdt's daughter, and Henry and 
Lec Rigby, whose father owned the Craneys' land at one time. Each of these affidavits to some degree supports 
the Baxters' contention that the fence line constituted the boundary between the two parcels. Singleton states 
that her father considered the fence to be the boundary. She also states that she assumed that the fence line was 
the boundaw. The Rigbvs. on the other hand. both state that the fence was not constructed for convenience 
- - .  
purposes, but was instead treated as a boundary between the two properties. The district court, howev 3 19% 
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cormnented on the affidavits, stating that it could not "in good conscience give [them] a great deal of 
credibility." 
[9,10] We conclude that the district court ened by considering the credibility of the affidavits. Although 
affidavits must set forth facts that would be admissible as evidence, see I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e), it is not proper for 
the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary judgment stage when credibility can be 
tested in court before the trier of fact. See Hines v. Nines, 129 Idaho 847,853,934 P.2d 20,26 (1997); Sohn v. 
Foley 125 Idaho 168,171,868 P.2d 496,499 (Ct.App.1994). Because the affidavits are sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the presence of a boundary by agreement, we reverse the district court's 
order granting summary judgment to the Craneys and remand the case for further proceedings on that issue. 
C. Prescriptive Easement Claim at Trial 
1. Standard of  Review 
[ll-141 Appellate review of the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusioiis of law. See Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269,985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 
812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor 
of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. See Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 
857,949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley ShamvockResources, Xnc. v. Tvavelers Leaskg Corp., 118 Idaho 
116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). It is the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Abbott v. Nampa School 
Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,808 P.2d 1289 (1991); I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings of fact that are based on 
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, will not be overturned on appeal. See Hunter v. Shields, 
13 1 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). I-Iowever, we exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of 
law to determine whether the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions 
are sustained by the facts found. See Whittlesey, 133 Idaho at 269,985 P.2d at 1131; Burns v. Alderman, 122 
Idaho 
2. Prescriptive Easement 
[IS, 161 In order to establish a private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present reasonably clear and 
convincing proof of open, notorious, continuous, and unintempted use under a claim of right and with the 
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive period of five years. See LC. 3 5-203; West 
v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 51 1 P.2d 1326 (1973). The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and 
notorious is to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to asserl his rights. The open 
and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use to a servient 
landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision over his premises. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 
Idaho 337,340,715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App.1986) (citations omitted). 
[17] The Baxters argue that Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge that the 
Baxters' cattle used trails on land east of the fence to reach the spring for water. The district court, however, 
noting that there was conflicting testimony that the trails were also used by deer and elk wandering off the BLM 
lands, concluded that the Baxters failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the trails were sufficient 
to put Esterholdt on notice of their use as a means for the Baxters' cattle to get to the spring. We agree. An 
examination of the record establishes that the district court's characterization of the land is accurate. The land in 
question is essentially a la1011 or hill. There are a number of trails present on the hillside, all of whch could 
either be used by the Baxters' cattle or by wild game. The Baxters argue that their testimony at trial d 
- 
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the main trails used by their cattle to reach the spring. The record, however, indicates that Esterholdt was ill and 
was only able to visit the property two or three tinles per year. Because a landowner need only maintain 
reasonable supervision over his property, see Kaupp, 110 Idaho at 340,715 P.2d at 1010, we agree with the 
district court that the presence of the trails on Esterholdt's land, without more, was insufficient to place 
Esterholdt on notice of their use by the Baxters' cattle. 
[18,19] In addition, the multiple paths do not show any established right of way on a specific trail. As the 
Court of Appeals noted in Roberts v. Swim, an easement by prescription "requires a showing by the claimant of 
a line of travel without material change or variation." 1 I7 Idaho 9, 15, 784 P.2d 339, 345 (Ct.App.1989). Travel 
over a tract of land in various directions and courses for the prescriptive period is thus insufficient to establish a 
right of way over any particular path. See id. Although the Baxters argue that their testimony at trial illustrated 
the particular trails their cattle were using to reach the spring, their testimony also indicates that the lay of the 
land makes it difficult, if not impossible, for their cattle to reach the spring without following one of the 
numerous trails that zigzag the slope leading to the water. As Mr. Baxter himself noted, his cattle were more apt 
to meander up and down the various trails than to travel in a linear fashion up or down the hillside. It is 
therefore reasoilable to conclude that the Baxters' cattle were not traveling by means of any particular route. 
The Baxters alternatively argue that there is no evidence demonstrating how the fence line that separates the 
two parcels was altered to allow their cattle to reach the spring. They assert that the lack of evidence as to how 
the use of the disputed property began raises tlle presumption of open, notorious, and continued use for the 
statutory period in their favor under I.C. 3 5-203, and contend that the burden then shifts to the Craneys, as 
owners of the property, to show that the use was permissive. See West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 
1326, 1333 (1973). 
[20,21] Although it appears reasonable to assume that Baxter himself altered the fence to allow his cattle to 
reach the spring, it is true that the record does not indicate how or when the fence was moved. There are, 
however, facts suggesting that even if Esterholdt was aware that the Baxters' cattle 
were crossing his land to water at the spring, their use of his property was permissive. The property in question 
is essentially useless for grazing because of its steep terrain and lack of vegetation. Additionally, Esterholdt did 
not lose access to the spring when the fence was moved. It is therefore logical to assume that even if Esterholdt 
was on notice that the Baxters' cattle were crossing his land to reach the spring, he was simply being neighborly 
by allowing the fence to be moved and giving the Baxters' cattle access to water. Because a prescriptive right 
cannot be established where the use was permissive, see Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151,953 P.2d 588, 
591 (1998), we reject the Baxters' assertion. 
[22] The Baxters also contend that the Craneys took possession of the land with knowledge of the easement. 
As evidence of their knowledge, the Baxters point to testimony that the Craneys inspected the land prior to their 
purchase and observed the trails. An examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely 
establishes that the Craneys were aware of the trails at the time of purchase. The Craneys' mere appreciation of 
the abundant trails, without more, is insufficient to establish that the Craneys were put on notice of a 
prescriptive easement across their land. Accordingly, because the district court's decision is supported by 
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb its conclusion. See Hunter, 
131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). 
D. Attorney Fees 
Finally, we turn to whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys as 
claimed by the Baxters in this appeal. Because we remand the case for further proceedings on the question of 
boundary by ageement, we vacate the award and direct the district court to redetermine the issue of the award 
of fees and costs upon completion of the proceedings on remand. Nonetheless, we deem it appropriate to 
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address an apparent misperception articulated by the district court with respect to its initial attorney fee 
detemimation. 
The Craneys requested, and the district court approved, attorney fees pursuant to I.C. (j 12-120 together with 
other costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court noted that 
both the Baxters and the Craneys are engaged in the businesses of ranching and farming, characterizing each 
party as being involved in a commercial endeavor. The district court, however, also summarily concluded that 
the relationship between the two parties was of a commercial nature. This simply is not the case. Idaho Code 
section 12-120(3) provides that attorney fees may be recovered by the prevailing party in a civil action to 
recover on "any co~nmercial transaction." Id. The term "commercial transaction," as defined in I.C. (j 12-120(3), 
includes all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. See id. This Court has 
previously recognized that "[alttomey fees are not appropriate under LC. (j 12-120(3) unless the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." 
Brower v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). 
[23] The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the Court of Appeals involving the 
determination of property rights. See Jervy J. Joseph C.L. U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555,789 P.2d 
1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attomey fees under I.C. (j 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a 
judgment coinpelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for inigation assessments, to record an 
instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence hindering its use of the easement and where 
after settlement, adjoining property owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho 
1006,1012,829 P.2d 1355,1361 (Ct. App.), opinion on review, 121 Idaho 1000,829 P.2d 1349 (1992) 
(determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a 
comnercial transaction under I.C. $ 12- 120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,785 P.2d 634 (1990) 
(holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent re- 
straining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and use of water determined was 
11ot based on a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. (j 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. 
Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 (1998) (concluding that an action to determine ownership and easement 
rights did not fall within the meaning of a coinmercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attomey 
fees were properly denied). Like the above cases, this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and 
easement rights and as such does not fall within the meaning of a comnercial transaction as defined in I.C. § 
12-120(3) and as applied by the courts. 
E. Conclusion 
The order of the district court dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession is affirmed, as is 
the judgment of the district court denying the Baxters' claim to an easemelit by prescription. We vacate the 
district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' boundary by agreement claim and remand 
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
We also vacate the order awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys, and direct the district court to 
redetennine the question of the award of attomey fees and costs upon resolution of the claim of boundary by 
agreement. 
No attomey fees or costs are awarded on appeal 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SXLAK, SCIJROEDER and ICIDWELL concur. 
Footnotes: 
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1. The Trappett Court notes that "a good deal of the judicial gloss has evolved mechanically and without benefit 
of supporting rationale, a criticism which might well be leveled at the tax payment requirement itself." Id. at 
530,633 P.2d at 595. 
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Norman S. STANDALL and Anita J. Standall, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Archie TEATER 
and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. 
[Cite as Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 1521 
No. 11308 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
July 26,1974. 
In an action to quiet title, plaintiffs prevailed in the District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County, 
Charles Scoggin, J., and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, McFadden, J., held that where defendants 
since 1955 had maintained a substantial enclosure around their land, and plaintiffs recognized such as an 
encroachment upon their lands acquired in 1962, and defendants were assessed only on land designated as "Tax 
6" and not on land described by metes and bounds, and paid all taxes on property assessed to them over the 
years, they met the statutory requirement of payment of taxes before claim to land under adverse possession 
could be established. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. 
Samuel Kaufman, Jr., Anderson, Kaufman, Anderson & Ringert, Boise, for defendants-appellants. 
Severt Swenson, Jr., Becker, Swenson & Shaw, Gooding, for plaii~tiffs-respondents. 
McFADDEN, Justice, 
Nonnan S. Standal and Anita J. Standal, husband and wife (plaintiffs-appellants), instituted this action to 
quiet title to real 
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property owned by them, alleging in their complaint that Archie and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, claimed 
an interest in their property. The Teaters (defendants-appellants) answered and counterclaimed alleging that 
they owned certain real property described in their counterclaim, basing their ownership of the property on 
adverse possession. The trial court, after hearing the case entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
adverse to the Teaters, and judgment was entered quieting title in the Staxdais. The Teaters then perfected this 
appeal. We affirm the judgment in part, and reverse in part. 
The lands in question are located in the Hagerman Valley in Gooding County. The Standal property is in 
Lot 1 of Section 28, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. The Teater property, as described 
in their deed is a part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. In their 
counterclaim they also assert ownership of property located in Lot 1 of Section 28, claimed by the Standals. The 
following is a slcetch of the property claimed by the respective parties, and while not drawn to scale, illustrates 
the claims of the parties. 
[Please see hardcopy for image] 
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In substance the trial court found: (a) In 1951 the Teaters by deed obtained title to their property in Section 
21; (b) The Standals purchased their property in Section 28 in 1962; (c) In 1953 the Teaters had an engineer 
survey and determine a new description of the land, following which they made a claim to land in Section 28 
located within a barbed wire fence, which "was down and cattle could cross and recross"; (d) Xn 1970 the 
Teaters had another engineer survey the property "due to the fact that the Defendants [Teaters] were not 
satisfied with the survey * * * in 1953 * * *. That at the time the Defendant, Mr. Teater, stated that the Section 
line was not in the area determined by Mr. Riedesel [the engineer who surveyed it in 19701 and directed that he 
survey a line showed to him by the Defendant, Mr. Teater, which moved the entire October, 1953 survey south 
into Section 28"; (e) A chain link fence was constructed by the Teaters, but they testified they never considered 
this fence as their boundary; (f) The Standals and their predecessors paid all taxes levied on their property in 
Section 28 and the Teaters paid taxes on lands in Section 21 and paid no taxes on lands in Section 28; (g) The 
Teaters made no open adverse claim to Tract B until 1970 when they constructed a fence along the boundaries 
of the land they claimed, which fence was promptly dismantled by the Standals. 
On the basis ofthe findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the Teaters failed to establish their claim to 
adverse possession under a written instrument (I.C. $9 5-207, 5-208), or under an oral claim of title (I.C. $5 5- 
209, 5-210), and entered judgment quieting title in favor of the Standals. 
The appellants have assigned as error various findings of fact and conclusions of law contending that the 
findings were not sustained by the evidence &d that the trial court misapplied the law in its conclusions. In 
summary, the appellants contend the trial court erred in holding, 
(1) that the appellants failed to prove their claiin of adverse possession to the land under a claim of 
a written instrument of title; and 
(2) that the appellants failed to prove their claim of adverse possession of the lands by an oral claim 
and exclusive possession in excess of five years. 
The Teaters purchased their property from Mr. and M s .  Farnsworth, receiving a deed in 195 1. Previously, in 
1949, the Teaters and Stella Farnsworth had entered into a written memorandum whereby it was agreed the 
Fmsworths would sell the Teaters a tract of about one acre of land on a knoll. The purchase price was minimal 
and the Farnsworths were unwilling to have it surveyed. In January 1951, a deed was executed by the 
Farnsworths to the Teaters describing the property as 
"A part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South Range 13 E.B.M., laying west of U.S. Highway 
30 consisting of approximately 213 of an acre and described as: Commencing at a point where U.S. 
Highway 30 crosses the south line of Section 21, thence west 250 feet; thence approximately North 
134 feet, thence in a Northeasterly direction 108 feet to the west line of U.S. Highway 30, then 
following the west side of U.S. Highway 30 South to point of beginning." 
This property was along the old highway from Bliss to Hageman, and lay west of the highway and east of a 
break or rather abrupt drop to the Snake hver.  
The Teaters commenced construction oftheir home on this property. During the course of construction, 
building materials were being pilfered, and in 1955 they constructed a 6 foot chain link fence topped by barbed 
wire to protect their property as is shown on the sketch, supra, as Tract A. The property was protected on three 
sides by the fence and on the west side by the break or drop-off. 
In 1953, the Teaters had a survey made of their property and a new description prepared. They testified that 
the surveyor 
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established the southeast comer of their property on the west boundary of the highway with a marked rock. This 
point, Point C on the sketch, supra, was 267.3 feet southerly from the point where the south line of the chain 
link fence intersected the west boundary of the highway. Teaters claim that from this Point C they own all the 
property westerly to the break or drop-off, some 72 feet as they claimed, and then northerly from that line to the 
west end of the south line of their chain link fence (Tract B, sketch, supra). 
The Teaters testified that they had made improvements in the claimed area by planting trees and maintaining 
the land in its natural rustic state. They also testified that they maintained an existing fence surrounding that 
area (Tract B). 
Mr. Teater is a well-lmown artist, and he used the property south of the chain link fence in his work as the 
basis for painting, exemplifying the natural state of the area. 
In 1970 the Teaters constructed a fence along the west and south side of the property they claim (Tract B). 
Standal testified that after the fence was built he pulled and stacked all the fence posts and rolled up the wires. 
Be testified that in the area claimed by the Teaters he had hauled gravel out of a pit and sold some 3,000 yards 
of gravel to another person. 
[ l ,2]  First, considering Teaters' claim to the disputed property based on adverse possession under a written 
claim of title (I.C. 9 5-207, 5 5-208), the trial court did not e n  in denying this claim. Their deed called for 
property situate in Section 21. The evidence clearly established the section line crossed their property between 
their home and the chain link fence to the south. Nowhere in the record does there appear any "written 
instrument" setting out any foundation for the Teaters' claim to the property lying south of the section line. The 
description set out by the surveyor in 1953 did not fit within the claim urged by the Teaters, or within the 
description contained in their counterclaim. The subsequent 1970 survey could not be used for any basis of 
adverse possession under a written claim. I.C. 3 5-207. The Teaters, who claim the property by adverse 
possession, had the burden of proof to establish their claim. Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253,409 
P.2d 393 (1965). See, Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 
428 P.2d 747 (1967). The appellants failed in this regard. 
As concerns appellants' claim as to Tract B under an oral claim of title, LC. $§ 5-209(fnl) and 5-210,(fn2) 
the trial court denied this claim, first because the Leaters failed to establish payment by them of any taxes 
assessed against property situate in Section 28, and secondly, they failed to establish that it was protected by 
any substantial enclosure. The trial court found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record fully sustains 
the trial court's determination that the barbed wire fence the Teaters contended bounded the area claimed by 
them was down and cattle could cross and recross 
the area. This finding, supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed 
by this court. Hafer v. Horn, 95 Idaho 621, 515 P.2d 1013 (1973); Enders v. Hubbard & Sons, Inc., 95 Idaho 
590,513 P.2d 992 (1973). I.C. § 5-210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, the person claiming it 
must have protected it by a substantial enclosure. In this regard the Teaters failed in their proof concerning the 
claim of enclosure by a barbed wire fence. 
[3] However, it is the conclusion of this court that the trial court erred in not recognizing the Teaters' claim 
to that portion of Tract A between the section line, southerly to the chain link fence. The record discloses that 
the section line between Sections 21 and 28 was northerly of the chain link fence and that that area of Tract A 
enclosed by the chain link fence encroached upon ground the record title of which was in the Standals. Mr. 
Standal testified that at the time he purchased his property in 1962 he recognized that this chain link fence was 
encroaching upon land owned by him, but that he did not want to do anything about it at the time. 
This court in a number of cases held that a fence can delineate the boundary of property regardless at%& 3 
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location of the actual boundary when the other elements of adverse possession are present. See, Bayhouse v. 
Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,105 P. 1066 (1909); M d e r  v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Calkins v. 
Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258 (1973). The 
record is without dispute that the chain link fence was first constructed in 1955 and remained intact thereafter, 
and that this fence was a substantial enclosure within the meaning of I. C. 3 5-210. 
The trial court held that notwithstanding such an enclosure by the chain link fence, the Teaters failed to 
show that they had paid any taxes upon land situate in Section 28. The tax assessor testified that initially the 
Teaters were assessed for a portion of Lot 3 west of the highway in Section 21, and that in 1952 the closest he 
could determine the acreage was .28 acres. The assessor testified that in 1953 the property was designated as 
Tax Number 6, and that he determined it contained two-thirds of an acre, but that he rounded the acreage off at 
one acre for assessment purposes. The record does not show that the assessor ever described this property by a 
metes and bounds description, but only assessed it as "Tax 6, Sec. 21, T. 6 R. 13". 
In 1973, in Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258, this court had before it an issue concerning the 
statutory requirement that taxes must be paid before a claim to land under adverse possession can be 
established. h fairness to the district judge and counsel, it should be pointed out that at the time ofthe trial of 
the instant case, none of them had the benefit of the decision in Scott v. Gubler, supra. In the Scott case this 
court reviewed at length prior decisions of this court and approved holdings from the Supreme Court of Indiana, 
and stated: 
"[XJn the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one landowner can 
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's 
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, ratlier than by 
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is 
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the Indiana statute. Nasser v. Stahl, 126 Ind. App 
709, 134 N.E.2d 567 (1956); Echterling v. Kalvaitis, 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573 (1955). Several 
Idaho cases have expressed approval of a similar theory. See White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615, 
622,428 P.2d 747 (1967); Beneficial Life v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,242,270 P.2d 830 (1954); 
Cakins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150,156,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22, 
26,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Bayhouse v. 
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Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,297-298, 105 P.2d 1066 (1909)." 95 Idaho 441, 511 P.2d 260-261. 
The rule quoted above in the Scott case is applicable to the factual situation here. In this case, since 1955 the 
Teaters maintained a substantial enclosure around their land. The Standals recognized this was an encroachment 
upon their land acquired in 1962. Over the years since acquiring their title the Teaters were assesesd only on the 
land designated as "Tax 6" and not on land described by metes and bounds. It is our conclusion that the Teaters, 
who paid all taxes on the property assessed to them over the years, as a matter of law did pay taxes on the whole 
of land designated as Tract A. This conclusion is further buttressed by the case of White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 
615,428 P.2d 747 (1967), where this court stated: 
"* * * it should be noted that in the analogous situation concerning adverse occupation of land, next 
to the boundary line between the property of the adverse claimant and his opponent, continuous 
adverse occupation will extend a true boundary line beyond the occupier's express deed limits, so 
that payment of taxes assessed on the deeded property is deemed payment of taxes on the lands in 
the clainlant's possession. [Citations omitted.]" 91 Idaho at 622,428 P.2d at 754. 
See, Scott v. ab l e r ,  supra; Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886,499 P.2d 1242 (1972); Beneficial Life v. 
Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830 (1954); Mulder v. Stands,' supra; Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra. 
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It is thus our conclusion that the Teaters are entitled to a decree quieting title to all property within the 
boundaries of the chain link fence (Tract A), and that portion of the judgment must be reversed. 
[4] A judgment defining rights to land must be precise in its description. Norrie v. Fleming, 62 Idaho 381, 
112 P.2d 482 (1941); Hedrick v. Lee, 39 Idaho 42,227 P. 27 (1924). The record here fails to contain any metes 
and bounds description of Tract A sufficient to properly describe the parties' respective tracts of land. Unless 
the parties can furnish an agreed upon and adequate description of Tract A, the trial court shall order a survey 
by a disinterested, qualified engineer in order to obtain the necessary data for a description of the property 
sufficient for the purposes of this case. The costs of such survey shall be fixed by the court and be borne equally 
by the parties. The parties shall be furnished the results of such survey and be given an opportunity to be heard 
thereon. See, Lisher v. ICrasselt, 94 Idaho 513,492 P.2d 52 (1972). Thereafter, the trial court shall enter 
amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in conformity with the views expressed herein. 
That portion of the judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs to land other than Tract A is affirmed, but that 
portion of the judgment concerning Tract A is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. No 
costs allowed. 
SHEPARD, C. J., and DONALDSON, McQUADE and BAKES, JJ., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. I.C. 5 5-209. "Possession under oral claim of title.-Where it appears that there has been an actual continued 
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon awritten 
instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held 
adversely. 
2. I.C. 5 5-210. "Oral claim-Possession defined-Payment of Taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessioll be considered established under the provisions 
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period 
of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law." 
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Lloyd GRIFFEL, Harshbarger Farms, Inc., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. David REYNOLDS and Gogie 0. 
Reynolds, husband and wife, Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs, and Roy Stegelmeier and Trudy Stegelmeier, 
husband and wife, Defendants Third-Party Defendants, Appellants. 
[Cite as Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 3971 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, May 2001 Term. 
No. 261 15 
Oct. 24,2001 
Neighbors brought action against landowners regarding boundary dispute to property landowners had purchased 
from former owners and surveyed, and landowners brought third party complaint against former owners for 
misrepresentation and other claims. Following summary judgment granted to landowners in action against 
former owners, the District Court, Fremont County, Brent J. Moss, J., entered judgment for neighbors. Former 
owners, who had agreed to defend all claims against landowners, appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., 
held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support finding that farming lines had not changed over past 20 years; 
(2) evidence was insufficient to support finding that disputed parcel of land contained 5.62 acres; (3) evidence 
was sufficient to support finding of agreement between neighbors and former owners creating boundary by 
acquiescence; and (4) landowners did not show compensable loss in misrepresentation action, as neighbors had 
not quieted title to land. 
Boundary by acquiescence affirmed; summary judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part 
Smith & Hancock, Rexburg, for appellants. Jesse D. Hancock argued. McGrath Meacham Smith & Seamons, 
Idaho Falls, for respondents. Bryan D. Smith argued. 
WALTERS, Justice. 
This case involves a boundary dispute, which arose when defendants David and Gogie 
Reynolds' (Reynolds) prepurchase survey demonstrated that plaintiffs' farming lines encroached on the parcel 
that Reynolds had purchased from Roy and Trudy Stegelmeier. The district court determined the location of the 
boundary by appl$ng the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
In 1976, Stegelmeier entered into an agreement of sale with W.L. and Virginia Hargis to purchase several 
tracts of land in Fremont County, Idaho, including a parcel described as the NU2 of the SE1/4, Section 24, 
Township 8 North, Range 44 E.B.M. The following year, Stegelmeier cleared the land of trees and began 
firming, which he continued until sometime in 1991 when he placed the land in CRP (Crop Rotation Program). 
In 1995, Stegelmeier sold approximately forty acres of said parcel to Reynolds. 
Prior to completing the purchase, Reynolds had the property surveyed. The description derived from the 
survey was noted on the deed from Stegelmeier to Reynolds as the NW1I4 of the SW114, Section 24, Township 
8 North, Range East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho. The surveyed parcel was bounded on the west by 
property owned by Harshbarger Farms, Inc. (Harshbarger), that had been farmed by Clifford and Alyce 
Harshbarger since 1943, and on the north by property which was owned and being farmed by Lloyd Griffel, 
who had purchased his land from Robert R. Litton. Reynolds began to set fence posts in 1996 along the 
boundaries identified in the survey. 1156 
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Harshbarger disputed the location of the fence as the boundary and tore out the fence posts to access land it 
had been farming for some time. Harshbarger brought suit against Reynolds, claiming a right to the land up to 
and including the farming lines which extended beyond Reynolds' proposed fenceline. Griffel, who also 
disputed his common boundary with Reynolds as shown by the survey, joined as a plaintiff in the suit to 
adjudicate the northern and westerly boundaries of the StegehneieriReynolds parcel. 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the boundaries between their properties and Reynolds' property 
had been established for more than twenty years by both farming lines and fencing lines, and that these lines 
claimed by the plaintiffs were visible and obvious, although they had never been surveyed. The plaintiffs 
asserted title to the disputed premises defmed by the farming lines as they existed in 1999 under theories of 
adverse possession and boundary by agreement andlor acquiescence. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary 
restraining order enjoining Reynolds from erecting the fence on the disputed boundary that would impede the 
plaintiffs from conducting their usual fa11 field farming work. 
Reynolds filed a third-party complaint against Stegelmeier, alleging breach of the parties' real estate 
agreement and warranty deed and misrepresentation. Subsequent to Reynolds' sumtnary judgment motion, 
which the district court granted, (fnl) Stegelmeier agreed to defend all of the remaining claims against 
Reynolds in the action. By the time the matter went to trial, the plaintiffs had abandoned their adverse 
possession claims and proceeded only on their claims of boundary by agreement or acquiescence. 
The district court, in its memorandum decision, found that the adjoining owners did not know the exact 
location of the common boundary lines prior to the survey but that a11 parties had acquiesced in the farming 
lines as boundaries for many years. Relying on the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, the district court found 
that the farming lines had not substantially changed for at least twenty years, thus providing a sufficient basis to 
establish an agreed boundary with certainty. The district court, however, allowed compensation for a deviation 
of seven feet in the fanning lines, pursuant to the expert's testimony. The district cowt entered judgment 
establishing the boundary lines applicable only to the property actually farmed and not modifying "any 
boundary otherwise described by deed that is currently located within existing patches of trees referred to 
above." The district court fixed the boundaries as follows: 
(1) between the GriffelReynolds parcel at a point seven feet 
north of and parallel to the farming line existing during the 
1999 farming year, and extending from the eastern boundary of 
the Reynolds parcel to the farming line against the trees on 
the west, and (2) between the HarshbargerReynolds parcel at a point seven feet west of and parallel to the 
farming line as it existed during the 1999 farming year; that boundary extends north and south to the farming 
lines against the patches of trees located on the north and south end thereof as reflected in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1,2, and 3. 
Stegelmeier, the third-party defendant, filed a *80 timely appeal from the judgment and from the district 
court's order denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal, he argues that the district court's 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, that the boundaries fixed by the district court are arbitrary, 
ambiguous, and not substantiated by the evidence, and that the plaintiffs' failed to sustain their burden of proof 
of acquiescence in the farming lines as the boundaries because the location of the farming lines from 1978 to 
1999 was not shown with certainty. DISCUSSION 
In Idaho, the phrase "boundary by acquiescence" is often used interchangeably with "boundary by 
agreement," although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 950 
P.2d 1237 (1997), (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,40,794 P.2d 626,629 (1990)). To prove PI97 
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boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surroundingcircumstances and 
conduct of the parties. Id. at 41,794 P.2d at 630; Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953). 
There is no dispute that the true boundaries between the plaintiffs' and the defendant's property were 
unknown. The parties' deeds, which were admitted as exhibits, describe the boundaries in terms of the section 
lines of Section 24 of the government survey, but none of the adjoining owners knew the true position of the 
lines on the ground. Stegelmeier testified that he had never had any discussions as to the location of the 
boundaries with the adjoining landowners, and until he could afford a survey, he farmed his property up to the 
existing farming lines. Further testimony of the parties established that there was no express agreement 
regarding the plaintiffs' common boundaries with Stegelmeier. Only when Reynolds set the fence posts along 
the boundaries that he bad surveyed in 1995 did the parties learn the location of the true boundaries and the 
plaintiffs' encroachment onto the Reynolds/Stegelmeier property. 
On the element of agreement, Cliff Harshbarger testified that from as far back as 1943, he had fanned up to 
a fence line, which he contended marked the boundary that he continued to obey. Lloyd Griffel also testified to 
the existence of a fence line, which he asserted divided his property from Stegelmeier's property, and up to 
which he had farmed even after the fence got caught in the disk and was removed. However, the plaintiffs 
offered no evidence as to when the fences were erected, by whom, and for what purpose. They also presented 
no evidence that Stegelmeier's predecesssor had agreed to treat either fence line as the boundary. Furthermore, 
because the fences were no longer in existence when Stegelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely 
on the old fence lines to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof with other evidence. 
Where no express agreement is shown, the agreed upon boundary "must therefore be determined from the 
conduct of the parties, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137, 
140,266 P. 797,798 (1928). A long period of acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed 
property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be inferred. Wells, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at 
630. Acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 
117,268 P.2d 351 (1954). 
The record discloses that Stegelmeies never confronted Harshbarger and Griffel with objections as to the 
location of their farming lines. No dispute existed until just prior to the commencement of this action in which 
the plaintiffs sought to claim rights to the property defined by the farming lines. From this evidence, the district 
court concluded that the parties had acquiesced in treating the farming lines as their boundary over many years, 
based upon a finding that the farming lines had remained substantially unchanged since 1978. Stegelmeier 
challenges this finding and that the disputed parcel contains 5.62 acres, claiming that the findings are not 
supported by the evidence. 
The plaintiffs' expert, Val Schultz, a cadastral surveyor, testified as to his interpretation of aerial photos of 
the disputed area taken in 1978, 1987, and 1992, which he compared to the actual location of the farming lines 
and identifiable features that he was able to observe on the ground in 1999 just before trial. He identified a berm 
and an area marked by a three-foot difference in elevation, which showed the lines that the adjoining 
landowners adhered to during the years that they farmed the property. His expert opinion was that the farming 
lines of Harshbarger and Griffel had not substantially ohanged for more than twenty years, and that opinion was 
admitted without contest. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's finding as to the certainty and permanence 
of the farming lines in this case. We conclude that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the 
finding that the farming lines bad remained substantially unchanged since 1978. 
Schultz, however, did not measure the farming lines in relation to the surveyed boundary lines, nor did the 
1995 survey admitted into evidence on the stipulation of the parties precisely locate the farming lines. The 
description provided by the district court defining the boundary by acquiescence was not derived from a survey 
illustrating the location of the farming lines. Unlike the metes and bounds description in Lindgren v. Martin, 
130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997), which was held to be supported by the record and deemed admitt d $ 1  0 ,  
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because it was not denied in the responsive pleading, the description constructed by the district court in this case 
is without a sufficient basis in the evidence. Therefore, we cannot sustain the district court's finding that the 
disputed parcel is 5.62 acres. 
Next, Stegelmeier argues that the district court erred as a matter *80 of law in establishing boundary by 
acquiescence, arguing that there was a failure of proof of an agreement. As earlier noted in this opinion, an 
agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or implied, is essential to a claim of boundary by 
acquiescence. See Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010. An agreement can be "[ilmplied by 
the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties, including erection of a fence or other demarcation, 
possession of the property up to the fence, and a period of acquiescence." Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870, 
865 P.2d 961 (1993); accord Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010 (such an agreement may be presumed 
to arise between adjoining landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or 
other monument on the line followed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such 
length of time that neither should be allowed to deny the correctness of its location). We are satisfied here that 
the adjoining landowners tacitly accepted the farming lines as visible evidence of their dividing lines for a long 
period of time. From the mutual recognition of the farming lines and the occupation and cultivation by each 
party up to the lines, the district court properly found acquiescence from which it implied an agreement between 
the parties. There are ample facts, therefore, to sustain the action of the district court holding the firming lines 
to be the boundary by acquiescence. 
We affirm the district court's order granting the plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence. Our decision, however, 
does not avail the plaintiffs of quiet title that they also sought in their complaint but only revises the parties' 
common boundary by operation of law. See Morrissey, 124 Idaho at 873,865 P.2d at 964 (oral agreement 
fixing boundary line between co-terminous owners where true boundary is -own, uncertain or in dispute is 
not regarded as a conveyance but merely the location of the respective existing estates and the common 
boundary of each of the parties); Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 366,262 P.2d at 1010 (holding that a finding, supported 
by substantial competent evidence, of an agreed boundary line has the effect of extending or diminishing the 
limits of the respective deeds to include and exclude the parcel of land in dispute). 
Our decision does put into question the district court's order on Reynolds' summary judgment holding that 
Stegelmeier shall reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of any property lost in the event the plaintiffs 
prevail in their claims. Stegehneier makes the argument on appeal that he . should not be held to have conveyed 
to Reynolds less than the property described in the warranty deed, making him liable for breach of the warranty 
of title; and he asserts that boundary by acquiescence undermines the integrity of legal descriptions in all deeds. 
Until such time as the plaintiffs successfully obtain quiet title in the disputed area that is bounded in part by the 
newly-established boundary by acquiescence but as yet undefimed, we are unable to measure the amount of 
property that Reynolds has been deprived of and the extent of any liability for said loss that Stegelmeier is 
responsible for. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment ordering Stegelmeier to 
reimburse Reynolds because it has not been shown that Reynolds has suffered a compensable loss. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisioil of the district court granting boundary by acquiescence to the plaintiffs is hereby affirmed. 
However, we vacate the order on summary judgment in favor of Reynolds requiring Stegelmeier to reimburse 
Reynolds for a loss of property, which has not been clearly proven. We do not award fees in that we cannot say 
that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended hivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v. 
Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). Costs are awarded to the 
respondents Harshbarger and Griffel. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SCEIROEDER, KIDWELL and EISMANN concur. 
Footnotes 1 .  On summary judgment, the district court held that Stegelmeier must 
reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of property lost in the event the plaintiffs prevail on their claims. 
The district court also held Stegelmeier liable to Reynolds for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in 
1199 
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defending against the plaintiffs' claims. 
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Alonzo V. CAPPS and Nona Lee Capps, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert D. WOOD and 
William J. Smith, duly appointed and acting personal representatives of Thomas B. Burton, deceased, and Frank 
C. Shirts, Jr., a single man, and Robert A. Shirts, a single man, Defendants-Respondents. 
[Cite as Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 6141 
No. 17257 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
April 11, 1990, 
In action to quiet title, on remand from appeal on issues of adverse possession and 
--- Page 615 -- 
exclusion of evidence, 110 Idaho 778, 718 P.2d 1216, the District Court, Third Judicial District, Washington 
County, Dennis E. Goff, J., adopted judgment entered after initial trial court proceedings dismissing plaintiffs' 
cause of action, granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' claim of prior settlement agreement with 
defendants, and denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Walters, C.J., held that: (1) plaintiffs were barred from urging the alleged prior settlement agreement with 
defendant as claim for relief on remand under the doctrine of "law of the case"; (2) trial court had discretion to 
determine whether the existing record was sufficient, or should be supplemented by new trial, in order to make 
the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand; (3) plaintiffs' quitclaim deed was outside the 
chain of title to the property in dispute where plaintiffs could not establish that person conveying quitclaim deed 
owned the disputed parcel at time the property was conveyed; (4) case was one of adverse possession where the 
complaint pled adverse possession in the alternative to fee ownership and the claim of fee ownership failed; and 
(5) plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. 
Affirmed. 
- Page 616 - 
Massingill & Felton, Weiser, for plaintiffs-appellants. R. Brad Massingill argued. 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, Boise, for defendants-respondents Wood and Smith. Teny C. Copple 
argued. 
Burton & Kroll, Weiser, for defendants-respondents Shirts. Ira T. Burton argued. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This is an appeal by Alonzo and Nona Capps fTom a judgment entered on remand following a previous 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Cupps v. Wood, 1 10 Idaho 778,718 P.2d 1216 (1986) (Capps I), in a quiet 
title action. The district court held that the Capps had failed to prove they were entitled to the property in 
question. The issues on the present appeal are whether the district court erred in ruling that the Capps were 
precluded, on res judicata grounds, from seeking specific performance of an oral agreement to acquire title to 
the land; whether the trial court should have held a trial de novo on the remand; and whether the Capps were 
required to prove a theory of adverse possession in order to prevail on their quiet title claim. We affirm. 9 (. 7 1'- \: 2. 
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The case comes to us with the following background. In 1978, the Capps brought this action to quiet title in 
their name to a parcel of land in Washington County and to recover damages for alleged trespass and slander of 
title. Named as defendants in the action were the personal representatives of the estate of Thomas Burton, 
deceased; Frarlk and Robert Shirts, purchasers of the disputed parcel from the Burton estate; and Frank Davison, 
attorney for the estate. Prior to trial, Mr. Davison was dismissed from the action. After trial, judgment was 
entered in favor of the remaining defendants. The Capps appealed (Capps I), asserting that the trial court erred 
in concluding that the Capps had failed to establish title to the disputed property on an adverse possession 
theory; that the court erred in excluding testimony under I.C. 5 9-202(3), the dead man's statute; and that the 
court erred in striking the testimony of a bookkeeper (an employee of Burton's certified public accountant) who 
had testified concerning a rental payment made by Burton to the Capps in 1973. 
In Capps I, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of testimony under I.C. $9-202(3) concerning an oral 
arrangement between the Capps and Burton for the sale and purchase of the disputed property prior to Burton's 
death. However, with respect to the testimony of the bookkeeper, the Court held that this evidence should not 
have been disregarded by the trial court. The record in Cupps I shows that, afler the bookkeeper had testified, 
the trial court became persuaded that the bookkeeper's testimony was a privileged or confidential 
communication under I.C. 5 9-203A and would have to be excluded from consideration. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. It ruled that I.C. $ 9-203A did not apply to testimony by the bookkeeper as lo an entry made in the 
ordinary course of business, reflecting the purported rental payment by Burton to Capps. Noting that the Capps' 
claim to title to the properly was predicated upon adverse possession for a five-year period (see I.C. $ 5-206), 
and observing that the Capps asserted they were Burton's landlord (Capps 1, 110 Idaho at 780, n. 1,718 P.2d at 
1218, n. I), the Court concluded that the bookkeeper's testimony about a rental payment made by Burton to the 
Capps in 1973 "could have established the 
-------- Page 617 ----~ 
five-year possession." 110 Idaho at 782,718 P.2d at 1220. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the district c o p  with directions to reconsider its findings in light of the admissibility of the bookkeeper's 
testimony. 
Upon remand, district judge Doolittle, who had presided over the trial, granted a motion by the Capps to 
disqualify himself from proceeding Eurther with the action. The case was reassigned to district judge Goff. The 
Capps then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that a settlement agreement had been reached by the 
parties in 1977, prior to filing the complaint in this action, in which the defendants had agreed to convey the 
disputed property to the Capps. The Capps requested judgment for specific performance of the alleged 
agreement. In response, the defendants maintained that no such agreement was ever made, that in 1977 the 
property had already been sold by the estate to the Shirts, that no claim for specific performance of any 
purported settlement agreement had been alleged in the Capps' complaint in this case and that such a claim was 
precluded by res judicata because it was never raised until after the appellate proceeding in Cupps I was final. 
By cross-motion, the defendants requested summary judgment in their favor on the settlement-agreement issue. 
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the Court invited further briefing from the parties on the 
question whether a new trial was necessary as a result of the remand from the Supreme Court. Eventually, Judge 
Goff granted a summary judgment to the defendants on the settlement-agreement issue, determining that the 
issue was barred by res judicata because it had not been raised in the proceedings resulting in Capps I. He also 
decided that a new trial was not necessary. He issued an order modifying the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law previously entered by Judge Doolittle following the trial. In this order Judge Goff made findings with 
respect to the bookkeeper's testimony theretofore excluded by Judge Doolittle, and he reached the conclusion 
that although the bookkeeper's testimony corroborated testimony that Burton may have been a tenant of the 
Capps, the Capps still had not proven they had been in possession of the property for a five-year period, as 
required by I.C. $5-206, before their action was filed in 1978. Judge Goff then adopted the judgment 
previously entered by Judge Doolittle in favor of the defendants, without further modification or amendment. A 
motion by the Capps to reconsider these rulings was denied and this appeal followed. 1 2 0 2  
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We turn first to the issue concerning the alleged settlement agreement. In their complaint to quiet title and to 
recover damages for trespass and slander of title, the Capps alleged that, on or about November 9, 1977, they 
met with the parties who eventually were named as defendants in the action. The complaint recites that those 
parties agreed to conduct a survey of a fenceline located on the property and, upon completion of the survey, to 
give to the Capps a quitclaim deed to the disputed parcel. The complaint did not pray for specific performance 
of the alleged agreement. During trial, the Capps presented testimony concerning the settlement averred in their 
complaint. The defendants also presented testimony to refute the Capps' evidence. One of the defendants, 
Robert Wood, testified that although the parties had attempted to negotiate a settlement in order to avoid 
litigation, the attempt was unsuccessful. He stated that the estate had never agreed to give the Capps any deed to 
the property in question. In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Doolittle determined that the 
Capps had not proven any right to the disputed parcel of land. His decision did not expIicit1y refer to the 
settlement agreement. 
[I] When the Capps pursued their appeal in Capps I, no issue was raised with respect to the settlement 
agreement. As noted by Judge Goff, the enforcement of that agreement was urged for the first 
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time after the case had been remanded to the district court. Judge Goff determined that res judicata, resulting 
from the failure of the Capps to assert enforcement of the agreement in their appeal in Capps I, precluded 
consideration of that question on remand. We believe that Judge Goff erred by applying the doctrine of res 
judicata. Instead, we conclude that the Capps were barred from urging the settlement agreement as a claim for 
relief on remand, under the similar but related doctrine of "law of the case." Therefore, because the judgment in 
favor of the defendants can be upheld upon another, correct theory, ihe result reached by Judge Goff will be 
sustained. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984). 
[Z-51 Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a matter previously adjudicated. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 
254,668 P.2d 130 (Ct.App.1983) (review denied). It is premised upon the entry of a valid and final judgment. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 3 13 (1982). Here, the judgment entered by Judge Doolittle 
was specifically reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the district court. 1 10 Idaho at 
782,718 P.2d at 1220. As a result, there simply was no final "judgment" that would stand as a bar under res 
judicata to the assertion of new claims or theories by the Capps on the remand. However, under the "law of the 
case" principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which arose prior 
to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal.(fnl) See 5 AM.JUR.2d 
Appeal and Error 5 752 (1962). This approach discourages piecemeal appeals and is consistent with the broad 
scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctrine of res judicata. We hold that the alleged settlement 
agreement is not a viable issue in the present appeal because it was embraced by the judgment from which the 
first appeal was taken yet was not raised in that appeal. 
[6] We turn next to the Capps' contention that the district court erred in not conducting a new trial in this 
action. As noted earlier, Judge Goff on remand simply modified the findings made by Judge Doolittle, after 
taking into account the trial testimony of the bookkeeper contained in the transcript prepared for the appeal in 
Capps I. A new trial was not mandated by the Supreme Court in its remand order, and Judge Goffs decision to 
proceed without conducting a de novo trial was compatible with that order. We previously have held that it is 
within a trial court's discretion to determine whether an existing record is suEcient, or should be supplemented, 
in order to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand. Sherry v. Sherry, 1 1 1 Idaho 
185, 722 P.2d 494 (Ct.App.1986). We find no abuse of that discretion in this case. 
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Finally, the Capps argue that the district court erred by finding that they had not proved their claim of title to 
the disputed property on a theory of adverse possession. The Capps contend that they in fact held a quitclaim 
deed to the property and that the burden to show a claim by adverse possession should have rested with the 
defendants and not with the Capps. We are not persuaded by their argument. 
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[7] As to the Capps' deed, the trial judge ruled that it was "outside the chain of title" to the property in 
question. The court's determination is supported by the following evidence presented at the trial. The property 
in dispute consists of 11.42 acres of land located adjacent to and southeast of the Weiser River. At one time this 
acreage lay northwest of the Weiser River. In 1958, the river was rechanneled some distance to the west by 
Burton. As a result of the rechannelling of the river, the 11.42 acres here in question became situated on the 
southeast side of the river. In 1968, ten years after the river had been moved, Capps acquired a parcel of land on 
the northwest side of the river, with its described boundary at the centerline of the river. The Capps conveyed 
that property to a Mr. Scott in 1970. Subsequently, in 1971, the Capps obtained a quitclaim deed from Scott to 
the 11.42 acres lying east of the river. Scott testified that, although he signed the quitclaim deed at Capps' 
request, he believed he did not own any property on the east side of the river. 
[8] Clearly, unless Capps could establish Scott's ownership of the disputed parcel at the time the property 
was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Scott to the Capps, then that conveyance would be extrinsic to the chain 
of title to the property. Scott's source of title came from the Capps. Their 1971 deed to Scott, and the earlier 
1968 deed to the Capps, "used the center line of the Weiser River as a starting point and conveyed property 
situated 'northwesterly of the Weiser River."' Capps I,  110 Idaho at 779, 718 P.2d at 1216. The Capps asserted 
no claim to the disputed parcel either by way of a theory of accretion or of avulsion.(fn2) Consequently, we 
agree with the trial court's determination that the deed from Scott to Capps was outside the chain of title to the 
property in question. 
191 Nor was the trial judge incorrect in deciding this case on a theory of claim by adverse possession. In the 
Capps' coinplaint, adverse possession was pleaded in the alternative to fee ownership. The claim of fee 
ownership failed and no issue concerning it is viable in the present appeal. The case was thus m~arrowed to one 
of adverse possession, as observed by our Supreme Court in Capps I. The Capps, as plaintiffs, had the burden of 
proof on this claim with evidence showing the strength of their own title, rather than merely attacking the 
defendants' title. It has long been settled that a party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the 
strength of his own title and may not merely rely on the weakness of his adversary. See e.g., Pincock v. 
Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 21 1 (1979). 
[lo, 111 One of the findings made by the district court, which was not challenged on the appeal in Capps I,  
was that the Capps never built or maintained any enclosure around the subject property. See LC. §$5-208(2), 5- 
210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed a meandering barbed wire fence on the property, built by 
employees of the defendants' predecessor, Burton, to separate livestock. It is well settled that persons claiming 
title by adverse possession must establish-as one of the elements of such claims-that they constructed or 
maintained an enclosure on the disputed parcel of land to indicate the extent of their claim. Loornis v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 97 Idaho 341,544 P.2d 299 (1975); Christle v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829,718 P.2d 1267 
(Ct.App.1986). A fence erected by a neighbor for the purpose of containing livestock or to restrain livestock 
from entering the neighbor's property will not suffice to satisfy the enclosure requirement for adverse 
possession by a claimant adjacent to the neighbor's property. Here 
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it is undisputed that Capps did not enclose the property in question. The district court's fn~ding is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Consequently, we uphold the district court's 
conclusion that Capps failed to prove their claim of adverse possession.(fh3) 
Finding no error in the proceedings below, we &m the judgment of the district court. Costs to 
respondents; no attorney fees awarded. 
BURNETT, J., and SMITH, J., Pro Tern., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. In Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,421 P.2d 133 (1966), our Supreme Court mixed this ruIe with the rule 
prohibiting consideration of issues on appeal that were not first presented to the trial court. The Court said: 
In their second assignment of error the Shriveses contend rescission should have been denied 
because of laches on the part of Talbols. This issue was not raised in the trial court, either in the 
first trial or in the second trial, nor was it raised on the first appeal [Shrives v. Talbot, 88 Idaho 209, 
398 P.2d 448 (1965)l or in the petition for a rehearing from the decision ofthe first appeal. It will 
not now be considered by this court, having been raised for the fvst time on the second appeal. 
91 Idaho at 346,421 P.2d at 141. 
2. See generally, Aldape v. Akins, supra, 105 Idaho at 256, n. 1,668 P.2d at 132, n. 1; Nesbitt v. Wolfkiel, 100 
Idaho 396,598 P.2d 1046 (1979). Although the movement of the river in 1958 would not have affected property 
boundaries then existing, under the doctrine of avulsion, this would not necessarily imply that subsequent 
conveyances referring to the "Weiser River" would be deemed to run to an old, previously existing river 
channel. Neither has Capps presented any authority in support of such an implication. 
3. The judgment dismissed the quiet title action brought by the Capps. The district court was not asked to 
determine-nor did it determine-the rights of the defendants or of any other possible parties to all or any part of 
the property in question. 
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OPINIONBY: LEHMAN 
OPINION: [*304] LEHMAN, Chief lustice. 
The descendants o f  Rawsel Turner (Rawsel) are quarreling over 7.3 acresof  family ground. Although the 
7.3 acre parcel was homesteaded by Rawsel's son. Deloss Turner, it is enclosed within a fence erected 
by Rawsei. Rawsel's successors in  interest sought to quiet t i t le i n  the property by  adverse possession or, 
in  the alternative, asserted that the property boundary had been altered by recognition and 
acquiescence. The district court rejected both theories, finding that  the fence was not a boundary fence, 
but one of convenience. Because we conclude that the district court's finding is not clearly erroneous, we 
affirm. 
ISSUES 
Appeilants presentfour issues for our  review: 
1. Whether the Court committed error in  granting the Plaintiffs only part of the disputed 
property. 
2. Whether the [ * *2 ]  Court committed error in finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the 
requirements t o  establish a boundary by impliedacquiescence. 
3. Whether the Court committed error in finding that the Piaintiffs did not fulfill the 
requirements for adverse possession. 
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4. Whether the Court committed error in  finding that the fence in  question was a fence of 
convenience. 
Appellees accept the first three issues as stated by  the appellants-, bu t  rephrase the fourth issue in this 
manner: 
Whether the trial court committed error in finding "that the facts and circumstances of this 
case are not equivalent t o  an express agreement to  make the fence the boundary line." 
FACTS 
I n  1915, Rawsei Turner received a United States patent to  78 acres in  Lincoln County near Bedford. 
Sometime between 1915 and 1920, Rawsel erected a fence in the vicinity o f  the southern boundary of his 
property. Actually, the fence was located beyond the southern boundary of Rawsel's land, and it 
enclosed approximately 7.3 acres of iand which was then owned by the United States Forest Service. I n  
1929, Rawsel's son. Deioss Turner, received a patent to the Forest Service iand immediately south of 
Rawsei's. [**3] Since this time, the fence has been maintained in  the same location. 
Over the years, the Rawsel and Deioss properties were passed down among theTurners. Rawsei's land 
was eventually conveyed to his son Clifford Turner. Clifford and his wife Ruth have, in  turn, passed it on 
to  their chiidren. I n  1983, Clifford and Ruth deeded an acre of iand in  the southwest corner of  their 
property to  their daughter Carol Lucy [*305] Downes. Believing the fence to  constitute the southern 
boundary. Mrs. Dowdes and her husband placed their home on the now disputed property. The 
appellants in this case, Beverly Kimball (Clifford and Ruth Turner's oldest daughter) and her husband 
George are fee owners of a majority o f  the parcel homesteaded by Rawsel. 
I n  the meantime, Deioss' land was also passed down through the generations. The appellees, Lowell 
Turner (Deloss' son) and his wife Opal currentiy own most o f  the land homesteaded by  Deioss. When 
Lowell and Opal decided to convey parcels to  their children for them to  build on, a survey was required. 
At this time, around 1992, the surveyor noticed the fence was not located on the property boundary. 
Other surveys followed, and the parties eventually learned that [**4] the fence enclosed 7.391 acres of 
largely undeveloped land located within Lowell and Opal Turner's property description. The property in 
question is partially forested and rises steeply to the east. 
When Lowell and his son Kory Turner began erecting a fence on the true property line, the Kimballs and 
Carol Downes instituted this action. They first requested, and were granted, a restraining order. At the 
same time, the Kimballs and Downes sought to  quiet t i t le to  the disputed 7.3 acres, claiming the 
uroDertv by adverse possession. I n  the alternative, they claimed that the fence had altered the boundary 
"rider tl ie doctrine of rc-cognition and acq~:escrn:e. ~ f t e r  a bench tr  ai, the distr:ct c o i r t  r-?jectru ootn 
theori,?~ as thcv re ate to the Kimballs, f~nding that tire fence constitutes s fen1.e of conlentence. 
However, the district court ruled in  favor of Downes and quieted tit le to  one acre of the disputed parcel in 
her. The remainder o f  the disputed property was quieted in Lowell and Opal Turner, the appellees. The 
Kirnballs timely appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a fence is a boundary fence or merely one of convenience is a question of  fact. Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). [**5] This court will not set aside a district court's findings of 
fact uniess the findings are cieariy erroneous or contrary to  the great weight of the evidence. Id.; 
Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 301 (Wyo. 1983); Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961  P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 
1998). When reviewing the record, we keep in  mind the following principles: 
The judge who presided a t  the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is in  the  best position 
to determine questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both expert and 
non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a f irmly established and oft-stated rule that we must accept 
the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence 
of the unsuccessful party in  conflict therewith, and give to  the evidence of the successful 
party every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. 
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Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t  1260 (quoting Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 301). We review a district 
court's conclusions of law de novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d at 978. 
DISCUSSION 
Adverse [**6] Possession 
To establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous Dossession of another's oroDertv which is hostile and under claim of riaht or color of title. 
Stansbury v: Heiduck, 961 P.2d at 979; ~ i l l akd  v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1258; ~ u t a r j a r m s  & Livestock, Inc. 
v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982). Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. 5 1-3-103 (Lexis 1999); Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1258; Connaghan v. Elghty-Eight Oil Co., 
750 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Wyo. 1988). Where there is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who has 
occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner 
thereof, is entitled to a presumption o f  adverse possession; and the burden shifts to  the opposing party 
to explain such possession. Hillard v. Marsha//, 888 P.2d at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 342 (Wyo. 
1966); City ofRockSprlngs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 517, 273 P. 908, 915-16 [*306] (1929). However, i f  a 
claimant's [**7] use of the property is shown to be permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d a t  344. 
I n  some circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of an adverse claimant. 
Meyerv. Ellis, 411 P.2d at 343; Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 936 (Wyo. 1983); Hiilard v. Marshall, 888 
P.2d at 1259. However, a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect upon the true boundary 
between tracts of land. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 297; Hiilard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1260. This is 
so because a fence of convenience creates a permissive use, and a permissive user 
cannot change his possession into adverse titie no matter how long possession may be 
continued, in the absence of a clear, positive and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the 
title of the true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge; there must be either actual 
notice of the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and notorious that 
actual notice will be presumed in order [**8] to  change a permissive or otherwise 
non-hostile possession into one that is hostile. 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t  1261 (quoting Stewartv. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (Ala. 
1959)). 
After a bench trial, the district court found that the fence erected by Rawsel was a fence of convenience 
and ruled that the Kimballs had not established their claim for adverse possession. n l  I n  making its 
ruling, the district court could have followed either of two routes. Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t  1260. 
First, it could have concluded that the Kimballs had not made a prima facie case of adverse possession 
because the convenience fence was an explanatory circumstance to the contrary; or, second, it could 
have found that the Kimballs had made out a prima facie case but concluded that the evidence that the 
fence was one o f  convenience rebutted the presumption of adverse possession. Although the record 
does not reveal which of these means the trial court employed to arrive at its decision, it does not 
matter. Under either scenario, the district court's decision would stand; if the evidence that the fence 
was one of convenience is sufficient 1**91 to establish that fact in the first  lace. then it is sufficient to 
. . 
rcbJt the pres~mption. H.lla,d /. Marsi~ali, 888 P.20 at 1260. Tnuj, the questior~ for this ccurt 1s nhctner 
the d strlc! c o ~ r t ' s  flnd ni l  of a cunven elice fence s clearly erroneous. We conclLdr it is not. 
n l  Because adverse possession cannot be acquired against the government, we are only concerned with 
circumstances that followed DelossTurner's acquisition of his property from the United States Forest 
Service. Porter v. Carstensen, 40 Wyo. 156, 160, 274 P. 1072, 1073 (1929). 
- - - - - -. - - - - . End Footnotes. . - - - - - . - - - - - - 
The district court summarized its findings in this fashion: 
rl ie pnysicsi appearance of the fence. . . c.?ariy di.rncnstrates that it coula riot na.e tieen 
constr~r ted as a bc~nda -y  fence. To ca. ihe structure 3 leiice is generous. I t  consist% gf 3 
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wires meandering between trees, bushes, and fence posts in  an irregular fashion. It appears 
from the physical appearance that someone waiked in the east-west direction stringing 
barbwire from [ * * lo ]  tree to  tree, placing fence posts when trees or  bushes were not 
available. The irregular course of the fence clearly indicates that it was not constructed on a 
section line, a quarter section line, or any other line of a U.S. governmental subdivision 
parcel. Even to a casual observer, it is obvious that  whoever built the fence never intended 
to strictlv follow the straiaht line demarcation of a U.S. Government subdivision descriotion. - 
CI?aily, the fence .vas corlsirucied by Ransel as a con~en:ent  way of separ;lt:ng h:s 
~ lomestetd i ro,n the flubl.c domj in .  The (:o>rt .s n r ~ t  able to t ~ n d  at.? conc !~do  that Kahse. 
constructed the fence as a boundary. 
Besides these findings, which are supported by  photographs and testimony, the district court's decision 
is buttressed by testimony from Lowell Turner. Lowell, who has been around the Turner land ail his life, 
provided insight into how Rawsel and Deloss viewed the fence. Lowell testified that Rawsel and Deloss 
never treated the fence as a boundary fence. Instead, it was simply used to  separate Rawsel's and 
Deioss' cattle. I f  cows [+307] escaped, the owner would simply retrieve them. 
Even after Rawsel and Deloss had passed the property on, both the [ * * I l l  north and southTurners 
went back and forth freely on the now disputed property. None of  the Turners asked permission to use 
the property because the land was seen as "family ground." Lowell aiso testified that his father, Deioss, 
had always said the fence was "off," meaning not on the property line. One of  Lowell's sons, Kory 
Turner, testified that he had also been told a l l  his life that the fence was off. Besides the manner in 
which the fence was constructed, the manner in  which theTurners treated the  fence and the now 
disputed property supports t i le district court's finding that the fence was not  intended t o  serve as a 
boundary fence. See Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 1984). 
The Kimballs next contend that the district court's judgment is inconsistent because the district court 
quieted tit le in  Downes, who had built a home on one acre of the disputed property, but not in  the 
Kimballs. Relying on Kranenberg v. MeadowbrookLodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981), the Kimballs 
argue that the facts that supported the finding of  adverse possession for Downes mandate a finding of 
adverse possession for the entire disputed parcel. We disagree. [ * * I21  
We have previously rejected the Kimballs' all-or-nothing view of  adverse possession. A similar argument 
was before this court in  Hillardv. Marshall. There we wrote: 
Hillard argues that Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981) 
estdbilshes the rdie tnat aovirse possession is a r i ~ a ~ i - o r - r . o t h r ~ g  proposition. t le ssse:ts t i lst 
sfrlce the possession of t i le nine-acr? Lract droie o ~ t  of the same set of clrcimstances as the 
fourteen-acre tract, by adversely possessing one he necessarily had to  have adversely 
possessed the other. 
In Kranenberg, the adverse claimant had built a portion of his home on the defendant's land. 
A contiguous tract of that land was aiso used by the claimant as a yard, including the 
placement of a swing set, a sandbox, a barbecue and a root cellar. Kranenberg, 623 P.2d at  
1197-98. The district court found that the claimant had adversely possessed the portion 
around the house but not that  portion which was utilized as a yard. Kranenberg, a t  1196. We 
reversed, holding that  the continuous possession of the entire portion of the property for the 
same puroose, residential use, was sufficient to  show 1**131 adverse possession. Since the 
ceienaant had failed ~3 demonstrate a perm sslve usej ivc. conc l~ded that the clamant riag 
ao\erseiy possessed i i ie eritlre tract. Kra~~enherg, 623 PZd  at 1199-1200. 
Kranenberg is distinguishable from this case. Here the land claimed is neither contiguous nor 
was used for the same purposes. Hillard used the fourteen-acre tract mainly for farming, 
while the nine-acre tract was exclusively used for grazing purposes. Further, the fact that the 
two parcels are physically separate could mean there are different reasons for them being 
fenced in, as the tr ia l  court found to  be the case here. Although the tracts were created at  
the same time, their non-contiguous nature and the different uses on each requires the 
adverse claimant to  prove his case for each tract individually. Hiiiard failed to  do that. 
Kranenberg is not applicable. 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at  1261. 
. . 
I/ is---. j 
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Here, as in Hillard v. Marshall, the two parcels have not been used for the same purposes. Since Downes 
moved her home onto the property in 1983, the acre quieted in her has been used for residential 
purposes. I n  fact, Downes' property is separated [** I41 from the rest of  the disputed parcel by a fence 
erected to prevent cattle from grazing on her land. The fencing and placement of structures upon land 
belonging to another can give rise to a claim for adverse possession. State v. Moore, 356 P.2d 141, 146 
(Wyo. 1960). Meanwhile, the balance of the disputed parcel has been used mainly for pasturage and 
recreational purposes, consistent with the historical, permissive use of the family ground. 
I n  addition, by moving her home onto the property, Downes acted in a manner that changed the use of 
the property from permissive to hostiie. Where, as in Downes' [*308] case, a parties' predecessor in 
interest held the disputed property by permission and not hostilely, a claim of adverse possession must 
fail. Miller v. Stoval, 717 P.2d 798, 805 (Wyo. 1986); Johnson v. Szurnowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 230, 179 P.2d 
1012, 1018 (1947). However, a permissive user may change his possession into adverse title with a 
clear, positive, and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the title of the true owner brought home to 
the latter's knowledge. HjIJard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1261; Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d at 805. [**I51 
"There must be either actual notice of the hostiie claim or acts or deciarations of hostility so manifest and 
notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order to change a permissive or otherwise non-hostile 
possession into one that is hostile." Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t  1261. Here, although the southern 
Turners knew the fence was "off," they did not know how far off. Despite this, Downes' home was 
located close enough to the fence that the southern Turners were on actual notice that she was building 
on the now disputed property. Indeed, Lowell Turner admitted he was aware that Downes had moved 
her home on the land. Bv ~ lac ina  home on the orooertv. Downes had unfurled her fiaa in such a 
manner that t h e ~ u r n e r a ~ ~ e l l e e s  w re on actual notice'of her hostiie possession. ~ h & ,  when she 
moved a home onto the property in 1983, Downes changed possession from permissive to hostiie. 
Finally, besides finding that Downes had adversely possessed the acre she claimed, the district court also 
relied on an estoppel theory. Because theTurner appellees stood by and did nothing while Downes built 
on the property, the district court ruled that they were estopped from [**16] asserting ownership to 
Downes' oarcel. We conclude that the circumstances of Downes' claim for adverse oossession are 
su~f!icientiy d fferent from those s.irroinding Kirnball's c iam tna! separate tredtment IS :,arranted. The 
dstrict court aid not err :n ruling in favor of Do:rnes b ~ t  aganst the Kimballs. 
Recognition a n d  Acquiescence 
The Kirnballs also rely on the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence to  argue that the fence has 
aitered the boundary. This court, per Justice Blume, first described this doctrine in Carstensen v. Brown, 
32 Wyo. 491, 500-502, 236 P. 517, 520-21 (1925): 
It is well settled that parties may make an express par01 agreement as to a boundary line. 
But, t o  have a basis for consideration, it must be in dispute or uncertain and not readily 
ascertainable, and, to take it out of the statute of frauds, it must be followed up by 
occupancy by the parties in accordance with such agreement, up to  the line agreed on. I t  
would seem that the elements of mistake involved, both in estoppel as well as adverse 
possession, are eliminated in a case when parties deliberately enter into an agreement 
under such conditions, in the absence of special [ ** I71 circumstances which would relieve a 
party from a mistake, because want of knowledge of the true boundary, and uncertainty 
thereof, is made the very basis of the agreement. The doctrine of recognition and 
acquiescence would seem to be based primariiy, though not solely, upon the same principles 
as an express agreement. . . . However. . . . an agreement to fix an uncertain or disputed 
boundary need not be express, but may be implied, and may be shown by the conduct of the 
oarties. 
. . . The existence o f  a division fence does n o t  alone s h o w  the  requisi te facts. I t  m a y  be  
kep t  up on ly  f o r  the convenience of  theparties. But we think we may safely say that when 
there is recognition and acquiescence of'the parties in a boundary line, uncertain or in 
dispute in the first instance, for a period equal at least to the prescriptive period, under facts 
and circumstances which should be considered equivalent t o  an express agreement, and the 
land on each side of the line is occupied by the respective parties as their land, no good 
reason exists why the parties should not be bound to the same extent as though such 
express agreement had been made and carried out, particularly [ ** I81 when facts exist 
a 9 i  n 
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which wouid make any other holding inequitable. 
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) 
The Kimballs complain that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of recognition [*309] and 
acquiescence by requiring the Kimballs t o  prove an express agreement that t he  fence wouid be 
considered the boundary. They correctly point out that  such an agreement need no t  be express, but may 
be implied from the parties' conduct. Moreover, "iong practical acquiescence is regarded as the equivalent 
of an agreement." Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. a t  501, 236 P. at 521. 
We disagree with the Kimball's assertion that  the district court denied this claim soiely because there 
was no express agreement. While the district court recognized that no express agreement was reached, 
it also concluded that "the facts and circumstances of this case are not eauivaient t o  an exmess 
~ ~ 
dyrecnient ro  irldke rhe fer~ce lilt? b o ~ n > a r y  1 . n "  Tor rhe i o  i o ~  f ig  reascns, Ne interprzt this i dng~3ge  
to b? a i n J ~ n u  tlldt there has r.o i i i~u l ,ed aqreerilent thdt t le fence oc a boindarv.  F.rst, rn:s f ~ n d  ng or' 
- .  
the district court was preceded by a'paragraph in which the district court found no express [**I91 
agreement that  the fence be a boundary. I f  the district court had, as the Kimballs claim, required them to 
prove an express agreement, nothing further need have been said. However, t he  court went on to make 
a finding tha t  the facts and circumstances o f  the case were not theequivalent o f  an express agreement. 
I n  making this finding, the district court tracked language found in Carstensen v. Brown that discusses 
impiied agreements. I t  is clear that the district court made a finding that no implied agreement existed; 
we, therefore, reject the Kimballs' ciaim that the district court required them to  prove an express 
agreement. 
I n  any event, the district court's decision is supported by more than one ground. I n  ruiing on this issue, 
the district court also reiied on its previous finding that the fence was not a boundary fence, but a fence 
of convenience. As Carstensen v. Brown teaches, " the existence of a division fence does not alone show 
the requisite facts. It may be kept up only for the convenience of the parties." 32 Wyo. at 501-502, 236 
P. a t  521: Johnson v. Szumowicz. 63 Wvo. 211. 229-30, 179 P.2d 1012. 1018 (1947). This was the case 
here, [**20] and the district court apbropriateiy denied the ~imbal l ' s  ciaim based'on this ground. State 
v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 438-39, 19 P.2d 955, 957 (1933). 
Finally, Carstensen v. Brown indicates that the equities of the case piay a role in  determining a ciaim of 
boundary by recognition and acquiescence. 32  Wyo. a t  502, 236 P. a t  521. On this issue, the district 
court wrote: 
There is nothina ineauitabie about ruiina that l t he  Kimballsl are t o  retain the raw. 
-nimproved, unbe~eioped property contzlined Mithin the;r pioperty uescr1p:ion; and that [rl~e: 
3p&eiict.s] are to r e t an  [l ie satn.2 k n d  of prcpcrty contancd ~ l t l i l n  their descr ivt~on. 
We cannot disagree. The decision of the district court on this issue is affirmed 
CONCLUSION 
"There is a critical distinction between a fence which establishes a boundary line, and a fence that mereiy 
separates one side of the fence from the other. The former is a monument as well as a fence, while the 
latter is merely a fence." Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 1984). In this case, 
the district court's finding that the fence constitutes a fence o f  convenience [**21] is not clearly 
erroneous. This finding precludes both the adverse possession claim as weii as t he  claim that the 
boundary had been altered by recognition and acquiescence. The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
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tions exist, when in fact there are only six, 
is a materially false assumption of fact. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "material" 
as "important; more or less necessary; 
having influence or effect; going to the 
merits; having to do with matter, a s  distin- 
guished from form. Representation relat- 
ing to matter which is so substantial and 
important as to influence party to whom 
made is 'material."' Black's Law Dictio- 
nary 976 (Gth-ed. 1990). Under this defini- 
tion, we cannot say that tlie district court's 
mistake as to the number of felonies was 
"material." 
The district court did not consider the 
exact number of felonies in the actual sen- 
tencing, instead finding generally that 
Gawron was a repeat offender and likely to 
offend again. The issue of the seventh 
felony only arose in the context of the 
denial of the motion for reconsideration. 
In its order, the district court discussed 
specific grevious offenses of which Gawron 
had been convicted, but  did not mention tlie 
overturned 1980 conviction. Gawron lias 
Failed to show that the sentence or recon- 
sideration motion 1x"liablg would 1i:ive 
turned out differenUg had ilie district court 
realized U~ere were sis prior felonies in- 
stead of seven. Our indepcndcnt review o i  
iiie rccord reveals inuthing tliat rvouid iiidi- 
eate tlie district cou;.t's belief that sevcn 
prior felonies existed instead of six had any 
material affect on either the sentence or 
the subsequent motion to reconsider. 
We therefore conclude tliat Gawron's 
due process rights were not abridged either 
by the statement5 made a t  Xuck's sentenc- 
ing, the statements made in Kuck's presen- 
tence report, the inispercegtion by the dis- 
trict court that Gawron lrad seven felony 
convictions when in fact be only had six, or 
the consideration by the district court of 
prior unproven offenses. 
111. 
17,81 Finally, Gawron appeals tile sen- 
tence imposed and the dcnial of his motion 
for reconsideration under I.C.R. 35. The 
district court sentenced Gawron to a fif- 
teen-year indeterminate term with nine 
years minimum confinement. Initially, we 
IlEPOIlTS 
a Rule 35 motion to reduce a sentence is : 
governed by the same standard a s  that 1, 
applied in reviewing the sentence, i.e., an ? 
abuse of discretion must be shown. State : 
ho 903, 811 P.2d 513 (Ct.App.1991). If 
[B, 101 We first consider the sentence 
itself. If the sentence is not illegal, the 
appellant has tlie burden to show that it is : 
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of 
discretion. Slalo v. Brovo?~, 121 Idaho 385, 
fiiiement is necessary "to accomplish the : 
pt.imiiry oijjective of protectinp society and 
to achievc any or all of the rclated g-oals of 
statutory maxiinuln per 
sen te~~ce  imposed under the Uni 
probable duration 
5 19-2513; Str~le v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 
776, 769 P.2d 1148 (CtApp.1989). Thus, 
we view Gawmn's actual term of confine' 
ment a s  nine years. Gawron must estab i 
lish that under any reasonable view of the. 
facts a period of confinement of nine years 
for the conviction for burglary and grand 
t l~e f t  was ;in abuse of discretion. ?]'is 
court will not substitute its ow 
In sentencing Gawmn, the 
took into consideration Gawron's extenslv 
Cll. PP 1% Ids 
past history of burglary and theft. In ad- 
dition to his history of criminal behavior, 
the district court also weighed heavily the 
need to protect society and the need to 
punisli Gawron. We can find nothing that 
indicates the district court abused its dis- 
cretion in weighing these considerations. 
Therefore, the seiitence imposed by the dis- 
trict court was not an abuse of discretion. 
As for the denial of the motion to recon- 
sider the sentence, no additional evidence 
was offered with the motion under Rule 35 
to indicate tiiat the district court abused its 
discretion. Uecause we found the sentence 
to be within the district court's discretion, 
and because of the Pack of additional evi- 
dence a s  to the motion to reconsider, we 
find that the reconsideration was properly 
denied. See Stale v. Caldurell, 119 Idaho 
281, 805 P.2d 487 (Ct.App.1991). 
The judgment and sentence of the dis- 
trict court is affirmed. The order denying 
the motion to recuse and the motion lo 
reduce the sentence is also affirmed. 
WAL'IXRS, C.J., and LANSING, d., 
concur. 
862 P.2d 321 
Leslie Kent DUfilGARNER, 
Plainliff-Itespondent, 
Y. 
Gary D. IIUMGAKNEIL, Defendant- 
Appellant. 
No. 19757. 
Court of A1)peals of Idaho. 
Oct. 4. 1993. 
Landowner brought action against ad- 
jacent landowner seeking to quiet title and 
alleging trespass and negligent idiction of 
emotional distress. The First Judicial Dis- 
trict Court, Kootenai County, Jam- Judd, 
*24 b3.k R**P 
.. BUMGARNEK 
ah0 629 (App) 
J., entered judgment quieting title and 
awarding landowner compensatory, statu- 
tory, and punitive damages for trespass. 
Adjacent landowner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: (1) 
evidence supported finding that deeds, con- 
veying property to landowner and adjacent 
landowner, included disputed strip of land: 
(2) trial court employed correct measure of 
damages for adjacent landowner's con- 
struction of road on landowner's property; 
(3) evidence supported damages awarded 
for removal of trees: (4) trial court did not 
. . 
err in awarding punitive damages: (5) adja- 
cent landowner was not entitled to ores- 
crilitive easement; and (6) landowner was 
entitled to attorney fees. 
Aff~rmed. 
1. Appeal and Error 4=994(3), 1008.1(3), 
3011.1(5) 
Court of Appeals does not weigh evi- 
dence or substitute its view of facts for 
that of trial court; it merely determines 
whether findings are supported by substan- 
tiiii, even if conflictia& evidence in record. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
2. Apr,c;il and Error ~ l t J08 .3 (1 )  
Standeld of deference on ;il)),cal to txi- 
a1 court's factual findings applies even 
wliere cvidence supporting disputed finding 
is entirely documenlary. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 5%). 
3. Appeal and Error @842(2) 
Court of Appeals will exercise free re- 
view over trial court's conclusivns of law to 
determine whether court correctly stated 
:~pplicable law and whether lcgal conclu- 
sions are suslained by facts found. 
4. Deeds -93 
In construing deed of conveyance, trial 
courl's primary function is to seek and give 
effect to real intention of parties. 
5. Evidence 9390(1)  
If language of deed is unambiguous, 
parties' intent will be ascertained from 
iieed itself as matter of law, without resort 
to extrinsic evidence. :. - : . ' . : 
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6. Deeds -100, 110 
If deed language is ambiguous, inter- 
pretation of grantor's intent becomes ques- 
tion of fact to be determined from instru- 
ment itself and from all surroui~ding fact? 
and circumstances. 
7. Easements +14(2) 
Phrase "less a strip of land twenty-five 
feet wide on south side of said described 
land which is reserved for purpose of giv- 
ing passage or right of way for roadway" 
in three deeds conveying equal portions of 
described land was ambiguous; phrase 
could mean either that grantor intended to 
retain fee interest h~ strip or Lhat she in- 
tended merely to reserve riglit of ease- 
ment. 
8. Easements -36(3) 
Finding that ambiguous phrase "less a 
strip of land twenty-five feet wide on south 
side of said described land u4dcl1 is re- 
served for purpose of giving passage or 
right of way for roadway" i n  original  deed.^ 
conveying property was intended to include 
strip and to reserrc only right of way over 
it was supported by cvideace that, aftw 
original grantors conveyed projietty, cotin- 
ty  assessor'^ office no longer b'cnted Llicrn 
as ouwing any fee inkrest in pro],erty, tlial 
all suhseilucnL grantees \\,ere assessed Lax- 
cs on full property, including strip, and 
that it was only after institittion of lawsuit 
regarding ou~nersl>ip of strip that asses- 
sor's office began to treat it as separate 
parcel. 
9. Easements -36(3) 
Finding that grantor intcnded by use 
of phrase "less a strip of land twentji-five 
feet wide on south side of said described 
land which is reserved for purpose of giv- 
ing passage or right of way for roadway" 
in deeds conveying to her three children to 
convey three 72-foot wide i,ortions, calcu- 
lated by including strip in prol,erty, rather 
than three 64-foot wide portions, reklining 
fee interest in strip, was supr~ortod b.v evi- 
dence that prior deeds conveying property, 
which contained identical phrase, were in- 
tended to convey strip, and by notations in 
grantor's personal records that she gave 
each of her ehildrenone third of property 
) REPORTS 
a t  width of 72 feet and other documents 
indicating that grantor understood 'her in-: 
terest in pro],erty to include strip and in. 
tended to convey all interest in property, 
including strip, to children, notwithstand. 
ing testimony of grantor's attorney as to 
his opinion that grantor intended to exelude 
strip from conveyances. 
10. Trespass -60 
Statute providing for treble damages : 
in actions for Lrespass applies only where 
alleged trespass is shown to have been 
wilful and intentio~~al. I.C. 5 6-202. : 
I I. Trespass QfiO 
Where defendant wrongfully enters i 
upon plaintiff's prolierty or cuts plaintiff's 
trees, but defendant's trespass is neither 
wilful nor intentional, plaintiff is entitled to :, 
recover his actual damages a t  common law, : 
but lie is not entitled to have those dam- ? 
a g a  trebled ]jursuant to statute. I.C. 5 G 
202. 
12. Trespass -43(4) 
Triai court did not err b)~ awarding 
actual damages lo landowner for adjacent ., 
I:~ndowner's trespass undw negligence the- 
ory, wliicli bad not lbcen pled; trial court's 
findings of negligo~ce did not form basis of 
damages asiunrd, l~ut ,  athe,; were directed 
toward denial of Inadowner's claim for he- : 
blc damaces for wilful tresoass and toward 2 
denial o~landowncr's claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. LC. G 
202. 
13. Trespass -50 
Where injury to land due to trespass i 
temporary, owner is entitled to recover 
amount necessary to repair injury and put 
land in same condition it  was 
im~nediakly preceding injury. 
14. Trespass Q46(3) 
Assuming that diininutioi~ 
value establishes outar limit of 
temporary injury to land, damages au'a 
ed by court, in amount needed to repair 
land, in trespass action arising out of adja- 
cent landowner's construction 
land did not exceed that limit; 
BUMGARNER v 
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testified that adjacent landowner's bulldoz- 
ing activities diminished property's market 
value by cost of repairing and restoring 
land, there was no competent evidence to 
,how that value had not decreased as land- 
~ w n e r  testified, and fact Lhat value of prop- 
erty continued to appreciate did not negate 
landowner's claim for damages. 
16. Evidence @474(18) 
landowner was competent to .testify 
as to diminished value of land as result of 
adjacent landowner's trespass. 
16. Trespass @52 
In action for timber trespass, measure 
of actual damages is based upon amount of 
trees taken and market value of trees in 
that area a t  time of taking. I.C. 5 6-202. 
17. Trespass -46(3), 52 
To establish damages in timber tres- 
pass action, landowner is required to show, 
with reasonable certainty, number of trees 
taken. 
18. Danxaps -6, 184 
"Reasonable certainty" does not re- 
quire mathematical exactitude, but only 
that da~nnges be Uken out of realm oi 
speculation. 
Sec publication \trol-rlr and Pbrases 
for oll,er judicial consrtn,aionz and 
deri~iiiionr. 
19. Damagcs -184 
Alere fact that it  is difficult to arrive a t  
exact amount of damages, where it  is 
shown that damages occurred, does not 
mean that damages may not be awarded; it 
is for trier of fact.to fix amount. 
20. Damages *208(1) 
In fixing amount of damages, it  is for 
trier of fact to determine credibility of wit- 
nesses, resolve conflicts in evidence, and 
draw reasonable inferences therefrom. 
21. Trespass -46(3) 
Finding that adjacent landowner re- 
moved ton two-foot tall evergreen trees, 
ten four-foot tall evergreen trees, 17 six- 
foot tall evergreen trees, and three "birch 
Clumps" from landowner's property was 
supported by testimony that adjacent land- 
,. BUMGARNER 
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owner removed 30 to 50 evergreen trees 
from property, that approximately twelve 
of thbse trees were between six and eight 
feet tall, 20 were between four and six f e e t F >  
tall, and rest were less than four feet t a l l . 4  
and that adjacent landowner removed up to,- 
four birch clumps. 4 
22. Damagcs @188(2) 
Cost of replacement is evidence of 
itcm's "market value" for purposes of eal- 
culating damages. ., 
23. Trespass -52 
Cost of repurchasing trees on open 
market was appropriate measure of dam- 
ages in timber trespass action, rather than 
price landowner would have received had i 
he sold them "on site." d' 
24. Trespass '@45(6) '-' 
In determining damage award in land- 
owner's trespass action arising from adja- 
cent landowner's construction of road, trial 
court could consider incident in which adja- 
cent landowner enlarged existing road on 
landowner's property, even though claims 
lpsed on that i~icident were barred by s t a t  
ute 01 limihtions; after incident, landown- 
er insti.iicted adjaeolt landort~aei. not to 
build any loads, and incident was re1ev;int 
to dclcnnioing adjacent la~~dowoer's state 
of mind when h6 decided to build road, 
which was essential element of landowner's 
claim for punitive damages. 
25. Appeal and Error -1013 
When trial court has made punitive 
damages award, Court of Appeals' stan--' 
dard of rcview is whether substantial evi- 
dence supports determination that requisite .-; 
factual findings criteria have been satis- 
fied. 
26. Trespass -46(3) 
Finding that adjacent landowner's COII- 
struction of road on landowner's property 
was malicious, outrageous, and unreason- 
able, warranting award of punitive dam- 
ages in landowner's trespass action, was 
supported by evidence that, when adjacent 
landowner previously enlarged existing 
road on landowner's property, landowner 
accused him of "raping" property and spe 
632, I&* l"Il'l" 1.U' "I.." - - -  Cite- 124 Idaho 629 UP~.)  
cifically instructed him not to build any 31. Easements -5 38. Trespass -75 ene, in Kootenai County, Idaho. The prop- 
roads or to change property in any way, In order to establish private prescrip. Trial court was required to award e*, known as the "Cottonwood Bay Prop 
and that, when adjacent landowner re- tive right of easement, claimant must sub. ,)laintiff full reasonable attorney fees at- ertyt" originally was part of a larger parcel 
quested permission to build road on proper- mit reasonably clear and convincing proof tributable to his successful trespass claim, owned by P.P. and Luciie Johnson, who, in 
ty, landowner refused and again told adja- of open, notorious, continuous, and uninter. ; even though defendant prevailed on some 1926,. deeded it  to A.M. Pratt using the 
cent landowner to leave property rupted use, under claim of right, with trespass statute authorized court follOwing -3 
notwithstanding adjacent landowner's testt  knowledge of owner or servient tenement, to award fees only to plaintiff, and there The north three and one-half acres of the 'd 
mony-that he built road for convenience of for prescriptive period of five years. 1.c. was no statutory basis for offsetting award east half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, N 
landowner and that he had misinterpreted g 5-203. or apportioning of fees between parties. Township Fortweden (47) North, Range p-( 
landowner's previous admonitions. LC. 5 6202. (4) West of the Boise Meridian, less a 
32. Easements -7(.5) strip of land twenty-five feet wide on 
27. Damages -87(1) If roadway's use was adverse for any . i 39. Trespass -75 south side of said described land which 
Purpose of exemplary damages is to continuous five-year period, that use can Party who successfully defends is r m m d  for t h ~  purpose of giving 
deter defendant's misconduct, not to tom- prescriptive right to use of road, against claim for treble damages in tres- passage o r  + l ~ t  of way for a roadway. 
pensate plaintiff for his losses. LC. 6 5-203. pass action is not entitled to recoup his (Emphasis added.) 
28. .Damages -@87(1), 94 
In ascertaining whether awards of ex- 
emplary damages are duplicitous, proper 
focus of inquiry is not u.liether plaintiff 
obtained double recovery, but whether de- 
fendant has incurred multiple penalties for 
same wrongful act. 
29. Trespass -56 
Award of treble damages, pursuant lo 
trespass statute, for adjacent landowner's 
intentional and wilful removal of trees 
from landowner's prope?ty d u g  coa- 
struetion of road 011 that property did not 
preclude a\vartl of punitive damages for 
adjacent laiidou~ner's conduct in construct. 
ing road; act of building road, underlaken 
in defiance of landowner's unequivocal re- 
quest that no road be built on his property, 
wae act distinct from taking valuable trees. 
LC. 5 6-202. 
30. Appeal and Error -1052(5) 
Any error in admitting hearsay testi- 
mony as to conversation in which adjacent 
landowner allegedly contrived factual sce- 
nario, solely for purposes of landowner's 
action against him to quiet title and for 
trespass, to support his claim of owncrship 
to disputed pmpcrty was harmless; trial 
court found that defendant in fact believed 
that lie owned property and refused to 
33. Easemenls @8(2) 
Prescriptive right cannot be obtained if 
use of servient tenement is by permission 
of its owner, as such use clearly is not 
ad~xerse to rights of owner. I.C. 5 5-203. 
34. F,aserncnts -36(I) 
Presumption of adverse use and claim 
of title applies where claimant of prescrip- 
tive easement has established his open, no- 
torious, continuous, nninterrunted. use for 
. . 
prescriptive period, without evidence as to : 
how that use began. 
35. Esscment5 @31i(3) 
Pitiding that adjacent landowner used ' 
turn-around road on landowner's property 
u7ith landowner's permission, so that adja- 
cent landowner was not entitled to pres:: 
criptive easement with respect to road, was : 
supported by evidence that adjacent land- .: 
owner used road after landowner acquired : 
property to access vehicles which landown- 
er expressly permitted him to locate on 
property. I.C., 5 5-203. 
36. Costa *208 
Where parties have succeeded on en- 
tirely segarate claims, those claims are : 
properly distillguished and should be ana- I 
lyscd separately in determining whether : 
attorney ices are avprouriate. 
attorney fees. I.C. 5 6202. 
40. Trespass -75 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in allocating one half of plaintiff's attorney 
fees to his successful trespass action and 
awarding those fees to him; substantial 
amount of plaintiff's efforts were directed 
at two claims on which ile did not prevail, 
but some of legal work performed on those 
claims overlapped with sueeessful claim for 
trespass. 1.C. g 6-202. 
Cookc, hmaiina, Smith $ Cogs\seli, 
Sandpoint, for deie~~dant-appelial~t. D;lr 
Cogswell argued. 
hlichaei B. Kague, Coeur d'Alene, ar- 
gued for plaintiff-respondent. 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. 
This lawsuit stems from a property dis- 
pute between two brothers, Leslie Kent 
Bumgarner ("Kent'? and Gary Bumgarner 
("Gary"). Gary appeals from the judg- 
ment, entered against him, quieting title to 
real property and awarding compensatory, 
statutory and punitive damages for tres- 
pass. He also appeals from the district 
court's award of attorney fees. For the 
reasons explained below, we affirm. 
By subsequent deeds of conveyance, 
each containing the identical reservation 
language, Leslie C. Bumgarner zed his 
wife, Laura Bumgarner, acquired the Cot- 
tonwood Bay Property in 1947. Mr. Bum- 
gamer died in 1963, leaving his interest in 
the property to Laura. I11 1970, Laura 
decided to divide the property equally 
among her three children, Gary, Kent, and 
Jean. Laura had deeds prepared convey- 
ing the north one-third of the Cottonwood 
nav lot to deiu,. the south one-ihirrl in -." ~.~ ~ ~ ...., ~~~- ~ ~ ....... ..
Gary, and the middle one-tl~ird to Kent. 
Each of thc deeds used identical language 
Lo describe Uie lot being divided. Execut- 
ing these deeds, Laura ttius conveyed to 
Jean: 
The North one-third of the followi~ig de- 
scribed property as measured along the 
...o. i 1ha. 
.,*"" .... -. 
The North three and one-half acres of 
the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) 
four, Township (47) Forty-seven North, 
Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian, 
less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide 
on the south side of said described land 
which is reserved for the purpose of giv- 
ing passage or right of way for a road- 
way. 
She conveyed to Gary: 
Ttie South one-third of the following de- 
scribed property as measured along the 
.. . 
award exemplary damages for trespass on Facts West line: 
disputed property, indicating that it was 37. *194.16 The circumst;inces giving rise to this The North three and one-half acres of 
not nersnaded bv testimonv. Rules Civ. Trial court is authorized to award ab ease involve the division and convevance of the East half of Lot (4) four. Section (4) 
approximately three and one-half acres of four, Township (47) ~irty-seven .NO&, 
103(a), 803(1). real property fronting on Lake b u r  d'Al- Range (4) West -of theBoiae,Meridian, 
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less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide 
on the south side of said described land 
which is reserved for the purpose of giv- 
ing passage or right of way for a road- 
way. 
And she conveyed to Kent: 
[The] South half of the North two-thirds 
o f  the following described property as 
measured along the West line: 
The North three and one-half acres of 
the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) 
four, Township (47) Forty-seven North, 
Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian, 
less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide 
on the south side of said described land 
which b reserved for the purpose of girr- 
ing passage or right of way for a road- 
way. 
I n  1973, a neighbor questioned the 
boundaries of the Cottonwood Bay Proper- 
tv and intimated that he minht elaim a 
.> .... ~~~~~ ~~ ~ ... ~~~~ -~~~ ~ ~ 
right to use the twenty-five foot strip for 
lake access. Troubled by aiis prospect, 
Jean located P.P. Johnson, the original 
grantor of the Cottonwood Bay Property. 
Through Jean's efforts, Jotinson, in 1975, 
gratuitously quitclaimed his interest in the 
twenty-five foot strip to Jean, Kent and 
Gary. In 1981, Jean and 1:ent quitclaimed 
their iateiest in the skip Lo Gary, who held 
titlo, to the south one-third of tlie CotLon. 
wood Bay Property. 
Laura died in 11181. In that same year, 
Gary constructed a house on his lot, In the 
process, he enlarged the already existing 
turn-around roadway in the middle of 
Kent's lot. When Kent, who was residing 
outside the state a t  the time, noticed the 
change a year later, he confronted Gary 
and accused him of "raping" his property. 
However, reasoning that the damage had 
already been done, Kent permitted Gary to 
use the turn-around, but told him not to do 
enything more to his lot. In June of 1986, 
Kent wrote to Gary and Jean sj~ecifically 
telling tlicm "not to change my lot in any 
way; no roads, no tree or firewood re- 
moved, no beach cleaning, in short, no ac- 
tivity of any kind." That September, Gary 
sought permission from Kent to build a 
new road across Kent's property in order 
to access the beach. Kent denied permis- 
sion and again told Gary that he wanted his 
lot left alone. 
In 1987, notwithstanding Kent's requests 
to leave his lot alone, Gary constructed a 
roadway across the west end of Kentzs lot 
(''the West Road"). in the process, he d e  
stroyed approximately thirtyseven fir 
trees and several "birch clumps." Gary 
also constructed a new road to the heach, 
("the Beach Access &ad"), running in an 
east-west direction, and in doing so r e  
moved two or three pine trees. He also 
erected a l~itcliing post on Kent's lot, nea? : 
the shore. The Beach Access Road and the 
hitcldng post are located on the south por- :j 
tion of Kent's lot, which, throughout this 
litigation, both parties have claimed to own. 
I'roecdural Background 
In nlay, 1988, Kent filed this action 
.. .
na- #?A Idaho 629 (Aps.3 
for trespass in its construction. Gary also line he had insklled across Kent's proper- 
denied Kent's claims for trespass arising ty, and to use the turn-around roadway in 
from the construction the West Road, the middle of Kents lot. The parties' re- 20 
which indisputably lies across Kent's lot. spective theories of deed construction are 
He further asserted i~rescriptive rigllts to illustrated by the following skekh. p-i 
and maintain the septic tank effluent . hl 
4 
f' 
X 
U*. 
c0.Y LI,U.". 
} >, :e. 
scrip 
against Gary, seeking quiet title to a seven- 
ty-two foot lot which lie maintains he r e  
,ceived as a result of Laura's division and 
conveyance of all of tile Cottonwood Bay' 
I'rollerty, incL%iling the twenty-five foot 
strip, among her three children. He also j 
alleged that Gary's construction of the two 
roadways awoss 11;s lot constituted tres- -i 
passes for which he was entitled Lo corn LrkC 
CDrw 0'Al.n" pensatory, sl~itutory and ijunitive demages. 
Additionally, lie sought to recover damages .; 
for the negligent infliction of emotionai 
distress. 
Gary denied all of Kent's claims and filed . 
a counterclaim seeking to quiet title in him. < 
self to an eighty-nine foot wide parcel in : 
. 
the Cottonwood Bay Property. He alleged caryCs meow of Deed construction 
that under the deeds of conveyance, Laura : 
had divided the Cottonwood Bay Property, 
czcluding the twenty-five foot strip, into 
three sizlpJo~r foot wide lots. He assert- Both parties moved for,partial summary foot strip, not merely an easement. There- 
ed that he lator acquired title to the twen- judgment on the quiet title issue. Gary fore, he argued, Laura had no interest in it 
ty-five foot strip through the quitclaim asserted that Laura never meant to inelude to convey Kent's position, on the oLlier 
deeds of P.P. Johnson, dean and Kent, giv- the conveyances to her children, was that the language 
en io him i n  conjunction with a to divide the proper. W ~ S  intended reserve an easement or a 
but uncot~sum~nnted, plan among his sib- ..a right-of-way over the twenty-five foot strip, ty into three sixty-four foot wide lots. To 
and tl,at in dividing and conveying the Cot. lings to redivide the entire Cottonwood Bay 
Property. Based upon this factual scenar- su!lport his assertion, he argued that the tonwood B~~ property to her children, lau. 
io, he claimed that the Beach Access Road grantor of the original deed in 1926 had had included her fee interest in the 
retained a fee interest in the twenty-five *trip.' was Ioeated on the northern portion of his ,.: .,., . ~~. , . . . . ,  , ... . : .  
own lot, and thus he was not liable to Kent 
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After considering conflicting evidence on nance of the septic tank effluent line in. (c) Was the award duplicative of the children a seventy-two foot wide lot, and 
the matter, the district court denied the stalled across Kent's lot. award of treble damages? not a sixtyfour foot wide lot as urged by 
motions, holding that the deed language 
reserving the twenty-five foot strip was 
ambizuous and that extrinsic evidence 
therefore would be admissible to interpret 
Laura's intent. Followinr an eight-day tri- 
al before the court without jury; the 
district judge found that Laura had intend- 
ed to convey, and did convey, to Jean, Kent 
and Gary all of the Cottonwood Bay Prop 
erty, including the twenty-five foot strip, 
so that each of the children received a 
parcel approximately seventy-two feet 
wide. The court quieted title in Kent and 
held tliat the Beach Access Road and the 
I hitching post were located on Kent's prop- 
erty. Eased upon these determinations, 
the court awarded Kent $2,014.60 as tlie 
costs to repair and restore the damage 
caused by the Beach Acccss Road, plus 
$201 for the pine trees removed in tlie 
urocess. and $26 to remove tlie hitchine 
Finally, the court determined that Kent 
was the prevailing aartv in the lawsuit and 
~. 
awarded-him $5,ibi.41 in costs. The court 
also found that because Kent had arevailed 
on part of his statutory claim f i r  treble 
damages, he was entitled to attorney fees 
under I.C. 8 6-202. The court awarded 
$18,532.75 to him in attorney fees-the 
amount it determined to be attributable to 
the trespass claim upon which Kent had 
prevailed. The court entered a final judg- 
ment in favor of Kent in the amount of 
$36,689.87. 
Gary appeals, chailetlging Oie court's d p  
cision to quiet title to the disputed property 
in Kent; the court's awards of eompensato- 
ry, statutory and put~itive damages; and 
the court's award of attorney fees. 
Issues on Appeal 
bost. The couit further concluded tliat be- 
,, 
cause Gary had believed he owned that 
portion of the lot, his actions did not rise to 
the level which would justify imposing ex- 
emplary damages. 
However, Gary had tiinde i ~ o  claim 01' 
uwnersliip (a the west end of Kent's lot 
over which Ile had constructed the West 
Road. Eased upon Gary's t~cspass  (a tlial 
portion of Kent's lot, the court awarded 
Kent 8816.50 to repair and restore the dam- 
age caused by the West Road, and 
1 $6,190.44 for the value of trees Gary had 
removed in the process. Pursuant to LC. 
$ 6202, the court trebled the damages for 
the trees to $18,511.37. Additionally, the 
court awarded $15,000 in punitive damages 
for the construction of the road, conduct 
which the district court found to be "mali- 
cious, outrageous and unreasonable." The 
court denied Kent's claim for neelilrcnt in- 
- - 
fliction of emotional distress. The court 
also denied all of Gary's disputed clnims, 
except that it granted him a prescriptive 
right of easement for the use and mainte- 
tllc twenty-five fool strip. In 1981. Gary. Kent 
and lean jointly eommissioncd another survey 
ol the boundarier, which again showed the strip 
to be included in the propeny thcy owned. A 
. 
6. Did the court err by admitting hear- 
say testimony? 
7. Did the court err denying Gary's 
claim to a right by prescriptive ease- 
ment? 
8. Did the trial court erroneously award 
Kent $18,532.15 in attorney fees? 
Standards of Ileview . 
[Is] In an appeal such as this, we are 
presented with mixed questions of law and 
fact. We will defer to factual findings 
made by the district court, if they are not 
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). We do 
not weigh the evidence, nor do we substi- 
tute our view of the facts for that of the 
trial judge. Alumel v. Bear Lake Grazillg 
Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253, 256 
(1991). We merely determine whether the 
indings are supp&tcd by substantial, even 
if confiictin~, evidence in the record. If so 
Gary. This conclusion is based on the <c 
court's construction of the phrase "less a v-4 
strip of land twentyfive feet wide on south 
side of said described land which is re- *-( 
served for the purpose of giving passage 
o r  right of way for a roadway." (Empha- 
sis added.) 
[ G I  In construing a deed of convey- 
ance, the trial court's priinary function is to 
seekand give effect the real intention of 
the oarties. Gardner v. Flieoel, 92 Idaho 
167,'710, 450 P.2d 990, 993 (f969); Iiogan 
v. Blakney, 1 3  Idaho 274, 279, 251 P.2d 
209, 213 (1952); Phillips Industries, lnc. v. 
Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-91, 827 P.2d I' 
706, 109-10 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, if the 
language of the deed is unambiguous, the d 
parties' intent will be ascertained from the 
deed itself as a matter of law, without 
supported, -sucli findings will not be resort to extrinsic evidence. Lalhanz v. 1. Did tile district court erroneously 
conclude that the deeds by which Laura : deemed clearly erroneous, and thus will not Garner, 105 Idaho 854,857, 613 P.2d 1048, be disturbed on appeal. Sun  Valley 1051 (1983); Gnvdncr, 92 Idaho a t  770-11, divided and conveyed the Cottonwood 
Day Property to her three children in- :. Slumvock Resou?.ces, Inc. v. Tmclcrs  450 P.2d a t  993-94. If, however, the dced 
cludc the twenty-five foot strip? Leasing Col~,., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 lnguage is found to be imbiguous, tllc P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). This same stan- interprcb~tioti of the grantor's intent be- 
2. Did the courl erroneously award '4 dard of deference on al)i)csl aillllies eve11 comes a oucsLion of iact to be detertnincd . . . . . .~~  . 
~ c n t  dalnabrfs for losses based on llfgli- where the evidcnce rupl)ortirig the disputed from the jnslrumcnt.j~self and from all the 
gcncc, a tlicoh-y of recovery which was finding is entircly documentary. See Dew suwounding facts. and circumstances. La- 
never asserted in the pleadings? Creek, Inc. v. GLav~ndon Hot Spri71.9~ tha7n, 105 ldallo at 857, 673 p.2d at 1051; 
3. Did the court err by awarding dam- RancI~, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 290-91, GB Gardner, 92 Idaho a t  771, 450 P.2d a t  994. 
ages for temgorary injury to property 
., P.2d 1191, 1194-95 (CtApp.1984). Howev- 
measured as the costs of repairing and 
restoring the land? 
4. Does the record lack sufficient evi- 
dence to support the court's award of 
damages ior lhe removal of the trees 
from the west end of Kent's property? 
5. Did the court err in its award of 
punitive damages? Specifically: 
(a) Does the record lack substantial ev- 
idence l o  support the award? 
@) Did the court base its award on 
causes of action barred by the statute 
of limitation? and 
IiiirJ runey, commisrioned by Gay ~n Dccea. 
ber. 1981-alter the commcncemcn! of this law. 
ru#t+xcludcd the slrtr, from its dewn~tion of 
the propny boundadk. 
er, we will exercise free review over the 
lower court's conclusions of law to deter 
mine whether the court correctly stated the 
applicable law, and whether the legal con- 
clusions are sustained by the facts found. 
B u m  v. Aldeman, 122 Idaho 749, 752- 
53, 838 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ct.App.1992); Is- 
sak v. Idaho First Nnl, Bank, 119 Idaho 
988, 989, 812 P.2d 295, 296 (Ct.App.lSSO), 
affd, 119 Idaho 907, 811 P.2d 832 (1991). 
1. The Trial Courl Did Not Erroneously 
Construe the Deeds. 
We turn first to the district court's con- 
clusion that Laura conveyed to each of her 
2. In (iilrdner, the Courl held that the phrase 
Zers a strip of land 30 feet wide off the Eaa 
side for madway war ambiguous: "On the one 
[7] In the instant case, the district court 
concluded that the phrase, "less a strip of 
land twenty-five feet wide on south side of - 
said described land which is.reserved for 
the purpose of giving passage or right of - 
way for a roadway," as contained in the 
deeds from Laura, was ambiguous: the 
phrase could mean either that the grantor 
intended to retain a fee interest in the 
strip, or that she intended merely to re- 
serve a right of easement. In view of our 
Supreme Court's decision in Gardner, 92 
Idaho a t  771, 450 P.2d a t  994, we uphold 
this threshold determination? Our task, 
hand it crpressa the inlent to retain the fee to 
the strip in the grantor. On the other hand it 
ciprervr the Inten: lo create an eagmenr for 
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then, is to determine whether the district 
court erred in finding, as a matter of fact, 
that Laura intended to include the strip in 
her conveyances. 
[El We hold that the district court's 
finding that tl,e descriptive phrase was in- 
tended to reserve an easement, only, is 
amply supported by tire record. Although 
the reservation clause in the deeds was 
subject to r~ossibly conflictinp inter~reta- 
tion;, the language nonethele& serves as 
strong evidence that the original grantors, 
. - 
the ~ohnsons, intended to reserve an ease  
ment; there was no need to describe the 
strip as being "reserved" for "a right of 
way" if they had intended to retain fee 
title. ~ c c o i d  Cusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho 
229. 231-32. 215 P.2d 297. 299-300 119501 
. . 
(holding that a deed c o n k i n g  language 
"Except a strip of land sixteen feet wide 
reserved for right-of-way for road pur- 
poses" expl-esses an intent to convey tl,e 
fee and reserve only an easement), o v c ~  
nbled on other glaunds, Cardenas v. 
Kuqjjuweit, 116 Ida!,o 739, 779 P.2d 414 
(1989). Moreover, the evidence shows that 
after the Jol~nsons had conveyed the prop. 
erty, the c o u ~ ~ t y  assessor's office no longer 
treated (hem as o\iziiing any ice interest in 
that lot. All of the subsequent grantees, 
including Leslie C. and Laura Bumgarner, 
were assessed taxes on the full property, 
including the strip in question, during their 
respective ownerships of the Cottonwood 
Bay Property. I t  was only a j l c ~  the com- 
mencement of this lawsuit that the asses. 
sor's office began to treat the twenty-five 
foot strip as a separate parcel. Based 
upon this record, we uphold the district 
court's finding that the original deed of 
conveyance was intended to include tlie 
strip in question, and that the reservation 
language was intended to reserve only a 
right-of-way over it for a roadway. 
[91 In light of the construction placed 
on the language -in the original deed of 
conveyance, the later deeds, which used 
rordwny over t lw strip in favor of ,he graniai. 
Such expressions a( intent are inronrincnl." 92 
ldpllo 31 77&71. 450 P.2d a1 993-94. Contpore 
Cuze v. Civenr, 70 Idaho 229, 231-32. 215 P.2d 
297. 299-300 (1950) (holding ,hat a deed con. 
identical language to divide the property 
among Laura's children, should likewise be 
construed to include the twenty-five foot 
strip. See Gnrdner, 92 Ida110 a t  770, 450 
P.2d a t  993. Notwitlistanding the con. 
struetion placed upon the prior deeds, Gary 
argues that contrary evidence demon. 
strates that Laura intended to ~zc lude  the 
strip from her conveyances to her children. 
In particular, Gary notes that the attorney 
who drafted the deeds a t  Laura's instruc- 
tion testified that Laura did not intend to 
include the strip with the conveyances. 
Yet, a review of the trial transcript reveals 
that the lawyer's testimony was but ]>is 
opinion, based upon his own interpretation 
of the reservation language contained in 
the original deed and his subjective belief 
that Laura urould not have wished to give 
Gary, her favored son, a lot encumbered by 
an easement Nowhere did this witness 
identify any statement froni Laura to indi- 
cate either that she believed she did not 
own the s t r i l~ or that she owned it but 
wislled to retain it for herself. To the 
contrary, the documeatary evidence admit- 
ted a t  trial amply demonstrates that Laura 
understood that her ownership of the Cot- 
tonwood Bay Properly i?zelzded the tweii- 
ty-five foot strip, and that slie iiilcnded to 
convey to her children all of her interest in 
that progert],, i?lcll~di?~;g the st~.ip in ques- 
tion. For exaniple, ia 1970, she wrote in 
her personal records "Gave Gary 'A  lake 
prop. 72." She made similar notations con- 
cerning the lots given Jean and Kent, each 
consistent with an understanding that she 
owned the twenty-five foot strip and in- 
tended to include it in her conveyances to 
her children, and inconsistent with Gary's 
claim Oiat she ,had Intended to convey 
three, sixty-four foot lots. 
Gary further complains t l ~ a t  by its find- 
ing that Laura intended to include the 
twenty-five foot strip in her conveyances, 
the district court improperly rejected the 
testimony offered by other witnesses. 
Tl~is argument is misplaced. As noted 
tnining lanyagc '"Except a sfrip of land sixteen 
feet wide reserved for right.of.way for road pur- 
porn'' cxpresres an intent to convey the fee and 
resene only an easement). 
above, our role in reviewing contested find- 
ings of fact does not permit us to reweigh 
conflicting evidence. We are limited to de- 
termining whether the record contains sub- 
stantial evidence to support the challenged 
findings. The record before us in this ease 
-.. - 
is replete with such evidence, and the 
court's findings will not he disturbed. The 
judgment quieting title in Kent to a lot 
seventy-two feet wide, which is based upon 
those challenged findings, therefore. is af- 
firmed. 
2. The Court Did Not Grant Recovery 
Under a Negligence Theory. 
Gary also assigns error to the district 
court's findings that he had "negliget~tly" 
damaged Kent's lot by constructing the 
Beach Access Road and the hitching post, 
and by removing two trees, all wl~ich oc- 
curred on the portion of the property which 
both parties claimed to own. Gary main- 
tains that these findings, and the damages 
awarded on tile basis of such findings, 
must lie overturned because the theory of 
~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
"negligent damage to property'' was never 
pled or tried in this case, As exjilained 
below, this argument miscl~aracterizes the 
district judge's findings and conclusions. 
[lo, 111 Althougl> not stz~ted iii tlie sbi.- 
ute, 1.C. 6 G-202 agplies only w11(?rc the 
alleged trespass is shovrn to have been 
wilful and intentional. Eavl v. Fo~dice, 84 
Idaho 542, 545, 374 P.2d 713, 714 (1962); 
Menasl~a Woodenware Co. v. Spokane 
Int'l Railway Co., I9 Idaho 586, 594, 115 
P. 22, 24 (1911). Thu,, where 'the deien- 
dant wrongfully enters upon tlie plaintiff's 
property or cuts his trees, but the defen- 
dant's trespass is neither wilful or i n t o  
tional, the plaintiff is entitled to recover his 
actual damages a t  common law, hut he is 
not entitled to have those damages trebled. 
McnasIia IVoodenware Co., 19 Idaho a t  
594, 115 P. a t  24; see nlso Afococlc 7,. Pot- 
latcl~ C O ~ . ,  786 P.Supp. 1545, 1547 (D.lda- 
ho 1992). 
puted southeast portion of Kent's lot. 
With respect to those trespasses, the court 
concluded that, because Gary had believed 
he owned the portion of land in question, E'- 
his invasion of Kent's property rights was 4 
not wilful and intentional, hut merely negli- 
gent. Consequently, the court declined to 4 
award treble damages for the value of the 
pine trees removed. Similarly, the court 
refrained from granting punitive damages 
for Gary's conduct, concluding that "Such 
negligence does not rise..to a level which 
would justify the awarding of punitive 
damages," and thus awarded Kent only the 
costa of repairing and restoring the south- 
east,portion of his land. A reading of the 
memorandum opinion further reveals that 
the court'sadditional reference to Gary's ,, 
negligence was in its decision to deny 
Kent's claim f6r negligent infliction of emo- 
tional distress. Consequently, we reject 
Gary's assertion that the court's finding of 
negligence served as the basis of an award 
against him. 
3. The Court Employed thc Correct 
: nlcasure of Da~~iages for Injury 
to Property. 
[I31 Gary next asserts t l ~ a t  tlie trial 
court einploycd y .  improper measure in 
assessing damages-resulting from the tres- 
passes to Kent's land. Where, a s  here, the 
injury to the land is temporarj. and not 
permanent, the owner is entitled to recover 
the amount necessary to repair the injury 
and put the land in the condition it  was at 
the time immediately preceding the injury. '-' 
Smith v. Big Lost River In. Dist., 83 
Idaho 374, 385, 364 P.2d 146, 157 (1961), --.' 
cited i n  Bradford v. Simpson,' 91 Idaho 
133, 192 n. 1, 541 P.2d 615 616 n. 1 (1975); 
Raide v. Dollar, 34 Idaho 682, 683, 203 P. 
469, 471 (1921); McLaugRlin v. Robi?lson, 
103 Idaho 211, 216, 646 P.2d 453, ;158 (Ct. 
App.1982). Applying this measure, the dls- 
trict court awarded Kent $816.50 to repair 
[I21 I t  is clear from the district court's and restore the injury caused by the con- 
memarandum.oninion that the court's find- struction of the West Road, $2,074.60 as 
ings of negligence were directed, in part, to the costs to repair and restore the damage 
its denial of Kent's claim for treble d a m  caused by the Beach Access Road, and $26 
ages for trespasses occumng on the dis- as the cost of removing the hitching post. 
[I41 Gary contends that the court erred 
by allowing Kent to recover the costs of 
repairing and restoring his land absent any 
evidence that the property's market value 
had diminished. Gary relies on Alesko w. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., G2 Idaho 235, 2.11, 
109 P.2d 874, 877 (1941), wherein our Su- 
preme Court stated that, "if the cost of 
restoration exceeds the value of the premis- 
es in their original condition, or the diminu- 
tion in market value the latter are the 
limits of recovery!' This limitation has not 
appeared in the Supreme Court's more re- 
cent statements concerning the measure of 
damages for temporary injury to real prop- 
erty. See, e.g., Bradford, 97 Idaho a t  192 
n. 1, 541 P.2d a t  G I G  n. 1; Smitlb, 83 Idaho 
a t  385, 364 P.2d a t  157; see also McLauglb- 
l i n ,  103 Idaho a t  216, 64G P.2d a t  458.3 
However, assuming that diminution in mar- 
ket value does establish an outer limit of 
recovery for temporary injury to land, we 
conclude that the record contains substan- 
tial, competent evidence to show that the 
damages awarded by the court did not ex- 
ceed this limit. 
[I51 As owller of the property a t  issue, 
Kent was competent to testify to its value. 
S??tillb, 83 Idaho a t  386, 364 P.2d a t  ,152. 
ISe testified that Gary's bulldozing aclivi- 
ties had diminished the oro~~ertv's inarket 
. . "  
value by the cost of repairing and restoring 
the land. Moreover, there was no compe- 
tent evidence to sliow that the value of the 
lot Iiad not decreased as Kent had testified. 
Contrary to Gary's assertion, the fact that 
the value of the lake-front iot has contin- 
ued to appreciate over the years does not 
negate Kent's claim for damages. Finding 
no error in the court's measure of dam- 
ages, we uphold the court's decision to 
award Kent the costs of repairing and re- 
storing his property. 
4. Sufiicicnt Evidence Supported 
the Damages Awarded for 
Rcmovsl or the Trees. 
[I61 Gary also asserts that the trial 
court's award of damages for the trees 
taken from the west end of Kent's lot was 
3. Of courss, even if this limitation has been 
abandoned, recovery still- would be subject to 
> REPORTS 
not adequately supported by the evidence, 
and therefore should be vacated. In an 
action for timber trespass, the measure of 
actual damages is based upon the amount 
of the trees taken and the market value of 
the trees in that area a t  the time of the 
taking. 1.c. Q 6-202; Mercer v. S/lea%~, 
84 Idaho 536, 540-41, 374 P.2d 116, 719 
(1962). I n  this case, the court found that 
Gary had removed from the west end of 
Kent's property ten two-foot tall evergreen 
trees, valued a t  $240; ten four-foot tali 
evergreen trees, valued a t  $480; and seven. 
teen six-foot tall evergreen trees, valued at 
$1,224. The court also found that Gary 
had removed three "birch clumps." valued 
a t  $4,246.44. 
[I?-201 Gary complains that the testi- 
mony as to the number of trees removed 
was sometimes so general, and sometimes 
so conflicting, that it was insufficient to 
adequately establish the amount of Kent's 
ean~ages. We disagree. To establish his 
damages, Kent was required to show, with 
reaso~~able certainty, the number of the 
trees taken. "Reasonable cerhinty" does 
riot require matl~ematical exactitude, but 
only that the danlztges ire tsken out of the 
realm of speculation. I f ~ e n e r  71. Ada 
Coz~nly 1 3 ~ ~ 1 ~ . u ~ a . ~  f i s t ,  108 Id;lI~o 170, 174, 
697 P.2d 1284, 1188 (1985); Lewsslon IJ1.c- 
Mix Concrete, Inc., v. Rolzdc, 110 Ida110 
640, 648, 718 P.2d 551, 559 (Ct.Ap11.1985). 
The mere fact that it  is difficult to arrive a t  
exact an~ount of damages, where it is 
shown that damages resulted, does not 
mean that damapes may not be awarded; it 
is for the trier-if-factto fix the amouilt. 
S?nit/b v. Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718, 471 
P.2d 571, 573. (1970). In fixing that 
amount, i t  is for the trier of fact ta detei- 
mine the credibility of the witnesses, to :. 
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to z 
draw reasonable inferences therefrom. El- ~. 
i o ~ ~ u l o s  v. Ifondo Fanns, Inc., 102 Idaho : 
915, 919, 643 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ct.A1,p.1982). j 
1211 The testimony in the record shows 
that Gary caused U~irty to fifty evergreen ; 
trees to be removed from Kent's lot; that '> 
principles of economic wane end avoidable 
consCSuenas. . . 
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approximately twelve of those trees were 
between six and eight feet high: that ap- 
proximately twenty were between four and 
six feet talk and that the rest were less 
than four feet tell. The testimony also 
showed that Gary also had up to four birch 
clumps removed from the west end of 
Kent's property. The district court's find- 
ings as to the number, size and species of 
the trees removed are consistent with this 
testimony and the other evidence submit- 
ted, and thus are supported by the evi- 
dence. 
[22,231 Gary also takes issue with the 
court's valuation of the trees. Specifically, 
he argues that tile court erred in valuing 
the trees based upon evidence of tile cost 
of repurchasing them on the open market. 
He suggests that the court instead should 
have calculated the value of the trees 
based upon the price Kent would have re- 
ceived had he sold them "on site." It is 
well established, however, that the cost of 
replacement is evidence of an item's "mar 
ket value!' See Spa?zbauer v. J.R. Sim- 
plot Go., 107 Idaho 4 5  46, 685 P.2d 271, 
275 (1984). Finding no error, we uphold 
the district court's dccision concerniog the 
valuation of trees removcd. 
5. Punitive Damagcs. 
Gary also cl~allcnges the court's award 
of punitive damages. Specifically, he ar- 
gues that (a) the trial court based the 
award on conduct for which recovery was 
time-barred; (b) the evidence was insuffi- 
cient to support the award; and (c) the 
recovery of punitive damages duplicates 
the award of treble damages. 
a. The award was not Based upon time- 
barred ciaims. 
[241 In its memorandum opinion, the 
district court found that in 1981, Gary had 
enlarged the turn-around road on the west 
end of Kent's lot and had also installed a 
septic tank effluent line across Kent's prop- 
erty. The court further found that when 
Kent observed the changes to his lot, he 
accused Gary of raping his land,'and later 
specifically instructed Gary. not to build 
any mads or to change hisproperty in any 
BUMGARNER 
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way. In 1986, when Gary sought permis- 
sion to build the road across the west end 
of Kent's property, Kent refused and again 
told Gary that he wanted his lot left alone. 
Based upon these findings, the district wJ 
court concluded: *-I 
The constmction of the road on the west Lv 
end of Kent's lot was intentional, reck- 4 
less and in knowing disregard of Kent's 
property rights. For Gary, an individual 
knowledgeable about tree farming and 
who had previously been accused by 
Kent of raping Kent's lot and told in no 
uncertain terms by Kent "to please not 
change my lot in any way; no roads, no 
tree or firewood removal, no beach clean- 
ing, in short, no activity of any kind" to 
have constructed the west end road was 
the height of arrogance. Such conduct 
was maliciohs, outrageous and unreason- -i 
able. Kent is entitled to an award of 
punitive damages against Gary in the 
sum of $15,000.00. Such sum is neces- 
sary to both punish Gary for his past 
conduct and to deter such future con- 
duct. 
;Gary notes that any claims for damages 
arising out his conduct in 1981, i.~., tile 
cnlargetnent of the turn-around road and 
the installation of the effluent line across 
Kent's lot, are barred by tlie statute of 
limitatirm, see LC.'$ 5-218(2), and were ap- 
propriately dismissed by the court prior lo 
trial. Gary maintains,, however, that lie 
cause the statute of limitation precluded 
recovery for any damages incurred in 1981, 
the statute likewise ~recluded the cour' 
from considering the parties' conduct at-' 
that time when it evaluated Kent's dam- 
ages claims arising in 1981. - 
I t  is clear that the court's reference to 
t11e 1981 incident goes to the fact that Gary 
was, from that point forward, put on notice 
that any further damage to Kent's lot 
would not be tolerated. Thus, regardless 
whcther Kent could recover for the dam- 
ages he sustained in 1981, the parties' con- 
duct a t  that time was evidence bearing on 
Kent's claims for the trespass arising in 
1987. In particular, the evi'dence was re le  
vant to. determinine Garv's state of mind 
when ,he,decided to-bnlldbze a mad aaoss 
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the west end of Kent's lot, an essential 
element of Kent's claims for punitive dam- 
ages. See Clbeney e. Palos Verdes Inv. 
Cow., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661, 
669 (1983). At  trial, Gary had protested 
that his intentions in constructing the West 
Road across Kent's land were innocent, if 
not magnanimous. However, evidence of 
Gary's previous conduct, including his ac- 
tions in 1981, was relevant to refute this 
assertion and tended to show instead that 
his actions were malicious, outrageous, and 
done with knowing disregard of Kent's 
property rights. Hence, Gary's conduct in 
1981 bore upon Kent's claims for punitive 
damages, and was properly considered by 
the trial court. 
6. SzcOstantial evide?zce suppovts the 
a w a ~ d .  
1251 Gary also contests the punitive 
damages award on the ground that such an 
award was not sufficiently supported by 
the facls. Our Supreme Court has stated: 
An award of punitive damages will be 
sustained 01, appeal only wlien it  is 
shown that the defendant acted in a man- 
ner that was "an extreme deviation fron~ 
ieasonahle standards of conducl, and 
that the act was performed by the defen- 
dant with an understanding of or disre- 
gard for its likely consequences." The 
justification for punitive damages inust 
be that tlie defendant acted with an ex- 
tremely liarmful state of mhid, whether 
that state bc termed "malice, oppression, 
fraud or gross negligence"; malice, op- 
pression, wantonness"; or simply "delib- 
erate or willful." (Citations omitted). 
Man?d?lg v. Turin Jkl ls  Clinic & Hosp., 
122 Idaho 47, 52,830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1932) 
quoting Cfzeueg, 104 Idaho a t  905, 6G5 
P.2d a t  669. Wlicn a trial court has made a 
punitive award, our standard of review is 
whether substantial evidcncc supports the 
determination that the requisite factual 
findings criteria have been satisfied. It.T. 
N a i ~ m  Co. v. Hulel, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752 
P.2d 625, 631 (Ct.App.1988). 
[261 Gary complains that the court's 
finding that Gary's conduct was "mali- 
cious, outrageous and unreasonable" was 
REPORTS 
erroneous in light of his testimony that his 
only motive for bulldozing Kent's property 
was "to further a family convenience for 
both Kent and Jean" and that he had misin. 
terpreted Kent's previous admonitions to 
leave the property alone. The trial court 
weighed Gary's testimony against the body 
of evidence showing that Gary's actions 
were done in wilful disregard of Kent's : 
property rights. The evidence, although 
conflicting, was sufficient to support the 
trial court's findings that Gary's actions 
were "intentional, reckless and in knowing 
disregard of Kent's property rights" and 
that his conduct was "malicious, outta. 
geous and unreasonable." Compare R.T. 
Nnhm Co., 114 Idallo a t  29,752 P.2d a t  631 
(punitive damages award for trespass va- 
cated on basis, in part, tliat property right ! 
infringed upon was uncertain until after 
adjudication). Accordingly, we will not dis- 
turb these findings on appeal. 
p Tile award did no1 duplicate the 
a w a ~ d  of slatut.o?y damages. 
127,281 Pinall),, me consider whether 
the court erred in granting boU1 punitive 
damages and ti-ebk damages under the 
statute. Thesc allegedly duglicitous 
awards were granted as cxcmplary dam- 
ages, the purpose of which is to deter the 
defendant's misconduct, not to compensate 
the plaintiff for his losses. Soria v. Sic?-ra 
Pac. Airlines, 111 Idaho 594, 610, 726 P.2d 
706, 712 (1986). Hence, in ascertaining 
whether the awards are duplicitous, the 
proper focus of our inquiry is not whether 
the plaintiff obtained a double recovery, 
but whether the defendant has incurred 
multiple penalties for ilic same wrongful 
a c t  Cf: 22 AM.JUR.2D D a n m e s  D 817 
(1988). . I t  has been said that the imposition 1 
of two penalties for llie same wrongful act 3 
violates basic fairness and thus due process 
of law, even though the theories behind the 
cnuscs of action differ. See id., a t  864. 
I291 The record in this ease reflects 
that, a s  required by I.C. Q 6202, the court 
granted damages for treble the value of 
the trees that Gary had intentionally and 
wilfully removed from Kent's lo t  Howev- 
er, this award of statutory damages for the 
BUMGARNCR v. BUMGARNER 
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act of taking trees did not prevent the trial 7. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Re- 
court fmm awarding punitive damages for fusing to Grant a Prescriptive Right 
Gary's conduct in constructing the West to the Turn-around Roadway. - 
Road. In granting this latter damages 
award, the court found that Gary's aet of 
?oad building-undertaken in defiance of 
Kent's unequivocal request that no im- 
provements be made to the lot, specifically 
"no roadsu-was an act distinct from the 
act of taking valuable trees. In denying 
Gary's post-trial motion to amend Lhe find- 
ings, the district court again expressly 
found that its punitive damages award was 
not duplicative of its award of treble dam- 
ages, but that it  had based each award 
upon distinct acts committed by Gary. We 
further observe that each of these awards 
is supported by the evidence, and thus nei- 
ther will be disturbed on appeal. 
U 3  [31-331 Gary next asserts that thc 
court erred in denying his claim of a pres- 
criptive right of easement over the turn- hP 
around road located in the middle of Kent's ~4 
lot. In order to establish a private pres- 
criptive right of easement, a claimant must 
submit reasonably dear and convincing 
proof of open, notorious, continuous, and 
uninterrupted use, unde? a claim of right, 
with the knowledge of the owner of the 
servient tenement, for the prescriptive peri- 
od of five years. LC. $ E-203; Chen v. 
Conwa~,. 121 Idaho 1000, 1005, 829 P.2d 
1349, 1354 (1992); West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 
550. 557. 511 P.2d 1326.1333 (1973). ' I f  the --- 
roadway's use was adverse for any  eontin- 
uous fiveyear period, that use can estab. - 
6. Admission of Ifearsay Evidence Did lish a prescriptive riglit to the continued 
Not Constitute Reversible Error. use of the road. Burnett w. Jayo, 119 
(301 Gary also takes exception to the 
court's decision te allovr Kent to testify to 
a previous conversation he had with Jean's 
son, IIerb. The thrust of tllis testimony 
was that Jean and Gary had conirived a 
factual scenario, solely for purposes of this 
lawsuit, to support Gary's claim of owner. 
ship to the disputed southcrn portion of 
Kent's lot. Garv ob.iectcd to tlie teslimoiig 
. . 
on the ground that it was hearsay. Ovcr- 
ruling the objection, the court admitted the 
evidence under the "present sense impres- 
sion" exception to the rule against hearsay. 
See I.R.E. 803(1). We note, however, that 
the district court expressly found that Gary 
in fact helieved he owned the disputed por  
tion of Kent's lot.' This finding, which is 
contrary to Herb's reported story, indicates 
that the court was not persuaded by this 
hearsay testimony. Moreover, the court's 
finding is consistent with its refusal to 
award any exemplary damages arising out 
of Gary's construction of the Beach Access 
Road and the installation of the hitching 
post. Hence, we conclude that any error in 
allowing the hearsay testimony was harm- 
less, a s  it  did not affect any substantial 
right of the party, Gary, over whose objec- 
tion the evidence was admit@ See I.R.E. 
1031a); X.R.C.P. 61. . .., . . . . . 
Idaho 1009, 1012, 812 P.2d 316, 319 (Ct. 
App.1991). However, a prescriptive right 
catiuot be obtained if the use of the ser- 
vient tenement is by jiermission of i t s  own- 
ui-, as such use clearly is not adverse to the 
right3 of the owner. Slate ez rcl. Na?n(~?~li 
h FOG 100 Idalio 140, 143, 594 P.2d 1093, 
lO$G (1979); B ~ i n l s  a Alderman, 122 Jda- 
ho 749, 754, 83$ l3.2d 878, 883 (Ct.App. 
1992). 
In this ease, the district court found that 
Gary's use of the turn-around had been 
permissive. Gary takes issue with this 
finding. He contends that his continued 
use of the turn-around roadway between,._: 
1970-when Kent first acquired title to the 
lot-nd 1982, when Kent confronted Gary ._,: 
about having widened the roadway, raised 
the presumption of adverse use for the 
prescriptive period and shifted the burden 
to Kent to prove that tile use was permis- 
sive. Ile argues that Kent failed Lo rebut 
tbis presumption, and that the court's find- 
ing therefore must be reversed. We are 
not persuaded. 
[34,35] The presumption from which 
Gary seeks to benefit applies where the 
claimant has..established .his open, notori- 
ous, wntinuous,:and uninterrupteduse. of 
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the way for the prescriptive period, uith- on entirely separate claims, those claims 
out  &dence as to how that use began. are properly distinguished and should be 
West, 95 Idaho a t  557, 511 P.2d a t  1333; analyzed separately in determining wheth. 
Bums, 122 Idaho a t  754, 838 P.2d a t  883. or attorney fees are appropriate. See 
In this case, however, the record contains Ranzco v. H-I< Contractors, Inc, 118 Ida. 
ample evidence detaiiing tlie Bumgarner ho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1388 (1990); 
family's acquisition of the Cottauwood Bay ~ u m  v. County ojBoundary, 120 Idaho 
Property, the forging of the original turn- 623, 625-26, 818 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Ct.App.. 
around road in the middle of that property, ISSO), modz3ed on othergrounds, 120 Ida. ; 
and Gary's use of the turn-around between 110 614, 818 P.2d 318 (1991). We also note, 
1970 and 1973 to access vehicles which however, that the trial court is authorized 
Kent had expressly permitted him to locate to award attorney fees only as  provided by 
on his lot. Given this evidence, a presump- statute or contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); see : 
tion of adverse use and claim of title was also Hellar v. C e n a m ~ s a ,  106 Idaho 571, 
not appropriate. Moreover, the record is 578, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (1984). In this case, 
devoid of any evidence to show that Gary's the court based its award of iees on I.c. 
use of the existing turn-around was ad- 8 6202. That statute, which applies to 
verse to Kent's interests, or that Gary had claims for intentional and wilful trespass, 
ever asserted a claim of nonpermissive mandates an award of reasonable attorney 
right to use that roadway. Upon this r e e  fees in an ?.tiion "brought to enforce the 
ord, tlie court could properly find that terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails." 
Gary's use of the turn-around after 1970 Id As applied to the case a t  hand, this : 
had heen with Kent's permission. Accord- statute authorized the district court to j 
ingly, we uphold that finding. ,award fees only to Kent, "the plaintiff" in 
that action, and then to awa1.d only those 
8. Thc Attorney Fecs Award Does Not fees reasonably incurred in prosecuting the 
Represent xn Abuse of 1)iscrelion. trcspass action upon which lie prevailed.' 
1 3 ~ ~ 3 9 1  \+ie ,lert consider district lienee, even tIioug11 the court found that 
award of auor,lc), fees. ~ . ' ~ l j ~ ~ i , ~ ~  G a y  had prevailed on some of the claims 
tile district coi,rt,s issuiiIlce findings " ~ s e ~ t d ,  it found no skitutory biisis upon 
?jent a costs biii wl~icli he would be entitled Lo any off- 
w],icj, included $37,0(;5.50 in fees. ~ e t t i l x  award. ~onsequently, and con- 
B~ its subsequeilt decision trary to Gary's position, there was no basis 
and order awardillg attorney fees, tiie dis. for the court to apportion fees between the 
trict court heid that am,or. pe~ t ies .  Rather, the court was required to 
tionment of the total fees incurred in this award Kent his full reasonable attorney 
matter to the trespass claim, is sum of fee attributable to his successful trespass 
$18,532.75," and awarded Kent attorney 
fees in that amount. Gary does not dispute [401 it is clear from district court's 
that Kenes success on the statutory tres- 
memorandum opinion and order awarding : 
pass entitles him a mandatory attorney fees that the court considered the ,.: 
award of attorney fees under LC. 8 6-202. fact a suhslantial of Kent#s :i 
However, Gary contends that the trial eiiorts were directed at upon which 
court abused itq discretion in fixing Uie he did not specifically citing Kent>s . 
amount of the award, arguing Ll~at the elaim tres13ass to ti,e bvacl, his 
court failed to 1)roperly consider the claims property and K~~~~~ for :, 
-upon whicli he, Gary, had prevailed. distress. The court found, however, that 
Gary is correct with respect to his asset- some of the legal work performed on those 
tion that where the parties have succeeded claims overlapped with Kent's successful , 
4. Thus, a party who successfuily defenhF againa I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Compare I.C. g 12-120(3) 
a claim for tre6le damages is nor entitled to (mandating attorney feer, in cettain cases, to 
recoup his fees under thcstatute. I.C. 5 6202: the "prevailing pnrry.") 
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claim for tresvass to the west end of his 862 P.2d 337 
Kt, and that ~ e n t  was entitled to recover 
those fees. Accord Bubak v. Euans, 117 
Idaho 510, 513, 788 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct. 
~pp.1989). Based upon its findings, which 
Gary does not dispute here, the court allo- 
cated one-half of all Kent's attorney fees, 
or $18,532.75, to the prosecution of the 
successful trespass claim. Upon this rec- 
ord, we conclude that the district court 
acted within the boundaries of its 'discre- 
tion and consistent with the legal standards 
applicable to its decision. We further con- 
clude that  the court reached its decision 
through the exercise of reason. Finding no 
abuse of discretion, we affirm the district 
court's award of attorney fees. See Asso- 
cio,tcs Norlizwesl, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 
603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987). 
Randall 0. KNIGHT, Petitioner- 
Appellant, 
L i- 
Y. 
L-2 
CQ 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, c.1 
State of Idaho, Respondent. pi 
No. 20152. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho 
Oct. 8, 1993. 
Insurance agent appealed administra- 
tive determination that he had misappropri- 
ated premium trust funds. On rejnand, -_ 
119 Idaho 581, 808 P.2d 1326, Department 
of Insurance 'again suspended agent's li- 
. 
cense. and arent again appealed. The 
Conclusion pour& ~udicia?Distri;t ~ o u & , ~ d a  County, 
Deborah Bail, J., affirmed, and further ap- We affirm the district court's judgment peal was taken, Court of 
quieting title in Kent to a lot approximately C.J,, that: de. 
sevealty-Lwo feet wide. Additionally, we partment3s failure to sei,d a warl,ing letter 
affirm the district court's awards of coni- before filing complaint againsl agent was pensator?, statutory and punitive damages no$ jurisdictiooal error, and thus could not 
against Gary. Finally, we uphold the dis. be raised for first time 011 appeal, and (2) 
tricl court's a!vard of attol.ne)r fees. 
,ircluiuins col]ected by agei~t, whether re- 
Because lic lias pre\,ailed in this appeal, 
Kcnt is enlitled to his costs on appeal. 
I.A.R. 40. We iurUler hold that Kent is 
also entitled to an award of attorney fees 
on appeal pursuant to LC. 8 6-202. See 
Bubak, 117 Idaho a t  513,788 P.2d a t  1336. 
The amount of attorney iees shall be deter- 
mined as  provided by I.A.R. 41. 
SWANSTROM, and CAREY, JJ., Pro 
Tem., concur. 
ferrred to as "accoupl current premiums," 
or "direct bill" business, were premiums 
held by agent in trust and thus could not 
properly be withheld from insurer. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure " 
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. 
On appeal from administrative deter- 
mination, Court of Appeals reviews record 
with the regard for, but independently of, 
district court's review in decision. 
2. Administrative Imw and Procedure 
-786, 788 
Reviewing court may not reverse find- 
ings of administrative agency where find- 
ings are clear, dispositive and supported by 
'evidence in record; agency's finding8 are 
binding even where there exists conflicting 
.ievidenw~~1~:1.@~.~~67d21&4 - (199).>.ne;.:.-: 
. ~ .  . 
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34 Idaho 682; Raide v. Dollar; 203 Pac. 469 
-------"-* - Page 682 - -----Me 
E. E. RAIDE, Respondent, V. DAVID H. DOLLAR, Appellant. 
[Cite as Raide v. Dollar, 34 Idaho 6821 
December 28, 1921 
EVIDENCE - OPINION TESTIMONY - ADMISSIBILITY OF - REAL PROPERTY-DAMAGES- 
TEMPORARY INJURY-INSTRUCTIONS-WHOLE CHARGE TO BE READ AND CONSIDERED 
TOGETHER - RIVER - HIGH-WATER MARK. 
1. Evidence examined and held sufficient to support the verdict and judgment. 
2. Error cannot be predicated upon the admission of testimony of witnesses as to what in their opinion it would 
cost to place certain land back in the same condition that it was before logs were dragged over it, where such 
witnesses testified as to the nature and extent of the injury. 
3. In an action for damages for temporary injury to real property, the owner is entitled to recover the amount 
necessary to repair such injury and to place the land back in the same condition it was immediately prior to the 
injury. 
4. All of the instructions given in a case must be read and considered together, and where, talcen as a whole, 
they correctly state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably 
-"-"-,- Page 683 ------- -- 
and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due consideration to the whole charge, and was not 
misled by any isolated portion thereof. 
5. The high-water mark of a river, not subject to tide, is the line which the river impresses on the soil by 
covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy its value for agriculture. 
6. Held, that the record contains no evidence tending to show that the land claimed by respondent is below the 
high-water mark of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River. 
APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, for Shoshone County. Hon. William W. Woods, 
Judge. 
Action for damages to real property. Judgment for plaintiff. Aflrmed. 
Robert H. Elder and C. D. Randall, for Appellant. 
The court committed prejudicial error in not requiring witnesses to qualify before receiving their testimony. 
(Jones on Evidence, sec. 363, p. 456.) 
"If the land is temporarily but not permanently injured, the owner is entitled to recover the amount 
necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was at the time immediately preceding the 
injury, with legal interest thereon to the time of the trial." (Boise Valley Const. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 
105 Pac. 1070,28 L. R. A., N. S., 968; Youngv. Extension Ditch Co., 13 Idaho 174,89 Pac. 296.) 
d 9 ' > P  
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"On navigable streams riparian rights do not extend beyond the high-water mark." (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 Pac. 854.) 
"The title of the state extends not only to the land underlying that part of a navigable stream or body of 
water over which navigation may be conducted, but extends to the entire bed, and in particular to the land which 
is covered and uncovered by the ordinary rise and fall ofthe tide, stream or lake." (Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury, 
178 Cal. 554,174 
--~------- Page 684 --------- 
Pat. 329; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S.  324,24 L. ed. 224; McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1 .) 
The defendant had the right to use the channel of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River at all stages of 
the water (Idaho Northern Ry. Co. v. Post Fulls Lbr. Co., 20 Idaho 695, 119 Pac. 1098,38 L. R. A,, N. S., 114; 
Mashburn v. St. Joe Improvement Co., 19 Idaho 30,113 Pac. 92,35 L. R. A,, N. S., 824), and it has been held 
tliat such use, even when the water is above the line of mean high water, would not be a use of the adjoining 
land. (Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 36 Wash. 198,78 Pac. 904.) 
McFarland & McFarland, for Respondent. 
Where one instruction is ambiguous or incomplete, but taken with a11 the instructions correctly stales the 
law, the decision of the lower courl will not be reversed on account of such incomplete or ambiguous 
instruction. (Bruyman v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 31 Idaho 140,169 Pac. 932.) 
BUDGE, J.-In respondent's complaint there are two causes of action alleged. In the second cause of action 
respondent sought to recover damages sustained by reason of the destruction of his dwelling-house and personal 
property situated therein and permanent injury to the land described in the first cause of action. The injuries 
complained or and sustained by respondent in his second cause of action were found upon the trial by the court 
to have been due to the act of God, and not to negligence or fault upon the part of appellant, but to an 
extraordinary flood which occurred on or about the thirtieth day of December, 1917, in the north fork of the 
Coeur d'Alene River, adjacent to which stream respondent's land is situated, the waters having suddenly risen to 
an unprecedented height, causing logs belonging to appellant in large numbers which were upon rollways along 
the bank of the river to be precipitated into the stream and carried down with large quantities of other logs 
belonging to other parties, as well as stumps and debris, on to the lands of the respondent. 
In his first cause of action respondent alleged, inter alia, that about four and a half months after said logs 
had been permitted to lodge and jam upon and against his said lands and premises, appellant negligently and 
wrongfully and without the consent of and contrary to respondent's wishes, with force and violence entered 
upon respondent's lands and premises and particularly upon his meadow, with teams of horses, logging trucks 
and devices, and proceeded to remove the logs of appellant from the premises, and in so doing cut up and 
injured his meadow lands, causing numerous and divers roads and roadways to be made, on, over and across the 
same, to his damage in the sum of $500, and negligently and wilfully cut down and destroyed two apple trees of 
the value of $25 each, whereby respondent was further damaged in the sum of $50. 
Appellant entered a general and special denial to the foregoing allegations contained in respondent's first 
cause of action. 
Judgment was entered upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the respondent, assessing his damages in the 
sum of $500, from which judgment and an order denying a motion for a new trial, this appeal is prosecuted. 
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Appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment; the action of 
the court in giving and in refusing to give certain instructions; that the verdict is excessive and was rendered 
under the iilfluence of passion and prejudice; and that the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
The latter error assigned is not discussed in appellant's brief, and will not be considered upon this appeal. 
In order to pass upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, it becomes necessm to review briefly 
some ofthe testimony offered during the trial. It is admitted that respondent was the owner in fee, in the 
possession and entitled to the possession of the premises described in his complaint. It was also established 
beyond dispute that appellant went upon the premises and particularly the meadow 
land of respondent and removed therefrom by the use of teams, trucks and other devices, a large number of logs 
that had been deposited upon the meadow lands as a result of the flood, and that the same were dragged for 
some distance over the meadow lands to the bank of the river and dumped into the stream for the purpose of 
being floated down to the mills. It is insisted by appellant that there is no competent evidence to support the 
verdict or judgment, and that no injury was done to the meadow lands by reason of the removal of the logs. 
Respondent testified that in moving the logs, ditches were plowed into the meadow. Witness Neurmi for 
respondent testified that some of these ditches were over a foot deep. Witness Wilson corroborated the 
testimony of respondent and the former witness as to the condition in which the meadow was left after the logs 
had been dragged over and across it. 
The witness Neurmi testified that he saw the meadow before and after the logs had been pulled off it. He 
further testified that he had known the meadow since 1916, that he had lived in that locality, that he owned land 
adjoining, that he had experience in farming, that he knew the character and kind of land owned by the 
respondent. Thereupon the following question was propounded to the witness, to which counsel for appellant 
objected upon the ground and for the reason that the witness had not shown himself qualified to answer the 
question: "Do you lcnow what the reasonable cost would be of putting that land in the same condition as it was 
before any of those logs were hauled away on account of the scratching and the roadways you have testified 
to?" to which question the witness made answer that he knew, and was thereupon asked, "How much would be 
a reasonable cost for putting the land in the same condition as it was before any of the logs were hauled away?" 
His answer was, "Between five and six hundred dollars anyhow." 
----- Page 687 --"-- 
The witness Wilson testified that he hgd lived on the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River for twelve years; 
that he had worked in the woods and had farmed; that he helped to remove the logs from respondent's place; 
that it took three or four days with about seven men and three teams of horses; that after removing the logs the 
land looked very bad on account of the logs plowing up the meadow; that some of the places made by the logs 
were a foot deep. Thereupon counsel for respondent asked the witness the following question: "Do you know 
what the reasonable cost would be for filling up these ditches and roads caused by the dragging of those logs, 
and putting the land in the same condition it was before the logs were dragged off of it?" to which he made 
answer that he did, and he was thereupon asked how much, whereupon counsel for appellant objected to the 
witness answering the question upon the ground that he had not shown himself qualified. The objection was 
overruled. and the witness answered that it would cost never under five or six hundred dollars. 
The court did not err in overruling the objections and permitting the witnesses to answer. Their testimony 
disclosed the nature and extent of the injury done to the meadow by removing the logs. It was for the jury to fix 
the damages. The fact that the witnesses testified as to what in their opinion it would cost to place the land back 
in the sane condition that it was before the logs were dragged over the meadow was not prejudicial to4aw~l!qnt, 
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in view of the fact that the witnesses had testified to the actual conditions in which the meadow was left as a 
result of the dragging of the logs over it. 
In actions of this nature the principle of actual compensation governs and the damages awarded must be 
confined to the actual damages sustained. We think the damages proven in this case were supported by 
sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict. The meadow was not permanently injured as a result of 
dragging the logs over it, but it was a temporary injury and the owner would be en- 
----- ----."--- Page 688 -.,-"-"-, 
titled to recover the amount necessary lo repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was in at the time 
immediately preceding the injury. Whether it was necessary to replow and resow the meadow, or to fill in the 
ditches made as a result of dragging the logs through the meadow, was for the jury to determine. Appellant was 
entitled to recover a verdict sufficient in amount to repair the injury done or to place the land in the same 
condition that it was immediately prior to the injury sustained, and such additional damage if any that may have 
resulted by reason of appellant's failure to remove the logs from the meadow. 
Appellant insists that the court erred in giving instruciion No. 3A, which reads as follows: "And you are 
further instructed that if from the preponderance of the evidence you believe that defendant did so enter 
plaintiffs land without his consent and contrary to his wishes with said teams and logging devices and did 
therewith drive and drag logs over plaintiffs lands and premises and his said meadow, whereby said lands and 
premises and meadow were cut up and injured and roads and roadways caused thereon by defendant in driving 
and dragging logs over said lands, premises and meadow, by reason of which plaintiffs said lands, premises and 
meadow were injured and damaged, you should find in favor of plaintiff and assess his damages against 
defendant in such sum as it would necessarily cost to repair such injury, if any has been proven." 
It is insisted that the foregoing instruction is indefinite and uncertain because it does not limit ihe liability of 
appellant to such repairs as are necessary to put ihe land of respondent in the condition it was at the time 
immediately preceding the injury, but leaves it open to the jury to find the total amount of damages done to 
respondent's land, not only in removing the logs but also the damages caused by the flood, and said instruction 
does not state the law. There is no merit in this contention. In instructions No. 1A and 2A, the court limits 
respondent's right to recover to the injury sustained by the wrongful entry of 
appellant upon respondent's premises, and expressly admonishes the jury that they should find in favor of 
respondent and assess his damages against appellant in such sum as it would necessarily cost to repair such 
injury, if any had been proven. 
All of the instructions given in a case must be read and considered together, and where talten as a whole 
they correctly state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be 
assumed that the jury gave due con side ratio^^ to the whole charge, and was not misled by any isolated portion 
thereof. (Brayman v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 31 Idaho 140, 169 Pac. 932.) 
It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 6, which is as follows: "You are 
instructed that the title to the bed of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River below the ordinary, or natural 
high-water mark, is vested in the state of Idaho, for the use and benefit of all the people; that therefore, if you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the logs of the defendant were deposited on land 
which is below the ordinary or natural high-water mark, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict will be for 
the defendant." 
The high-water mark of a river, not subject to tide, is the line which the river impresses on the soil by 
covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and io destroy its value for agriculture ( tg x re]. IFL 4 
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Citizens'Electric Lighting & Power Co. v. LongfZlow, 169 Mo. 109, 69 S. W. 374.) 
In this connection it is urged that the land upon which these logs were cast was below the high-water mark 
of the river at that point, and that the title to the land was in the state for the use of the public. The evidence, 
however, fails to justify any such conclusion, but shows, on the contrary, that the land was under cultivation, 
that hay, grain and vegetables were raised thereon, and that some twenty-five bearing fruit trees were then 
growing upon the land. 
While the evidence discloses that portions of this land were occasionally overflowed during spring freshets, 
yet appellant's position that the land was below the high-water mark is untenable, in view of the finding of the 
court that the logs were cast upon the land by an unusual and extraordinary flood. By the term "high-water 
mark" is meant those points along the shore where water rises to such a height as may reasonably be 
anticipated, but does not include such extraordinary freshets as cannot be anticipated. (Erdman v. W m b  Rapids 
Power Co., 112 Minn. 175, 127 N. W. 487,128 N. W. 454.) 
The court did not err in refusing to give the instruction requested. 
There is no evidence in the record that would justify this court in reaching the conclusion that the verdict is 
excessive by reason of bias or prejudice. Neither do we think that the jury was confused in assessing 
respondent's damages by reason of the flood and such damages as resulted by the removal of the logs. 
Finding no reversible error, the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Costs are awarded to 
respondent. 
Rice, C. J., a id  Dunn and Lee, JJ., concur. 
McCarthy, J., dissents. 
Footnotes: 
Publisher's Note. 
2. Admissibility of opinion of witness as to amount of damages to realty, see notes in 3 Ann. Cas. 667; 
Ann. Cas. 1912A. 191. 
3. 01% cost of restoration as measure of damages for injury to real property, see note in 17 L. R. A. 426. 
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Neal K. POWELL and Dianne B. Powell, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants-Cross 
Respondents, v. Kenneth W. SELLERS, a single man; Robert Sellers and Robyn L. Sellers, husband and wife, 
Defendants-Respondents, and Orville Durrant and Fay Durrant, husband and wife; Duane Dwant, a single 
man; Bobby Wayne Whitehead and Linda Ann Whitehead, husband and wife, Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
[Cite as Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 1221 
No. 22580. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
May 5, 1997. 
Landowner sued adjacent landowners, seeking declaration of terms of their stipulation concerning construction 
of new drainage ditch. Adjacent landowners counterclaimed, alleging that landowner had negligently performed 
his duties under stipulation resulting in damage to their property. The Seventh Judicial District Court, Bingham 
County, Marvin M. Smith, J., made declaration, and after jury trial, awarded damages to adjacent landowners 
and awarded attorney fees to both sides. Landowner appealed and adjacent landowners cross-appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that: (1) instructions were proper; (2) erroneous failure to submit three 
admitted exhibits was harmless; (3) appeal record supporting claim that several unadmitted exhibits may have 
gone to jury was inadequate; (4) adjacent landowners were competent witnesses concerning value of their 
property; (5) evidence supported damage award to adjacent landowners; (6) statute providing for attorney fees 
to prevailing party in suit involving commercial transaction applied; (7) evidence supported jury's 
apportioiment of 20% liability to adjacent landowners; and (8) neither side was entitled to fees or costs on 
appeal. 
Affirmed. 
----- page 124 -,-,-.-.--..--.----- 
Ken Law Office, Blackfoot, for appellants. Robert M. Kerr, Jr. argued, Blackfoot. 
Whittier, Souza and Clark, Chtd., Pocatello, for respondents-Sellers. John Souza argued, Pocatello. 
PERRY, Judge. 
In this case we are asked to review a number of rulings by the district court. After a review of the record and 
applicable law, we affirm. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
This is a consolidated case, that originated as four separate proceedings, and involves the owners of three 
adjacent parcels of property. The parties agreed to settle their disputes through the construction of a new ditch 
to service the properties. They entered into a detailed stipulation for the construction of the ditch, which was 
accepted by the district court. 
- 
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The stipulation provided that Neal Powell was to provide certain equipment, move sand from the southeast 
corner of the Durrant property to the northeast corner of the same property for use as the ditch pad, and 
construct the ditch pad as described in the stipulation. After Powell constructed a ditch pad, Kenneth Sellers 
was to construct a ditch on the pad provided by Powell and work with Bingham County for the placement of a 
culvert. The Sellers(fn1) agreed to pay Powell $1000. The Durrants(fn2) agreed to provide an 
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easement across their property for the ditch and to install two headgates. The Durrants also agreed to pay 
Powell $500. 
The stipulation provided that construction of the new ditch pad was to begin by December 1, 1993. The new 
ditch was to be completed by March 15, 1994. An existing ditch was to remain in place and open until 
September 15, 1994. The stipulation provided for attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce the 
agreement. 
In December 1993, Powell attempted to start the ditch pad project, but his tractor was not functioning 
properly. On March 2, 1994, he began the job, but the tractor was still not functioning properly. Powell then 
contacted Will Cagle and hired him to complete the ditch pad. Cagle finished placing the pad on March 7, 1994. 
The equipment used by Cagle was much bigger and heavier than the equipment specified in the stipulation. 
On April 28, 1994, Powell filed a petition for a declaratory judgment. Powell asserted that the Sellers and 
the Durrants had failed to comply with the terms of the stipulation. Powell sought a declaration that the 
stipulation was still in effect, and the parties, therefore, remained bound to comply with the terms of the 
stipulation. Powell further sought a declaration that he was free to fill in the original ditch on his property after 
September 16, 1994. On June 21, 1994, the district court declared the stipulation to be effective and enjoined 
the Sellers and the Durrants from interfering with Powell's filling in of the original ditch on his property. The 
district court noted that Kenneth Sellers had not constructed the ditch as of that date, but had adequate time to 
do so before the September 15 date upon which Powell became authorized to fill in the original ditch. The 
district court determined that whether the stipulation had been breached and whether damages should be 
awarded were questions to be addressed in a separate proceeding. Powell's attorney filed a memorandum and 
affidavit in support of an attorney fee award. Kenneth Sellers, personally, and the Durrants, through counsel, 
objected to the requested attorney fees. 
Meanwhile, the Durrants counterclaimed against Powell, alleging that Powell had damaged their property 
while constructing the ditch pad and further alleging that the ditch had not yet been constructed due to Powell's 
delay in placing the ditch pad. On September 26, 1994, the Durrants indicated that they were willing to 
withdraw the issue regarding the delay in placing the pad. The property damage claim went to trial, where a jury 
found that $5,000 of damage had been done to the Durrant property. The jury apportioned liability, finding that 
Powell was 80 percent responsible for the damage and that the Durrants were 20 percent responsible, and 
awarded the Durrants $4,000. 
Powell moved for a j.n.o.v., or in the alternative for a new trial, and objected to an award of attorney fees. 
The district court denied the j.n.0.v. and new trial motions. The district court awarded the Durrants attorney fees 
attributable to the pursuance of the counterclaim and awarded Powell attorney fees related to the earlier 
declaratory judgment proceedings. Powell appeals, claiming over thirty errors by the trial court, and requesting , 
attorney fees. The Durrants cross-appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
[I, 21 Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Ida? plf;yl3, 
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826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,555,768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct.App.1989). However, 
we will defer to findings of fact based upon substantial evidence. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps , 1 10 
Idaho 349,351,715 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ct.App.1986). 
A. Interpretation of the Stipulation 
Powell's first four issues on appeal involve the interpretation of the stipulation. The stipulation provided that 
the new ditch was to run from point B-2 in the northeast corner of the Durrant property, as shown on a drawing 
of the involved parcels, to point B-3 in the southeast corller. Powell claimed at trial that B-2 was on the northern 
fence line of the Durrant property, while the Durrants 
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alleged that B-2 was actually at the Durrants' existing ditch. The relevance of this question arises because one of 
the ways in which the Durrants claimed that Powell harmed their property was by destroying and filling in the 
existing ditch in the northeast corner. Powell claims on appeal that the district court erred by failing to interpret 
the stipulation. Powell argues that allowing the jury to interpret the stipulation, and therefore determine where 
the new ditch was to end. was reversible error. 
First, we note that the district court did interpret the stipulation. That interpretation was given to the jury 
through instruction 15, which provided, in part: 
You are instructed that the construction of a written instrument, stipulation or contract is a 
question of law for the court to decide. . . . 
Accordingly, the court gives you the following instmctions as to the terms and legal effect of 
the stipulation made by the parties in August, 1993. 
It was the intention of the parties, among other things, to change the route of the Sellers' water 
to run through the Durrant/Sellers ditch from H-5 to the northeast corner of the Durrant property 
then through a new ditch from the northeast corner of the Durrant property (0-2) to a culvert across 
Tanner lane near the southeast corner of the Durrant property (B-3). . . . 
If Powell's equipment was inoperable Powell was under a duty to render performance that was 
substantial. 
It is for you to decide whether Powell's substituted service andlor performance was reasonable. 
This instruction not only interprets the stipulation, but does so in strict compliance with Powell's demands. 
The instruction provides that point B-2 was in the northeast corner of the Dunant property, as Powell claims. 
The instruction identifies the issue for the jury as one of the reasonableness of Powell's actions on the property. 
Included in this question was the reasonableness of Powell's decision to fill in the existing ditch. Powell's 
assignments of error regarding the interpretation of the stipulation are without merit.(fn3) 
B. Jury Instructions 
[3,4] Powell claims that the district court made several errors in instructing the jury. The question of 
whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Needs v. 
I 2 2 8  
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'~ebener ,  118 Idaho 438,441,797 P.2d 146, 149 (Ct.App.1990). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask 
whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. L & L 
Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Boise Water Carp., 120 Idaho 107, 110, 813 P.2d 918,921 (Ct.App.1991). 
[5] Powell claims that the district court should not have given instruction 17, regarding Powell's ability to 
alter the portion of the ditch which ran across his property. Powell claims that the district court should, instead, 
have given Powell's proposed instruction 15, which provided that Powell could alter the flow of the ditch on his 
property, so long as it did not place an unreasonable burden on the Durrants. We agree that it would have been 
preferable for instruction 17 to include the term "reasonable." As noted above, however, given instruction 15 
clearly states that the jury was to determine the reasonableness of Powell's actions. Hence, the instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately cover this point. Further, the Durrants did not claim that the Powell's action in 
raising his own ditch caused them damage. Rather, they argued that Powell caused damage to their property 
while negligently moving sand to construct the ditch. 
Powell claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the substitution of equipment, 
rental cost, and crop loss. After a thorough review of the instructions provided, we conclude that the 
instructions fairly and accurately reflect the applica- 
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ble law on these points. Powell's assignment of error in this regard lacks merit. 
C. Exhibits 
Powell contends that the court clerk mishandled the exhibits. Specifically he claims that three of his 
exhibits, which had been admitted, were not provided to the jury. Powell further alleges that the jury was 
allowed to consider unadmitted exhibits, including three photographs, unmarked drawings by Faye Durrant and 
Linda Whitehead, pictures of a drawing by Wayne Whitehead, and a set of interrogatories. 
[6] Powell's admitted exhibits 31A, 31B and 33 were not provided to the jury because they were 
inadvertently removed from the courtroom by Powell's own attorney. Each of these exhibits was an illustrative 
aid. Exhibits 3 1A and 3 1B were portions of an aerial photographic view of the area in question. Powell's exhibit 
3 1 is a copy of the same photo. Exhibit 33 is a rough depiction of the area and was drawn by hand. Powell's 
exhibit 35 is a much more detailed drawing of a greater portion of the same area. After reviewing these exhibits, 
we conclude that the error in failing to submit the three exhibits was harmless in light of the fact that other 
exhibits adequately satisfy the illustrative purpose behind their admission. 
[7-91 Powell asserts that several unadmitted exhibits may have gone to the jury. However, there is no basis 
to support Powell's allegations regarding which exhibits were taken to the jury room. Powell cites to the 
affidavit of his attorney, which was submitted to the district court ill support of Powell's post-trial motions, on 
this point. In that affidavit, counsel specifically stated, "there was nothing to indicate which exhibits had been 
taken to the jury room and those which had been retained by the clerk." Powell has failed to provide a record 
adequate to support this claim of error. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to 
substantiate their claims on appeal. Ckenowetk v. Sanger, 123 Idaho 189,191,846 P.2d 191, 193 (1993). We 
will not presume error on appeal. Powell's claims of error regarding the publication of exhibits to the jury do not 
provide a basis for relief on appeal. 
D. Evidence Regarding the Amount of Damage Done to the Property 
Powell contends that the district court erred in allowing testimony of the Durrants and their witnesses 
regarding the value of the danlage done to their property. Powell contends that the evidence submitted 
constituted conjecture and did not support the jury award. 
- 
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110-121 Damages, and the amount thereof, must be proven to a reasonable certainty. Wing v. Ifulet, 106 
Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct.App.1984); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,919,643 
P.2d 1085,1089 (Ct.App.1982). "Reasonable certainty" does not require mathematical exactitude, but only that 
the damages be taken out of the realm of speculation. Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d 
321,332 (Ct.App.1993). In fixing that amount, it is for the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. 
Two excavation professionals, McNeeley and Goodwin, testified regarding their bids for repairing the old 
ditch which had been filled in and destroyed by Powell. The bid of McNeeley was admitted after the prices 
were redacted because of problems with his computation. Goodwin's bid was admitted over objection. Linda 
and Wayne Whitehead testified to the number of trees removed from the property, and to their estimate of the 
trees' value. They also testified that they had to buy an extra four and a half tons of hay to feed their cattle 
because the damage to the property, ditch and fence delayed the time when the cattle could graze in the pasture. 
They further stated the amount paid for that hay. The Durrants, and several other witnesses, testified that there 
was damage to the pasture. Linda and Wayne Whitehead testified that five acres had been damaged and that 
their estimate for repair was $300 per acre for reseeding the pasture. Linda testified that she had reseeded the 
property several times in the past. 
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[13, 141 In an action for injury to land, where the injuiy is temporary, the owner is entitled to recover the 
amount necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was at the time immediately preceding 
the injury. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho at 639, 862 P.2d at 33 1. The proper measure for the value of the trees which 
were removed from the property was the market value cost of replacement. Id. at 641, 862 P.2d at 333. 
[IS, 161 We are constrained to conclude that Linda and Wayne Whitehead were competent witnesses 
concerning the value of their property. See Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41,44, 
896 P.2d 949,952 (1995). In light of the Whiteheads' testimony and other evidence presented, the monetary 
value of the damage done to the property was sufficiently established. Although Powell also contends that the 
amount of the award was not supported by the record, we note that the total amount of the award was less than 
Goodwin's bid for repairing the ditch. The amount of the award was well within the estimates for repair to the 
entire pasture, and Powell's claims in this regard are not meritorious. 
E. Post-trial Motions 
1. J.N.O.V. 
(17,181 In considering the district court's denial of Powell's j.n.0.v. motion, this Court is to determine 
whether as a matter of law there was sufficient evidence upon which reasonable jurors could return a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiffs; or, as stated by our Supreme Court, "there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that 
reasonable minds could have reached." Quick v. Crane, 11 1 Idaho 759,764,727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). If an 
alternative motion for new trial is made with the j.n.0.v. motion, the trial court must rule on both motions 
separately. Quick, I l l  Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195. 
The district court in this case analyzed the issues separately and independently for each motion. The district 
court recognized the relevant standards and legal principles applicable to a motion for j.n.0.v. The district court 
noted that it was surprised by the verdict, but that after careful consideration the district court determined that 
the evidence was sufficient for reasonable jurors lo find for the Durrants. We agree. The jury's verdict is 
supported by sufficient, competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Powell's 
j.1l.o.v. motion. 
2. Motion for new trial 
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theory that there was no contract for the relevant year or that the contract expired prior to the events at issue. 
The court determined that the landholder was not entitled to an award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), because 
the claim was based on the tort of conversion and was not based on the contract. Brooks, 128 Idaho at 78-79, 
910 P.2d at 750-51. 
In Brooks, the jury found that there was no contract in force at the relevant times. Here, the Durrants' 
successful claim was based on the negligent performance of a contract, the stipulation. There is no dispute that 
the stipulation was in effect when Powell damaged the Durrants' property. Although the claim is not a standard 
breach of contract claim, we find that the nexus between the stipulation and the negligence claim in this case is 
closer than that between the agistment contract and the conversion claim in Brooks. This case is distinguishable 
from Brooks because the stipulation between the parties was still in effect and was the gravamen of the lawsuit. 
The district court properly awarded fees on the statutory basis of I.C. § 12-120(3). We note that an award of 
fees may also have been appropriate on the alternate basis of the attorney fee provision in the stipulation, as 
suggested by the Durrants. The stipulation provided for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an 
action initiated to enforce the agreement. The Durrants filed this action to recover for negligent performance of 
the contract by Powell. We uphold the award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 9 12-120(3). 
H. Cross-Appeal 
[25,26] The Durrants claim that no substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Powell was only 
liable for 80 percent for the damage to the Durrant property. However, other than stating this issue as their 
cross-appeal issue, they provide no argument or authority on appeal to support the issue. Further, the 
determination and apportionment of negligence is for the trier of fact to 
determine and will not be set aside if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Smith v. DavidS. 
Shuutleff& Assoc., 124 Idaho 239,241, 858 P.2d 778, 780 (Ct.App.1993). Powell provided testimony at trial to 
support the position that the ditch banks failed due to the Dwrants' use of flood irrigation, failure to install 
headgates and poor maintenance. This testimony is sufficient to support the jury's apportionment of liability. 
Accordingly, the Durrants' cross-appeal fails. 
I. Costs and Pees on Appeal 
[27,28] Both parties request attorney fees. Powell brought thirty issues on appeal, many of which were 
without substance, eleven of which were not even the subject of argument and none of which were meritorious. 
Accordingly, he did not prevail and is not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal. The Durrants were 
successful in defending against Powell's appeal, and may have been entitled to costs and attorney fees for their 
defense of that action. However, they brought an unsuccessful cross-appeal which merely asked us to reevaluate 
the evidence and set aside a decision based on competent and substantial evidence presented at trial. An appeal 
should do more than simply invite the appellate court to second-guess a finder of fact on conflicting evidence. 
Krebs v, Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,576,759 P.2d 77,82 (Ct.App. 1988). See also Pass v. Kenny, 11 8 Idaho 445, 
449,797 P.2d 153,157 (Ct.App.1990). Accordingly, we conclude that neither party was a "prevailing party," 
and we award neither party attorney fees or costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. The instructions 
further address, properly, the issue of the interpretation of the stipulation. Powell has failed to demonstrate 
which, if any, exhibits that were not admitted during trial were published to the jury. Further, the exhibits which 
were not provided to the jury, due to counsel's oversight, were cumulative of those published to the jury , 1,232 
- 
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Sufficient, competent evidence supports the amount of the damage award. Powell's post-trial motions were 
properly denied. The attorney fee award below is upheld. The cross-appeal is denied due to a lack of argument 
and authority, and further because the jury's apportionment of liability is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal. 
WALTERS, C.J., and LANSING, J., concur. 
Footnotes: 
1. Kenneth W. Sellers and Robert Sellers and Robyn L. Sellers, husband and wife. 
2. Orville H. Durrant and Fay Durrant, husband and wife; Duane Durrant; and Linda Ann Whitehead and Bobby 
Wayne Whitehead, husband and wife, will hereinafter be collectively referred to as the Durrants. 
3. We offer no opinion as to the correctness of this statement that interpretation of the stipulation is a question 
of law for the trial court. However, it is not challenged on appeal. 
4. An agistment contract is a particular kind of bailment under which a person, for consideration, takes animals 
for care and pasturing on his land. BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY 66 (6th ed. 1990). 
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Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved. 
The Casemaker Oniine database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is 
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement 
to which all users assent in order to access the database. 
Page 1 of Z I 
134 Idaho 691; Weaver v. Stafford; 8 P.3d 1234 
-- Page 691 
Max WEAVER, an individual, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, v. Frank D. STAFFORD, Sr., 
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, and Owyhee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant- 
Respondent. Owyhee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Cross-Claimant, v. Frank D. Stafford, Sr., 
Cross-Defendant. 
[Cite as Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 6911 
No. 25238 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2000 Tern. 
July 14, 2000. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22,2000. 
~ando'wner brought action against neighbor and against holder of deed of trust on landowner's property, 
alleging trespass, breach of wairanty of title, negligent interference with appropriative water rights and 
slander of title, and seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and 
costs. Neighbor counter-claimed for negligent and/or intentional interference with appropriative water 
rights and alleged that he had acquired easement by prescription to maintain irrigation ditch on 
laiidowner's property. Holder of deed of trust cross-claimed against neighbor, alleging that neighbor's 
assertions that he had interest in landowner's property constituted slaider of title. The District Court, 
Canyon County, James C. Morfitt, J., awarded landowner $5,000 in punitive damages on trespass claim, 
and awarded holder of deed of trust $7,832.35 in attorney fees and costs. Neighbor appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Trout, C.J., held that: (1) use of metes and bounds description to determine boundary 
between landowner's property and that of his neighbor was warranted; (2) subdivision plat map was 
insufficient to support neighbor's argument that he entered landowner's property under color of title; (3) 
neighbor failed to establish prescriptive easement along boundary of landowner's property; (4) 
neighbor's actions in filling in original dirt irrigation ditch running along boundary of landowner's 
property constituted abandonment of any prescriptive easement neighbor may have acquired in ditch; (5) 
no irrigation right-of-way by agreement existed which would have allowed neighbor to relocate 
inigation ditch onto landowner's property; (6) neighbor could not bring cause of action against 
laildowner under statute which prohibits alteration of irrigation ditch so as to impede flow of water; (7) 
landowner's modifications to irrigation lateral did not constitute negligent or intentional interference 
with neighbor's appropriative water rights; (8) neighbor's action warranted punitive danlages award; and 
(9) holder of deed of tmst established that neighbor committed slander of title. 
Affirmed. 
. -JI I". 
Lawrence G. Sirhall, Jr., Boise, for appellant, argued. 
Uranga & Uranga, Boise, for respondent Max Weaver. Louis L. Uranga argued 
Randolph E. Farber, Nampa, for respondent Owyhee Village, Lnc., argued. 
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TROUT, Chief Justice. 
This case involves an action for trespass, breach of warranty of title, negligent interference with 
appropriative water rights and slander of title. Frank Stafford (Stafford) appeals from the district judge's 
decision that he trespassed upon Max Weaver's (Weaver) property and slandered the title of Owyhee 
Village, Inc. 
Three parcels of real property are involved in this dispute. Stafford purchased the parcel at 4912 
Laster Lane (the Stafford property) consisting of 1.39 acres on October 11, 1994. At the time Stafford 
purchased the Stafford property, Max Weaver (Weaver) owned the parcel at 4920 Laster Lane (the 
Weaver Laster Lane property). The Weaver Laster Lane property is southeast of the Stafford property 
and is approximately 4.26 acres in size. On October 1, 1996, Weaver acquired the parcel referred to as 
Lot 16, located southwest ofthe Stafford property, by a warranty deed subject to a deed oftrust in favor 
of Owyhee Village, Inc. Lot 16 is approximately 5.25 acres in size. 
A cement irrigation ditch (the cement irrigation ditch) runs along the northeast side of Lot 16 and 
parallel to the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. The cement irrigation ditch has been 
in place for many years and was previously used to irrigate the beet field which existed on Lot 16 prior 
to 1969. 
Before Stafford and Weaver acquired their respective parcels, there was both a fence and a dirt 
irrigation ditch (the original dirt ditch) running northeast of the cement ditch. While Stafford believed 
the original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, there was never any 
conversation or agreement with anyone froin Owyhee Village to that effect. Stafford removed the 
origjnal fence and filled in the original dirt ditch sometime in the fall of 1994 or the spring of 1995. 
Dunng the summer of 1995, Stafford filled ill all the imgation laterals w i n g  from the original dirt 
ditch that serviced his property. Stafford testified at trial that the original dirt ditch was located ten feet 
northeast of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 and ten feet southwest of the boundary line between 
Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
David Wilson, who resided at 4920 Laster Lane for approximately twenty-five years prior to 
Weaver's acquisition of the property, testified that he regarded the original dirt ditch as the boundary line 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Wilson stated that there was an infonnal agreement among 
neighbors, but no recorded easement, concerning a ten foot right-of-way to maintain the original dirt 
ditch. Dorothy Bright (Bright), owner of the parcel directly east of the Stafford property, also testified 
that she regarded the original dirt ditch as the b o u n d v  between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Bright 
testified that the former owners of the Stafford property used the original dirt ditch for irrigation. Greg 
Slcinner (Skin- 
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ner), a licensed surveyor, testified that the original dirt ditch approximately followed the surveyed 
boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
In the fall of 1995, Stafford erected a new fence northeast of and parallel to the cement irrigation 
ditch on Lot 16. Stafford's testimony about the location of the new fence was not consistent. While on 
i - ( Page 3 of 11 
one occasion he testified that he placed the new fence in the location of the original fence, he also 
testified at trial that he was unsure where he had placed the new fence in relation to the location of the 
original fence. Stafford also testified that he did not measure the distance from the original fence to the 
cement irrigation ditch. Weaver regarded Stafford's new fence as an encroachment upon Lot 16 and 
demanded its removal. Stafford complied in the spring of 1997. 
In March 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch which approximately followed the line of the 
new fence. Stafford admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's 
permission. Stafford never used the new ditch. 
Stafford's warranty deed contains the following relevant metes and bounds description of the 
boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property: 
South 7' 0' East 366 feet to the center of an irrigation lateral; thence meandering 
North 29' 50' West 23 feet; 
North 43" 20' West 168.5 feet; 
North 71' 20' West 92 feet; and 
North 35' 20' West 228.4 feet along the center of an irrigation lateral to a point 36 feet 
South ofthe North boundary of the aforesaid Southeast Quarter; thence ... 
In April 1995, licensed surveyor Skinner performed a boundary survey on behalf of Stafford and 
Weaver. Skinner established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property based on existing 
monuments. Skinner performed a second survey in November of 1996 for Weaver and established that 
Stafford's new fence encroached upon Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum of 10.2 feet. 
On April 13, 1997, Skinner determined that Stafford's new ditch encroached upon Lot 16 by 
approximately five to ten feet. 
Weaver hired Chris Wildt (Wildt) to conduct an archaeological cross-section of the boundary area 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Stafford hired Dr. Mark Plew (Dr. Plew), aprofessor of 
anthropology to evaluate Wildt's report and to perform his own cross-sectional analysis. Dr. Plew dug 
three cross-sectional trenches starting approximately five feet from the cement imgation ditch on Lot 16 
and extending northeast across the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Dr. Plew 
discovered two features which were likely ditches. Feature 1 was discovered three meters north of the 
cement irrigation ditch, which did not appear to have drawn water for any extensive period and may 
have been used for two years or less. Dr. Plew concluded the second ditch, Feature 2, had been in use for 
a very long time, was the larger of the two ditches and was older than Feature 1. Dr. Plew testified that 
Feature 2 was close to the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
Licensed surveyor John T. Eddy (Eddy) also performed a survey of the Starford property at 
Stafford's request. Eddy's October 1, 1997 survey established the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property along-a meandering dirt ditch, the same as Skinner's November 7, 1996 survey. Eddy 
testified that Feature 2, as identified in Dr. Plew's report, coincided with the meandering ditch 
referenced in Stafford's deed. 
Water is provided to the Stafford property and the Weaver Laster Lane property by the Pioneer 
Inigation District via Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.0, Gate 24. Water is provided to Lot 16 via 
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Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.6, Gate 23A. Water for the Stafford property and Weaver Laster Lane 
property historically flowed from Gate 24 in a northwesterly direction to a T-box located near the point 
where the northwestern comer of the Weaver Laster L a ~ e  property meets the southeastern comer ofthe 
Stafford property. At the T-box, irrigation water flowed to the Stafford property via the original dirt 
ditch between the Stafford property and Lot 16 or could be directed to the 
northeast to irrigate apareel directly east of the Stafford property. Water from the South Branch Lateral 
15.6, Gate 23A flows though the cement ditch in the opposite direction. 
Weaver made several changes to the irrigation lateral which began at Gate 24 and continued across 
the Weaver Laster Lane property. At the end of the lateral, Weaver installed a concrete collection box to 
replace the T-box, and also installed a concrete slab in the collection box to block the outlet to the 
Stafford property. That action lead to Stafford filing a misdemeanor criminal charge against Weaver 
which was dismissed. A con&tion of the dismissal was that Weaver remove the concrete slab and install 
a pipe from the collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Weaver removed the concrete slab and 
installed a pipe, but Stafford did not excavate a ditch to the pipe. 
Tom Eddy testified as an expert in hydrology and stated that changing the grade of the pipe from the 
collection box to the Stafford property would improve the flow of water to the Stafford property. Tom 
Eddy also stated that without any change to the elevation of the collection box, water would travel from 
the collection box to the end of the Stafford property. 
During the 1995 and 1996 irrigation seasons, Slafford diverted water from the cement irrigation 
ditch to irrigate the Stafford property. Stafford had no authorization nor permission to draw water from 
the cement irrigation ditch or to divert water from that ditch onto his land. Weaver demanded that 
Stafford cease diverting water from the cement irrigation ditch after purchasing Lot 16 and Stafford 
complied. 
Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford and Owyhee Village, Inc. alleging that Stafford had 
committed trespass by erecting a fence and subsequently excavating a ditch on Weaver's property. 
Weaver sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and costs. 
Stafford denied Weaver's allegation and asserted affirmative defenses, alleging that he was entitled by 
prescription or boundary by agreement to maintain a fence between the adjoining properties and that a 
prescriptive irrigation right-of-way existed. Stafford counterclaimed that Weaver had negligently and/or 
intentionally interfered with Stafford's appropriative water rights and that he had acquired an easement 
by prescription to maintain an irrigation ditch on Weaver's property. Owyhee Village cross-claimed that 
Stafford committed slander of title by alleging that he had an interest in Weaver's Lot 16. The district 
judge entered an Amended Judgment on January 29, 1999, finding that Stafford had trespassed upon 
Weaver's Lot 16 and awarding Weaver $5,000 ill punitive damages. The district judge also determined 
that Stafford slandered the title of Owyhee Village and awarded Owyhee Village $7,832.35 in attorney 
fees and costs. Stafford has now appealed that decision. 
XI. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] Stafford challenges the district judge's detailed findings of fact which were set forth in his 
fifty-two page Memorandum Decision and Order. This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless 
1237 
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they are clearly emeous .  I.R.C.P. 52(a); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 
(1997). We will not disturb findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent, although 
conflicting evidence. Id. 
III. 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LOT 16 AND THE STAFFORD PROPERTY 
Stafford argues the district judge should have determined the imgation lateral, referred to in 
Stafford's deed, was a monument and should have used this monument to determine the boundary line 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, rather than utilizing the metes and bounds call in the deed. 
The district judge clearly referenced the lateral and determined that "Feature 2" as identified by Dr. Plew 
was basically in the same location as the lateral. The district judge noted the metes and bounds 
description in Stafford's deed was consistent with an earlier conveyance involving the properties 
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and the Slcinner surveys of 1995 and 1996 which also placed the boundary line along the imgation 
lateral described in Stafford's deed. The district judge further found that Feature 2 "follows the line of 
the surveyed boundary to a rather remarkable degree." He therefore concluded there was no ambiguity 
concerning the location of the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and that the line 
could be clearly identified using the metes and bounds description, incorporating the reference to the 
lateral (Feature 2). 
[3,4] Stafford asserts Feature 2 represents a monument and the district judge should have examined 
whether the parties intended Feature 2 to be the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by instead using the metes a$~d bounds description to determine 
the bouidary. The argument is unavailing in two respects. First, notwithstanding Stafford's color of title 
and prescriptive easement arguments, the legal significance of Stafford's argument is unclear in that, 
assuming Feature 2 was a monument and established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford 
property, Stafford still erected a new fence and excavated a new ditch on Weaver's side of Feature 2, 
clearly outside of Stafford's property. Second, a monument is generally considered to be a permanent, 
visible and identifiable physical feature. See Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Tmvelers Leasing 
Corp., 118 Idaho 116,119,794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) (citing Achter v. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149,493 
P.2d 989 (1972) (monument must be a "tangible landmark," have physical properties such as "stability, 
permanence, and definiteness of location"); Scott v. Nansen, 18 Utah 2d 303,422 P.2d 525 (1966) 
(monument must be "definitely identified and located")). Feature 2 cannot be deemed a monument, for 
purposes of resolving the boundary dispute between Weaver aid Stafford, because Stafford filled in 
Feature 2 in the fall of 1994. The district judge was thus unable to utilize the actual imgation lateral 
named in the deed because Stafford had destroyed it. The findings made by the district judge are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence and support his determination that Feature 2 is located 
where the original irrigation lateral was and allows an accurate determination of the boundary between 
the Weaver and Stafford property utilizing the metes and bounds description in the deed. We therefore 
hold the district judge did not err by using the metes and bounds description to determine the boundary 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
IV. 
COLOR OF TITLE 
. 
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15-71 Stafford argues the district judge erred by requiring him to prevail on his affirmative defenses 
of imgation right-of-way by prescription and boundary by agreement in order to succeed on his entry 
under color of title argument. The argument is not supported by the circumstances of this case. The color 
of title doctrine arises in the context of adverse possession and refers to an instrument which has the 
appearance of title but is not in fact title. Fouser v. Paige, 101 Idaho 294,297, 612 P.2d 137, 140 (1980) 
(citing Munkres v. Chatmon, 3 Kan.App.2d 601, 599 P.2d 314 (1979)). Color of title involves awriting 
which purports to convey title, but does not have that effect and passes only the color or semblance of 
title. Id. Stafford cannot maintain a color of title argument as he has failed to present evidence of any 
written instrument which purportedly gave him title to the portion of Lot 16 which is the subject of this 
action. Stafford offers only that the Owyhee Subdivision plot map reflects a twenty foot right-of-way 
adjacent to the cement inigation ditch on Lot 16. The argument is unavailing to Stafford because the 
Owyhee Subdivision plot map is not an instrument of conveyance and does not reflect a twenty foot 
right-of-way north of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. Moreover, Stafford knew where the 
boundary was, as his warranty deed contained a specific description of the boundary and the boundary 
was subsequently established by the Skinner and Eddy surveys. We therefore hold substantial and 
competent evidence supports the district judge's determination that Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under 
color of title. 
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PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
[8] Stafford argues he had a prescriptive easement in that section of the original dirt ditch running 
northwest from the T-Box on the Weaver Laster Lane property and along the boundary between the 
Stafford property and Lot 16. The district judge determined Stafford did not have a prescriptive 
easement in the original dirt ditch as Stafford failed to establish the open, notorious, continuous and 
unintempted use of the original dirt ditch under a claim of right for five years. The district judge noted 
testimony from prior owners of Stafford's property was inconsistent and that Stafford filled in the 
original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995. The district judge further determined Stafford 
failed to establish a prescriptive easement because the location of the original dirt ditch could not be 
established with certainty. 
19-12] A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convincing 
evidence of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use under a claim of right and with the 
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive five year period. Marshall v. Blair, 
130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997). While there was testimony by people who had lived on 
or around the Stafford property that they had imgated their property utilizing the original dirt ditch, the 
testimony was conflicting as to where exactly the ditch was located. This testimony alone is insufficient 
to establish a prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch as it fails to establish the open, notorious, or 
uninterrupted nature of any prior use of the original dirt ditch and does not address the knowledge of 
such use by Weaver or any previous owner of Lot 16. Moreover, assuming Stafford did have a 
prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch, Stafford abandoned this right. Abandonment of a 
property right must be evidenced by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act. Perry v. Reynolds, 63 Idaho 
457,464, 122 P.2d 508,510 (1942) (citing Sullivan Constr. Co. v. Twin Falls Amusement Co., 44 Idaho 
520, 526-27,258 P. 529,530-3 1 (1927)). Mere nonuse of an easement does not effect an abandonment. 
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,67,813 P.2d 876,878 (1991). Here, Stafford testified that he filled in 
the original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994. Stafford's act is sufficient to abandon any prescriptive easement 
which may have existed in the dirt d~tch. We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports 
- 
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the district judge's determination that Stafford did not have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt 
ditch. 
VI. 
IRRlGATION RIGHT-OF-WAY BY AGREEMENT 
[13] Stafford asserted an irrigation right-of-way by agreement, located in the original dirt ditch, as an 
affirmative defense. Stafford offered no evidence of an express or implied agreement between himself, 
or his predecessors in interest, and Weaver, or his predecessors in interest. Moreover, it is difficult to see 
the relevance of this argument. There is no question there was at one time an original dirt ditch between 
what is now Lot 16 and the Stafford property. That ditch was destroyed by Stafford and he then sought 
to relocate the ditch to a location on Lot 16. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
diskict judge's determination of the location of the original dirt ditch and it is not in the same place 
where Stafford sought to create the new ditch. While Stafford disagrees with the district judge's 
determination, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence in the record to support it. At this point, it 
appears Stafford simply asserts some right to put the new ditch in a location of his choosing and his 
argument for an irrigation right-of-way is unavailing. 
VII. 
WEAVER'S INTERFERENCE WITH STAFFORD'S WATER RIGHTS 
Stafford asserts Weaver made changes to the irrigation lateral which provided water to the Weaver 
Laster Lane and Stafford properties. Stafford specifically alleges that Weaver tiled some portions of the 
irrigation lateral, replaced the T-box with a new con- 
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Crete collection box and installed PVC pipes to irrigate one of Weaver's fields with water fcom the 
irrigation lateral. Stafford also alleges that Weaver changed the elevation of the ground around the 
irrigation lateral, lowered the irrigation lateral, blocked the outlet from the new concrete collection box 
which would have served Stafford's property and filled the area between the new concrete collection box 
and Stafford's property with gravel, all of which prevented Stafford from receiving water. Stafford 
argues the district judge erred by holding Stafford was barred from recovery under LC. 3 42-1207 
because he did not have a ditch in place to receive water. Stafford also argues the district judge erred by 
determining Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's appropriative water 
rights. 
A. I.C. $42-1207 
[14] Idaho Code § 42-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch in a manner which impedes the flow 
of water or "otherwise injurers] any person or persons using or interested in such lateral ditch." Stafford 
failed to introduce any evidence of the historic flow rate of water to the Stafford property before and 
after Weaver's changes. Dorothy Bright, however, whose property receives water from the new concrete 
collection box through an outlet at the same level in the collection box as the outlet to the Stafford 
property, testified that she received more water after Weaver's changes. In addition, Stafford cannot 
maintain that he was interested in receiving water from the irrigation lateral when, in the fall of 1994, 
Stafford filled in the ditch that wouId have received water from the concrete collection box. Stafford, 
therefore, cannot recover under I.C. § 42-1207. 
B. Negligent interference with appropriative water rights 
[IS] The elements of common law negligence include (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to confonn to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. Brooks v. 
Logan, 127 Idaho 484,489,903 P.2d 73,78 (1995). Here, Weaver incurred a statutory duty to avoid 
injury to Stafford when making changes to the irrigation lateral. Stafford fails to establish that Weaver 
breached that duty. 
(16) Stafford argues that, without a shutoff mechanism on the PVC pipes which Weaver installed 
upstream from the concrete collection box, the concrete collection box would not fill to the top and 
Stafford would not receive water. Evidence at trial, however, included photographs showing the 
concrete collection box full to the top. Stafford also argues he was harmed by Weaver's installation of a 
concrete slab to block the collection box outlet to the Stafford property. Weaver removed the concrete 
slab and installed a pipe from the concrete collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Stafford, 
however, filled in the ditch which would have received irrigation water from the pipe and carried it 
across Stafford's property. We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports the district 
judge's determination that Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's 
appropriative water rights. 
VIII. 
STAFFORD'S MOTION TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by denying his motion to add a claim for punitive damages. 
In support of the alleged error, Stafford reasserts his contention that Weaver intentionally or negligently 
interfered with Stafford's appropriative water rights. The district judge denied Stafford's motion, stating 
"[tlhe Court will allow such a motion to amend the pleadings if the moving party establishes ... a 
reasonable lilcelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." The 
district judge concluded "tile evidence before the Court does not establish such a likelihood in this case." 
(17-191 To support a motion to add punitive damages under I.C. 5 6-1 604, Stafford is required to 
establish a reasonable likelihood 
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he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Weaver acted oppressively, fraudulently, 
wantonly, maliciously or outrageously. See Vaught v. Dairylandlns. Co., 131 Idaho 357,362, 956 P.2d 
674, 679 (1998). The district judge's determination that Stafford failed to establish such a reasonable 
likelihood is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., 131 Idaho at 362-63, 956 P.2d at 679-80. The abuse 
of discretion inquiry examines (1) whether the trial judge correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently 
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to him; and (3) whether the trial 
judge reached his decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 
Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). It is clear from the judge's comments that he correctly 
understood the discretionary decision to be made, applied the correct standards and utilized reason in 
reaching his decision. We therefore hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion by denying 
Stafford's claim for punitive damages. 
IX. 
WEAVER'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
[20-24) Stafford argues the district judge erred by awarding Weaver punitive damages for Stafford's 
trespass because Sitinner's April 1995 survey did not establish the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property and Stafford believed he had title to Lot 16. We have stated: 
An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the 
defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or 
disregard for its liltely consequences." The justification of punitive damages must be that 
the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed 
"malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence;" "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or 
simply "deliberate or willful." Highland Eizteus., Inc. v. Bauker, 133 Idaho 330,348-349, 
986 P.2d 996, 1014-15 (1999) (citations omitted). Punitive damages axe thus appropriate in 
a trespass action when the defendant acted in a manner which was outrageous, unfounded, 
unreasonable, and in conscious disregard of the plaintifi's property rights. See, e.g., Walter 
E. Wzlhite Revocable Living Tmst v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 
539, 549, 916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). Where a trespassing defendant has notice that his 
activities constitute a trespass and nonetheless continues his trespass, the landowner 
plaintiff may be entitled to punitive damages. See Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 
Idaho 566,570,602 P.2d 64,68 (1979). We review an award of punitive damages to 
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the judge's finding of 
extremely unreasonable and malicious conduct. Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. 
Prof1 Bus. Sews., Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 561, 808 P.2d 1303,1306 (1991). 
[25] Here, the record contains substantial evidence that Stafford's conduct was an extreme deviaiion 
from reasonable conduct. For example, in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995, Stafford removed the 
original fence and filled in the original dirt ditch located between the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 
and the surveyed boundary line. Stafford made no measurements or any documentary record regarding 
the location of the original fence and dirt ditch. In Aplil 1995, the boundary between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property was established by licensed sunley and was determined to be in the location of the 
original dirt ditch. In the fall of 1995, Stafford proceeded to erect a new fence on Lot 16 which Skinner's 
November 1996 survey established encroached upon Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum 
of 10.2 feet. In March of 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch on Lot 16 in approximately the same 
location as the encroaching new fence. Stafford admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on 
Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stafford thus erected the new fence and excavated the new ditch on 
Lot 16 with full lcnowledge of the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, demon- 
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strating willful disregard for Weaver's property rights. We therefore hold substantial and competent 
evidence supports the district judge's punitive damages award to Weaver. 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
Owyhee Village alleged Stafford slandered its title to Lot 16 by falsely and maliciously asserting an 
easement or ownership interest in Lot 16 which caused Weaver to withhold payment to Owyhee Village. 
Owyhee Village also alleged it incurred legal expenses in defense of Stafford's claims to Lot 16. 
- (' ("  ' ' Page 10of 11 
Stafford argues the district judge erred by basing his slander of title conclusion on Stafford's failure to 
prevail on his affirmative defenses. Stafford asserts the district judge should have focused on Stafford's 
reasonable belief that he owned the property up lo where he placed the new fence and that such belief 
negated the malice element of slander of title. The district judge, however, did not rely solely upon 
Stafford's failed affirmative defenses to find slander of title and instead set out the elements of slander of 
title and articulated the substantial evidence in support of his finding. 
[26-291 A cause of action for slander of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the following: (I) 
uttering or publishing of slanderous statements; (2) when the statements were false; (3) with malice; and 
(4) resulting in special damages. See Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758,760-61, 572 P.2d 861,863-64 
(1977). Here, Stafford's pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the publication element of 
slander of title. Stafford's repeated assertion of an interest in Lot 16 was clearly false in light of the deed 
which set the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and Stafford's destruction of the 
original dirt ditch which corresponded to the boundary. Moreover, Stafford admitted that he excavated 
the new ditch on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Malice has been generally defined by Idaho 
courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 
337, 342, 563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). An action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although 
false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues he believed the 
original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Upon removing the original 
fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith effort to record the location of the original fence or 
to place the new fence or new ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence 
was where the original fence had been only in places. Stafford's conduct in erecting the new fence and 
excavating the new ditch on Lot 16 thus belie any good faith belief in his ownership interest in Lot 16. 
Finally, Owyhee Village has incurred special damages in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment 
and the legal expenses incurred in defending Stafford's claims. We therefore hold the district judge's 
slander of title determination is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
XI. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
1301 Weaver requests attorney fees on appeal under X.C. $ 12-121. Attorney fees are proper when the 
appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 
244,249,985 P.2d 669,674 (1999). Although Stafford predoininantly raises factual issues upon which, 
at best, there was disputed evidence before the dishict court, he does raise some novel arguments 
concerning the meaning and use of the term monument for purposes of interpreting a deed and 
concerning color of title as an affirmative defense to trespass. Stafford's appeal, therefore, does not lack 
foundation and we decline to award Weaver attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. $ 12-121. 
Owyhee Village requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. $ 12-120, I.C. $ 12-121 and I.A.R. 
41. We find no basis for an award of fees under LC. $ 12-120. As to an award of fees under I.C. $ 12- 
121, we find sufficient merit to the question relating to slander of title to withstand an award of fees. 
-- Page 702. 
CONCLUSION 
The district judge's decision finding Stafford trespassed upon Weaver's Lot 16 and slandered the title 
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of Owyhee Village is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to Weaver and Owyhee Village. 
Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER, WALTERS and IUDWELL concur. 
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Bill RAYL, Plaintiff-Respondent, Cross-Appellant, v. SI-IULL ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation. 
Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Respondent, and Jaclc R. Smith, Defendant, Cross-Respondent. 
[Cite as Rayl v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 5241 
No. 15030. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
July 25, 1984. 
On Rehearing May 8, 1985. 
Farm tenant filed action seeking judicial determination that corporate landlord had not given him propcr notice 
of termination of lease, asking that he be allowed to occupy premises in following year, and seeking to foreclose 
labor lien previously filed upon property. Corporate landlord counterclaimed seeking eviction of tenant and 
removal of lien, and also alleging slander of title. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, 
Theron W. Ward, J., entered partial summary judgment in favor of corporate landlord, finding unlawful detainer 
of property and ordering tenant to vacate premises, but, at later trial to resolve remaining issues betwcen parties, 
including damages, found that no damages had been proven on slander of title count, that irrigation system 
removed by tenant was not a fixture, and that no waste was committed upon land. Both parties appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Bakes, J., held that: (1) irrigation system was a fixture; (2) in view of fact that, but for slander 
of title caused by filing of false lien, attorney fees directly attributable to removal of lien and cloud from title of 
property would not have been incurred, special damages sufficient to establish slander of title were proven; and 
(3) trial court erred in assessing interest on judgment awarded to corporate landlord at only 12% interest. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Shepard, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed an opinion. 
Bistline, J., dissented. 
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John I-Iepworth, of Hepworth, Nungester & Felton, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant, cross-respondent. 
Lloyd J. Webb, of Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine, Twin Falls, for plaintiff-respondent, cross- 
appellant. 
BAKES, Justice. 
This case involves an appeal and cross appeal from a judgment attempting to settle a dispute between a 
corporate landlord and a farm tenant over the termination of a lease of farmland. We reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and remand for final determination and resolution in accordance with the views expressed herein. 
Shull Enterprises (Shull) is a closely held family corporation owned by descendants of Nora Rayl. Bill Rayl, 
respondent and cross appellant, is a minority shareholder in Shull. Beginning in 1962, Ray1 and Shull entered 
into successive written leases of farm property (the Hollister farm) owned by Shull. The agreements provided 
for a sharecrop arrangement, wherein rent was paid by crediting Shull with a percentage of the crops grown on 
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the land by Rayl. The last written lease entered into between the parties was signed February 9, 1970. That lease 
by its terms expired December 3 1, 1974. After 1974, however, Rayl remained in possession of the property by 
apparent agreement of the parties, without a written lease, until 1981, when he was dispossessed by order of the 
trial court. 
In 1980, the corporation decided to sell the Hollister farm property. Rayl made at least two offers to buy the 
farm, both of which were rejected. OnNovember 22, 1980, at a directors' meeting, Rayl was advised that his 
lease would be terminated December 3 1, 1980, and the corporation would sell to an outsider if an agreement to 
sell to Rayl could not be reached. Rayl was later served with two written termination notices, one served 
January 6 ,  198 1, and the other January 12, 198 1, asking that he vacate the premises by February 15, 198 1. 
On November 5, 1980, Rayl filed a labor lien against the property, seeking compensation for labor 
performed such as clearing sagebrush, illstalling ditches, leveling the property, and installing fencing, all of 
which was done between 1963 and 1967. On December 30, 1980, Rayl filed this action seeking a judicial 
deternlination that proper notice of termination had not been given, asking that Rayl be allowed to occupy the 
premises in 198 1, and also seeking to foreclose the labor lien. Shull filed a counterclaim seeking eviction of 
Rayl and removal of the lien. The counterclaim also alleged a cause of action for slander of title and sought an 
accounting between the parties, and included an offer to compensate Rayl for his interest in a pivot irrigation 
system located on the land. 
On March 13, 1981, a partial summary judgment was entered in favor of Shull, finding an unlawful detainer 
of the property as of February 15, 1981, and ordering Rayl to vacate the premises. The summary judgment also 
found the lien to be invalid. The court reserved questions of damages for a later trial. 
Rayl vacated the farmhouse on March 31, 1981, but did not remove his cattle from pastureland until late 
April and early May and did not remove all of his personal property from the land until May. When Rayl 
vacated the premises, he removed a pivot irrigation system in which he owned a two-thirds interest, with the 
corporation owning a one-third interest. Removal of the system required the removal of underground electrical 
cables and piping. 
On September 25, 1981, by consent of both of the parties, Shull filed an amended counterclaim, realleging 
the unlawful detainer (which by this time had already been decided by the court) and asking for reasonable 
rental value as damages and, in addition, seeking treble damages under I.C. 5 6-301. The complaint realleged 
the slander of title allegations, and the allegations of the necessity of an accounting. In addition, a new 
counterclaim was added alleging conversion of Shull's interest in the pivot irrigation system and alleging that 
the irrigation system was a fixture and that by removing that fixture Rayl committed physical and economic 
waste upon the property. Shull also sought punitive damages, alleging that the actions of Rayl were willful, 
malicious and intentional. 
A trial was held to resolve the remaining issues between the parties, including damages. On January 4, 
1983, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding Rayl liable for the reasonable 
rental value of the land only for the period of time after March 31, 1981; finding that no damages had been 
proven on the slander of title count; that the irrigation system was not a fixture, and that no waste was 
committed upon the land; and finding that no punitive damages, no treble damages, and no prejudgment interest 
would be allowed. Shull has filed an appeal from this judgment, and Rayl has filed a cross appeal. 
Numerous issues are raised on the appeal and cross appeal. These include: (1) whether the trial court erred 
in finding that the pivot irrigation system was not a fixture; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the 
attorney fees incurred in seeking to remove the false lien from the real property could not constitute those 
special damages necessary in proving slander of title; (3) whether the trial court erred in not allowing 18% 
interest 011 the judgment; and (4) various other alleged errors, including the failure of the trial court to allow 
I 2 4 6  
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damages for prejudgment interest, unpaid rent, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and recovery 
for improvements allegedly made to the real property. We fmd that the trial court did err in its treatment of the 
first three items of the above list, but that no enor was committed as to those items listed under (4). We thus 
reverse for consideration of additional damages due because of the errors noted. 
We f is t  consider whether the pivot irrigation system was a fixture. Two center pivot irrigation systems were 
purchased between the years of 1974 and 1976 for purposes of irrigating the farmland. At the time of the initial 
purchase, Rayl paid two-thirds of the purchase price of each pivot, and Shull paid the other one-third. The 
system was generally described by Rayl during his testimony. 
"Q. All right. Would you explain to the court what that system that was then installed consisted of? 
"A. It consisted of a pump and motor, electrical control box, underground pipe that went from the 
pump to the pivot point, the electrical wiring that went froin the control boxes to the pivot point, a 
quarter mile of overhead pipe that consists of the pivot. 
"Q. And this system that you then acquired, it consisted of a busied pipeline three or four feet under 
ground; isn't that true? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And then it came up, that buried pipeline, to this circle that was purchased in 1974 and used in 
1975 into a big cement pad which handled the pivot around which the arm rotated; is that not right? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that pivot was securely affixed to that property by means of a cement slab and bolts and 
other means to securely fasten it to the real estate; isn't that right? 
"A. It was-yes. It was fastened by bolts on the comers. 
"Q. And then that circle, including the arm, were all tied together or coilnected 
together to form one unit; isn't that true? 
"A. Yes." 
When the pivot system was installed, a gravity irrigation system, composed of a series of ditches, was removed 
by pulling out cement checks through which the water flowed and filling in the ditches. 
The trial court found that there had always been an u~derstanding between the parties that each of them 
owned a portion of the pivot irrigation system, but that no system for reimbursement had yet been agreed upon. 
Testimony of various officers of the corporation indicated that the corporation intended to pay Rayl for his 
contribution to the system, but that he had refused payment at various times. Other testimony indicated the 
possibility that the corporation had chosen not to conduct a reimbursemeilt program before this dispute began. 
f 1 
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The testimony is undisputed that Rayl,' removed the pivot irrigation system when he was ordered to vacate 
the premises by the court. Removal of the system included digging up the main line and piping, which consisted 
of plastic and steel water pipes and an electrical conduit, all of which were buried three to four feet under 
ground, cutting the wires of the electrical conduit, and removal of the pumps and motors, including removal of a 
cement slab that was buried in the ground. 
The classification of a particular item as a fixture is a perpetual problem in the landlordltenant area. In 
Idaho, tenants are generally allowed to remove fixtures from leased premises during their term if the removal 
can be effected without injury to property, so long as the fixture has not become an integral part of the premises. 
I.C. § 55-308. See also Beebe v. Pioneer Bank& Trust CO., 34 Idaho 385,201 P. 717 (1921). Generally, the 
problem is resolved by application of thee  general tests. 
"[IJn determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to 
be applied: ( 1 )  annexation to the realty, eitber actual or constructive; (2) adaptation or application 
to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and 
(3) intention to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold." Pearson v. Harper, 87 
Idaho 245,256,392 P.2d 687,693 (1964). 
Other than the trial court's findings concerning the ownership interests in the pivot irrigation system and the 
value of the system, the trial court made only one finding of fact concerning the system. That finding reads: 
"When Rayl left the premises, he removed a buried pipeline and electrical system and took with him two 
irrigation pivots." From that finding of fact, the trial court issued a conclusion of law that "the pivot irrigation 
systems complete were not fixtures legally attached to the realty and instead had retained their character of 
personalty." There is no indication that the trial court considered any of the three tests normally applied in 
situations such as these to determine whether a particular object had become a fixture. 
[I, 21 Normally, the determination of what is a fixture is a mixed question of law and ract. State, Dept. of 
Revenue v. Boeing Co., 85 Wash.2d 663,538 P.2d 505 (1975). See also Thompson, Real Property, § 55 (1964). 
However, application of the three-part test becomes a pure question of law when only one reasonable 
conclusion may be drawn from the evidence. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore, 72 Wis.2d 
60,240 N.W.2d 357 (1976). See also Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra 34 Idaho at 393,201 P. 717 
("Applying the tests laid down in the above decision to the property in question, in light of the evidence, the 
door to the bank vault was clearly part ofthe realty, and it would have becn proper for the court to have so 
instructed the jury."). 
[3] The first part of the test, that of annexation, is often considered in light of the actual relationship of the 
object to the realty. In addition, a fixture may be constructively annexed to the real property. See Beebe v. 
Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra. 
"Even more importantly, however, the cases and authorities recognize that the annexation which 
renders the object a fixture may be not only actual, but also constructive. Thus, constructive 
annexation may be found where the objects, although not themselves attached to the realty, 
comprise a necessary, integral or working part of some other object which is attached . . . ." 
Seatrain Terminals of California v. County ofAlameda, 83 Cal.App.3d 69, 147 Cal.Rptr. 578,582 
(1978). 
Thus, in Wisconsin Dept. ofRevenue v. A.0. Smith Harvestore, supra, while noting that a large silo was 
attached to a concrete foundation through the use of bolts, the court ruled that an annexation had occurred 
because the silo was firmly attached as one unit. In Seatrain Terminals of California v. County ofAlarneda, 
supra, the court ruled that large 750-ton cranes, although not themselves attached to the realty, were attached by 
reason of their enormous weight to rails which were embedded in the wharf and thus, since the cranes, 1248 
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comprised a necessary and integral part of the rails, an annexation had occurred. 
The adaptation test is generally held to be met when the particular object is clearly adapted to the use to 
which the realty is devoted: 
"The question most frequently asked is whether the real property is peculiarly valuable in use 
because of the continued presence of the annexed property thereon . . . . [Aln object placed on the 
realty may become a fixture if it is a necessary or at least a useful adjunct to the realty, considering 
the purposes to which the latter is devoted." Seatrain Terminals of California v. County of 
Alameda, supra at 582 (emphasis in original). 
[4,5] The test of the intention in installing the object is regarded as the most important of the three factors. 
The intention sought is not the undisclosed purpose of the annexor, but rather the intention implied and 
manifested by his act. Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, supra. Thus, the intent should be determined from the 
surrounding circumstances at the time of instal!ation, and not necessarily from testimony as to the subjective 
intent of the installer and his frame of mind at the time of installation. See State, Dept. ofRevenue v. Boeing 
Co., supra. 
"[Tlhe inquiry is not strictly as to the intention ofthe person himself who annexed the chattel to the 
freehold . . . . The inquiry is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the 
circumstances, when tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject." 
Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,392,201 P. 717,719 (1921) (quotingJFom Boise 
Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462,186 P. 352 (1919)). 
An Oregon court had the opportunity to consider a question very similar to that presented in this case. In 
Johnson v. Ilicks, 51 0r.App. 667,626 P.2d 938 (198l), the court considered whether an irrigation system on 
the plaintiffs land, which had been removed by plaintiffs former brother-in-law, was a fixture and thus had 
passed to plaintiff by reason of a divorce decree declaring the real property to be plaintiffs. Certain statements 
included by the court in its opinion are peculiarly applicable to the present situation. 
"[Ilt is apparent that . . . whoever installed the irrigation system on the farm, did so with a view to 
enhancing the production of the farm, to increase the growth of vegetation thereon. Irrigation in a 
semi-arid region . . . is the very life of the land. It is beyond compreheilsion that the system was 
installed for any temporary purpose." Id. at 941 (quotingfrom First State, etc. Bank v. Oliver, 101 
Or. 42, 198 P. 920 (1921)). 
The court held that the irrigation system, although movable, was intended to have been annexed to the land for 
purposes of irrigating the farmland, and thus could be classified as a fixture. 
[6] All of these factors, when considered within the context of the present fact situation, can lead only to one 
conclu- 
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sion-that the irrigation system was a fixture permanently attached to the land. The system was annexed to the 
land, either constructively or actually, in that it was bolted to cement slabs buried in the ground, and attached to 
pipes and electrical wires which were buried three to four feet underground. Removal of the system necessitated 
digging up these buried wires and pipes, which could only result in some damage to the realty itself. See I.C. Ej 
55-308. 
The irrigation system was also clearly adapted to the land. The purpose and use of the land in question was 
that of farming. Irrigation is peculiarly necessary to a farming operation conducted in Idaho. This particular 
irrigation system was adapted to the particular ground being farmed. f 249 
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Finally, there could only be one intent inferred considering circumstances surrounding the attachment of the 
system to the realty. In this case, a farmer installed a necesscuy and integral irrigation system for the purpose of 
developing and farming the land in the manner he had been accustomed to. The gravity system in place before 
the present system was installed was destroyed, indicating that it was no longer necessary to have the gravity 
system because of the permanent installation of another irrigation system. 
This case is one of that type wherein the facts are so clear that only one result could be reached; thus, we 
can determine as a matter of law that the irrigation system under consideration here was a fixture. It is clear that 
error was committed in the trial court's conclusion that the system was not a fixture. Therefore, this case must 
be reversed so that the trial court may determine what further damages, including possible punitive damages, 
must be awarded because of the waste committed by the tenant in removing this fixture. 
We next consider the slander of title count. After it became apparent that a sale of the farm was imminent, 
Rayl filed a labor lien. This lien alleged an obligation on the part of Shull to compensate Rayl for fencing, 
ditching, leveling and clearing of the land, all work that he performed from the time he began farming the 
premises in 1962 until approximately 1967. Thus, this claim was allegedly for work performed some thirteen 
years before this dispute arose. Clearly this was not a valid lien, and was declared invalid by the trial court. 
Even Rayl's attorney did not seem sure of the validity of the lien, as he indicated in oral argument before the 
trial court that: 
"[Wle will agree to strike that lien or have the court strilce it. This does not mean that we have no 
right to the claim that was attempted to be illustrated by the lien which frankly I had in mind more 
or less as a lis pendens in the event that something could not be worked out between these parties. 
And that possibility, of course, is still available unless the court totally dismisses this case. But at 
least for our purposes right now I think there is no right to a lien against the property." 
Thus, when Shull filed its counterclaim it alleged a slander of title had occurred because of a filing of the 
labor lien. The trial court found: "All claims of liens filed by Rayl were barred . . . . The wrongful recording of 
such patently unenforceable claims against Shull's realty constitutes slander of title." However, the trial court 
also found that: "The slander of title, though established, is not compensable without damages, which were not 
establislied." However, the trial court did allow Shull to recover as costs its attorney fees and court costs 
incurred in attempting to remove the lien which constituted the slander of title. Thus, Shull alleges that a slander 
of title had been proved, in that compensable damages, or special damages, were proven, and thus the trial court 
erred in its basic premise that a slander of title, which cannot be established without proof of special damages, 
was not preseut in this case. 
[7] We have previously considered the elements of slander of title. In Matheson v. Harris, 98 ldaho 758, 
572 P.2d 861 
-- --.---- page 530 --.---- -vmvm" 
(1977), we noted that there are four essential elements to the cause of action which include: "(1) The uttering 
and publication of the slanderous words by the defendant; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) malice, and (4) 
special damages . . . ." Id. at 759, 572 P.2d 861 (footnote omitted). Thus, special damages must be alleged and 
proven before one can recover for slander of title. The trial court in this case found that all the other elements of 
slander of title were proven. That finding is supported by substantial competent evidence and will be upheld. 
However, the trial court erred when it ruled that the attorney fees and costs expended by Shull in its attempt to 
remove the false lien from its property did not constitute those special damages required in a slander of title 
action. As noted in Prosser, Torts, § 128, at p. 922: "Lilcewise it would appear obviously to include the expenses 
of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiffs title, or other expenses to counteract the 
disparagement . . . ." As noted by a New Mexico court, "In a slander of title action the plaintiff mu t prpv S2bSj 
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actual pecuniary damage, and proof of attorneys' fees and other costs of a quiet title suit to remove the slander 
afesuch peuniaiy damages." Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425,611 P.2d 11 19,1124 (App.1980). 
Although some courts have ruled that a slander of title action must be dismissed if it fails to allege the loss of a 
particular pending sale, as urged by Rayl, see Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483 (1942), 
other courts have allowed maintenance of a slander of title action where the only special damage shown was t h  
expense of removing the cloud upon a plaintiffs title. See Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 655 P.2d 513 
(Nev.1982). Thus, in Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, supra, after considering those cases where attorney fees 
incurred were allowed as a special damage, the court said: "We believe the rationale of [these cases] is based on 
reason and recognizes that but for the wrongful act of slander of plaintiffs title, the plaintiff would not incur any 
expenses in removing the cloud from his title." Id. at 5 15. We agree wit11 the reasoning of the court in Summa 
Corp. v. Greenspun, supm. It seems clear that, but for the slander of title caused by the filing of a false lien, 
Shull would not have incurred the excessive amount of attorney fees directly attributable to removal of the lien 
and the cloud from the title of the property. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that no special damages have 
been proven. Upon remand, the trial court should award those attorney fees and costs as damages for the slander 
of title, and should also consider whether, in its discretion, p~~nitive damages should be awarded based upon the 
establishment of a cause of action for slander of title. 
[8] Appellant also alleges that the trial court erred in assessing interest on the judgment awarded to Shull at 
only 12% interest. This judgment was issued April 8, 1983. The statute governing interest on judgments was 
amended effective June 30, 1981, to read: 
"28-22-104. Legal rate of interest.- . . . 
"(2) The legal rate of interest on money due oil the judgment of any competent court or tribunal 
shall be eighteen cents (186) on the hundred by the year." 
Thus, it seems clear that the trial court was required by this statute to award interest on the judgment at the rate 
of 18%, instead of the 12% actually awarded by the court. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to correct this 
error in this judgment. 
We have considered all of the other errors alleged by both appellant and respondent, dealing with treble 
damages, punitive damages other than as referred to in Paragraphs I and I1 above, further alleged rental 
damages, interest, and attorney fees. We find that no error was committed by the trial court in its handling of 
these subjects. 
- --- Page 531 ,-- --um--*-~-- 
Reversed and remanded for hrther proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellant. 
DONALDSON, C.J., and BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur. 
SI-IEPARD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I concur in parts I1 and I11 of the Court's opinion, but dissent as to part I. 
I believe the majority opinion ens in part I wherein it fails to distinguish between the various portions of the 
12'51 
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irrigation system, but rather reasons as a matter of law that the entire system was a fixture and therefore Ray1 
was not entitled to remove any part thereof when he was ordered to vacate the property. As aclu~owledged by 
the majority, Rayl owned a two-thirds interest in the irrigation system. The trial court ruled that the "pivot 
irrigation systems complete" were not fixt~~res. In my view, that ruling is ambiguous, to the extent that it cannot 
be determined whether the ruling encompasses only the pivots which, by their nature and design, were mobile 
and moved across the land in a circular manner being attached at one end or whether the ruling intended to 
encompass also the underground piping and electrical systems which delivered the water and power to the 
pivots. If the ruling of the trial court was meant to encompass not only the pivots but the underground portion of 
the system, then I believe the trial court erred. 
In my view, the irrigation pivots were, by their natme and design, personalty rather than fixtures. They were 
designed to be and were in fact mobile. Utilizing the approach of the majority, one could as well argue that a 
portable carousel or ferris wheel is a fixture, which would engender considerable surprise to operators of 
portable carnivals. 
I agree that the cause must be remanded in accordance with the majority's disposition of parts I1 and 111. As 
to part I, I would remand that portion of the cause to the trial couri for a determination of that portion of the 
irrigation system which actually constituted a fixture, excluding therefrom the actual irrigation pivots. In nly 
view, Rayl had the right to remove the actual irrigation pivots, and the trial court was correct in attempting to 
determine the value of Shull's interest (one-third) in those pivots. The trial court utilized the systems value of 
$36,100 before its removal from the property and the value at $1 8,600 following the removal. Thereafter, the 
trial court awarded Shull one-third of the $36,100, or $12,033. In my view, the trial court erred and Shull was 
entitled to an award or only one-third of the $18,600, or $6,200. Obviously, Shull should therefore be awarded 
the value of that portion of the irrigation system which constituted a fixture to the property. 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
A petition for rehearing in the above entitled action having been granted and the cause reargued, the Court 
has reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented by counsel. Chief Justice Donaldsou and 
Justices Bakes and Huntley continue to adhere to the views expressed and the conclusion heretofore reached in 
its 1984 Opinion No. 95, issued July 25, 1984. Justice Shepard continues to adhere to the views formerly 
expresscd in his separate opinion. 
Justice Bistline no longer joins the opinion of the Court, but separately dissents. 
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. 
The petition for rehearing emphatically stated: 
What the opinion of this Court basically comes down to is that every irrigation system installed 
upon a farm becomes a "fixture." In Idaho we no longer consider the relationship of the claiming 
parties, the relative difficulty of removal, or the nature of the article annexed .... Nor do we 
consider the previous rulings of this court. See, Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379 [565 P.2d 5721 
(1977). 
Yielding to the admonition of that paragraph, Duffhas been revisited, but only after searching our majority 
opinion to 
ascertain what use we there made of it-a search in vain. The first noteworthy aspect of Duffis that it was a 
unanimous opinion, and a second prime attribute is that it was authored by the same justice whose persuasion or 
writing style in this case has produced an opinion for the Court that a farm sprinkling system automati a y 
hi+n.ll~inxnri lmrrriter n~tlroi-hinlt~uiol~xi~hli~~~~~11~~il+cenLXie7n~~~iiRmK~W O?-T unnnnnnrFnU 
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became part of the realty on which it was installed to sprinkle. When I read in Duffthat we unanimously held 
otherwise, I blush in mortification. Compounding the error in our ways, it further appears that we applied Beebe 
v. Pioneer Bank& Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,201 P. 717 (1921) to go one way, but, a few years later, we now 
apply the same case to go another. This flagrant insult to the science of jurisprudence causes me to repeat an 
appropriate statement made by an attorney who shall go unnamed: 
The most intolerable evil, however, under which we have lived for the past twenty-five years, has 
been the changing and shifting character of our judicial decisions, by which we have been deprived 
of the inestimable benefit of judicial precedents as a safeguard to our rights ofperson and property. 
The trial co~~rt 's  findings in Dufl supra, excerpted directly from the Clerk's Record, were succinct, not 
elaborate: 
In the late spring of 1968 Goff contacted defendant Draper who was in the irrigation equipment 
business. The purpose was to obtain a sprinkler irrigation syslem for his lands which had been 
renovated from gravity irrigation to syrinkler ivrigation. 
The pump was attached to a fixture by bolts, and the outlet pipe was attached to the pump by 
bolts. The lateral lines and their component parts were portable. None of the equipment in question 
was sufficiently attached to the land as to become a part of it and thereby lose its character as 
personalty. The equipment was not specifically designed for Goff's land but could be used on other 
land and could be obtained by sample or catalog number. R., pp. 11 1-12 (emphasis added). 
Scanty as those findings were, they were the findings of the trier of fact, they were adequate, and were upheld in 
an equally scanty Supreme Court opinion: 
The equipment in question consisted of an irrigation pump and "hand" or "lateral" irrigation 
lines. The pump sat on a concrete foundation embedded in the ground. It was attached to the 
foundation by bolts and could be removed from it by loosening the bolts and by removing its 
coupling with an irrigation line. The "hand" or "lateral" lines were above ground lines which could 
be removed from the property by uncoupling them from the sub-surface lines which supplied water 
to them. Given these facts, there was evidencefrom which the district court could conclude that 
thesepieces of equipment were not futures attached to the realty and had retained their character as 
personalty and we uphold that finding. See Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,201 
P. 717 (1921); Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462, 186 P. 252 (1919). CJ: I.C. § 
55-101; I.C. 5 28-9-313. Dug supra, [98 Idaho] at 381-82,565 P.2d at 574-75 (emphasis added). 
In holding that the irrigation system was personalty, the Court ruled against a strong argument made by the brief 
of the land owner's trustee in bankruptcy, the argument of which was IargeIy predicated upon Beebe, and its 
three tests. The trial court judgment which the Court reverses today is virtually indistinguishable from Dufi 
supra. To say that is not to say that the Court's opinions in the two cases are not readily distinguishable. In Duff 
the factual findings of the trial court were set forth for public view, and declared to substantiate the ultimate 
factual finding that the sprinlcling system was and remained personalty. 
I In this case the Court's opinion states at one place that the trial court found "that the irrigation systyem was 
not a fixtureb'-and nothing more at that point-implying 
----- ---- Page 533 p""",-.w"---.-- 
or at least leaving the impression that the trial judge was totally unaware of the Duffcase-which less than six 
years earlier had been decided by another district judge in the same district.(fnl) $253 
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The findings of the trial court here are found to go beyond the extent implied by the majority. There were 
some additional findings which, in addition to lu~owing the law as previously announced by this Court, 
obviously influenced the trial court's ultimate findings. Perhaps, in this extremely complicated case, it would be 
well to isolate the findings pertinent to the irrigation sprinkling system: 
1. Shull Enterprises, Inc., is a closely-held family corporation owned by the children, 
grandchildren and great-grandchild of Nora Rayl, Bill Rayl is a grandchild of Nora Rayl and the 
son of Laura Lee Rayl Smith. Both Bill Rayl and Jack R. Smith are stockholders of Shull 
Enterprises, Inc. 
2. On February 9, 1970, Rayle entered into a written farm lease on the property involved in this 
lawsuit, which will be referred to as the "Hollister Farm", with the said written lease to run from the 
9th day of February, 1970, until the 3 1st day of December, 1974 .... 
5. Rayl admitted that he was served with a written notice terminating his lease on January 6, 
1981, and that he was served on January 12, 198 1, with a second written notice to vacate the 
premises on Febrnary 15, 1981 (Exhibit 26). 
16. The parties bought the first pivot sprinkling system in 1974. It was agreed that the parties 
would pay in the same proportion as they received the income, Rayl two-thirds, Shull one-third. 
The same division was used on the 1976 pivot. 
17. Although the parties had always recognized the interest of each in the two pivot systems, 
they never set up a system for reimbursement or for depreciation. 
20. After Shull determined in November, 1980, not to renew Rayl's lease, the directors agreed 
that Shull should buy out Rayl's two-thirds interest in the pivot systems. However, as referred to in 
Finding 19, they didn't know what the values were. The net result was that when Rayl was ordered 
with his property to vacate the premises he still owned two-thirds of the two pivot systems. R., pp. 
58-62. 
Where the two purchasers of the systems, Bill Rayl and Shull Enterprises, are in absolute agreement that after 
installatioil they own the systems together-which systems are located on corporate realty-this in and of itself 
would seem to conclusively establish a lack of any intent on the part of the two participants that the installation 
was intended as a permanent annexation. I had always thought that on an annexation of personalty to realty, the 
owner of the fee in the realty became eo inslante the owner of that which was annexed-all one property. The 
ultimate finding of fact, which, as I mention from time to time, is often called a conclusion of law, was so here 
called by the trial court, and was: 
1. The pivot irrigation systems complete were not fixtures legally attached to the realty and 
instead had retained their character of personalty. 
Predicated on that ultimate fact, the trial court proceeded in Conclusion of Law No. 2 to add that, "The removal 
of the sprinkler systems by Rayl was justified and lawful and did not constitute either conversion or waste." 
In Shull's post-judgment motion to amend the findings and conclusions, Shull sought the removal of 
Conclusions 1 and 2 above, and requested a substitution as follows: 
---*"--- page 534 -. --"' 
1. The pivot irrigation system complete was a fixture legally attached to the realty. 1254 
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2. The removal of the sprinkler system was not justified and did constitute waste. 
The motion set forth no grounds or reasoils for so altering Conclusioil No. I ,  which rather strongly suggests 
that all counsel were of a view that this Co~lclusion No. 1, inore aptly a finding of ultimate fact, was, as in a trial 
to a ju~y, simply a factual determination. 
I11 arguing the motion, counsel for Shull realized that the factual determination had been made, mildly 
expressed dissatisfaction with it, but did not suggest that evidence did not support it: 
The second issue, of course, is the sprinkler; and that is a little more complex. And we are 
simply asking the court to consider a matter that we felt deserved consideration and a matter that 
proof really was offered on, although we, if the court remembers4 don't want to mislead the court. 
We in our trial and in our brief that was submitted after the trial took the positioil that there was a 
conversion of this property and that the sprinkler system was a fixture and part of the land. And the 
court, of course, found that that was not the case and found that it was personal property and, I 
think, relied on aparticular Idaho case that I am familiar with in that finding. And while I really 
respectfully disagree with the findings at least with respect to the buried pipeline and those things 
that were set in cement and firmly fixed, I am not arguing thatpoint for now. 
What I am suggesting, however, is this, Your Honor, and that is that the court found that the 
value of that sprinkler system in place while owned by Bill Rayl two-thirds and my client one-third 
had a value of 36,100; that after its removal the value was 18,600. Well, that left the value lost in 
destroying that installation at 17,500. Now, the court knows that the proof was undisputed that the 
new systems cost $75,128; and the installati011 value of that was $28,830. And our point is simply 
this, Your Honor: I think that it is-it was well demonstrated during the trial that, and not disputed, 
that when Mr. Rayl put on the sprinkler systems during the time he was in tenancy a11d when he 
paid two-thirds and the defendant-or our client one-third that he took out and literally destroyed all 
checks and all ditches and all means of irrigating that by gravity flow. And it was obvious that there 
was no intention then or at any time that that system would be removed. 
And I might also call the court's attention to the ilotice that was sent to him notifying him of the termillation 
of his tenancy which contained a statement to him that our client, Shull Enterprises, was prepared to pay for his 
interest in that sprinlcler system. And frankly, and I think there was testimony to the effect that they were 
prepared to pay $40,000, which was substantially more than the system was worth. But we recognized too that 
by his taking it off we had to replace it, and it was going to be even more expensive than that. But in disregard 
with that and with no opportunity to even discuss that, he just ripped it out. 
And what we are suggesting that the court-if the court finds that it is personal property, which you have, that 
the proper way to value the damage to Shull would be to look at the cost of installation as well that they had to 
incur as a result of what we think is an improper and an unjustified act in digging up that main line and tearing 
out those installations. And what the arithmetic we went through is that the cost of that installation was 
$28,230; that Rayl owned two-thirds of the 17,500, which was the installation value of the system he removed, 
just using the arithmetic, the value after-or before removed less the value after removed gives you what the 
installation costs would be. And then giving him credit for that, which would be $1 1,666.67, and that the net 
cost of replacement, then, of that installation would be 
----- Page 535 - --- 
$1 7,163.33. And then suggest, then, taking the value of the pivots after removed and considering that Rayl-or 
that Shull Enterprises had a one-third interest in that, which would be $6200, using the 18,600 value after 
removal, and you add the two together and you come, for a total damage on that of $23,366.33. 
And I simply respectfully submit, Your Honor, that this would put our client more nearly in t er 1 2 d a  
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position he should have occupied; but to give him less than that and apply-and totally disregard the 
cost of installation and the fact that it was not intended that those be removed leaves our client 
through no fault of its own in a position of suffering damage that he is not-or it is not being 
compensated for. 
Now, again, I have set this forth in our motion, Your Honor, and also in our brief; and we have 
also done the calculations in those. And I would respectfully request, Your Honor, that the court 
give consideration to that approach, which doesn't do damage and it doesn't question the decision 
the court made as treating it as personal property. 
There is in my mind a large question as to whether counsel can move the court to substitute one conclusion 
for another (one ultimate fact for another), and then, after abandoning the proposition in argument before the 
trial court, then raise and argue it for the first time on appeal. That is precisely what has happened. But it would 
also seem to be unneedful of determination where, as here, the evidence, albeit it may have been capable of one 
or more interpretations, does support the findings of the true finder of facts-a truism often declared and applied 
by Justice Bakes, and by him applied in Duffv. Draper, with four justices joining his opinion. 
Returning to my distinctions between the facts of this case and Duffv. Draper, in the latter the owner of the 
land had no investment in the sprinkling system. Here, if I have it correctly, from the majority opinion, Shull 
Enterprises owned 113 of the sprinltling system, and Bill Rayl was one of the corporate stockholders-all of 
whom were related. Bill Rayl owned 213 of the sprinkling system-outright. That division of purchase price 
flowed from the 113-213 share cropping lease. 
The ownership is conceded, and equally conceded is the fact that Shull Enterprises full well recognized that 
they were obligated to pay for Bill Rayl's two-thirds ownership if they wanted to keep the system. But Shull did 
not do it, and as one of two parties owning personally as tenants-in-common, and having the larger interest, Bill 
Rayl took the system with him when his lease was up after the family corporation obtained an eviction order 
against him. Most, if not all, share-cropping tenants talce their equipment with them when they leave. Nothing in 
the record supports any contention that the two systems would not work on two other parcels of land capable of 
being sprinlcler irrigated. 
Moreover, counsel for Shull, with commendable candor, in telling us at oral argument on rehearing that our 
first opinion was a proper application of the Beebe test, third criterion, i.e. purpose, added, "That's not to say 
lhat they couldn't be removed and installed somewhere else for the same purpose. "That counsel went on to add, 
"But the fact of the matter is they were purchased for use on this particular property," adds or subtracts nothing. 
After all, Bill Rayl was a tenant. A decision was made just as it was in Duffv. Draper to move away from 
gravity irrigation to pump-powered sprinkling. In this case, moreover, the landlord, Shull, participated in this 
decision, a decision involving a large amount of money. Moreover, Shull recognized its obligation to purchase 
Rayl's ownership interest if Shull wanted to keep it. Bear in mind that under the law of fixtures, if annexation be 
the sole or main concern, under the majority view Shull as owner of the real property, automatically becane the 
owner of the sprinkling system. Yet Shull conceded otherwise, throwing a vast illumination on the question of 
intent. 
It is true, as counsel for Shull argued, that the systems that were purchased and 
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installed were designed and sufficient for the particular lands Rayl was [arming as share-cropper. Of course 
they were. It is seriously doubted that Rayl or any one else in his right mind could involve himself and his 
landlord in acquiring a system for some other farm. Nor would the average farmer purchase a system too large, 
or one too small, for the particular job. 
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Basically what the trial bench and bar will see here is that an esteemed trial judge faithfully applied this 
Court's views espoused in Duffv. Draper, only to find himself reversed by reason of having done so. That the 
trial court applied Duffv. Draper is apparent from the remarks of counsel for Shull at arguing the motion to 
alter the findings and conclusions. Moreover, after not deigning the opportunity to distinguish for the trial court 
the facts of this case from DufSv, Draper, counsel for Shull reserved that effort for this Court. The distinctioii 
drawn, while it may or may not have convinced the majority, at least engendered enough energy to ignore the 
trial court findings and fabricate a new set. At any rate, the effort at distinction was made, but it does not appear 
iin the Court's opinion, as equally glaring as no mention of Duffv. Draper. The distinction, beginning at page 48 
of appellant's brief, is this: 
The irrigation system in Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379,565 P.2d 572 (1977), was somewhat 
different from the system in the case at bar. The system in the Dufcase consisted of a pump bolted 
to a pad, a buried or sub-surface maill line and hatid lines or lateral lines which were merely 
coupled into the main line. The hand lines were not bolted onto the main line nor were they 
operated by a series of electrical switches and motors. The pivot system in the case at bar consisted 
of the pump, and electrical panel, buried main lines, buried electrical lines from the electrical panel 
which operated the switches and motors that activated the panels and connected to the electric 
switch panel by the buried electrical lines as well as the buried main lines. In the Duffcase, the laid 
was irrigated by uncoupling the hand lines and moving them by hand to a new location each set. In 
the case at bar, the pivot was not unbolted or uncoupled at all. The electric switches were activated 
and the electricity went through the buried electrical lines to activate the pivot system which then 
moved around in a circle to irrigate the land. In the Duffcase, the hand lines, which were designed 
to be uncoupled by hand for easy movement, were removed and the pump was removed. The 
buried main line was le$ intact. There was no buried electrical lines connecting the hand lines to 
any electrical panel, nor were the hand lines bolted down. The system could not be heated as one 
unit, as it should be in this case. 
It should be noted that this court did not hold that a pump which is bolted down could not be a 
fixture. It merely held that under the facts of that particular case, evidence ilitroduced supported the 
district court's finding that the pump had not become a fixture. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 49-50). 
Where this Court designedly did not adopt Shull's distinguishing of this case from Duffv. Draper, then at 
the least, as a matter of downward judicial courtesy, it should at least explain to the district court the maliner in 
which Duffv. Draper was misapplied. Instead, so it would seem, it was easier to factually redecide the case. 
Even that endeavor was not well done. Whereas clearly stated findings of fact are required of lower courts, that 
rule apparently has no application where the findings are made at this level. 
For the most part, the redetermillation of facts was not done by "fiiidings," but rather by "indications." 
Hence, "various officers of the corporation indicated that the corporation intended to pay Ray1 for his 
contribution (not share of ownership) to the system ...." "Other testiiilony indicated the possibility that the 
corporation had chosen not to conduct a cost reimbursement program ..." And, importaiitiy, and an outrage to 
the district judge, "There is no 
indication that the trial court considered any of the three tests iiormally applied in situations such as these to 
determine whether a particular object had become a fixture." 
Having established by indication, or lack thereof, the true facts of the matter, the majority opinion t B 7  
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that: "This case is one of that type wherein the facls are so clear that only one result could be reached; thus we 
can determine as a matter of law that the irrigation system under consideration here was a fixture." In getting to 
"that type of case" the majority necessarily is obliged to ignore the intentions of the parties in purchasing and 
installing the system. This is handled nicely by resorting to Beebe, and as it quoted from Boise-Payette Lumber 
Co. v. McCormiclc, by striking therefrom the word "strictly." Beebe is thus made to read: "The inquiry is not as 
to the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel to the freehold ...." 
The striking of the word "strictly" is necessary to the majority's rationale on its factual redetermination, but 
it is a disservice to the parties and does little to enhance any esteem for the Court. In this case the installation 
was made by the two identities who purchased the system, and by both, or by the major owner with the other's 
full consent and itnowledge. Only by striking the word "strictly" does the majority achieve the goal of 
substituting its own findings for those of the trial court. Intent of the installers of personal property is a large 
factor in making the factual determination as to whether or not an annexation took place. 
The Court in Beebe stated that the third criterion was the "Intention of the party making the annexation to 
make the article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature of the article 
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and 
the purpose or use for which the annexation has been made." Id,  34 Idaho at 391,201 P. 717. The Court went 
on to add, continuing to quote from the early Ohio case, that "the intention with which an article was annexed 
the consideration of paramount importance, id. at 391,201 P. 717, and then declared the first two tests as 
"mainly important as evidence of intention." Id. at 391,201 P. 717. 
What the Boise-Payette Lumber Co. case actually said, at p. 392,201 P. 717, was considerably different 
than as editorially excerpted and set out in the majority opinion. In that case, where the contest was between an 
attaching creditor and a mortgagee, on the left is what the Court's opinion quoted, and opposite it the majority's 
version: 
The portion omitted by the majority is: "Neither party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of the 
owner." The quote in the majority opinion, as editorialized, makes the inquiry to "what intention must be 
imputed to him in the light of ..." referenced back to the annexer, whereas the full text reads very clearly that: 
"The inquiry is as lo what intention must be imputed to him (the owner) in light of all the circumstances, when 
tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject." All of which had to do with a creditor 
and a mortgagee who had nothing to do with the annexation, and a far cry from this case where the systems 
were bought as commonly owned property, and the involved parties were not strangers dealing at arms-length, 
but on the contrary had very good opportunity each to know the mind of the other as they together spent a great 
deal of money which went into systems to be used by the tenant Ray1 who was at the time in possession of the 
farm only by virtue of carry-over statutory provisions after his lease ran out. 
If this Court is to malte amends, far better to set this case down for a third reargument than to stand on the 
present majority opinion. Such would encompass one hour of this Court's time, which though an inconvenience, 
would be far better than leaving this area of the law in a shambles. I close this effort as I opened it: 
What the opinion of this Court basically comes dowi~ to is that every irrigation system installed 
upon a farm becomes a "fixture." In Idaho we no longer consider the relationship of the claiming 
parties, the relative difficulty of removal, or the nature of the article annexed .... Nor do we 
consider the previous rulings of this Court. See, Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379 [565 P.2d 5721 
(1 977). 
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1. The majority gratuitously impugns the district court in saying that: "There is no indication that the trial court 
considered any of the three tests normally applied ...." Likewise, anyone reading DuSfv. Draper can say there is 
no indication that the Supreme Court considered any of the three Beebe "tests," which go wholly unmentioned 
in the Court's opinion. Beebe is mentioned, however. 
"[Tlhe inquiry is not strictly as to the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel to the 
freehold. . . . The inquiry is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the 
circumstances, when tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject." 
Majority Opinion, p. 572 
"Except in cases where, by contract or agreement, the intention of the party who made the 
annexation determines the character of the article or machine as to whether it is a chattel or a 
fixture, the inquiry is not strictly as lo the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel 
to the freehold. Thus, in the case at bar the contest is between an attaching creditor and a 
mortgagee. Neither party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of the owner. The inq~liry 
is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the circumstances, when tested by 
the common understanding of those familiar with the subject. . . ." 
Beebe, supra, at 392,201 P. at 719. 
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GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
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[On September 27, 2005, Court ordered the exhibits admitfed into evidence (Plainhfs' 
Exhibit #I, and DeJendanfs' Exhibits A through N, inclusive) and the testimony adduced at the 
Preliminary Injunction hearing conducted on April 15, 2005, incorporated into the Court Trial of 
this matter.] 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for trial to the Court, sitting 
without a jury in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
Mr. Schwam informed the Court that on June 20, 2005, this Court granted the 
plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to include equitable estoppel, but the 
Amended Coiiipiaint they filed just stated estoppel and other things had been changed as 
well and moved that the trial proceed with equitable estoppel being the only amendment. 
Mr. Brown argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Schwam argued in rebuttal. Mr. 
Brown argued in surrebuttal. Mr. Scl~wam argued further in rebuttal. Court denied Mr. 
Schwam's motion, ordering that the trial would proceed on the plaintiffs' claims as 
asserted in the June 10, 2005, Amended Complaint in paragraph 54 as asserted in the 
proposed amendment. Mr. Schwam argued further. 
Mr. Schwam presented the twelve original survey photographs which comprised 
Defendant's Exhibit RR. 
Court informed counsel that it had read the transcript of the April 15, 2005, 
preliminary injunction hearing and stated that although Defendant's Exhibits J and K had 
been offered and Mr. Brown had indicated that he did not object to their admission, it did 
not believe that it had stated for the record that they were admitted. Court admitted 
Defendant's Exhibits J and K. 
Mr. Brown presented an opening statement on behalf of the plaintiffs. 
Mr. Schwam presented an opening statement on behalf of the defendants. 
Ronald Paul Monson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit # 2  Monson Record of Survey, was identified. 
Court recessed at 10:32 A.M., reconvening at 10:42 A.M., Court, couixeI and the 
parties being present as before. 
Mr. Monson resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs 
on direct examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit #3, Priest Record of Survey, was identified, 
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, aerial map, 
was identified, offered and rejected after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam. Plaintiff's 
Exhibits #5, aerial map; and #11, copy of Defendant's Exhibit N already in evidence; 
Defendant's Exhibit W, Surveyor Monson's location of fence remnants on Weitz land; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #12, Application for a Preliminary Injunction; Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
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legal description to Tract 4; #14, legal description for Track 1; #15, legal description for 
Track 2; and #16, Priest's legal description as per red fence line describing Tract 4; were 
identified. Plaintiff's Exhibits #36A, #36B and #36C, photographs, were identified, offered 
and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibit W, notes from Priest's survey, was 
identified. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit P, Monson Corner 
Perpetuation and Filing Record, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Defendant's Exhibit S, State of Idaho Bearing Tree Marker for l/4 corner, 
was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination 
continued. Defendant's Exhibit W, Surveyor Monson's location of fence remnants on 
Weitz land, was offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Court recessed at 1200 Noon, reconvening at 1:02 P.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Mr. Monson resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs 
on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibits FF 1-9, photographs, were 
identified. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit 0, Monson Survey, was 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits Q 
1933 aerial photo; and R, enlarged copy of Q, were identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Plaintiff's Exhibit #37, series of 
photographs, was identified. Plaintiff's Exhibit # 2  Monson Road Survey, was identified, 
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exlubit AAA, diagram 
of property line, was marked for identification, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibits #30A and #30B, 
photographs, were identified, offered and admitted without objection. Defendant's Exhibit 
U, aerial photo with Priest overlay of items shown in Exhibit T, and Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, 
aerial photograph, were identified. Redirect examination continued. Recross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. Neither counsel wished to exainine the witness on the Court's questions. 
Pennie Morgan, Ph.D., was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit #52, cross section of a Ponderosa pine tree, was marked for identification. 
Plaintiffs Exhibits #53, #54, #55 and #56, cross sections of Ponderosa pine trees, were 
marked for identification. 
Court recessed at 234 P.M., reconvening at 246 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present. 
Plaintiff's Exhibits #52, #53, #54, #55 and #56, cross sections of Ponderosa pine 
trees, were offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Ms. Morgan resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs 
on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection 
from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Terry Odenborg 
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Dana Townsend was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
#6, July 2003 calendar of Dana Townsend, was identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. 
Schwam. Defendant's Exlubits QQ2, QQ4, QQ5, QQ6, QQ7, QQ8, and QQ9 were 
identified and offered. Mr. Brown objected to the offer of QQ6 Mr. Schwam withdrew his 
offer of QQ6 QQ2, QQ4, QQ5, QQ7, QQ8, and QQ9 were admitted into evidence without 
objection. Cross examination continued. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross 
examination. The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Brown moved to be allowed to read Ritter and Landeck depositions. Mr. 
Schwam had no objection to reading the Etter deposition but argued in opposition to the 
Landeck deposition. Colloquy was had between counsel regarding the depositions. 
Pursuant to the agreement of counsel, Court stated it would read the deposition of 
Joshua Ritter this evening. 
Court recessed for the day at 3:58 P.M. 
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DISTRICT JUDGE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF l"kE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. UTEITZ, husband and wkfe 
and W I T Z  & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Plaiiltiffs/ 
Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, I~usband and wife, 
STBVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
1 
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1 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
) MOTION FOR RE,CONSIDERATION TO 
) AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD 
1 CLAlM FOR ESTOPPEL 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD 
CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL 1 
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The plaintiEEs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plixntlffss' Motion to 
Amend Complaint to Add Clainl for Estoppel having been duly noticed for l~caring, but having come 
before this C o w  for mpnen t  in open court at the request of defendants' attonley Andrew M. 
Schwam at the pretrial conference held on September 27, 2005, the plaintifl's having been 
represented by Charles A. Brown and the defendants having been represented by Robert M. Magyar 
and Andrew M. Schwam, and oral argument having been heard, and the (~OLW, having reviewed the 
file and record herein, hereby makcs the following ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT said motion is hereby granted. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT on this 27' day of September, 2005 
3r4 
DATED on this - day of OAhC ,2005. 
District Judge 
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Attorney at Law 
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Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN 'ELI DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF LAThK 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, Itusband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Plaintiffs1 
Counterdefendants, 
VS. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
SILVERNALE SI-IOOK, DANIAL T. 
CASTLE and CATI-IERINE C. 
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 
) 
) 
) 
1 
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1 
) 
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1 
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AMENDED COMPLNNT 
Plaintiffs GERALD E. WEIT% and CONSUELO J. WE]= (hereinafter refei~ed to 
as "WEITZES"), husband and wife, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC (all plaiutirfs are collectively 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 1 
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Chnilcs A. arovn. Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Mein Sr 
Lrrrirlcm, iddte 83501 
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referred to as "plaintiffs"), by and though their attorney, Charles A. I3rown, for claims against 
defendants, and each of them, hereby dlege as follows: 
JZrrUSDICTION 
. The Court has jurisdiction @f the si~bject matter of this action pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 1-705 and jurisdicifon over the parties pursumt to ldaho Code Section 5-514. 
Venue is proper in Latah County pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401. 
2. The amount in eontrovexsy exceeds the jurisdiction oit l~e Magistrate Division. 
PARTIES, CLAIMS, AND GENERAL FACTS 
3. The piaintiffs WEiTZES are husband and wire ~ n d  hold title in fee simple 
absolute, founded upon a recorded written instrument, to the East 112 oftheNortheast 114 of Section 
8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ("E 112 NE 114" or 
"Weitz property"). The plaintiffs WWEITZ & SONS, LLC, is an Idaho 1im.ited liability company and 
holds title in fee simple absolute to the West 112 of the Northeast 114 csFSection 8, Tomship 40 
North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian u7.1 Latah County, Ida110 ("W 112 1/4" or "LLCproperty"). 
(The Weitz property and LLC property are collectively referred to as "plaintifls' property.") 
4. Defendmts and their claims to real estate situate in the State of Idaho, County 
of Latah, affected by this action, are as follows: 
4.1 Defendants TODD GREEN and TONIA GREEN are husband and wife 
(hereinafterreferred to as "GREENS") and claim title to the real property rnore particularly described 
in Exhibit A, attached to this Amended Complaint ("Tract 4"). 
4.2 GREENS granted a deed of trust on real property they claim, including Tract 
4, recorded December 16,2002, as instrument No. 47 1571, records of h t a h  County, Idaho, to U.S. 
Banlc Trust Company, N.A., as itustee, in favor of Defendant U.S. Bank N.A., as bei=ficiary. 
4.3 Defendants DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATI-ERNE C. CASTLE (hereinafter 
referred to as "CASTLES") are husband and wife and claim title to the real property more 
particularly described in Exhibit B ~ttacl~ed to t h i s  Amended Complain-t ("Tract 1"). 
4.4 Defendants STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK 
(hereinafterreferred to as "SHOOKS") are busband and wife and claim title to t l~e  real property more 
particularly described in Exhibit C attached to this Amended Complaii~t ("Tract 2"). 
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4.5 PfaintifFs have l a d e  a diligent se.mclt for all others having a11 interest this 
action and have found none. Therefore, plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet title against all unlmown 
owners andlor interest holders. 
5. Tract 1, Tract 2, andl'ract 4 (collectively "defendants' property ") lie adjacent 
to and south of ~laintiffs' property. The location ofthe shared b o u n d a ~ ~  between plaintiffs' property 
and defendants' property is at issue in this case. 
6. Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Consuelo Weilz's grandfather, Fred J. 
Schoepflin, who acquired the NE 114 of said Section 8 by Warranty Dead recorded December 13, 
1929, under Instrument No. I 13310, records of Latah County, Idaho. 
7. Fred J. Schoepflin deeded the NE 114 ofsaid Section S to Consuelo Weitz's 
parents, Howard and Constance ~choe~f l in ,  i  1967. 
8. Constance Schoepflin subsequently passed away, and Howard Schoepflia 
re-married. Howard Schoepflin and his then wife, Sylvia Scl~oepflut, deeded the E 112 NE 114 to 
Weitzes in 1977. Howard Schoepflin and Sylvia Schoepflin deeded the W 1/2 NE 114 to 
Sylvia Schoepflin's children ("Yeatts") in 2002. Yeatts deeded the W I r2 NE 1/4 to Weitz & Sons, 
LLC, in February, 2003. 
9. Ail Scltoepflindeedsreferenced above, conveying the E 1/2NE 114 and W 112 
NE 114, contained legal descriptions by division ofquarter sectiou rather than by metes and bounds. 
The Yeatts deed referenced above, conveying the W I12 NE 1/4, contained a legal description by 
division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds. 
10. A fence and ~Tenceline were constructed no later than 1929 aidhave existed 
in the same place since that time in the vicinity and nulning easterly and westerly over the entire 
length of the quarter-section line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "fence and 
fenceline"). 
11. GREENS employed Ronald P. Monson, pro'fessional land surveyor, who 
performed a survey in 2002 of the SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "Monso~~ s wey"). The Monson 
survey determined that said fence and fenceline are located as little as approximately 75 feet, and as 
mucl~ as approximately 150 feet, south of the quarter-section line andnuming easterly and westerly 
over the entire length of the quarter-section line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8. 
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12. WEITZES claim ownership ofthe properly lying behveensaidquartcr-section 
hne and said fence and fencel~ne adjacent to the E I12 NE I/4, and W I r Z  & SONS, LLC, claims 
ownership of the properly lying between said quarter-section line and said I'ence and fenceline 
adjacent to the W 112 NE 1/4. According to the Monson survey, tile property claimed by plaintiffs 
collectively totals approximately X,57 acres (colleclively the "Disputed Property"). 
13. Fred J. Schoepflin and Howard Schoepflin (ct~llectively "Scl~oepflins") 
consistently pastured cattle on the NE 1/4 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property fiom 1929 
through 1972. 
14. By 1967, a road had been consLmcted by Schoe1sflins -xithiri the Cisputed 
. Property and no*rh of the fence and fenceline rulu~ing easterly and westerly for the entire length of 
the Disputed Property (the "road"). 
15. The road has been continuously used and maintained by the plaintias and 
Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular 
access to areas within plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property. 
16. WEITZES have harvested firewood from the Disputed Property on a frequent 
and continuing basis since 1977. 
17. The Rogers f ~ l y  ("Rogers"), predecessors in interest to defendants in the 
SE 114 of said Section 8, never objected to 0% the above-described activities undertaken by the 
Sclloepflins and plaintiffs on the Disputed Property. 
18. In the 1950's, Fred Schoeptlin selectively logged a portion of the NE 114 of 
said Section 8 and the Disputed Property, to the fence and fenceline h d  not southerly of the fence 
and fenceline. In 1991, WEITZES selectively logged aportion of the N12 114 of said Section X and 
the Disputed Property to the fence and fenceline and not southerly of the fence and fenceline. Neither 
the Rogers nor any predecessor in interest to the Rogers, ever protested or disputed the SchoepLIins' 
or WEITZES' selective logging operations within the Disputed Property. 
19. The SI.7 114 of said Section 8 was heavily logged at least twice since 1929 by 
Rogers or their predecessor in interest to the fence and fenceline and not noherly of the fence and 
fenceline. 
20. In November, 1963, Fred Schotpflin and his wife leased a site within the 
Disputed Properly to Memll I-1a1t for a "radio receiving and sending" station, for ten years, ptusuant 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 4 
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to a Lease Agreement recordcd in Boolr 14, Fago 389, lnsWu.inc~~t No. 223359, records oFLat?tnh 
Cotu~ty, Idaho. Mr. Hart concurrently thereto entered into an Agreement with Latah County and the 
City of Moscow to construct said "radio receiving and sending" station for operation by the Latah 
Counly Sheriff s Office and the Moscow Police Department, which Ag~ee~nent was recordedin Book 
14, Page 391, Instrument No. 223360, records of Latah County, Idaho. A shuctxre was then 
constructed within the Disputed Property, north of the road, to houseand operate the "I-adio receiving 
and sending" station Remains ofthat structure are still visible within ihe heispnted Property and 
north ofthe road. The Rogers never disputed the Schoepflins' said lease activity or the construction 
of said "radio receiving and sending" station within the Oisputed Propety. 
21. In 1994, WEITZES installed a blue gate on i l~e astern boundaryofplaintiffs' 
property and a connecting hoyrire fence that extended southerly along the eastern boundary ofthe 
Disputed Proper& to its intersection 4 t h  the fence and fenceline to keep intruders from trespassing 
on the NE 114 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property. The Rogers never disputed the 
WEITZES' installation of the hogwire fence dong the eastern boundary vof the Disputed Properly. 
22. The "true," actual boundary between the NE 114 ~md SE 114 of said Section 
8 was unknown to any owners of the NE 114 a d  SE 114 until the Monson survey was completed. 
23. On information and belief, some defendmts or their agents, at some time 
during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant portion of the fence and fenceIine by cutting 
fhe fence wire approximately every twenty feet of its length, by desixoying some fence posts, and by 
destroying rock piles that helped stabilize some of the fence posts. 
24. On information and belief, on or about Jaly 28, 2003, defendant 
TODD GREEN trespassed on said NE 114 and the Disputed Property, while armed with a handgun, 
and acted in an aggressive and threateniilg manner towad rn agent of the WEITZES. 
25. Defendants have asserted claims of ownership to the Disputed Prope~ty and 
demanded fiat plaintiffs not enter upon Llle Disputed Property. 
26. Defendants' conduct has hindered plaintiffs planned forestry, agriculturd, and 
other operations and uses on thc Dispr~ted Properly and continues to do so. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quict Title -Boundary by Agreement andlor Acquiosccnce 
27. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fidly set forth here. 
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28. Tl~c kue, actual boundmy line between tlieNNE I/4 and SE 114 of said Section 
8 was unkr~own from at least 1929 until the Monson survey was completed in 2002. 
29. Said fence and fenceline were consm~cted in approximately 1929. On 
infomtatiotl and belief, there is no evidence as to the manner or circumstances of the original 
location of the fence and fenceline. 
30. The fence and fenceline have long existed and been recognized by the 
respective property owners as the boundary between plaintif&' property and defendants' property. 
31. Since 1929, the respective property owners Itave treated the fence and 
fenceline as the property line or boundary between piaillt?ffs' propefcy and d & ~ d w ~ i s '  property. 
32. Since 1929, plaintkffs and their predecessors have exercised dornii~ion and 
contxol over the entirety of the real property north of the fence and fenceline consistent with 
ownership. 
33. Tl~e Disputed Propcrty belongs to p1ainti.E~ by virtue of the doctriixe of 
boundary by agreement, and the Court should quiet title in plaintiffs against all other interests. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quiet Title - Estoppel and Latches 
34. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if hlly set forth here. 
35. For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors sat idly by and 
allowed plahtiffs and their predecessors to use the Disputed Property as their own and to maintain 
stewardship of the Disputed Property at the expense of plaintips and their predecessors. 
36. For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors treated the 
fence and fenceline as the boundary betwmn tile NE 1/4 and SE 114 of said Section S. 
37. For approximately 70 years, dafendants and their predecessors took the 
position that the Disputed Property belonged to the plaintiffs and their predecessors. 
38. At the time GFSENS, CASTLES, and SHOOKS purchased their respective 
parcels, they had actual, constructive, or inquiry notice that the Disputed Property did not belong to 
them, regardless of their respective deed language. 
39. It would now be unconscionable and inequitable for the defendants to take a 
contrary position to that previousiy taken by them and their predecessors and to act inconsistently 
with such prior conduct. 
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40. The doctrines of ost.oppe1, including not limited to quasi-ostoppel and 
equitable estoppel, and latches apply to prevent defendants from asserting owlersl~ip over, or any 
interest in, tlte Disputed Property. 
41. The Court should quiet title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against all 
other interests. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Prescriptive Casement 
42. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if Mly set forth here. 
43. Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made open, notorious, contirxuous, and 
uninterrupted use of the road withillthe Disputed Property as described above and have consistently 
Logged and harvested firewood within the Disputed Property, for a period of inore than five yews. 
44. Plaintif% and their predecessors have made such uses within the Disputed 
Property under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the defendants and their predecessors. 
45. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment confirming in their favor a prescriptive 
easement for continued use of ibe road and for logging and harvesting firc:wood within the Disputed 
Prop.*. 
e 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Trespass 
46. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if Fully set forth here. 
47. As described above, on infohation and belief, defendant TODD GWEN 
and/or some other defendant(s) a~d lo r  their agent(s) entered upon plaintiffs' property and, among 
other damages, damaged plaintiffs' fence and fence improvements. 
48. Plaintfffs did not consent to such elltry. 
49. Plaintiffs were harmed by such entry. 
SO. Plaintiffs sieered damages by such entry in amounts to be proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Estoppel 
51. Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if f~111y set forth here. 
52. That the defendants herein should be equitably and legally estopped and 
prevented from setting forth any defense whatsoeser to Clle above-stated causes of action dae to ate 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Chorlrs A. Brows. esq. 
P.O. Box 12251324 Mdil 51. 
I.ewiston ldolia 83501 
fact that the dclendmts havc drendy receivod compensntioil fiofn tl~oiu predecessor in title in rcgwd 
to ~e value of &e Disputed Property as set forth above. Thus, the defendants should be equitably 
and legally estopped from again alleging or claiming any interest to the Disputed Property due to the 
equitable and legal estoppel concepts in common Law or also due to the applicability of Idaho Code 
section 61606. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, plaintiffs retained the 
services of Charles A. Brown to prosecute this action 011 their behalf, and plaintiEfs 11ave agreed to 
pay said attorney areasonable fee for his services. PlaintiRs are entitled to an award of attorney fees 
against defendants, some or all ofthem, pursuant to Idaho Iaw, including but not limited to Idaho 
Code section 12-121. 
RXGHT TO AMEND 
53. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this Amended Complaint as this inatter 
proceeds. 
WT3EEREFOl7E, plaintiffs pray for relief and dcmandj~tdgn~ent against the defendants, 
some or all. of them, individually andlor jointly and severally, as follows: 
FIRST: Quieting title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against 
all other interests; 
SECOND: Awaxding compensatory and special damages, in amounts exceeding 
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division, to be proven at Uial; 
THIRD: Ordering restitution of the Disputed Property to plaitltiPfs. 
FOURTFI: Declaring an easement by p~escription in the Disputed Property in 
favor of plaintiffs. 
FIFTH: Enjoining defendants from entering the Disputed P~operty andlor 
damaging plaintiffs' fence or fenceposts 
SIXT1-I: Awarding reasonable attorncy Tees pursbmt to Idaho law, including 
but not limited to Idaho Code section 12-121; 
SEVENTH. Awarding costs as allows by Idaho law; 
AMENDED COMPLAINT S 
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Childes A, IBi~owrr. Esq. 
P.O. Box 12251.124 M l i n  SI. 
Lcwiston, ldnho83WI 
205-7A'766-79A71208.766-iB86 (fax) 
EIGHl'H: Granting such other relief as the Court deems just under the 
circumstances. e 
DATED on this a day of September, 2005. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I, Charles A. Brcwn, hereby certie &at a true and correct copy of the fimgoing was: 
- 
mailed by regular frrst cIass mail, - sell1 by Facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-892-8030 -Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
_)Lf sent by f~c'acsimile, mailed by sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delive~y 
deposited in rl~e United States 
Post Office 
- hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magym 
Attorney at Law 
201 Noxlh Main Street 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. ( m a i  I on1 y ) 
Schwam Law OEce 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, ID 53843 
Y*, 
on this day voZ September, 2005. 
Cl>nOer A Brow,. Enq. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 9 
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EXHIBIT &- 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SE% of Section 8, T40N. 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest comer of SE% of Section 8; thence S 59'51'56' E. 
181 1.61 feet. along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, to the NW corner of 
Tract 4 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence, continuing along said north iine, S 8995"1'56" E. 825.00 feet to kine 
NE corner of said Tract 4 and the NE comer of the SEX of said Section 8: 
Thence S 1°09'40' W, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said SEK of 
Section 8, to a point of intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence, S 8Q027'56" W, 832.31 feet, along said fence, to a point on the 
west line of said Tract 4; 
Thence, leaving said fence, N 3'41'52" E, 160.00 feet, along said west 
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEQINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
total area in Tract 4 North of fence =2.95-acres. 
A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SEX of Section 8, T40N, R5W BM 
and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest corner of S f  % of Section 8 and the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Thence S 89'31'56" E. 800.00 feet. along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, 
to the NE comer of Tract 1; 
Thence S 4O45'08' E, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 1, to a point of 
intersection with a fence from the west; 
Thence N 84O38'17' W, 817.31 feet, along said fence, to a point of intersection 
with the west line of said SEX of Section 8; 
Thence, leaving said fen=, N 1°00'27' E, 75.00 feet, along said west line of SEX 
of Section 8, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 1 North of fence 2.07-acres. 
A legal description for a parcel of land louted in thc SEX of Section 8, T40N, 
R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the northwest comer of SE% of Section 8; thence S 8Q051'56" E. 
800.00 feet, along the north line of said SEX of Section 8, to the NW comer of 
Tract 2 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Thence S 89'51'56" E, 1011.61 feet, along the north line of said SEX of 
Section 8, to the NE corner Of said Tract 2; 
Thence S 3°41"52" W, 160.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 2, to a 
point of intersection with an east-west fence; 
Thence N 89016'21n W. 988.95 feet, along said fen=, to a point on the 
west line of said Tract 2; 
Thence. leaving said fence, N 4O45'00' W, 150.00 feet, along said west 
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION) 
Total area in Tract 2 North of fence = 3.55 acres. 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 FacsimiIe 
SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwarn #I573 
514 South Pollc Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Atlomeys for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shoolcs and Castles. 
IN THE 3ISTRICT COURT OF TRE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husbahd and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS '
1 
PlaintiffsICounterdefendants, 1 SUPPLEMENT TO 
v. ) 
1 TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SNOOIC, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANI< N.A., 1 
J 
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs. 1 
1 
Defe~~dantsICounterplaintiffs submit the followiilg Supplement to their Ttirial Memorandum. 
VII. PERMISSIVE USE -WILD, UNENCLOSED OR UNIMPROVED LANDS. 
Defendants/Connterplaintiffs are entitled to a pres~mption that the Plaintiffs' use of their land 
was permissive because the land is wild, unenclosed or ~~nimproved. 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
SUPPLEMENT TO TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 1 
SeeCoxv. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d929; Tmxnellv. Ward, 86 Idaho 555,389 P.2d221; 
and Christle v. Northern Ventures, Inc., 1 10 Idaho 829,718 P.2d 1267; copies ofwhich are attached 
hereto for the convenience of the Court, with relevant portions highlighted. 
VIII. PRESCmPTIVE EASEMENT - USE IN COMMON WITH PUBIC,  
Plaintiffs can not acquire a prescriptive easement when their use is ih comnon with the 
public. 
See Simmons v. Perlcins, 63 Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740, a copy of which is attaclied hereto for 
tl~e convenience of tlle Court, with relevant portions highlighted. 
IX. PRESECNPTIVE EMEMENT - BURDEN OF PROOF. 
A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convinciilg 
evidence of open, notorious, continuous, and ulllntexixpted use ~111der a claim of right and with the 
Ici~owledge ofthe owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive five year period, 
See Wea-~e? y..Stafford,134 Idaho 691, 8 P.3d 1234, a copy of which is attached hereto for 
the coilvenience of the Court, with relevant portioi~s highlighted. See also Simmo'ns, supra. 
X. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Piaiiltiffs/Counterdefendants claim for equitable estoppel does not satisfy the elements 
reqnired to establisli equitable estoppel. 
See Reeiovich v..First WeStern Igvestments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 997 P.2d 615, a copy of 
which is attached hereto for the conveniellce of the Court, with devant portions higl~ligl~ted. 
DATED this 4" day of October, 2005. 
~AG,  
Robert M. Magya# 
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby terrify that on this 4"' day of October, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM to be served on the foIIowing in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
h h S " L , *  
Robert M. Magyar I/ " 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) FacsilniIe 
00 Hand DeIivery 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS 
SUPPLEMENT TO TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 2 
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Lewis A. COX md Ruth Cox, husbmd md wife; md Button Jones and Melissa Jones, husband a d  wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents9 v, Ellie COX, Defendant-AppeBlmt~ 
[Cite as Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 51 31 
No. 9039. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
August 6,1962. 
Action to enjoin defendant from using private madway and from allowing caktle to trespass on plaintiffs' land, 
wl3ereisa defei1dmt sought injmctioa Po restrain plaintiffs from obstructing road and from allowing their cattle to 
trespass on his lmd. The District Cow? of the Sixfi Judicial District, Binghm County, Ezra P. Monson,, J., 
enjoined both parties from aliowing their cattle to trespass and enjoined use of roadway by defendant, and 
defendant appealed. The Supreme Cow9 McFadden, J., heid &at evidence sanshined findings that plaintiffs 
built and maintained road, md, inasmuch as road that had not been 1ai.d out and recorded as !highway by order of 
board of county commissioners, plaintiffs were entitled to injunction. 
Kern & Williams, Blackfoot) for appellant. 
Befire am action in equity lie it must appear that the plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, The 
cowts of equity will not lend their aid in preventing alleged wrongs or attempt to fabricate some kind of legal 
machinery io edorce an injunction when the ordinary legal tribunals we capable of affording sufficient !relief. 
Picotte 6:. Watt, 3 Idaho 447,31 P. 805; County of Ada v. BuUlen Bridge Co., 5 Idaho 79,419 P. 848, 36 E.R.A. 
367; 19 A ~ . J w ~ ,  Sec. 100 and 102, legal remedy as affecting relief in equity. 
lit is not necessary that ia highway be worked throughout its entire length, at public expense, to come within 
the provision of section which declares that all roads used as such for a period of five yeas  which have k e n  
worked and kept wp at public expense are highways. Gross, b a d  Overseer v. McNutt3 4 Id&o 286,38 P. 935. 
The evidence is without conflict that the (roadway and bridge) were used by (respondent md its 
predecessorc) mintemptedly md continuously for more thm the prescriptive period, which raised a 
presumption that such use was adverse and under a claim of right (19 C.J. 959); md there is no su1fficien.t 
evidence ofparol license to overcome this presumption. Nofihwestem & Pacific Hypdheek Bmk v. Hobson, 
59 Idd%o 119,80 P.2d 793; Taylor v. O1CornelP, 50 Id&o 259,295 P. 247; Checkeas v. Thompson, 45 ;[d&o 
715, 152 P.2d 5855; Hogan v. BRhey, 73 Idaho 274,251 P.2d 209; Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Wakm.atsna, 75 
Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830; Sirnett v. Werelaas et al., 83 Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952. 
Jay Stout, BiacBafioof h r  respo~.dent. 
Aa injmctiow may be grmted when it appears by the comjoiaint that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded and such relief or my part thereof consists in re- 
- I 
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straining the comission or contigwce of the act complained of either for a limited period or perpetualiy. 
Idaho Code Section 8-LBBDZ(1). 
W e r e  gates are in existence across a road b m h g  the passage thereof so that it is necessary to open said 
gates in order to use such road, h e  existence of such gates has always been considered as stmng evideimce that 
the road was not a public road. Ross v. Swexhgen, 39 lId&o 35, at page 39,225 P. 102l,lO22; Peasley v. 
Tros,mr9 103 MowQ. 404,64 P.2d 109; Smithers v. Finch, 82 Cal. 153,22 P. 935; Board of County 
Comissioners of Jackson County v. Owen, 166 P.2d 766 (Ok1.); Irion v. Nelson, 249 P.2d 10'9 (Okl.). 
To acquke m easement by adverse possession over the real property of mother the use must be hostile and 
e m o t  be by acquiesmnse or consent. One asserting adverse possession as against the omer  of red estate man4 
prove each a d  every element of adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence. Simmons v. Peie!cins, 63 
Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740; Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345,118 P. 269; Pleasants v. !Hem, 36 Idaho '928,283 P. 
565. 
Plaintiff!! (respondents) Cox md Jones me the owners of red property md holders of State leases of grazing 
lands in the Wolverine me& Binghm County, Idaho; their lands and leases adjoin properties owned a7.d leased 
by the d e f e n d ~ t ~  (appellant) Ellie Cox, who is a nephew of plaintiff Lewis A. Cox. All parties to this action 
graze cattb on heir respwtive prope&ies. Thoughout the past severd yews there were numerous insances in 
whkh the cattle of the parties became commingled and would be grazing on each other's property. 
Access to respondents' properties is by the road that is the subject of the litigation here, taking off kom the 
Wolverine Creek county road. This access road Peading south leaves the county road* traversing the propeuty of 
the respondents Jones md Cox. A short d i s h c e  off the road a gate has k e ~  maintained for many yews, 
md in later years, adjoining the gate a cattle guard has k e n  placed. Fwther south on the road, and near Jones's 
cabin, mother gate is across the road. 
This present action arises from difficulties be8891een these p d e s  over the use ofthe road though 
respondents' properties, md &om the c o d n g l i n g  of the cattle of the parties on each other's properties. The 
respondents seek injunctive relief against the appellant to st010 him kom using the road h question and a1lowia.g 
his caele to wespass on their propem and leased ground. The appellant by countec2laim alleged the road was a 
public mad md sought an injunction, against the respondents born obstructing the road and from allowing their 
cattle to trespass on his l a d  and 
leased groundasg. The trial cow$ heard the case .without aajanny md enter& judgment enjoining all parties from 
allowing their cattle to trespass on the land ofthe others, determining that the road was n~ot public, but a private 
one* enjoinixng use by the appellant ofthe road in question and further enjoined any interference with the gates 
maintained by the respondents on the roadway. 
From this judgment, appellant appeals. While some twenty-thee assignments of emor me presented, 
appellant s m a r i z e s  the main issues before this cowl as follows: (1) whether a trespass should be enjoined 
where respondents fail to come into c o d  with clean hands md when they have m adequate remedy at law; (2) 
whether adme road in question is public or private; md (3) if the road is determined to be a private road, whether a 
p~xr ip t ive  asement in favor of appellant *BbD the use of the road has arisen. Since appdlmt's citation of 
authorities and argument in his brief axe primarily directed to these thee issues, h e  assignments of enor 
msuppofied by citation or argument will not be discussed. Koch v. Elkins, 7 1 ird&o 50,225 P.2d 457 Kn~BPaBl 
v. Rimbal19 83 lic3aI-10 12, 356 lP.2d 919. 
!I] The trial c o w  found that respondents have allowed their cattle to trespass on premises o m  fH?fn.jed 
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by appellantne, as wen1 as finding thka't the appellant has allowed his cattle to trespass on premises owned and 
leased by respondents. This finding is Mly substantiated by the evidence. The country in which the property off 
the parties is situate is mowtaimfious, with the inherent difficulties of fencing in such a rugged country. Some 
fencing has been done by the parties7 not ws cons~ming encQoswes, but merely by way of "&ik fencess'. The 
dria fences did not prevent the cattle from roaming onto the adjoining properties. The problem is created by &.e 
normal tendency of cattle to move while grazing. That the trial court acted jdiciously and correctly in enjoining 
both parties &om allowing their cattle to trespass on the other% property cannot seriously be questioned by 
appellant, because by bis o m  pleadings he charges that the respondents "l~ave permitted their cattle to trespass 
upon the lease holds of comterir-cldmant (appellant) * * * causing severe and imparable damage to the cotug'der- 
claimant's lease nEQBlding." Appellant M e r  &ages respondents with the intent to continue to pemit their cattle 
to trespass airnd damage his holdings, and prays for an injunction against them. 
I[%?] Appellant contends that this action should not be maintained, first for the reason that before an action in 
equity wiU lies it must appear that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at Raw, md that here respondents have an 
adequate remedy at !aw; and 
secondly %hat he fmdmmtaR principle off equity that one seeking equity must do equity, or Uhat a person mmst 
come into ah4 equity c o w  with clem hmds, b a s  h is  action. in regard to appellant's first contention, it is fully 
mswered by Goble v. New Wodd Life Ins. Co., 57 Idaho 5B6,67 $28 280. Quoting from Staples v. Rossi, 7 
lidah 618,626,65 P. 67,49, in discussing what is now 1.C. 4 8-402$ it was there stated: 
" 'This statute modifies the old d e s  of chancery in regard to the issuance of injunctions. lit says 
nothing whatever about the lack of m adequate remedy. We are therefore ofthe opinion that the 
authorities cited by the appellants to the effect that, if m adequate remedy exists in behalf of time 
plaintiffs$ said injmction should be refused> have no application whatever to the case at bm, under 
the shtute cited'." 
i[3,4] As to the second contention, the maxim that one seeking eqdty must do equity, it must be pdnded out 
&at both appemmt md respondent have presented this action in the trial court on the theory that both were 
respectively entitled to injunctive relie8 appellant by his cowterclaim seeking an injunction against respondents 
fiom &lowing their cattle to trespass, also seeking an injunction against them for obstmcting the roadway, and 
resp~ndents eeking m injunction against appellant from allowing his cattle to & s p a s  s,d kom using the road 
in question. This action was tried on the issues iianned by the pleadings of &&parties, md was tried in the 
district cow4 on the theory that this w s  an action for injunctive relief~ The record fails to disclose where the 
issue ofthe applicability of the doctrine of "dean hands" or of the maxim "That one seeking equity must do 
equity", was ever presented to the trial court for consideration. The rule is firmly established that parties are 
held to the theory upon which the action is tried, md issues not raised in the trial cmnot be first presented here 
on appeal. Smith v. Shim, 82 Idaho 941,350 P.2d 348; Shipman v. MRoppenbwg, 72 Idaho 323,240 P.2d E 15 1; 
Wornward v. Taylor, 70 ~ d & ~  450,221 P.2d 686. 
As concerns the second issue mentioned by appdlant* i. e., whether the road in question was a public or 
private road, 1.C. 4 40-103 p ~ ~ ~ i d e ~  in part: 
"Roads %aid out and recorded as highways, by order of the boad of comissioners~ and all 
roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up 
at the expense of the public, or located md recorded by order ofthe board of commissionew, are 
highways. * * *" 
This court in Ross v. Sweaingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1022, referring to the foregoing 
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section stated in Bamgwge app~copriinte to the situation here: 
"Appellants had the burden of establishing the existence of the public road described in the 
petition. They failed to prove that the r o d  had been laid out md recorded as a highway by order of 
the bomd of c ~ m i s s i o n e r s ~  or that it had h e n  used as such for a period of five yews. R.S. $ 851. 
Neither did they prove that the road had been Uaid out md recorded as a highway by order of the 
board of wmissioners, nor that it had been used as such for a period of five years, and that it had 
been either worked md kept up at public expense or located and recorded by order ofthe bomd of 
commissioners. C.S. 5 1304. There was evidence that the road had been used, but h was not 
established that it had bean 'laid out and recorded' by order ofthe board of commissioners, or 
'worked md kept up at the expense of fie public,' or 'located md recorded by the order ofthe board 
of comisioners.' The evidence was sufficient to just@ the c o u ~  in concluding that the #mad was 
not a public road, but that it was one over which people had traveled at will, but on which Umd 
owners through whose lands it extend4 had felt at Iikrty for many years to maintain md had 
maintained gates." 
See also: State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1 ,3  10 P.2d 787. 
Concerning the principle question of whether this was a public road, evidence d a n y  use prior to 1 893 is 
lacking. The trial coua found the road was not in existence between 11888 and 1893 (during which period Sec. 
85 1, Revised Statutes existed in its original form, under which my r o d  used for five years was a highway, with 
no requirements it be worked m kept up at public expense). Other findings of the tirial c o w  were that prior to 
respondents building the road9 various persons passed through the valley in which the road is located* using a 
natural cattle trail, Respondent Jones9 built a gate across the path of the present mad going to his cabin site in 
about 1926, and later built another gate across the trail by his cabin. In A930 and R 93 1, the road was h i l t  from 
the county road to Jones' cabin, md later the road was extended to the end of respondent C d s  property. The 
maintenmce ofthe mad was done by the re~apndents~ and the gates were kept closed md at times locked. The 
road was used by members ofthe public with consent and permission of the iespondents. Respondent Jams 
paid! a comuy employee $20.00 to go over the road with a road-grader one time, but the money was not received 
by Bingham County. On one occasion a county road-grader made one pass over 
fie road to a mine being developed by Neison Cox, respondent Cox's b r o t h  m d  the father of appellantnne, but 
there was m evidence 'chis work was done by Bingham County, but was done merely as a favor. There was a 
c o r n o n  custom in this area for county road crews to open up ranchers' roads to their yards, without charge ox 
obligation on the p a  ofthe rancher; the road has never been used as a public highway for a period of five 
yems, m d  it has not been worked or kept up at public expense. 
[6] While appellant chanlenges many of these findings offact, asserting enor iin &at hey "me contray to, 
md not supported by the weight of evidence submitted at the trial9" neverthelless there is substantia! evidence to 
support them. Thus this court a m o t  go behind such findings, and it is not the province ofthis couifi to say 
whether they axe contrary to the weight of the evidence, that f ic t ion being wholly for the trial couk Melton v. 
h a r 9  83 ]Idaho 99,358 P.2d 855. 
Q7] It is mcontroverted that this road has not been laid out md recorded as a highway by order of the Boad 
of c o ~ t y  comisioners.  The @id wurt found on substantial evidence that the road had not been worked and 
kept up at p2pbIic expense. This mad did not meet fiose requirements of I.@. 5 40-103 to be classified as a 
highway. 
In 1952 fie BBinghrana County Comissioners wrote respndent Jones that it had been brought to their 
attention fiat he, Jones, had fenced md Uocked the gate across the road in question. In this letter it was sate& 
f 283 
s-a-.il-----=. $-=.-:,* ~~ai~~~-h~~la~~~~l~i11eh/iril~.li~~1~wl+?Me5W@~emxb~~e~ Q3enxmFqId[ . , .  f 0/3/idr005 
- ~. I Page 5 of 6 , t 
"A resolution has been passed by the Board &at you be notified to unlock this gate banad allow 
stock and vehicles to follow this road imediately or it wil  be necessq for us to take action to 
condem the land md open a road though the property. However, we hope this action win9 not be 
necessary." 
While appellmt contends this is a recognition by the county coaruilnissioners that this road was a public road, 
such conclusion is not justified, for in the letter itself$ it is recognized that it may be necessary to condemn the 
land, m achowRedgment ofthe rights of respondent Jones to the l a d  in question. The %and over which the road 
traversed was w t  exempted from assessmea for tax purposes. 
[8] Appellant points out that &is particular road is a continmtion of mother road with which it comects; 
&at 'this comective road has been maintained at county expense over the yews m d  hence the maintenance of 
the com.ecting road constitutes maintenance at county expense ofthe road in question, thus making it a public 
highway. Bt is appdiiant's theory 
&at it is not necessary &at a highway be worked thoughout its entire lengthh at public expense, to come within 
the preview of B.C. 5 40-103, citing Gross V. McNut~t, 4 Idaho 286,38 P. 935. The holding in that case is not 
applicable. Here the maintenance work done on the county road was done for the maintenmce of that road 
alone. The record is devoid of evidence that it was done with the thought in mind it be considered as work on 
the road in question. To so extend the rule of the Gross v. McNutt case (supra) would mean tinat by public 
maintenmce on m y  county roads antomatica~ly every %me or road that touched or crossed such county rod ,  
would become a public  one^ The road in question was not an integral p a  of the county r o d .  Access alone. to a 
county road on which public maintenance is done cannot logidly be considered as sufficient to make 
applicable h e  holding of Gross v. McNutt, (supra). 
[9j Witnesses for both parties concmed that gates had been maintained across the road in question for many 
yeas, the only area of dispute being the time when the gates were first erected. Where gates are in existence 
across a road b m h g  the passage and making it n e c e s w  to open them in order to use the mad3 the existence of 
such gates is considered as strong eviden~e that the road was not a public road. Ross v. Swemingen, 39 Idaho 
35,225 P. 1021; Peasley v. Trosper, 103 Mont. 40%,64 PP.2d 109; Smithers vv. Fit& 82 Ca%. 153,22 P. 935; 
Board of County Comissioners of Jackson County v. Owen, 96 Okl~ 538, 166 P.2d 766; Idon v. Nelson, 207 
OCkl. 243.249 P.2d 107. 
The @id coautqs conclusion that this was not a county road and that appellant had no right to use it as a 
public highway is %lUy sustained by the record. 
[lq The evidence fails to esbblish appellant's clai& to a prescriptive right in this road. To establish such a 
pmscriptive right in a roadway it is essential that the use ofthe way must constitute some actual invasion orr 
infringement of the right ofthe owner. Simmons v. Perkins. 63 Idaho 136, li 18 P.2d 1940.It is the contention of 
appellant, however* that under the general d e  that proof of an open, notorious, and mhtempted user for the 
prescriptive period, without evidence of Inow it began9 raises a presumption that it was m adverse use and under 
a claim of right. He points to the fact that the roadway was used by himself md his father unintemptedly and 
continuousEy for more thm the prescriptive period, contending &at such ~ n t e m p t e d  use makes applbab1.e the 
presumption in his favor that the use was hostile. 
[In] As a general proposition appellant's contention concerning the presumption Wat arises from 
&ntempted use of 
an easement for the prescriptive period is correct. See: Sirnett v. WereBus, 83 Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952; Eagle 
" 
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Rock Corp. v. I h o n t  Hotel Co., 39 Idaho 413,85 P.2d 242; Northwest & Pacific Mypotheekbadi v. Hobson, 
59 Idaho % 19, 80 P.2d 793. Such a presumption, in Idaho, at least, has not been considered as inrefutable or 
mnclusive presumption. Last CInmce Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 35 Idaho 61,204 P. 654. 
[a] This general rule fixing the ppkesmpkion of adverse use is applicable 80 improved lands, and th.e Rands 
cultivated md enclosed. However, when one claims an easement by prescription over wild or unenclosd 3mds 
ofmother3 merq use of the way for the required time is not generally sdficient to give rise to a p ~ s m p t i o n  that 
the w e  is adverse. Fullenwider v. Kitchens, 223 Ark. 442,266 S.W.2d 281,46 A..iL.R2d 1135; Clarke v. 
Clarke, 133 CanBn. 667,66 P. 10; Todd v. Sterling, 45 Wash.2d 40,273 P.2d 245. Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. 
Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash.2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771; The Mountaineers v. Wymr, 56 Wash.2d "71, 355 P.2d 341; 
Hester v. Sawyers, 48 NaMex. 497,7% P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536; See also: Cases in the mno8ationii, 46 
A.L.R.2d 1140; 17A Am.Bw~ 683, Easements 8 '71; 28 C.J.S. Easements 8 68 p. 734. See discussion in 
dissenting opinion in Aguiwe v. Hmlin, 80 Idaho B 76, 327 P. 2d 349, in a dissenting opinion where the 
majority opinion neither accepted nor rejected this mle, determining that case on other principles. 
The underlying reason for this rule is well expressed in Fn'i~.enwider v. Kitchens, supra, as follows: 
"The reason for the rule that a passageway over anr&nclosed and wimproved land is deemed to 
be permissive is sowd and a h  easily eanade~s-dable~ * * **. HQ assumes thatthe owen of such land 
in many instances will not be in position to readily detect or prevent others from crossing over Inis 
Iand, md, even if he did, he might not enter my objection because of m desire to acco~modate 
others md because such usage resulted in no immediate damage to him. Also in such instances the 
Rmdomei would probably have no reason to think the users off the passageway were atteimpting to 
acquire any adverse rights. On the other hand there would be no reason or basis for such inferero.ce 
of permission on the part of the lmdomer if someone tore down his fence or desbroyed his crops 
by reason of such usage. These acts alone wound he cdcuiated to put the Smdowner on notice that 
others were using his 1md adversely to his o m  interest md right of occupation." 
p3, lap The trial com's detemination that the w e  ofthis road by otlhers with 
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pemission of respondents, b 1k18y substmtiated by the record; under the law the use being permissive, no 
prescriptive rights arose as to its use by appellmd. 
Costs to respondents.. 
SMTH, C. J., and TAYLOR, KNUDSON md McQUADE, JB., concw. 
- -----, -"- --- 
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court 
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
Court informed counsel that it had a chance to review the deposition testimony of 
Joshua Ritter and Ronald Landeck last evening. 
Mr. Schwam informed the Court that Ronald Monson, the land surveyor who 
testified yesterday, wished to correct his testimony from yesterday and requested leave to 
call him between witnesses today. Court stated it would so allow. 
Mr. Brown called Todd A. Green as witness and he was sworn. Mr. Scl~wam 
objected to Mr. Green being caIIed as he was not identified as a witness. Since Mi'. Brown 
did not comply with the pretrial agreement entered into between cou~sel  before this Court 
at the pretrial conference by informing opposing counsel of the witnesses each intends to 
call the night before they are called, Court sustained Mr. Schwam's objection, infor~niixg 
Mr. Brown that he may call Mr. Green tomorrow. 
Gerald Rockford Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. PlautFff's 
Exhibit #30C, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #31 and #32 photographs were identified, offered and 
admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Plaintiff's 
Exhibits #33, $34, and #35, photographs, were identified and offered. Mr. Schwam 
objected as to #35 unless it can be established when it was taken. Exhibits 833 and #34 
were admitted without objection. Mr. Brown reoffered #35. Mr. Scl~wam objected. Court 
rejected the offer. Mr. Brown offered Plaintiffs Exhibits #21 through #29, inclusive and 
were admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination resumed. 
Court recessed at 10:11 A.M., reconvening at 10:27 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Mr. Brown requested leave to make an offer of proof. Court so allowed. Mr. Brown 
made his offer of proof as to what Mr. Weitz would testify to regarding the disputed fence 
line and regarding the conversations he had with his grandfather regarding the property 
boundary. 
Gerald Rockford Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
plaintiffs on direct examination. Direct examination concluded. 
Mr. Brown requested leave to call a witness out of order. There being no objection 
from Mr. Scl~wam, Court allowed the testimony of Mr. Weitz to be interrupted to call 
Homer Ferguson. 
Homer Ferguson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, 
aerial map, was identified. Recross examination by Mr. Schwam. There being no objection 
Terry Odenborg 
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from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Gerald Rockford Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
plaintiffs on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. 
James Henry Hagedorn was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from 
counsel, the witness was excused. 
Jack Freeland was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. 
Court recessed at 1201 P.M., reconvening at 1:02 P.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present. 
Mr. Brown requested that the Court consider Dusty Weitz's deposition rather than 
have him called as a witness. Mr. Schwam requested that the Court consider the request 
after the testimony of Mr. Freeland has been completed. 
Jack Freeland resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiff 
on direct examination. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. 
There being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Mr. Schwain informed the Court that he had been told by Mr. Brown that Duane 
Priest would be called in his case in chief. Mr. Schwam stated that he did not subpoena 
Mr. Priest, so would like notice if plaintiffs are not going to call him so that he has time to 
subpoena him for the defendants' case in chief. 
Ronald Paul Monson was called, having been previously sworn, and testified out of 
order for the defendants. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. 
Court questioned the witness. Mr. Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. 
Court questioned the witness further. 
Nancy Flisher was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Recross examination by Mr. 
Schwam. 
James Edward Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. 
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down. 
Court recessed at 214 P.M., reconvening at 230 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 
Duane Priest was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Plaintiff's Exhibits 
#13, #14, #15, and #16, property descriptions, were identified, offered and #16 was 
Terry Odenborg 
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admitted without objection. Mr. Schwam objected to the offer of Plaintiffs Exhibits #13, 
#14, and #15. Mr. Brown argued further. Court sustained the objection to those three 
exhibits. Direct examination resumed. Mr. Schwam examined the witness in aid of 
objection. Court sustained the objections as to Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14, and #15. 
Direct examination resumed. Plaintiffs Exhibits #17, #18, and #19, legal descriptions, were 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination 
resumed. Plaintiffs Exhibit #4, aerial photograph, was identified, offered and admitted 
into evidence after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam. Plaintiffs Exhibit #5, aerial 
photograph, was identified, offered and rejected after hearing objections from Mr. 
Schwam. Direct examination resumed. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's 
Exhibit W, Priest Data Collection for Weitz, was identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibits W, V2 
and V3, legal descriptions prepared by Priest, were identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Plaintiffs Exhibit X, Priest 
data, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross 
examination continued. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. There being no objection 
from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Mr. Brown moved to have the Court consider the Deposition of Dusty Weitz. Mr. 
Schwarn objected. For reasons articulated on the record, Court sustained Mr. Schwam's 
objection. 
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding remaining witnesses. 
Mr. Schwarn requested that the Court read the following portions of Consuela 
Weitz's deposition: page 11, line 24 through page 12, line 23; page 19, line 2 through page 
20, line 6; page 50, line 14 through page 51, line 18; page 58, line 10 through page 59, line 16; 
page 65, line 2 through page 66, line 7; page 86, line 10 through page 87, line 18; page 89, 
line 11 through page 91, line 3; and the follotving portions of Gerald Weitz's deposition: 
page 10, line 23 through page 12, line 5; page 24, line 5 through line 25; page 26, line 10 
through page 27, line 6; page 47, line 1 through page 48, line 15. Court stated that it would 
read those portions this evening. 
Court recessed at 4:11 P.M., subject to call. 
APPROVED BY: 
_C 
JOHN R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk. 
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court 
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
Court informed counsel that it had read the excerpts of Consuelo Weitz and Gerald 
Weitz's depositions as requested by counsel. 
Todd Green was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. On motion of Mr. 
Brown the Deposition of Todd Green was published. Plaintiffs Exhibit #8, Road and 
Boundary Agreement, Green to Castle, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit #9, Road and Boundary Agreement, Green to Shook, 
w-as identified, offered and admitted into evidence wifkout objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits 
#lo, Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims between Rogers and Green; #44, 
Affidavit of Todd Green; and #45, letter, were identified, and Plaintiffs Exhibit #45 was 
offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #46, #47, and #48, letters, were 
identified. Direct examination continued. Plaintiffs Exhibits #44, #46, #47, #48, #49, and 
#50 were offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Court recessed at 10:23 A.M., reconvening at 10:36 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Todd Green resumed the witness stand and direct examination by Mr. Brown 
continued. Plaintiff's Exhibits #11, schematic drawing, and 812, schematic drawing, were 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam 
as to #12. Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's 
Exhibits EE-19, photograph, and NN, photograph, were identified, offered and admitted 
into evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit BBB, 
copy of plat map, was marked for identification, offered and admitted into evidence after 
hearing objections from Mr. Brown. Cross examination resumed. Redirect examination by 
Mr. Brown. Recross examination by Mr. Schwam. Court questioned the witness. Mr. 
Schwam examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down. 
Allen Drew was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. No cross exanination. 
The witness was excused. 
Court recessed at 11:59 A.M., reconvening at 1:03 P.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present. 
Mr. Brown informed the Court that Robert Brower was present pursuant to 
subpoena, but that he does not intend to call him. There being no objection from Mr. 
Schwam, Mr. Brower was excused from his subpoena. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit #10, Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims, was offered 
and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Terry Odenborg 
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Walter Carlson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from counsel, the 
witness was excused. 
Norman Clark was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross examination. There 
being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Curtis Wiggins was called, sworn and testified for the plainti€fs. Cross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examinaiion. There being no objection from counsel, the 
witness was excused. 
Consuelo Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Upon motion of 
Mr. Brown, there being no objection from Mr. Schwam, the testimony of Consuelo Weitz 
was interrupted to accommodate the next witness's schedule. 
Dustin F. Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination 
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. There being no objection from 
counsel, the witness was excused. 
Consuelo Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
plaintiffs on direct examination. Plaintiffs' Exhibits #37 A-66 through A-71, A-65 and A-63 
were identified. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37, A-66 through A-71, were offered and admitted 
without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37, A-62, photograph, was identified. Plaintiffs 
Exhibits #37 A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5, photographs, were identified and #37A-1 through 
A 4  were offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37 A- 
5 and A-6, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #37 A-7 through A-17, were identified, offered and admitted 
into evidence without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37 A29 and A-30, photographs, were 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Court recessed at 224 P.M., reconvening at 239 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 
Consuelo Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
plaintiffs on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibit ZZ, photograph, was identified. 
Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibit 
ZZ, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Defendant's Exhibit Y, copy of check, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Defendant's Exhibit Z, Landeck billing, was identified, offered and 
admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendanfs 
Exhibit AA, aerial photo, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Defendanfs Exhibit WW, letter, was identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit BB-1, 
survey, was identified, offered and rejected. Plaintiffs' Exhibits #37 A-18 through A-28, 
Terry Odenborg 
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and A-31 through A-65, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross examination. Court 
questioned the witness. The witness stepped down. 
Mr. Brown stated that he only had one or two witnesses left to call tomorrow. 
Court recessed at 409 P.M. 
APPROVED BY: 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court 
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
Harold Osborne was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
#40B, satellite photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence after hearing 
objections from Mr. Schwam. Recross examination by Mr. Scl~wam. Defendant's Exhibit 
0 0 ,  photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
There being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused. 
Mr. Brown moved to amend plaintiffs' amended complaint to conform to the 
evidence and argued in support of his motion. Mr. Schwam argued in opposition to the 
motion. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal. Mr. Schwam argued in surrebuttal. For reasons 
articulated on the record, Court granted the motion to amend. 
Plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Schwam moved to dismiss. 
Court recessed at 925 A.M., reconvening at 941 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Mr. Schwam inoved to dismiss the recently added claim of estoppel and the fifth 
cause of action and argued in support of the motion. Mr. Brown argued in opposition to 
the motion. Mr. Schwam argued in rebuttal. For reasons articulated on the record, Court 
granted the motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action. Mr. Brown argued further. To the 
extent plaintiffs have asserted an affirmative cause of action, Court granted the motion to 
dismiss. 
Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the second cause of action and argued in 
support of the motion. Mr. Brown argued in opposition to the motion. Court granted the 
motion to dismiss the second cause of action in the Amended Complaint. 
Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the first cause of action with prejudice and 
argued in support of the motion. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the 
motion. 
Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim and argued in 
support of the motion. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the motion. 
Court recessed at 10:02 A.M., reconvening at 10:08 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Danial Castle was calIed, sworn and testified for the defendants. Defendant's 
Exhibit QQ-1, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
objection. Direct examination continued. Cross Examination by Mr. Brown. Defendant's 
Exhibit DD, Declaration, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Cross examination continued. No redirect examination. The witness stepped 
down. 
Todd Green was called, having been previously sworn, and testified for the 
defendant. Defendant's Exhibits EE-1 through EE-18, and EE-20, photographs, were 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits 
HJ3-1 through HH-13, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Defendant's Exhibits 11-1 through 11-5, photographs, were identified, 
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits 11-6 through II- 
10, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. 
Defendant's Exhibits 11-11 and 11-12 photographs, were admitted into evidence upon 
stipulation of counsel. Defendant's Exhibits JJ-1 through JJ-4, photographs, were 
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination 
continued. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Redirect examination by Mr. Schwam. No 
recross examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. Brown examined the witness on 
the Court's questions. 
Steven Shook was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Defendant's 
Exhibits KK, sequence of fifty-six photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into 
evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit LL, photograph, was identified, offered 
and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit MM, photograph, was 
identified. Defendant's Exhibits PP-1 through PP-5, photographs, were identified, offered 
and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit MM, photograph, was 
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. 
Defendant's Exhibits QQ-3 and QQ-10, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted 
into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. 
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding scheduling. 
Court recessed at 11:57 A.M., reconvening at 1:12 P.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Steven Shook resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
defendants on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibits FF-1 through FF-10, photographs, 
were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit 
GG-1 through GG-6, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence 
without objection. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit #9, Road and 
Boundary Agreement, was identified. No redirect examination. The witness was excused. 
Thomas Richards was called and sworn. 
Mr. Brown objected to some of the defendants' exhibits that have not yet been 
offered and Mr. Richard's proposed testimony. Mr. Schwam responded to Mr. Brown's 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
objection. Mr. Brown argued further. Mr. Schwam argued further. Court overruled the 
objection. 
Direct examination of Thomas Richards by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibits R-1 
through R-12, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection, Defendant's Exhibit 'IT, Report by Northwest Management, Inc., was 
identified, offered and adinitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination 
continued. 
Court recessed at 258 P.M., reconvening at 3:14 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 
Thomas Richards resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for 
defendants on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibit UU, Supplemental Report by 
Northwest Management, Inc., was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without 
objection. Defendant's Exhibit XX, Northwest Management Report, was identified, offered 
and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Redirect 
examination by Mr. Schwam. 
Court recessed at 5:01 P.M. 
APPROVED BY: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fau) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cabIeone.net 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendmts. 
IN THE IXSTRXCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUIlICLtlL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
G E W D  E. VEITt and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 1 
and WITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability ) 
company, ) 
1 
vs. 1 Case No. CV 2004-000080 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONlA L. ) 
GREEN, husband and wife, 1 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 1 
SILVERNALE SHOOK, D A W  T. ) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
CASTLE and C A T F I E R ~ ~  c. i IN SUPPORT OF CLAIM THAT 
CASTLE, and US. BANK N.A., 1 DEFENDAM'S ARE NOT 
) BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR 
Defendants1 1 VALUE 
Counterplaintif&. ) 
COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record, 
Charles k Brown, and submit this memorandum in support of the claim that the defendants do not 
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meet the requirements for protection as bow fide purchasers for value. The facts presented in his 
memorandum will be &lly developed at trial. 
If it is determined that tliere was an uncertain boundary ihat was set by agreement, 
(.he question becomes what is the impact on a subsequent purchaser. Once a boundary line has been 
fixed under the doctrine of agreed boundary, that boundilly is binding upon successors in interest 
who purchase with notice of the agreement. Duflv. Seubert. 110 Idaho 865,870,719 P.2d 1125, 
1130 (198G), citing Prwlcy v. Harris. 75 Idalto 112,117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954). One buying 
property in the possession of a tllird party is put 00 notice ofany claim ol'title or right of possession 
by such third party which areasonable investigation would reveal. Paurlcy v. Harris, 75 Idaho 1 12, 
117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954). In Reid v. Duzet, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the district 
judge found: 
Although the Plaintiff was unaware of any marked property boundaries, 
choosing instead to tely on the deeded description, even a casual observation 
of the parcel would have revealed improvements in the area of the top hat. 
Those improvements, i.e., fencing, pens, wood shed, driveway, garage, and 
a home immediately east of the iron rod should have put them on notice tlmt 
someone claimed an interest in this property, regardless of what the survey 
later reveal&. 
140 Idaho 389,393,94 P.3d 694,698 (2004). 
The court then went on to hold: 
Idaho law provides that when two parties orally establish boundaries of 
vroverty to be transferred from one to the other, and the subseauenf: written 
deeddois not matchthose boundaries, the orall&greedupon bomdaries will 
prevail. This oral agreement is binding upon all subsequent ptucltaseri who 
have notice of Uw agreement, or who are put onnol4ce at the time ofpurchase 
that the property as described by the inaccurare deed is cIaimed bv sorrieone 
other th;n the seller. 
Thegeneral rule, then, is that onepunhiisiigpmperty i s  put on notice as to any claim 
of title or tight of possession which a reasonable investigation would reveal. PmcrIey v. Harris, 
supra. "One who reiies for protection upon the doctrine of being a bontc fide purchaser must show 
that at the time of the purchase he paid avaluable consideration and upon the belief and the validity 
of the vendor's claim oftitle without notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse Fights 
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ofanother." Imigv. McDonald, 77Idaho314,318,291. P.2d 852,855 (1955), citingRichlands Brick 
Corporation v. Hwst Hardware Co., 80 W. Va 476,92 S.E. 685; Merchants Trust v. Davis, 49 
Idaho 494,290 P. 383; Moore v. De Bernardi, 47 Nev. 33,220 P. 544; Davis v. Kleindienst, Ariz., 
169 P.2d 78; 92 C.Y.S., Vendor and Purchaser, $5 321, p. 214. Fwth~:r, "[ojne who purchases 
property with sufficient knowledge to put him, or a reasonably prudent person, on inquiry is not a 
bona fide purchaser." Id, ciringFroman v. Madden, 13 Idaho 138,88 P. 894; Mangum v. Stadel, 76 
Kw. 764,92 P. 1093; LaBrie v. Cartwrighf, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 144,118 S.W. 78$;SaZmn v. Norris, 
82 App. Div. 362,81 N.Y.S. 892; Shcphardv. Van Doren, 40 NM. 380,60 P.2d 635. "One who 
purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one 
who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in g o d  faith." 
Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho218,220,526 P.2d 178,180 (1974). ciling~fmerco, fnc. v. TulZor, 182 
Cal. App.2d 336,6 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1960). 
Therefore, ifthe Greens had sufficient facts to put thein on notice to inquire into an 
inconsistent claim by the Weitzes, and they did not engage in any inveslig11tion~ then they cannot be 
bona fide purchases for wlue- In Iferrmann v. Woodell, the court found that "A boundary marked 
by a fence, with the land on the Hemnanns' side being grazed and cultivated would constitute 
notice." 107Idaho916,921,693 P.2d, 11 18,1123 (1985). IrlHerrmnnn, the purchaser had walled 
the land before purchase and had noticed the barbed wire fence and cultivation. In our case, 
Mr. Green had also walked much of the area he ultimately purchased. Inhis deposition, Mr. Green 
stated that he had been on the property numerous times from 1999 to 2002, and at the preliminary 
injunction hearing he said 25 to 30 times. He testified that he traversed fllc perimeter road on his 
ATV 3 to 4 times a year from 1999 to 2002. He saw the radio shack, but he did not make inquiry 
of anyone concerning its history, owership, or purpose. I4e saw the blue gate and even used it to 
enter upon the disputed property. Thus, he did not access the disputed property from the propetty he 
intended to purchase but rather from the Bennett Lumby land then through the blue gate to the 
disputed property. Mr. Green saw not only the blue gate but the hog wire fence Ieading from the 
blue gate, which would have separated lrim &om &ectIy accessing the eastern end of the disputed 
property. The hog wire fence nuts between the pinkstdce and the western bearing tree, both of which 
Mr. Green allegedly remembers so well. Nobody bas argued &at the hog win? fence was not in good 
repair in July of 2002, extending approximately 100 feet south ofthe blue gate down the boundary 
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bdW'xn &a disputed property and Bennett Lumber propc~ty. Mr. Green traversed the barbed wire 
fence and fence posts of the disputed fence at the top of Tmcts 2 and 4 numerous times, even 
noticing the yellow barrel with a fence post in it. ARer lais purchase, when Mrs. Weitz infonried 
I~ that the Weitzes' land went to the fence, his reply of '%at old fenc.e?" indicated that lte knew 
exactly what fence she was referring to. 
With all this information, the Greens did not make inqtrjr to the Rogers as to ihc? 
boundaries of the property. No inquiry was made of the Weilzes, or the Stnetanas, or the O'Neals, 
or any residents ofthe Nearing Addition, same of whom were customers of Mr. Green's s W .  Nu 
inquj. was made into why there was a road, on land he thought he was purchasing, that did not 
connect in any way to his land, and, in fact, only connected to other roads on the Weitzes' propeny. 
No inquiry was made regarding the radio shack situated on the property he thought he was 
purchasing. There was no &ujr into whether the fences marked the boundary of the Rogers' land 
or any of Greens' few borders. After the purchase of the property, when the Greens were informed 
by the W e i w  of their ownership of the disputed property, the Rogers' acknowledged thal the 
Weitzes pmbably did have a claim to tbe land. This shows that even a very casual investigation 
would have revealed that there was an inconsistent claim to aportion of'the property they intended 
to purchase. The Grew certainly had cnough facts to put them on not~ce that there was a possible 
claim offight to aportion of the property, and they were under aduty to make inquiry. By choosiilg 
not ta do so, they cannot now claim to be born Ede pun:)asers. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMTED this day of October, 2005. FA d 
LMI, /I - 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendm& 
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I, Charles A. Brown, hereby d f y  that a and correct s o p  of the foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular f i s t  class mail, - sent by fkcsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-892-8030 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
- sent by ksimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular &st class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United Slates 
Post Office 
X hand delivered - 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attornqt at Law 
at Latah Couaty Courthorcse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Scl~wam Law Office 
at LataI~ County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
1 
on this _h day of October, 2005. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIE comm OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ a~ld CONSUELO ) 
3. WEITZ, husband and wife 1 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability 1 
company, 1 
Plaintiffs1 
Counterdefendants, ) 
f 
vs. 1 Case No. CV 2004-000080 
) 
TODD A. GREEN and TOW L. j PLAINTIFFS' MEMO RAM)^ IN 
W E N ,  husband and wife, ) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
STEVEN R. SI-KOOK and MARY E. j CLAIMS OF TRESPASS AND 
S I L W a E  SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 SLANDER OF TITLE 
CASTLE and CATHEKINE C. 1 
CASTLE, mdU.S. BANKN.A., 1 
1 
COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and though their attorney of record, 
Charles A. Browa, and submit this memomdurn inopposition to the defendants' claimsof trespass 
and slander of title. The facts presented in this memorandum will be fully developed at trial. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' CLATMS OF TRESPASS 
AND SLANDER OF TiTLE 1 
A. TWSPASS 
Thedefendantsclaimthat the plaintiffs have- "Howevel; 
one who holds property under a colorable claim of ownership is not subject to an action of trespass 
by the true owner." Wnlter E Wilhite Revocable Lfving TW v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension 
Fund, 128 Idaho 539,549,916 P2d 1264,1274 (1996). The Supreme Court was relying on the 
general statement of Lbe law in W. PQC Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KFEIQN ON THE LAW 
OF TORE3 4 13 at 77 (5" ed. 1984). This section states that "The same poky of favoring 
possession operates to protect the defendant, once he is in occupancy of the land for some 
appreciable time under a colorable claim of ownemhip. He is then no longer subject to an action of 
trespass on the part of the true owner, whoseproper remedy is in the form ofanaction of cjecmlent." 
The plaintif&and theirpredmcssom have beeniaposs&ionofthedisputedproperty 
since at least 1929. They have heated the property as their own by maintaining a fcnce on lbe 
boundary,logging, grazing animals, building roads, granting leases, and recreation. Under the theory 
of boundary by agreement, they have. at least, a colorable claim of ownership to the disputed 
property. Therefore, under the law of Idaho, they m o t  be liable to the defendants for trespass. 
This d e  applies to statutoxy trespass codified at I.C. 5 6-202. "Although not stated 
in the statute, I.C. 9 6-202 applies only where the alleged trespass is shown to haw been wilful and 
intentional." Bumgarner v. Bumgnmeer, 124 Idaho 629,639,862 P.2d 321,331 (Ct. App. 1993), 
citing Earl v. Fordice, 84 Idaha 542,545,374 P2d 713,714 (1962); Menmha Woodenware Co. v 
Spokane Inttl Railway Co., 19 Idaho 586,594, 115 P. 22,24 (191 1). See also, SeNs v. Robinson, 
2005 'WL 15381 1 1 (Idaho, 2005). "Thus, where thedefendant wrongfully enters upon the plaintiff's 
property or cuts his trees, but the defendant's trespass is neither wilful or intentional, the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover his achd damages at common law, but he i s  not entitled to Imve those damages 
Webled." Id, citing Menasha Woodenware Co., 19 Idaho at 594, 115 P. at 24, see also, Mock v. 
Potlatch Corp., 786 F.  Supp. 1545,1547 @. Idaho 1992). ff a person is acting under a colorable 
claim of ownership, it is not possible that any removal of kees is done wilfully and i~~tentionally. 
Therefore, them is no basis for awarding treble damages or common law actual damages. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM W OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' CLAMS OF TRJZSPASS 
AND SLANDER OF TITLE 2 
, En"tP"0-J ! E n - *  "OdC n*, on. 
a, Slander of Title 
In Maheson v. H4wis, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that there are four essential 
elementr to aslander of fitIe cause of action which include: "(1) The uttttring and publication of the 
slanderous words by the defendant; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) malice, and (4) special damages 
.... '' 98 rdaho 758,759,572 P.2d 861 (1977). 
In the present case, %ere MI be no allegation that thc claim of an interest in the 
property i s  false. Ibe Weiitzes have a legitimate claim to the disputed property based on the theory 
ofboundary by agreement. Further, there is no d i c e -  the suit was brought to b i d e  a boundary 
dispute, "Malie has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or 
fdsity of a statement." See Bandelin v. Pielsch, 98 Idaho 337,342,563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). "An 
action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with 
probable cause for believing it." Werner v. Saflord, 134 Idaho 691,701.8 P.3d 1234,1244 (2000). 
As to specialdanages,althoughIdaho has foundthat incurring attorney's fees to clear 
a titledoes constitute special damages, (see Ray1 v. ShllEnterprises, Im., 108 Idaho 524,700P.2d 
567 (1984)), inthe present case defendants Greenhave actually made money by selling portions of 
the property with this supposed "cloud" on their title. After the Wens  became aware of the 
Weitzes' claim of an interest in the disputed property, they negotiated and sold property to the 
Castles and Shooks. Both parties knew of the potential claim to a portion of the property they were 
purchasing and yet the Shooks paid S4745.82 per acre and the Castles paid $4,000.00 per acre - 
both paying at least twice what the Greeps had paid for the propem. Inaddition, at least according 
to defendants' allegations,they negotiated4 received a payment fium Greens' sellers, the Rogers, 
of $46,247.16 for them to defend the claim by the Weitzes. In no regard have the h e n s  suffered 
pecuaiary losses by the Weitzes' claim. 
Finally, the Greens' slander of title claim must also be taken in the context of their 
contractual duties under their Road and Botmdary Agreement with tile Shooks. In that agreement, 
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tlte Greens must bring an action to quiet title vis-a-vis the Weitzes in the evcnt that the WcitLos do 
not pursue a quiet title claim for the d i k e d  property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this -&day of October, 2005. 
uL Charles A. Brown 
Attorney for PlaintifiICountmdefendants 
I, Chnrles k Brown, hereby ceTtify that a m e  ad correct copy of the foregoing was: 
- 
mailed by regular first class mail, - sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-892-8030 -Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Scl~wam 
- sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
hand delivered 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
at Latah County Cowlhouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
at Latab County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
d on this __day of October, 2005. 
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M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FORTH& COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEIT2 and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEkTZ, husband and wife 1 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 1 
Idaho limited liability 
company, 
1 
Plaintiffsf j 
Counterdefendants, ) 
) 
vs . ) Case No. CV 2004-000080 
1 
TODD A. G R E ~  and TONIA L. 1 
GREEN, husband and wife. 1 
S'IEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 1 
SLLVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. 1 PLAINTIFFS WMORANDUM 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 1 IN SUPPORT OF 'BOUNDARY 
CASTLE, i d  U.S. BANK N.A., i BY AGREEMENT CLAIM 
1 
Defendants/ 1 
Counterpiaintiis. ) 
COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record, 
Charles A. Brown, and submit this memorandum in support ofthe claim for boundary by agreement. 
The facts presented in this memorandum will be fully developed at trial. 
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The doctrine of boundary by agreement is d established in Idaho. h Neidcr v. 
Show, the wwt described the requirements, relying on along history of cases. The eqxtslilted that: 
Boundary by agreement requires: (1) an uncemin or riiiputed boundary 
involving adjacentpropmlies, and (2) anagreement fixing, the boundary. Cox 
v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495,50 P.3d 987,990 (2002). Tbageement may 
be express or implied by the conduct of the parties. Id. Where a fence is 
alleged to establish a boundary by agreement, and there is no evidence 
regarding who built the fence orwhy they built it, the Gad that the fence 
has been in existence for a number of years strongly suggests it was put 
in place as a boundary by agreement. Id; see also Johnson v. Newport, 
13 1 Idaho 521,523,960 P.2d 1342,744 (1998) (finding feuee in existence for 
sixty yearsestablished boundary by agceement);Dreherv PgweI2. 120 ldaho 
715,718-19,819 P.2d 569,572-73 (Ct.App.1991) (Ending fence in present 
location for over sixty years established bouudary by agreement); Herrmnn 
v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 920, 693 PJd Zd 118, 1122 (Ct.App.1985) 
(neighboringlandownersacceptcd fence as boundary for many years). Which 
party pays property tax on the disputed land is irrelewt to determining a 
claim based on boundary by agreement. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 
901,950 F.2d 1237,1240 (1997) (citing Tmppeft v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 
633 P.2d 592 (1981)). Further, an agreed boundary binds successors in 
interest who purehase with notice, actual or wnsmctive. Paurley v. Harris, 
75 Idaho 112,117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954). 
138 Idaho 503,506,65 P.3d 525,528 (2003) (emphasis added). 
"The doctrine is premised upon the assumption that long acquiescence between 
neighbors concemingthe boundary line between theirproperty ought to preclude 'aconlroversy that 
will involve rights that have been unquestioned for ageneration."'Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715, 
717-718,819 P.2d 569,571-572 (1991), citing Bayhouse v. Urquich, 17 Idaho 286,298, 105 P. 
1066, 1070 (1909). In Dreher, the district court found that the fenee had been erected in 
approximately 1900. Further, no evidencc was presented to show that either party or rheir 
predecessors had actual bowledge ofthe location of the me boundary line, or that the Eelice was 
not on that line. The appellate court stated: 
In absence of any other explanation for the discrepancy in the location of the 
fence, the district court inferred that the predecessors of Dreher and Powell 
"were uncertain or did nOt know the location of the boundary line at the time 
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the original fence was erected ...." In the court's analysis, this starting poi* 
which was followed by about sixty yearsof acquiescence by the owners, led 
to tlie cow's conclusion thatthe fence had been established as the boundary 
by agreement. 
120 Idaho at 771,819 P.2dat 573. 
nte Dreher case is similar to fhe present case in that the fence was in place as long 
as myorx cm reme111ber. The Weims and their predecessars md the ~~' psa?decessors had 
always treated the fmce as the true boundary and had treated the land up to the fence as their own. 
Therefore, absent any evidence that tht: true boundary was known, there is a presumption that thc 
iocation of the hue bowdary line was &own at the time the fence w:is erected. 
Other Idaho cases have reached thesmne result. In Herrmmnn v. WoodeN. 107 Idaho 
916, 693 P.2d 11 18 (1985), there was no direct evidence of an agreement resolving a dispute, 
uncettainty, or ignorance over the true boundary. The fence had been in place so long that no 
witnesses wen; available to establish that an actual agreement to fix an unknown or uncertain 
boundary had occmed. There the court stated: 
However, "[sluch an agreement may be presumed to arise between adjoining 
landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a 
fence or othermonment on the line followed by such adjoining landowners 
treating it as fixing the boundary for such lrmgthof time tlrat neither ought to 
be allowcd to deny the comctness of its location" Edgeller v. .Johnston* 74 
Idaho 359, 365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953) (citations omitted). Further, 
"[flrom the long existence and recognition of the original fence as the 
boundary, and the want of any evidence as to the manner c~r cucumstanccs of 
its original location, the law presumes that it was originally located as a 
boundary by agreement ...." Beneficial Life Inrurancc Company v. 
Waknmatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830,835 (1954); see alsoHnlcs v. 
Frakes, 600 P.Zd 556 (Ut& 1979); Baum v. Defa. 525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974). 
Fdermorc, the period of acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence 
of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 351 (1954). In 
addition, a specific time period of acquiescence is not required. Trappett v. 
Davis, supra. h ins case, there is no evidence presented as to who 
constructed the fence or what function the fence was c~riginally to serve. 
Acquiescence can then be relied upon to show that a settlement agreement 
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must have taken p l m  sonutime in the past and was memorialized by the 
placement ofthe fence. McKinneyv. Kull, 118 Cal.App.3d 951,173 Cal.Rph. 
696 (1981); Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Cal.App2d 642,49 Cal.Rph. 
869 (1966). 
107 fdaho at 920,693 P.3d at 1122. 
I t  & not required that the boundary be marked by a fence. EdgeIier refers to the 
erectionof a fcnce or other monument whichis tkcnkx&d ar, the bound&?. In GriBlv. Reynolds, 
I36 Idaho 397,34 P.3d 1080 (2001). a portion of the fence whlch had served as a marker of the 
boundary wastemoved. There itwas foundthat abem with athrce foot elevation, whichhad served 
as a fauning lime for more than twenty years, had been agreed upon as the boundary. 
Thus, when a fence has been in p l m  for as long as anyotr can remember and there 
is no evidence to show that the fence was not intended lo serve as a bouadary between adjoining 
propeflies, the law will presume that there wasadspute or unmintyas to the location of the true 
bounday and that rhe fence was erected in a location agreed to be the boundary. 
Further, the agreement establishing a boundary may be express or implied fmm the 
snrroundq circumstances. C m r o n  v. Cox, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1997) 
(citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d 626, 630 (1990)). A long period of 
acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed property provides a factual basis 
fiom which an agreement can be inferred. GrSfJeel, 136 Idaho at 400,34 P.3dat 1083 (citing Wells, 
118 Idaho at 41, 794 P.2d at 630). In the present case, the agreement should be infened by the 
actions of the parties. The Weitzes and their predecessors leasedgonion~ ofthe land, built roads up 
to the fence lie, logged timber, grazed animals, and used& land for recreation without dispute for 
many decades. The Greens' predecessors also used the land up to the fence Iine as their own. 
Additionally, the period of acquiescence need not continue for the amount of time 
necessary to establish adverse possession because acquiescence is merely competent evidence of the 
agreement. Trappert v Davis: 102 Idaho 527,532,633 P.2d 592,597 (1981); see also PaurIey v. 
Uarrr3, 75 Idaho t 12,268 P.2d 35 1 (I 954). Once there is an agreed qwn boundary, the parties to 
the agreement are no longer entitled to the amount ofpropcrty provided for in their deeds and must 
absorb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount oftheir p r o m  as a result of the new 
boundary. Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223,226,31 P.3d 245,248 (2001). 
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In summary, when a fence &ga bodary  has been in existence for so long that 
no one remembers who erected the fence or for what purpose the fence. was placed, the law will 
presume tllatthere was adispute over the location oftt~e true boundary and the fence was placed in 
the location as a result of anagreement to treat the fence as the boundary. Further, acquiescence can 
then be relied upon to show that a settlement agseement must have takeuplace sometime in the past 
was memorialized by the pIacement of the fence. Once the agmment as to the boundary exists, 
the parties to the agreement no longer possess the amount of pmperty stated in their deeds. And 
finally, an agreed boundary binds successors in intenst who pu~hase with notice, actual or 
constructive. The k t s  of the present case fully support a finding of boundary by agreement: (1) a 
fence has been in existence for as long as anyone can remember; (2) there has been use by thc 
plaintiffs~d theupredeoessors,and the Greens' pfede~essors, up to the fence line; and(3) tltere was 
a long period of acquiescence as improvements were made on the plaintiffs' land. With these facts, 
there should be apmumption that there was a dispute over the true boundary; and that a fence was 
erected subsequent to an agreement to fix the boundary at the fence line. The yeasof acquiescence 
should serve as evidence of the agreement, and there should be a finding that. as a result of the 
agreement, the description of the property in the deed is no longerbiiding and thc plaintiffs own the 
property up to the fence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITI'E?? 6 da50f October, 2005. 
5- 
Charles w k Br w 
Altorney for Plainti.Ks/CounteKlefendm& 
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P.O.Bo* 122Si324 mrin St, 
Ladelea, ldnho SJSD1 
XI&766~7IIOL7lbS$t6  
I, Charles A. Brown, hcrcby o d f y  that a atrue and conect copy of the foregoing was: 
mailed by reguIar fitst class mail, - sent by fac$mile only 
and deposited in the United States ' to: 208-892-8030 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwam 
- sent by facsimile, mailed by . - sent by Federd Express, 
regular first cIass mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post Office 
X hand delivered 
- 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
at Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Schwam, Esq. 
Schvjam Law Office 
at Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
on this d a y  k o f  October, 2005. 
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Chdcr A. Brow\ Eq. 
P.O. Eox 122SD24 Msio St. 
r . w k l 0 n . 1 ~ 0  mo~ 
20&746nP7fDB.146.$ 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
324 Main Street 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
208-746-9947 
208-746-5886 (fax) 
ISB # 2129 
CharlesABrown@cableoneJlet 
Attorney for PlaintiffslCounterdefendants. 
IN TtIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
1HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TNE COUNTY OF LA'iAH 
GERALD E. 'WEJTZ and CONSUELO 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife 
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability 
compw,  
Plaintiffsf 
Counterdefendants, 
VS. 
TODD A. GREEN and TONLA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, 
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 Case No. CV 2004-000080 
1 
1 
1 
1 PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
SXLVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T. ) IN SUPPORT OF QUASI 
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. 1 ESTOPPELCLAM 
CASTLE, andU.5. BANKN.A., j 
1 
Defendants1 1 
Cormterplaintiffs. ) 
COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record, 
Charles A. Brown, and submit this memomdurn in support of the claim for quasi estoppel. The 
facts presented in this memorandum will be hlly developed at trial. 
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Equitable estoppel requires (1) a M$e representation or concealment of amaterial 
fact made with actual or constructive knowledgeofthe truth; (2) that the party asscrting estoppel did 
not and could not have discovered the mth' (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment 
be relied upon; and (4) W Ihe party asserting estop1 relied on the misrepresenSatioa or 
concealment to his or her prejudice. Willigv. State, Dept ofHealth & Werfme, 127 Idaho 259,261, 
899 P.2d 969,971 (I995), cihng Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg Corp v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 
22,644 P.2d 341,344 (1982). Quasi estoppel is distingnished &om equitable estoppel "in that no 
concealment or misrepresentation of existing fscts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the 
other, isa~xecessazyingrcdiont" Evamv. Idaho State TmComm, 97Idaho 148,150,540 P.2d 810, 
8 12 (1 975). The dochine of quasi estoppel applies whenit would be unconscionable to allow a party 
to assert a right Much is inconsistent with a prior position. MitcheN v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 
71 5,874 P.2d 520,526 (1994). "The doctrine ofqwii-estoppel applies when a person asserts a 
right inconsistent with a position previously talcen by him, with knowledge of the Eacts and liis 
rights, to the deh-iment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine." Young v. Idaho Department of 
Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,875,853 P.2d 615,620 (Ct. App. 1993). "Quasiestoppel does 
not require a W e  represeatation. Rather, it is adoetrine designed toprevent one party from gaining 
anuneonscionabIe advantage by clmgingpositions." RocordSteel & Const, Inc v Martel Consf., 
Ic . ,  129 Idaho 288,292,923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996), citing Afitchell v. Zihg, Inc, 125 
Idaho 709. 715, 874 P.2d 520,526 (1994); Young, 123 Idaho at 875, 853 P2d at 620. "Quasi 
estoppel prevents a party fmm asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is 
inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Htghway Dist. No. 4, 139 
Idaho 140,144,75 P.3d 194,198 (2003), citingfiloyd v. Bd. of Com'rs ofBonnevzlle Cowty, 137 
Idaho 71 8,726,52 P.3d 863,871 (2002) (citing E. Idnho Agric. Credit Ass'n, v. Neibuur, 133 Idaho 
402,410,987 P.2d 314,322 (1999)). 
The facts of this case will show that the defendants should be estopped from makiig 
a claim to the disputed property. The Greens contraced to buy 160 acres from the Rogers at aprice 
of two thousand dollars an acre. After the p ~ h a s e ,  but before the Greens sold secttons of the 
property to the Shooks and W e s ,  the Greens were made aware that the W e i ~  had a claim to a 
portion of the property (the disputed property.) With tius knowledge, the Greens decided to sell two 
sections ofthe propew, both includingportions ofthe disputed propelty, tothe Shooks and Castles. 
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The Shooks purchaszd their gmpcriy for four thousaud, seven hundred and forty five dollars aud 
e igwtwo cents ($4,745.82) per acre, and the Castles purchased their property for four thousand 
dollars ($4,000.00) pex acre. The Greens pmmised to continue with efforts to get clear title to the 
disputed property wit11 the Rogers. 
The Greens and the Rogers begannegotiations throughtheir attorneys. A letter from 
G ~ e n s '  attorney stated that an amount must be determined for ''teimbursing Greens' losses." The 
proposal was for the Greens to be paid as follow: for Castles' loss of 1.91 acrt?s at $4,000.00 per 
acre, for Shooks' loss of 3.66 acres at S4.745.82 pa acre. and for Greens' loss of 3 acres at 
$4,745.82 ~ e r  acre (even though the Greens purclmed at $2,000.00 per acre.) There was also to be 
additional sums for legal fees and aresurvey of the property, resulting in a total of $46,247.1 6 to be 
paid to the Greens. The attorney for the Rogers countered that %2,000.00 per acre would be fair 
because that was what the Greens had purchased the property for. In the end, the G ~ B S  were paid 
$46,247.16 and an agreement was signed releasing the Rogers from any flirther liability regarding 
the property. It is clear Erern the kfters between the attorneys that the Greens were to be 
compensated on aper acre  bas^ for land that they did not receive in the original sale. The claim that 
the Greens wre just relieving the Rogers of their duty to defend the title is not supported by any of 
the correspondence. There would be no purpose in paying at a per acre rate if the true reason wcre 
anticipated legal costs. This agreement was to reimburse the Greens for pmper~y that they did not 
receive in the original sale. 
The above h t s ,  and additional facts to be proved at trial, support the claim for quasi 
estoppel. It is clear that the agreement paying the Greens %46,247.16 wa;r paymenifor the acres the 
Greens did not receive in thew purchase of the 160 acres. lhey received a benefit much in excess 
of the $2,000.00 per acre price they paid to purchase the land. To allow the Greens to now receive 
the disputed property, which they have already been paid for, and quire the Weitzes to pay 
additional amounts to the Greens is wwnscionable. The Greens should not be allowed to assert a 
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right inconsistent with their previous position to the detriment of  the Weitzss. To allowotLeTW1se 
would result in the Greens having been paid for the propesty,twice, and at a much inflated ratc. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED on this 6 day of October, 2005. 
mL Charles A. Brown 
Attonley for PlaintEsICwnterdefendants 
I, Charles A. Brown, l~ereby c d f L  that a true atid correct copy of the foregoing was: 
- mailed by regular fist class mail, sent by facsimile only 
and deposited in the United States to: 208-892-8030 - Magyar 
Post Office 208-882-4190 - Schwan~ 
- sent by facsimile, mailed by - sent by Federal Express, 
regular first class mail, and overnight delivery 
deposited in the United States 
Post office 
X hand delivered 
- 
to: Robert M. Magyar 
Attorney at Law 
at Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Andrew M. Scltwam, Esq. 
Schwam Law Office 
at Latah County Cowtbouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/ 
on this day of October, 2005. 
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Piercie T R W E L E  and Cecil M. Trmeill, kmasband and wife, and Gerald T m e l l  m d  Doris Tmnnell, 
husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Glen WARD* Defendant-Appellmta 
Glen WAND, Ben Ward, Admidsbator of the Estate of Fred E. Wad, deceased, m d  Bva Wmd, the widow of 
the deceased, Fred E. Wad, Cross-CompBainmts, AppeUlmts, v. Piercie TRUNNEILE and Cecil M. T m ~ e l l ~  
husband md wife, and Gerald T m e 1 1  and Doris T m e 1 l ,  husbmd and wife$ Cross-Defendants* Respondents. 
[Cite as T rme l l  v. Wad, 86 Idaho 5551 
No. 9284. 
Supreme Court of Bddno. 
Action for trespass to enjoin defendants from further crossing pl&ntiffs9 property, wherein defendant cross 
complained seeking a deteminafion of prescriptive easement across pl&ntiffsq land, a detemination of 
ownership by adverse possession to certain land, and damages. The District Cow%, Seventh Judicial Dist&t, 
Cmyon County, Charles Scoggin, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs md an appeal was !hken. The S8nprem.e 
Court, McQutide, J., held that m easement by implication was not estabUished although there was unity of title 
md subsequent separation by grant of the domhant estate md apparent continuous use, in view off fact eviden.ce 
sustained finding that the easement was not reasonably necessq to proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
Bramerr & FulBer, CaldweBl, for appellants and cross-compl6ajnmts. 
Actual, continued occnp8anjon of land, under a claim of title, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, I05 P. I066 (1909); Idaho Code, Title 5, Section 208 (1947); Idaho Code, 
Title 5,  Section 209 (4947); Bewficial Life Hnnsnrmce Compmy v. Wdkaaunatsu, 75 Bddnkno 232,241,270 P.2d 
830 (1954). 
Land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied where it has been protected by a substmtial enclosure 
wid usually cultivated or i m p ~ ~ v e d  md taxes thereon paid. HdAo Code, Title 5, Section 210 (1947); !Edgeller v. 
Joh?ston, 741d&0 359,262 P. 2d 1006 (1953); Beneficial Life Bnswance Co. v. WAmatsu, 75 Idaho 232, 
241,270 P.2d 830 (1954). 
A presumption that use of m easement was under a claim of right and adverse arises from ardi~puted use of 
m easement for the period ofpresc~iption~ S m e t t  v. Werelus, 83 I d ~ o  514,522,365 P.2d 952 (1961); 
Nog.8.hwestem & Pacific H y p t h e e k b d  v. Hobson, 59 Hddnkno 119,80 P.2d 793 (1938); Eagle Rock Corp. v. 
IdmoM Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 413,85 P.2d 242 (1938); Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Iddmo 715, 152 P.2d 585 
(1944); 1 Thompson, On Real Proper&, Sec. 436, pp. 718-721; 28 C.J.S. Easements 8 68, p. 736. 
An easement by implication tigises when a grantor transfers part of his estate that is benefited by an existing 
right of way. Wilton v. Smith$ 40 Idaho 81,231 P. 704 (1924); J ~ h s o n  v. Gustafson, 49 Idad50 376,288 P. 427 
(1930); E i s e n b d  v. Delp, 70 I&o 266,215 P.2d 812 (1950); 28 C.J.S. Easements $31, page 687. 
% 3 I :i7 
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Actual location of easement is determined by its practical location and use over the the prescriptive period. 
Kirk v~ Schultzg 63 Idaho 278,289, 119 P.2d 266 (1941). 
S. Ben Dudap and Herbert W. Rettig, Galdwell, for respondents and cross-defendmts. 
~ , ~ - * ~ ~ - ~ - -  page ---.- - 
This general d e  fixing the presumption of adverse use is applicable to improved lands, and lands euitivated 
and enclosed. However, when one claims m easement by prescription, over wild or enclosed lmds of mother* 
mere use ofthe way for the required t h e  is not grounds sufficient "la, give rise to a presumption that the use is 
adverse. Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho !5B3:, 373 P.2d 929. 
Alleged statements of witness Beaverr, defendants' predecessor, concerning the boundary line between th.e 
two forty acre &xts  are not binding on the plaintiffsB$. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Waknmatsu, 75 ld&o 232,270 
P.2d 830. 
The bwden ofproving each a d  every element of adverse possession by clew and satisfactory evideio.ce is 
upon the party relying upon dtle by adverse possesion. Sec. 5-206, Id&o Code; Hogan v. B l h e y :  73 Idaho 
274,251 P.2d 209; Pleasan~ts v. Henry, 36 Idaho 728,213 P. 565; Lason v. 80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 
775; Last Chance Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 35 Idaho 61,204 P. 654; S i m o n s  v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 8 18 P.2d 
740. 
The mere proposition tinat a fence existed for the statutory period, or longer, does m t  convert it into a 
boonndw. Lmson v. Lindsay* 80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 773. 
An open m d  notorious occupation with hostile intent is 61 necessary constituent of an adverse possession. 
Weither a hostile intent without such occupation, nor such occupation without such intent is sufficient. Hogm v. 
Bldmey, 73 Idaho 274,251 P.2d 209, at local page 214. 
The use of driveway in common wW the owner and general public, in the absence of some decisive act on 
the user's part indicating a separate md exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption of an individual 
right therein in his favor. Simmons v. PerPCins, 63 Idaho 136, B 18 P.2d 74Q Cusk v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229 at 
Bd page 23 1,215 P.2d 297. 
McQUADE, Justice. 
Plaintiffs-respndents Pkrcie T m e 1 1  and Cecil MFard. T m e 4 %  own the Nofibeast quarter ofthe Southwest 
quater of Section eight? Tomship ffow Noirth, Rmge five, West of the BBoe Meridianarm, Canyon Comty, of 
which land respondents Gerald T m e l P  md his wife Doris T m e l Z  are the tenants in possession. Defendants- 
appellants Fred Ward and Iva Wmd me the omers  of anile adjoining Noahwest quarter of the Southwest qumter 
of Section eight, Tomship four North, Wmge five, West of the Boise Meridiandaa, Cmyon County. Appellant 
Glen Ward is the tenant in possession of &is Wmd property. 
Both of h e  properties are traversed by gr lmge irrigation ditch> the Plowhead Lateral, which flows gene~:aliy 
firom east to west. Most of appellants' property is located on the north side of this lateral, however, there is 
approximately 6.53 acres located 
south there of^ For many years, appellants haveused a private road located on respondents' property in order to 
reach &is 6.53 acres. In their cross complaiaaB, appellants alleged f ia t  this private road provides th.e only means 
of access for f m  machinev and equipment to the 4.53 acre tract. They fixther alleged that they have 
1318 
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coniinuously, opedy, wintemptedly~ actually and visibly used this private road for approximately eleven 
years. 
The road was built En 1929. Apparently, it was originally constructed for the purpose of l~auling hay back 
and forth to sheep which were corralled md fed on respondents' property south afthe Plowhead Lateral. The 
land over which the road crossed was unimproved. Respondents alleged that my  use that the appellants may 
have made of this road neither h m e d  respondents nor in my way interfered with use of their property. 
New the b o m d q  of the two properties and south of the Plowhead Later& there existed a fence:e. It is mot 
clear when the fence was erected, however, it appeas that it had k e n  in existence from 1948 (when gppellants' 
predecessor purchased the property) until it was removed by the respondents in 1961. In their cross comm.plaint, 
appellants alleged that the fence was originally constructed as a b o w d q  between the two properties. They 
contended itilaat they had used the property up to the fence line continuously, openly, mintemgstedly, actuaUy 
m d  visibly for approximately eleven years. They further alleged that their predecessor in interest had inforimed 
&em that the fence was the bons~adq between the two properties. 
At one time respondents o w e d  the entire eighty acres involved in this cause. Their property was devoted 
partly to farming and partly to the corralling of sheep. Respondents stated Gnat the so-cdled bouinndq fence was 
in actuality part of a sheep corral which they had maintained south of the Plowhead Lateral. They ~furtlzer stated 
that m area had been lefi between the corral fence md the property line sheep in the corrals. 
In 1940, the boundm disp~te mose. Respondents biad a survey made wEch indicated that a very small par4 
of h e  property claimed by tihe appePPmts was within the respondents' property description. Subsequently, 
respondents removed the fence south ofthe Plowhead Lateral md erected mother fence somewhat further to the 
west in conformance with the line ofthe survey. 
In 1959, respondent Gerald T m e l l  informed the appellants that he was going to remove the road across 
his property in order to cultivate that portion of his 1md. The road was destroyed in 1960, 
md in 19611 the area was planted md corrugated. Shortly thereafter appellant Glen Ward crossed respoiodents' 
property in order to gain access to his 6 3 3  acre tract. Respondents alleged that this action resulted in 
considerable damage to their newly cultivated Bmd. 
Respondents brought this action seeking dmages for trespass md to enjoin appellants from further crossing 
the respondentsq property. Appe1~mts filed an mswer md cross claim asserting an easement across respondents' 
propen& and adverse possession to that portion of f m l m d  south ofthe Plowhead Lateral> between the 
boundq  line and the old fence which respondents rennoved. Appdlaats also claimed dmages in that they were 
unable to have ingress and egress for farm machinew to the 633 acre tract of land. Trial was had and 
respondents were awarded $300 dmages and costs. Appellants were pemmently en@ined from entering or 
crossing upon the lands of the nesmmdents. TKs apped is from the judgment and the findings of fact a d  
conclusims of law entered in this cause. 
Appellants assign error to the failure of the triad court to find that: 4 .  A prescripkive easement was 
established across respondents' property by use thereof from 1950 to 1954; 2. inn easement by i~~p~ica t ion  was 
established across respondentss property by severance off the forty acres, part of which (the 6.53 acre tract) could 
only be reached by a right of way across the imd retained by respondents; 3. Title by adverse possession was 
established to the strip of Band south ofthe Piowhead Lateral, between the boundary line and the old fence. 
[I] To establish a prescriptive right for m roadway it is essential that the use ofthe way mnst constitute some 
actual invasion or inkingement oftk right ofthe owner. Simepns v. Perkins, 63 Idaho B 36, 4 l 8 P.2d 740 
(1941). It is appellants' contention, however, that proof of an open, notorious, continued and ~ m i ~ n t e n u ~ p ~ ~ y ~  
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for'the prescriptive period, withobi e a r n a t i n  of how it began raises a presumption that it was am adverse use 
and under a claim of right. Appellants point to evidence which shows that the roadway has been used by them 
wintemptedly md continuously for a period longer than is required by 1.C. 9 5-203. See Sirnett v. We1re1111~~ 83 
Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952 (1961). They argue that this court must presume that such use ofthe roadway was 
hostile md constituted m actual i.nvasion ofthe rights of the respondents. 
[I21 Appellants have comectly stated the general rule fixing the presmption of adverse use. See: Sinnett v. 
Werelus, supra, Northwestern & PaciGc Hypo&eekba& v. Hobson, 59 Idaho 1 19,80 P.2d 
- ----- page 560 ---------- "--- 
793 (1938), Eagle Rock COT. v. Bdmont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 0B3,85 P.2d 242 (1938). As we recently pointed 
out in Cox v~ Cox, 84 Ed&o 5 B 3,373 P.2d 929 (1 962), however9 the general m ~ e  is only applicable to imp~~oved 
nmds. In the instant case, the record shows that the land 6ver which prescription is claimed was unimproved 
until 1961. When one claims m easement by prescription over wild or unenclosed %mds of another, mere use of 
the way for the required time is not generally sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the use is adverse. Cow 
v. cox9 supra. 
1[3] FSWeheaasa~re~ the trial court fomd that my use that the apbelants made of the roadway was pemissive 
md acquiesced in by the respndents. S&skmtid and competent evidence exists to support this finding a d  it 
will not be disturbed on appeal. Cox v. Cox, supra, Sirnett v. Werelus, supra* S i m o n s  v. Perkins, supra. 
1[0? 51 In order to establish m easement by implication in favor of the dominant estate, thee essential 
elements must be made to appear: 1. Unity of title a d  subsequ&t separation by grant of the dominmt estate; 2. 
Appment continuous use; 3. The easement must be reasonably necessq to the proper enjoyment ofthe 
dominant estate. Davis v. Gowen, 83 1dd.o 204,360 P.2d 403, $8 A.L.R.2d 1192 (196 1). Two ofthe essential 
elements appeax to be present here. The trial court found, however, that the easement was not reasonably 
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe appellantss estate as there were other means of ingress md egress to 
md from the 6.53 acres. There is conflict on this point, but subs-tial md competent evidence exists to the 
effect that appellants possessed two other mems of access to this property. 
Appellants rely strongly upon Eisenbwth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,215 P.268 812 (1950). In that case this court 
held that where the owner of an estate consisting of several pmis so adapts them during his ownership that one 
derives benefit ii-691~1 the other9 and thereafter transfers one ofthe parts with d l  appwtenmas without mention 
ofthe incidental burdens of one in respect to the other, an implied easement is created in the grantee of such 
estate ofthe use theretofore eexrcised by the grantor. AppelBmts have failed to prove'&, however, that the road 
was designed to benefit the 6.53 acres. The evidence clearly establishes that the road was built to provide access 
to the sheep corrals located in the southwestern section of respondents' propew. As was stated in Davis v. 
Gowen, supra: 
"The creation of easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the 
---- Page 56a - --- 
rule that wiaen instments speak for themselves, and because implied easements me in derogation of such 
rule, they are not favored by the cows. The general m.anle is that the burden of proof rests upon the person 
asserting it to show the existence of facts necessq to create by implication an easement appurtenant to hls 
estate. * * *" 
1[6,7] Relative to the question of adverse possession ofthe disputed pace8 of l a d ,  the evidence shows that 
the old fence was originally constmcted m d  m&ntained only for the p q o s e  of sewing as a conral for the sheep 
which were kept on respondents' land. A fence is not converted into a b o m d q  merely because it exists for the 
statutory period or longer. Lason v. Lindsaygi, 80 Idaho 202,327 P.2d 775 (1958). Furthermore, the triaE court 
* r , n n  
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found that the appellants were not in actual, ex~lusive~ open notorious, hostile, visible and adverse possession o:F 
the prop* in dispuke. This finding is isupported by snn%stmtia&, competent evidence and will not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
The judgment ofthe trial c o w  is &finned. 
Costs to wspondents. 
KIWDSON, @. J., and McFADDEN, TAYLOR m d  SMITH, JJ., concur. 
-- w-pw---- --- 
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Peter K. CHRISTILE, Plaintiff-Cowter Defendmt-Respondent$ v. Bmce A. SCOTT md Ruby A. Scott, 
husband m d  wife, Defemr-Smts-Comter Claimants-Cross CBaimmts-Appellan1~~ v. NORTHEW VIENTUES, 
INC., iara Idaho corporation, Defendmt-Cr0~9 Defendant. 
[Cite as Christie v. Northern Ventwes, Inc., 1 10 Hdaho 8291 
No. 1578.2. 
Co'oeaffs, of Appeals of ]Idaho. 
May 6,1986. 
Record omer  brought action to quiet title to propexty. The District Court$ Idaho County, George R. Reiohardt, 
111, J., quieted title to disputed land in record owner, md claimants appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: 
( I )  claimant was not entitled to prescxiptive easement across disputed property, md (2) claimant was not 
entitled to c e d n  portions of lmd claimed mder theory of adverse possession. 
William B. Taylor, Jr., GrmgevilIe9 for defendmts-counter claimants-cross claimants-appellants. 
Peter K. C ~ s t i e ,  Kamiah, pro se. 
Before WAILTERS, C.J., SWANSTROM, 4. md McFADDEN, 9. Pro Tern. 
PER CUMAM. 
This case is a quiet title action brought by Peter Chisde. ABer a non-jwy trial9 the district court quieted title 
to the disputed lmd in Ckistle. On appeal, the Scotts' assigment of errors can be conso~idated into two issues: 
(1) whether the trial court erred in not granting the Swtts in presc~ptive asement across the Chistle property, 
m d  (2)  whether the trial iawt emed in not grmting title to ihe Scotts to certain portions ofthe land they clainned 
under the theory of adverse possession. We afirm. 
A review of the record reveals the following facts. iln 1979, Christle purchased app~oximately thirty acres of 
lmd in Idaho County. Christie, living in Minnesota at the time of the purchase, miwed at his newly acquired 
propem in 1980 to find that Scott, his neighbor, had bulldozed m d  ckared an old road on the property. Scott 
asserted &at he had m easement a ross  CMstle's propee for access to his land which was adjacent to the 
Ciwistle property. Scott claimed that he m d  his predecessors in title had always used the road, md that he 
intended to contime using it. Scott also chimed that a old fence which separated portions of his mdChistle's 
I property was the borndairy between the parcels of l a d .  A survey showed the fence was not on the borndairy line, a d  that portions of Chistlets property were on the Scotts' side of the fence. CbistEe, disagreeing with 
these claims, brought a quiet title action. Weer tdd, the district court found that the Scotts had no prescriptive 
easement across Ckist.BBess lmd, that the fence was not the true bomdav between the parcels of lmd, and that 
the Scot% had not adversely possessed any of Chistle's propee.  The district court accordingly quieted title in 
Clmistle. 
The ScoUsq first issue on appeal concerns whether the court emed in not ruling that Scott has a presc~ptive 
4 OCrO 
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roadway easement across Citanistle's Bmd. A cS&mantaB, in order to acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho$ must 
present clew m d  convincing evidence of open, notorious, continmus, wintempted uses under a claim of right, 
for a period of five yews, all with the how1edge ofthe owner ofthe servient estate. LC. 5 5-203; State ex rel. 
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (19'79); West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,SB 1 P.2d 1326 (19'13); 
Kaupp v. City ofMaike3 1 10 Idaho 337,7 15 P.2d 
4007 (Ct.App.1986). A prescriptive right c m o t  be obtained if use ofthe servbnt estate is by permission ofthe 
owner. Haman 100 Idaho at 143,594 B.2d at 1096. The general rude is that where ~ a a p  ev;idence is presented to 
establish how the use began, a presumption arises &at the use was adveme md mder claim of right. West, 95 
Idaho at 559,s I E P.2d at 1333. The owner ofthe servient estate mast then rebut that presumption by showing 
h e  use was "pemiss i~e~ or by vime of a license, contract, or agreement." Id Howeven; if the Bmds ofthe 
sewient estate are wild, menclosed, or mimproved, k is presumed that the use was permissive. West, 95 lnlaho 
at 557 n. 32,51l P.2d at 1333 n.32. 
[I] Here, no vidence was presented at trial as to how use ofthe disputed road began It was es&ab;lislhed that 
the Scotts' predecessors in interest had begm using the road possibly as early as the 1930's. The &rid corn 
fomd that the Ch~istie Bmd was "unimproved1 wild, md remdte." Accbdingly, there was a presumption of 
pemissivehess. On appeal, the Scotts wge us to reverse that findin& However, fie r e ~ o ~ d  cBearBy establishes 
ha t  such a cha~acterization ofthe lmd was accwate. We note that the trial judge in this case conducted an on- 
site inspection of the Imd, prior to characterizing the land-in his findings-as wimproved, wild, md remote. 
Findings by the $rid cow& if syported by subsstantiaP md competent evidence in h e  record. will not be 
disturbed on appeak 1.R.C.P. 526~1); Haman, I00 Idaho at 144,594 P.2d at 1097. 
[2j In addition to the presumption of permissive use, evidenm was submitted which supports a finding of 
permissive use. For example, in response to questions from h e  court, the defendant, Bmce Scott, testified that 
he origindBy thought there was a recorded easement acmss the Chistle Rmd. He dso  testified ahat since he had 
begm using the mad in 1944, he had never thought he was using the r o d  in derogation of myone's dghts, t&rjat 
he never thought that he was in my way trespassing on the property> and that his use had never inler~feired in aEy 
way with myo14e else's use ofthe Chisble property. Testimony by one of the Scottsq predecessors in inaterest 
indicated that he had asked md received pemission to use the disputed road and, as f a  as he knew, &at was the 
agreement handed down from yeax to yea.  A former tenant ofthe ChxistBe property testified that Swtt never 
asked him for permission to use the mad. He testified that he assumed the Scotts-;like other people who had 
previously o w e d  the Scoa property-were permitted to use the road. That same tenant testified &at he had at 
one time put a lock on a gate into the prop"* to keep people out3 but that he gave Scott a key to the ilock so 
Scott codd use the road. 
On Scoas' claim against Chistle's prop* by adverse possession, the record reflects similar evidence. 
Obviot~sly, any claim of title under an adverse possession theory involves a showing of adverse use. The record 
is devoid of my  evidence of adverse use ofthe Band. All parties agreed &at the fence was not on the true 
surveyed b o m d w  between the properties. Mr. Scott's agmeHn& was essentially that the fence had always k e n  
tlmere, and therefore, that is whqre the b o w d m  should be. ~ Q W B W ~ ~ ,  the evidence indicated that the fence's 
location was a matter of convenience, winding and meandering according to the lay of the lmd. For instance, 
the fence at one point curved momd the comer separating the two properties. The evidence also shows &at the 
fence was used as a livestock fence raher &an as a bmdav fence. In s m a ~ ~  there is n.o evidence 
whatsoevet that use ofthe imd by the Scoas or by their predecessors was adverse to ChistBe or his 
predecessors in title. 
The judgment is affmed. Costs to respondentPle, CbistBe. No attorney fees on appeal. See Curtis v. Caq~bekl, 
105 Idaho 705,692 P.2d 1035 (1983). 
-," --.- ms-p, ------"-"- --------,. 
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A. H. SIMMONS md F W C E S  M. SIMMONS, Appellants a d  Cross- res~dents~  V. LLOYD 11 .  PEN<INS 
a d  ALICE VllNIFED P E m m S ,  Respoadents m d  Cross-appelnmts. 
[Cite as S i m o n s  V. Perkins, 43 Idaho B 341 
No. 6875. 
October 15,19141 
Reheaing denied November 24,1941. 
EASEMENTS-DEDICATION-ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
I. In an action to quiet title to an easement for driveway in middle of block fiom center of alley to street, 
evidei;~ce stablished that there was m public dedication by property owner to city of such right of way. 
2. Courts will not ligihtiy declare a dedication to public lase but m intention to dedicate upon the part ofthe 
owner niust be pE&y manifest. 
3. Where &e owner of real property consanVncts a way o w  it for his own use and convenience, the mere use 
thereof by others which in w way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or 
permission. 
4. The use of a hiveway in c o r n o n  with the owner m d  the general public$ in the absence of some decisive act 
on the uses's part indicating a sepmate md exctnsive use on his pa4 negatives any presumption of individual 
right therein in his favor. 
5. Endividwls using 1md as a road in c o m o n  with the public cmxot acquire a prescriptive rigJtn4 of way against 
the omer. 
6. A use carnot be considered adverse or ripen into a right by prescription unless it cons1itutes some actual 
invasion or idringement of the rights of the owner. 
7. To acquire aan easement by adverse possession over the red p o p e - i  of mother, the use must be hostile sod 
c m o t  be by acquiescence or consent. 
8. One asserting adverse possession as against the o w e r  of red estate must prove each md evey dement of 
adverse possession by cEea md satisfactory evidence. 
9. In action to quiet title to an easement for right off way in middle of block fiom alley to street, eviden.ce clearly 
showing &at Lase of driveway by original owners was for their private use as a .means of ingress and egress in 
camyirmg on their business md that the use by others was but a permissive use smt&ned finding agai.nst 
prescriptive right of way. 
APPEAL fmm the District Corn ofthe Third Judicial District, in md for Ada County. Hon. Chas. F. Koeisch, 
Judge. 
/ 
I i 
Action to quiet title to m easement. Judgment for defendmts. Afirmed. 
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J. M. Empert, for Appellmt md Cross-respnda.  
The dley or highway in question here became a highway wder ow statute by p~scription, and a highway 
by prescription exists by virtue of user and not on the theory of a grant or dedication. (Gross 39. PAcNutd, 4 Idaho 
286 at 300; Ross v. hewra'ngea, 39 Idaho 35; Ore. Shortline R. C. v. Caldwell, 39 Idaho 71.) 
The strip of lmd in question here was used by the public for much more thm the shtutory perioQ snd was 
kept in repair at public expense, thus esbblishing a highway by prescription. (Mesewey v. Guillfo~-d, 14 Idaho 
133.) 
The s t~ip of lmd involved in h i s  proceeding was fenced off by the lmd owner from his other property; the 
public 
taavellng the s m e  for more 8 s ~  five yews and the public thus has acquired a prescriptive right theretos and the 
owner may not obstruct said road thereafter. (State v. Burg, 28 Idaho 724; WOE% v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569 at 
576.) 
Delma & Delma, for RespoPn6nents m d  Cross-appelRantsS 
Proof of dedication must be strict, cogent md convincingang, md the acts proved must not be consistent with 
my cons$zlctio~a, other hm dedication. (18 C. J. 96, Sec. 107; 18 6. J. 99, Sec. 1 B 1; CoIzdmbia & P4 S, R. Co. v. 
City ofSeattle (Wash.) 74 Pac. 671; H d e y  v. Riley, A4 Idaho 481,95 Pac. 68% Hardley v. Vemiilion (Calif.), 
70 Pac. 273; City & County ofSan Francisco V. Grobe, 52 Pac. 128; 65 h. St. Rep. 155; 41 L. ]I$. A., 335.) 
WExre the owner of real prop@y cons&ucts a way over it for his o m  use and convena;ience, the mere use 
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presmed to be by license or permission. (1 8 
Coup. Jw. 105, Sec. 120; Bradfordv. FuItz (Ia.), 149 9. W. 925; Burk v. Diers (Neb.)? 169 W. W. 263; Harhass 
v. woodmansee Wt.), 26 Pac. 291; Howbardv. Wright (Nev.), 143 pat. 1 184.) 
BUDGE, C.J.-This action involves an alleged easement though a portion of Block 3 of An~old's Addition to 
Boise City which block is bound by Pueblo Skeet on the North9 OB'lFmell Street on the South, 1 lth Street on the 
West$ 10 Street on the East. An dley m s  in a Northerly md Southe~cly direction horn P~eblo Street to O'Famell 
$wee$ through the center of Block 3. The Noaheast qw&r of Block 3 is divided into thee lots facing 10th 
Street. The southermost of these thee  lob is the one on which apjpellants a d  cross-resjpondends (bereinnafter 
refemed to as 'appellants') reside. For convenience it will be called Lot 3. The easement wf~ich appejlants seek to 
establish, r~ms dong the South side of Lot 3, in an Easterly and Westerly ddirectioan, fiom the center of the alley 
before mentioned to 10th Street. 
About 1893, George Bayhouse owned Block 7, m d  sold 
the No&east qtsmter of said Block to one Twogood who> in the course oX&e next five or six years, built thee 
E~ouses thereon, one of which is on Lot 3, and now o w e d  by appellants. At this time, 1893, there was $3.0 dley 
t!oxough the Block. On F e b m q  15, 1906, George Bayhouse executed two instinuments to Boise City. One, a 
deed to m alleyy, 13 feet 7 inches in width, mmkg 81$ough the center of the Block from Pueblo Street to 
OqFameBl Street. The other9 m easement for the laying ofa  sewer line, d n g  though $be center off the Block 
from 1 Bth Street to 10th Street. This latier i n s m e n t  conhirned the following p~iovision, "with the express 
132.6 
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mdersmding that the alley in said Block shall nana in a Northerly and Southerly direction * * * * That I shall 
not be required to move my house, or houses, or buildings situate orn said block* by reason of said privilege &us 
given to the City until fully ready to do so of my o m  free will." The house occupied by the Bayhouses was 
located directly across the al1ey granted to the City. This house was not removed until 1939 when the entire 
alley was opened up from Pueblo Street to @FmelB Street. Prior to this time, howeverr, a pa t  of the alley so 
granted was opened up kom Pueblo Street m d  connected witb the alleged dley to 10th Street. 
Ajppellmts became the owners of Lot 3 in 1919 and used the alley here in controversy, as did Bayhouses 
and others. In Apkl,l938, respondents m d  cross-appellants (hereinafterr refened to as 'respondents') became the 
omers ofthe land over which the alleged easement runs, md in September, 1939, they closed up this driveway 
or alleged easement. 
For a beaer mdens8andi;tag off the location dfthe alley from Pueblo to BBFmeR19 the alleged alley or easement 
fkom the center ofthe Block to 10th Street, the Bayhouse residence, and appellants' residence we will here 
iosert a plat of Block 7. 
The question therefore presented, as will appez fiom the above brief statement of facts, may be shted as 
fomows. Is the strip of land, 12 feet 4 inches wide running from 10th Street westward to the center of Block 7, a 
public alley either by prescriptive rig& or implied dedkation, or has it been used by others than the owners 
merely under a permissive fight. There is no contention that there was an express grant. 
The trial court found that appelBmts "do not have my interest or easement in, to or across my pa? .at the 
real 
estate herein found to be the property" ofresponde~18~> and concluded that respondents "are owners in fee simple 
free from any lie& claim of interest or easement therein" of appellants in and to the real estate over which the 
alleged alley m s .  
Judgment was entered in favor of respondent^^ from which this appeal is prosecuted. The evidence as to 
certain materid points is conflicting. 
From the record it appears that on June 2, 1904, Boise City filed of record in the office of the Recorder of 
Ada County, Idaho, Book 3 of Plats, page 100, m mended location of street centers in the Arnold AddWoa, 
which plat was certified to by the then city engineer and the &en city clerk, showing m alley mming Noxthedy 
and Southeriy though the Block 7, conesponding with the deeded alley. 
It further appears that the deed to appellants as grantees described the real estate purchased by them fiom 
Mary Glenn, by metes md bowds as fo11ows: 
"Ball that portion of Block Seven 479 of Dwight Arnold's Addition in Boise City, as follows: Connmencing at 
a point 74 feet South ofthe NoAeast Cower of said Block Seven (7), and m i n g  thence South 50 feet along 
the Westerly line of Tenth Street, and running thence West at right angles to Tenth Street I B 5 feet to ihe alley, 
Zl~esace North 50 feet; thence East l 1 5 feet to 'Westerly line of Tenth Street a d  place of beginning." 
Appellants dso filed a Declaration of Homestead containing identically the same description. Neither 
instrument makes my reference to or exception of an dley or easement across respondelfi.tsl land. Respondent 
Mr. Pe~kin.5 testified that he searched the City records and consulted the City Engineer before purchasing the 
properiy th~cough which it is sought to establish an easement and that there was no record or plat of my 
1327 
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driveway tibereon. 
Appellant Mrs. Simmons testified to seeing B i r d  Bayhouse dwhg 1837 or 1838, and of endeavoring to 
purchase fhom him a portion of the ground constibting the driveway from 10th Street to 'the centerr of the Block; 
that M. Bayhoose advised her that there was a loan on the property md that he would have to consult the mod- 
--- 
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gagee; &at he later idornned her that he had seen the mortgagee, and had been advised not to sell any ofthe 
property covered by the mortgage. Appellant Doctor S i m o n s  also testified to having discussed with his wife 
the purchase of some of the ground in the driveway here in question, and to his having talked with Mr. 
Bayhouse relative to this same matter. 
1Frlink Bayhouse testified to living in the Bayhouse residence on Block 7 beginning in 1879; that the 
driveway out to 10th Street was used as their private driveway from the Bayhouse home and bans from R 879 to 
1880, long before there were my  residences in the Block, other than the Bayhouse home, and before they 
constmcted the Bayhouse Floral Company b~ildings; that then it was used as: a private driveway for the benefit 
ofthe home and flora1 business, md was regarded as "om private drivewayqP; 6hat it wm maintained by them; 
that the City graded the alley leading out to Pueblo Street but did not grade the dley leading out to 10th Street; 
ha t  the driveway was never laid out or deeded as an alley; that they conshvcted and maintained tlhe b~ridge at 
the entrance of the driveway on 10th Street; that people coming in over the deeded dley from Pueblo Stre& 
couid and frequently did turn around on tine Bayhouse property md go back out to Pueblo Street as they had 
come in; tibat they hauled sand md cindeas. onto the 10th Street driveway md had certain oftheir employees do 
likewise. 
It was stipulated at the trial that Wemy Bayhouse, Kcdled as a witness, would ted i6  as to the drivemy 
leading out from the deeded dley to 10th Street, substmtially as dBM Frnnk Bayhouse. 
Oher witnesses testified that they saw the Bayhouses put cinders a d  gravel on the driveway but never saw 
the City improve it. A number of municipal officials testified to the effect that the driveway from 10th Strceet to 
the deeded alley was maintained by the Bayhouses. Where tibe driveway &om 10th Street crossed the sidewalk, 
the cwb was not cut, but a bridge was built by the Bayhouses over which they passed from h e  driveway on 
10th Street to the center ofthe Block, or t~ their place of business. It appears that one Monarch, Stwet 
Commissioner from 1926 to 1930, at one time sanded or filled 
up holes in the driveway at the request of the Bayhouses. 
Upon this pdnt of maintenance ofthe driveway there is a direct conflict in that certain witnesses for 
appellants testified that tibe driveway was maintained by BBoe City in tibe same manner as were other alleys of 
the City. There is &so some conflict as to the location o f a  fence m i i n g  along the South side ofappe1lmts' Lot 
3. Certain shrubbery md a chicken fence run dong the South side of this alleged alley, extending from the 10th 
Street entrance about half way back to tibe Bayhouse Floral Company's office. 
[I] It is clear that there was no public dedication by the property owners to Boise City ofthe right of way 
Beading &om 10th Street to the middle of the Block. There is positive evidence that there was a dedication of an 
alley though the center ofthe Block, m i n g  Worth and South from Pueblo Street to 09Famell Street, by the 
original owners, wbicnicPn would negative the contention on the part ofthe original owners to dedicate m alley 
from 10th Street to the deeded alley. Like-wise the evidence fails to support an implied dedication by the 
original owners of Block 7. 
- 
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The question therefore arises, *as there such a pubtic use as to establish a prescriptive ~rigInt of way. 
[a] In Village of Hailey v. Riley, 14 Idaho 4481,494,496,95 Pac. 486, the case of Cily & Coun@ of,§'an 
Francisco v. Grote, 52 Pac. 128, is cited with approvd9 as folliows: 
"It is m trivial thing to take another's lmd without compensation, md for this reason the Courts will not 
likely d e d a e  a dedication to pubiic use. It is elementary law that m intention to dedicate upon the loart ofthe 
owners mst  be plainly manifest." 
Further on in the course of that opinion, the case of Hartley v. VermiElion, 70 Pac. 273, is cited as follows: 
"The intention of the owner to dedicate is a vital ekrnent in every case, md h t  intention also .is a pwe 
question of fact. A mere permissive user, by the owner, of the land for a highway never can amount to a 
dedication. That is a user by license, m d  n~&ing more, and of itself never would ripen into a dedication, no 
inaHer how long continued. * * * * As previously stated9 in order to 
--  age a44 - 
constitute a dedication of a highway by evidence in pais, there must be convincing evidence that the owner 
intended to appropriate the Rmd to pubiic use." 
[3] The m1e would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his o m  use 
md convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be 
by way of license or pemission. Narhess v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227,26 Pac. 291; Howard v. Wright, 38 
Nev. 2s3 143 Pac. B 184; Bradfordv. Fultz, 164 Ia. 686,149 N. W. 925; Burk v. Diers, 102 Neb. 721,169 N. W. 
263; Long v. Mayberry, 96 Tern. 378,34 S. W. 1040; Parish a? Caspm, 109 9nd. 586, 90 N. E. 109; Null v, 
Willwlson, 166 Hnd. 534,'78 N. E. 76; Gascho v. Lennert, 176 Ind. 6'77,917 N. E. 6; RiEburn v. Adams (Mass.), 
7 Metc. 33,39 Am. Sec. 754; 18 C. J., sec. 120, p. 105. 
[0] The use of a driveway in manamon with the owner and fie general public, in the ne:b~en~e of some 
decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate md excluive use on Inis p& negatives my presumption of 
individual right therein in his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 63 1, 66 Pac. 10; fiena8.n v. Bevans, 5 1 Cal. A. 
277,196 Px. 802; Bradfo~dv. Fuh,  147 la. 686,149 N. W)31. 925; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y. 357,7 N. E. 2d 
242,264. 
[q An individual using land as a road in common with the public c m o t  acquire a prescriptive right of way 
against the owner. Thornley Land & Livestock CQ. v. Morgan Bros., 81 Utah 3 17,17 P. 2d 826; Pirman az 
Con&r, 273 N. Y. 357,7 N. E. 2d 242; 11 1 A. &. Ri$., Extended Amnotation, p. 221. 
[6] The rule is well established that no use c m  be considered adverse or ripen into a right by prescription 
unless it constitutes some actual invasion OF inifiringement ofthe ~ights of the owner. Thomas v. England 741 
Cal. 456, 12 Pac. 491; Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind. A. 1 19, 133 N. E. 156; 19 C. 9.887, sec. 52, 
Citations, Note 44. 
[9] To acquire m easement by adverse possession over the real propem of anothe~ the use must be hostile 
md carnot be by acquiescence or consent. 19 C. J. 886, sec. 51, Citations, Note 64; 9 R. C. 8. 778, sec. 37, 
Citations under Note '7. 
[8] One asserting adverse possession as against the owner of real estate must prove each and every element 
of adverse possession by clea md satisfactory evidence. Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 110 Pac. 269; 1329 
- 
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Pleasants 84 Hgny ,  34 Idaho 728,734, ZIP Pas. 565; 1 R. C. %. 695, sec. 9; 2 C. 9.262, sec. 585; I9 62.9.958, 
sec. 1181. 
[9] The evidence clearly shows that the use of the driveway by the original owners was for their private use 
as a means of ingress and egress in carrying on their business and that the use by others was but a. permissive 
use. There is no evidence in the record? as we view it, that establishes adverse posses~on~ on the p& of 
appellants or the public, which was achmU, visible, exclusive? or hostile to the original owners of the lmd over 
which the alleged driveway or alley m s ,  or to subsequent owners. 
At therefore follows that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial corn's findings, conc4usions anid 
judgment. 
']The judgment is affirmed, md it is so ordered, with costs to respondents. 
Givens> Morgan, Holden, and Aiiishie, JJ., concur. 
Footnotes: 
See 1 Parra. Jw. 925; 17 Am. Sw. 978. 
24 C. J. S$. Dedication $ l 1. 
M.s--m----- 
Lawriter Corporation. A11 rights resewed. 
The Cammaker QnJine database is a compilation excIusiw&Jy owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is 
provided for use lander the Berms, notices and conditions as expressly stated lander the online end user license agreement 
to which alB users. assent in order to access the database. 
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Max WAVER9 m individual, Plaiatiff-Comterdefendant-Respondent> v. lkIud6 B.~ STAFFORD, Sr., 
Defeiadant-Comterclaimmt-Appellmt and Owyhee Village, lnc., am Iddao corporation, Defendmt-Respondent. 
Owyhee Village$ Tn~c., am I&ao corporation, Cross-Clahmts v. Frank D. Stafford, Sr., Cross-Defendant 
[Cite as Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Iddao 6911 
No. 25238, 
Supreme Comt of Idaho, Boise, Mach 2000 Tern. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 229 2000. 
Lmdomer brought action against neighbor md against holder of deed oftrust on lmdomer's property, 
alleging trespass, breach of wmmdy off title, negliigent interference with appropriative water rights md slander 
of title> and seeking monekapt &magc%s, injunctive relief9 punitive damages md atto~they fees md costs. 
Neighbor counter-cRaimed for negligent m&Ok i~litentiond interference with appropriative water rights and 
alleged that he had acquired easement by prescription to maintain irrigation ditch on landomer's propertygi. 
Holder of deed off trust cross-claimed against neighbor, dleging that neighbor's assertions that he had inkrest in 
lm.dower9s property constituted sladder of title. The Distxict Corn, Cmyon Cow@, James C. Mofi.tt, J., 
awarded Imdomer $5,000 ia punitive damages on Qespass claim, md awarded hokder off deed of trust 
$7,832.35 in attorney fees and costs. Neighbor appealed* The Supreme Court, Troext, C.J., head that: (1) use of 
metes and bounds de5~riptkon to determine b o m d ~  between landomer's property and' that of his neighbor was 
wmmte& (2) subdivision plat map was insufficient to support neighbor's wgumemt &at he entered La~adomer's 
property under color of title; (3) neighbor fkiled to establish prescriptive easement alasng b o m d q  of 
lmdowerqs property; (4) neighbor% actions iaa 6lliing in original dirt irrigation ditch raming dong b o m d q  of 
lmdomerqs property constituted abmdoment of &y pres2riptive easement neighbor may have acqui.red !n 
ditch; (5) no irrigation rigbof-way by agreement existed which would have allowed deighbor to relocate 
irr*igataQion ditch onto landomer's property; (6) weigImbor couid not bring cause of action against landowner under 
statute wh.ich prohibits aheration ofirfigatioh ditch so as to impede Wow of water; (7) laqdomer's 
modifications 60 irrigation lateral &d not condtute negligent or intentional interference with neighbor% 
approjpriative watef ri.ghts; (8) tmeighbrk action warranted punitive damages awaxd; md (9) holder off deed of 
@us$ establ.ished that neighbor committed slander of title. 
Affirmed. 
Lawrence GI. SirhdB, Jr., Boise, for appellanta argued. 
Wranga & Uranga, Boise, for respondent Max Weaver. Louis E. Urmga argued. 
Randolph E. Fmber, Nampq for respondent Owybee Village, Bnc., argued. 
TROUT, Chief j ~ ~ t i ~ e .  
Thi.s case involves an action foir trespass, brewh of wmmty of title, negligent interference with 
appropriative water rights and slander of title. IFra& Staord  (Stafford) appeals !from the district judge* 
e,~... I/.....-., I--.,:+,, mrm+ll..n,l Qmn~~l(rrm~~nlurrplRnl~A~~a~~~aaa/+7iihnla~~ka'R~i~Rm~~~~ii TRnn3~ wFsnHwn9... 1 O/'B/2bZ63$ 
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decision &hat he trespassed upon hdax WeaveIT(s (Weaver) projperty and slandered gne title of Owyhee Vi'tlage, 
nnc. 
Three parcels of i r e d  property we involved in this dispute. Stafford pwc!nased the parcel at 4912 Easter Lane 
(the Stafford property) consisting of 139 acres on October B 1, 1994. At the time Stafford purchased the 
Stafford piiopenty, Max Weaver (Weaver) o w e d  the pace1 at 4992 Laster Lxae (the Weaver Laster Lane 
property). The Weaver Easter Lme property is southeast ofthe Sbflord propenty and is approximably 4.26 
acres in size. On October 1, 1996, Weaver acquired the pmcel referred to as Lot 1 6, located southwest of fine 
Staffford property, by a wamrnty deed subject to a deed of tirust in favor of Owyhee Village, Inc. Lot 16 is 
approximately 5.25 acres in size. 
A cement irrigation ditch (the cement irrigation ditch) mns along the ~aorthwst side of Lot 16 and parallel to 
@me boundary between Lot 16 md the ShTfoxrd property. The cement inrigation ditch has been in p k e  for many 
yeas and was previously used to irrigate the beet field whicB~, existed on Lot 16 pr io~  to 1969. 
Before Stafford and Weaver acquired their respective pwcels,'the~e was both a ayence and a dint irrigation 
ditch (the original dirt ditch) m . h g  fiortheasi off the cement ditch. While Stafford believed the original fence 
was the bound,a~ bfkken Lbt 16 rnd the Stafford property, there was never any conversation or agreement 
with myoune fmm Owyhec Village tbP that effect. Stafford removed the or.igina1 fence and filled in the origind 
did ditch sometime in the fall of 1994 or the spring of 1995;. During the s m b r  of 1995, Stafford filled in &A 
the imigation ~8ttmls mming fiom the original did ditch &at serviced his proper@. Stafford testified at bid that 
the miginall &kt ditch was Racated ten feet no&east ofthe cement irrigation ditch on Lot 14 and ten feet 
southwest of the boundaw line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. 
David Wilson, who resided at 49220 Laster Erne for app~oximately Wegaty-five yews prior to Weaver's 
acquisition of the propem, testified that he regarded the original difi ditch as the bouindary line bekeen Lot 16 
and the Staffford Wilson stated that there was itnfomal agreement among neighborss but no 
recorded easemew4 concerning a ten 8008 rightbof-way $0 mainbin h e  original dirt ditch. Dorothy Bright 
(Bright), omer  off the parcel directly east ofdke Staffford property3 also testified that she regarded the original 
iirt sit& as the b o m d k  between Lot 16 and the ~ b f f o d  p~oPefiy. Bright testified that thi former omGrs of 
h e  Staffford propnty used the original & ditch for higation. Greg Skimer (Skin- 
ner), a Licensed surveyor, testified that the original dirt ditch approximately folRowed the snilweyed bow~dary 
between Lot 16 mad the Stafford property. 
]in the fall of 1995, StdTord erected a new fknce northeast of md paallel to the cement irrigation dtch on 
Lot 14, Stafford's testimony about the location of the new fence was not consistent. While on one occasion he 
testified that he placed the new f;e in the location off the original fence, he also testified at trial that he was 
aansujre where he had placed the new fence in relatioh to the location of the original fence. Stafford also testified 
that he did no& measure the distance fkom the origind fence to 'he cement irrigation ditch. Weaver regarded 
Sihffo!f&s new fence as al l  e $ ; n l ~ r ~ a ~ h e a ~ t  Upon Lot 16 and demanded i.ts removal. Sbff~lTd ~ ~ ~ ~ n p l i e d  in 'h  
sprik9.g of 1995'. 
In Marc81 1997, Sbfford excavated a new did ditch which a1pproximateQy followed the line ofthe new fence. 
Stafford admitted at trian that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stafford 
never used the new ditch. I332 
- 
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Staffor& w m m Q  deed co~~tains the foff lowing relevant metes md bomds description ofthe b m d a v  line 
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property: 
South 4" 0' East 366 feet to the center of an imiigatioii lateral; hence imemdering 
North 29' 50' West 23 feet; 
North 43" 20' West 168.13 fee& 
North 7 1' 20' West 92 feet; md 
North 39' 20' West 2284 feet dong the center of an irrigation Raierali to apoint 36 feet Soutn of the 
North boundary ofthe aforesaid Southeast Q&er; thence ... 
in April 8995,l.icensed surveyor Skinner performed a boundw survey on behalf of Stafford md Weaver. 
Skimer establislaed the bolmndv between Lot 16 and the Stafford property based on existing monuments. 
Skinner performed a second survey in November of 1996 for Weaver and established that SB&lffordrs new fence 
encroached upon Lot 16 &corn a minimum of2.17 feet to a maximum of 10.2 feet On April 13, 1994, Skinner 
determined that stafford's new ditch encroached upon Lot 16 by approximately five to t m  feet. 
Weaver hired Chis Wadt (Wild&) t~ conduct rn mchaeologicd cross-sectio~a of the bunundq area between 
Lot 16 and the S8suffoild property. Sh@brd hired Dr. Mark Plew (Dr. Plew), a pmfessor of antlh~rwpology to 
evaluate Wildt's report a d  to perfom his o m  cross~sectiond mdysis. Dr. Plew dug thee cross-sectioililal 
trenches s w i n g  approximately five feet from the cement irrigation ditch om Lot 16 and extending noifiheast 
across the born* line between L Q ~  16 and the Staffford property. D r ~  Plew discovered two features which 
were likely ditches. Featme 8 was discovered thee meters north off the cement irrigation ditch, which did not 
appear to have drawn water for any extensive period a d  may have been used for two yeas or less. Dr. Plew 
conciuded the second ditch, Featme 2> had k e n  in use for a very Qmg time, w a s  the larger ofthe two ditches 
and was older than Featwe I. Dr. Plew testified that Feature 2 was close to the bomdav line between Lot 16 
and the Stafford propeity~ 
Licensed surveyor Job g. Eddy (]FAdy) also performed a s m e y  of the Stafford property at Staffor&s 
request Eddy's October 1,1997 survey established the boundary between Lot 16 md the Stafford property 
along a meandering dirt ditch, the same as Skima's Novennber ir9, 1996 survey. Eddy testified that Feature 2, as 
identified in Dr. PleMi's repod, coincided with the meandering ditch referenced in St&rdqs deed. 
Water is provided to the Skdfofd property m d  the Weaver Laster Lane property by the Pioneer Irrigation 
District via Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 1§B, Gate 24. Water is provided to Lot 16 via PioneePs South 
Brm.c%iu Lateral 1.5.4, Gate 23A. Watw for the Stafford property md Weaver Laster Lme property historically 
flowed ffom Gate 24 in a mfihWesterly ditection to a T-box ~ocated near the point where the no~hwestem 
comer of the Waver Laster Lane propetty meets the southeastern comer ofthe Stakford property. At the T-box, 
irrigation water flowed to the Stafford property via the original dirt ditch between the Sbf'ford propfly and Lot 
I6 or could be directed to the 
northeast to intigate a parcel directly east ofthe Stafford property. Water i%om the South Branch Lateral 15.6, 
Gate 2318 flows though the cement ditch in the opposite direction. 
Weaver made several clnmges to the irrigation lateal which began at Gate 24 and continued across the 
Weaver Laster Lane property. At the end ofthe lateral, Weaver hstalled a concrete collection box to replace the 
T-box, and also i9nsh1ld a concrete slab in the collection box to block the outlet to the Stafford projperty. Tlaat 
action lead to Stafford filing a misdemanor criminal charge against Weaver which was dismissed. A c n itjq 14~9 
* 
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ofthe dismissal was that Weaver remove the concrete slab md install a pipe firom the cdPI1ection box to the edge 
of Stafford's property. Weaver removd the concrete slab a d  bostdled a pipe, but Stafford did not excavate a 
ditch to the pipe 
Tom Eddy testified as an expert h hydrology and stated that changing the grade of the pipe from the 
w~.lection box to the Stafford prope&y would improve the flow of water to the Stafford propeHBy. Tom Eddy 
also stated tI(dat without my change to the elevation ofthe collection box, water would travel @om the collection 
box to &e end of the Stafford property. 
During the 1995 and 1996 irrigation seasons, Stafford diverted water from the cement inrigation ditch to 
kidgate the Stafford pr~perty. St&ord had ana~ authori%tion nor permission to draw water from the cement 
irrigation ditch dgip to divert water from that ditch onto his lmd, Weaver demmded that Stafford cease diverting 
water from the cement irrigation ditch after purchasing Lot 46 and Stafford complied. 
Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford m d  Owyhee Villages Irnc. alleiing that Stafford had corramitted 
trespass by erecting a fence .and subsequently exavating a ditch on WeavePs property. Weaver sought 
monetay damages, injunctive relief9 lounitive damages md attorney fees and costs. Stafford denied Weaver's 
allegation md asserted affirmative defenses, alleging that he was entitled by prescription or b o m d w  by 
agreenment to maintain a fence between the adjoining properties and that a presc~ptive irrigation right-of-way 
existed. Stafford counterclaimed that Weavet had negligently and/or intentionally interfered with Staffod9s 
appropdative water rights a d  that he had acquired m easement by prescription to aaintain an imigation ditch 
on WeavePs property. O y h e e  Village cross-claimed that Stafford ~~Imffdit t~d slander off title by alleging that he 
had an interest in Weaver's Lot 16. The district judge entered m Amended Judgmmet~t on Jmaary 29, 9 999, 
Village $7$32.?5 in attorney fees md costs. Stafford has now appealed &at decisi& 
[I, 21 Stxiford challenges ihe district judge's detailed findings of fact which were set forth in $is fifty-two 
page EdIemorandm Decision m d  Order. This Court does not set aside findings of fact mless they are dearly 
ewoneous. B.R.C.P. Marshall v. Blair, 130 llddoo 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (19973. We will not disturb 
findings of fact which are supported by sabskntial md comp&nt, although wnfli~bjag evidence. Id 
Stafford argues the district judge should have determined the irrigation lateral, refened to in Stafford's deed, 
was a monument and sb.ould have used this monument to determine the b o m ~ d w  line between Lot 16 and the 
Stafford property, !rather tiinan utiliiing the metes md bounds call in the deed. The dis&>ict judge clearly 
referenced the lateral m d  determined that "Feature 2' as identified by Dr. Plwr was basically in the s m e  
location as the lateral. The distnictjaadge noted the metes md bounds description in StafforsB's deed was 
conistent with an earlier conveyance invo1vin.g the properties 
m.d the Skinner s ~ ~ v e y s  of 1995 a d  1996 which also placed the b o m d q  line dong tb.e irrigation j.ateraI 
desc~ribed in Staffor& deed. The district judge fiwther fomd that Featme 2 "follows the line ofthe s~weyed 
boundw to a rather remarkable degree." He therefore concluded there was m ambig~tity concerning the 
location ofthe 'boundary line between Lot 26 and the Stafford pmpe&y md that the line coal8 be cleady 1 3 .> 4 
2 .  
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identified using the metes and bounds description, incorporating the reference to the lateral (Featwe 2). 
41 Stafhrd asserts Feature 2 represenb a monument md the distiactjudge sk~ould have examined whether 
the p&ies intended Feature 2 to be the boundary between Lot 16 m"Be SQRo?rd property. Stafford argues the 
district judge enred by instead using the metes a d  bounds description to ddemine tb.e boundary. Tl3.e mgu!m.ent 
is unavailing in two respects. First, n~withshnding ~tx~for&s color of title and prescriptive easement 
arguments, the legal significmce of St&ffor#s argument is mclea~ in that, assuming Feature 2 was a monument 
and established the boundary between Lot 86 a d  the Staffford prope~rty~ StaKord still erected a new fence md 
excavated a new ditch on Weaver's side off Feature 2, clearly outside off StaRor#s property. Second? a 
monument is generally considered to be a permanent, visible md identifiable physical featwe. See Sun Valley 
Shamrock Resources, IOC. v. '.ravelers LeasB'qg Corp., 188 Idaho 116, 119,794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) (citing 
Achter e4 Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149,493 P.2d 989 (1972) (monment must be a "tangible la~drnark: have physical 
properties suc11 as "s~hbiliiy~ pemmence, m d  definiteness of bcations'); Scott v. Hansen, 18 8 t h  269 303,422 
P.2d 525 (1966) (rmoaument must be "defiaitely identified and locatefl)). Feature 2 c m o t  be deemed a 
monumen4 for p u ~ p s e s  oftesolving the bowndmy dispute between  weave^ and Stafford, because Stafford 
filled in Featwe 2 in the fall of 8994. The distrkt judge was thus unable to uti1.i~ the actual irrigation lateral 
named in the deed because Stafford had destroyed it. The findings made by the district judge me supported by 
substantial and com~petent evidence a d  support his dete~mination that Feature 2 is located where the original 
irrigation lateral wab and aRRows at accurate detemination ofthe b o m d w  between the Weaver and Staffford 
property utilizing the metes m d  bounds description in the deed. We therefore b l d  the district judge did nmt err 
by using the metes and bounds description to determine the boundmy between Lot B 6 and the Stafford property. 
[5-7] Stafford argues the district judge em& by requiring him to prevail on his aEirmative defenses of 
irrigation right-ofway by prescription md boundmy by agreement in order to succeed wa his entry under color 
oftitie  argument^ The argmerit is not supported by the circmsb.ces oifthis case. The color of title doctrine 
arises in the context of advese possession &d refers to an instrment which has the appearanw of title but is 
not in fact title. Fouser P? BPbaige, 101 I~d&o 294,297,612 P.2d 137, 140 (1980) (citing Munbes v. Chaw~oa, 3 
Km.App.2d 601,599 P.2d 314 (1979)). Color of title involves a withag which puqmkts to convey title, but does 
not have that effect md passes only the wlor or semblance of title. Id. Stafford cannot maintain a color of titie 
argument as he has failed to pte.sent evidence of any witten i n s m e n 8  which puupx=tedly gave him title to the 
portion of Lot 16 which is the subject of this action. Stafford offers only that the Qwhee  Subdivision plot map 
reflects a twenty foot right-of-way adjacent to the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 14. The argument is annavailiiag 
to Sbffoird baause the Qwyhee Subdivision plot map is not an instrument of conveyance and does not reflect a 
twenty foot right-of-way north of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. Moreover9 Stafford h e w  where the 
boundary was, as his wrsmty deed conhined a s1pecific d~~~~ijptioXI ofthe boundary and the boundary was 
subseque~atly established by the Skinner m d  Eddy surveys. We therefore hold substantial md competent 
evider@ce supports the district judge's detemination that Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under color of title. 
i(8] Stafford argues he had a prescriptive easement in that section of the original dkrt ditch northwest 
from the Tne-Box on the Weaver Laster Lane property md along the bou;admy between the Stafford property and 
Lot 16. The district judge determined Stafford did not have a prescfriptive easement in the original dirt ditch as 
Stafford failed to establish the open, notorious, conthuous and unircterrujpkd! use ofthe original dirt ditch under 
a claim of right for five yews. The dist&t judge noted testimony froin prior owners of %ffo~d '~  propef was f535 
- . -- - - - .-.?,7"7>,% s ,? "l, c. ,*-A,- 
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inconsistent and that Stafford 6lled in the original dirt ditcb inn the fall of 1994 or spring off 1995. The district 
judge haher determined Stafford failed to establish a prescriptive easement because t11e location of the original 
dErt ditch could not be eshbRished with certainty. 
[9-12,] A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convincing evidence of 
open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use ~ d e i r  a claim of right and with the howledge of the omer  
ofthe servient tenement for BIme prescriptive five year period. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Id&o 675,680,946 P.2d 
975$980 (19973. While there was testimony by people who had lived on or around the Staffford property that 
they had imigated their jproperty utilizing the original dirt ditch, the testimony was conflicting as to where 
exactly the ditch was located. This testimony alone is insufficient to establish a prescriptive easement in fie 
original dirt ditch as it fails to estabnish the open, notorious, or win.tem3pted nature of my prior use ofthe 
original dirt ditch md does not address Ufie lmowledge of such use by Weaver or any previous owner oELot 16. 
Ndoreover, assuming Stafford did have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch, Shfford abandoimed this 
iriglat. A b a ~ d w i e n t  of a property right must be evidenced by a clear$ unequivocal and decisive act. Perry v. 
Reynolds, $3 Idaho 457,464, 122 P.2d 508,510 (19182) (cithg Sullivan Comsdr. CQ. v. Tvdin Fafls Amusermnf 
Co., 44 Idaho 520,526-27,258 P. 529,530-3 1 (1927)). Mere nomse of an easement does not effect an 
abandoment. Kolouch 89 Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,67,813 P.2d $76,878 (1991). Here, S h f W  testified that he 
filled in a e  original dirt df.kh in the fall of 1994. Stafford's act is sufficient to abandon any prescriptive 
easement which may have existed in the dirt ditch. We therefore hold $ubstmtia.U and competent evidence 
supports the district judge's determination that Stafford did not have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt 
ditch. 
ImGATION RIGHT-OF-WAY BY AGmEMENT 
[1l3] Stafford asserted m irrigation right-of-way by agreeme* located irfi the mighal did ditch, as an 
awcirnnative ddense. Staxford offered no evidence ofan express d~ff iua~pli~d apeement between himself3 or his 
predecessors in interest.> and Weaver1 or his predecessors in interest. Moreover, it is difEcult to see the relevance 
of this argument. There is no question there was at one tin.& an original dirt ditch between what is now Lot 16 
md the Stafford property. That ditch was destroyed by Stafford and he then sought to irelocate the ditch to a 
location on Lot 16. There is sub$tzIimUial md competent evidence to sujpport the diS$ict judge's detenmination of 
the Ioc~tion ofthe original dirt ditch md it is not in the same place where Stafford sought to c ~ a t e  the new 
ditch. While Stdfford disagrees with the district judge's detemin~tioaa~ there is neveAeless sufficient evidence 
in the record to support it. At this p in t9  it appews Stafford simply asserts some right to put the new &tch h a 
locaiion of E s  choosing mid his argument for an imigation right-of-way is rmwailing. 
W!EAVERvS IWTEWEWWCE WITH STAFFOmvS WATER P3aGHTS 
Stafford asserts 'Weaver made chmges to the irrigation lateral which provided water do the Weaver Easter 
Lane m.d Skblrd propetties. Stafford spedfically alleges tinat Weaver tined some portions oftlme irrigation 
nateiral, replaced the Fbox with a BeW con- 
crete collection box and installed PVC pipes to higate one of Weaver's 6eB.d~ with wateir from the irrigation 
lateiral. Stafford also alleges that Weaver changed the elevation of the ground around the irrigation lateral$ 
lowered the in:l"igation h e r d ,  blocked the outlet from h e  new concrete co!!ection box which tvooid have served 
Staffor& proioerty md filled the area between the new concrete colnection box and Skffor&s property with 
gravel, d l  wf wlnich prevented Stafford from receiving water. ~tzIfirord argues the district judge emed by holding 
Stafford was bmed kom recovery uimder i[.C 4 42.1207 because h.e did not have a ditch in place to receive 1335 
. . ~ ~. 
., . a ' ,. *-,?a ---. n 1 %  ' s n ~ ~ . c ~ ~ ~ . ~ , i ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~  I GPI'4I'PfiBaS 
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water. SMford dso argues the district judge erred by determining Weaver did not irm.tentiondly or negligently 
interfere with Stafford's appropriative water rights. 
p4g I&-o Code 4 4-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch in a manner which impedes the flow of 
water or "ot!mewise injureis] my Amrson or persons using or interested in such lateral ditch." &afford failed to 
i~tlf~d~ikace m y  evidence of the historic flow rate of water to the Stafford propemiy before and seer "Weaver's 
changes. Dorothy Br.ight, however, whose propem receives water from the new concrete colnection box 
thougln an outlet at the same level in the collection box as the outlet to the Stafford property, testified that she 
received more water &deh Weaver's changes. In addition, Stafford cam06 maintain that he was interested in 
 receiving water from &e irrigation lateral wheh in the fdl  of 1994, Stafford filled in the ditch that would have 
rrecdved Water from the concrete collation b ~ x .  Stafford$ therefore$ cmmnot recover under I,@. 8 42-1207. 
lh3, Negiligemt BnnQrff@rennse with appr~priative water rights 
[ng The eleiments of common law negligence include (I)  a duty, recognized by law, requirin.g the defeiadant 
to conffotm iSGa a ce&ain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal cosnraection between the 
defendant's conduct md the resulting injuries; md (4) actual loss or damage. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 
4!,89,903 P.2d 73,78 (1995). Here, Weaven incurred a statutory duty to avoid i n j w  to S,ta~Tford w h  making 
changes to the inrigation lateral. Sttafbrd fails to establish that Weaver bwached that duty. 
inla] Stafford argues that9 without a shutoff mechanism on the PVC pipes which Weaver installed upsaream 
fiom the concrete collection box, the concrete collection box would not f 11 to the too and Sitafford would not 
receive water. IEvidence at trialE4, however, included photographs s!nowing tine concrete colBection box full to the 
top. Stafford also argues he was harmed by Weaver's inshllation ofa  concrete slab to block the colliection box 
outlet to the Stafford properr@. Weaver removed the concrete slab md installed a pipe &om the conc~ete 
collection box to the edge of ~taffordqs propertys Stafford, howe~ei~, filled in the ditch which would have 
received irrigation water from the pipe and cmied it across Shff~lCd's property. w e  therefore hold substmtid 
and comjpetent evidence supports the district judge's &&mination that Weaver did not inteutiondb or 
a~egligently interfere with St&ord's apprropriative water rights. 
STAPFOmvS MOTION TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Sitafford arsgunes the district judge erred by denying E s  motion to add a claim for pukitive damages. In 
suppori of the alleged error, Skaiford reasserts his contention &at Weaver intentionally or neglige12tly interfered 
with Stafirord's appropriative water rights. The district judge denied Sitdforas motion, ~8Bil~g "[t]he @ou!rri will 
allow such a motion to amend the pleadings ifthe moving panty istablishes ... a reasonable likelihood of 
proving facts at trial sufficient to s~pport an awmd of punitive damages." Th.e &stri;.ctjudge concLuded "the 
evidence before h e  Cmri does not establish such a likelihood in this case." 
[n7-IB] To supponl a motion to add punitive damages wdei I.@. $6-1604, Stafford is required to establish a 
reasonable $ikeBihood 
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he could prove by a prepondermce ofthe eviden.ce that Weaver acted ~ p p l ~ e s ~ i v ~ l y ,  fuanddently, wmtonly, 
m.aliciousAy or oueageously. see ra%gkd v. Dairykandl#z~. CQ., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998). 
The distxid judge's determination tinat St&ord failed to establish such a reasonable likelihood is  reviewed for 
abuse of discretio~.. Id., 131 Idaho at 33643,956 P.2d at 6798-80. The abuse off discretion inquiry exmines (1) 
whether the trial judge coaectly perceived the issue as om of discreti.on; (2) whether the trial judge acted w3 7 
" 
the outer hmdwies of his discretion a d  consistently with the legal smdmds applicabie to the speci.Sc choices 
avainable to km; ad, (3) whether the trial judge reached his decision though an exercise of reason. Sun Valley 
Shopping C'kB: 84 Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,8000 (1991). M is clear firom the judge's 
cornmerats that he cotrect1y understood the discretbnq decision to be madeS applied the correct stzmdacds annd 
utilized reason irm reaching his decision. We therefore hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion by 
I denying Stafford's claim for punitive dmages. 
WEAVERvS CILAilM FOR PUJNRTIIVE DAMAGES 
[2@-24] Stafford argues the district judge e d  by awarding Weaver punitive damages for St&fordqs trespass 
because Skinner's April 1995 smvey did not establish h e  bouiadxv between Lot 16 md fie Stafford property 
and Stafford believed he had title to Lot 16. We have stated: 
An awzrd of punitive damages wUI be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the defendant 
acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation &om reasonable standards of conduct, and $hat 
the act was performed by the defendant nl.vidHn m understanding of or disregard for its likely 
consequences." The justificatioa of punitive dmages must be that the defendmt acted with% an 
extremely harmful state ofmindj whether that be temed "malice, oppression, fraud or gi:oss 
negligence;" "malice, oppression, wa~mtomess;" or simply "deliberate or willful.s' Ha'ghI~dB~tcrs., 
Bw. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,348-349,986 P.2d 996, 101.3-15 (1999) (cihtions omitted). Punitive 
damages me thus appropriate in a trespass action when the defeinc$mt acted in a manner which was 
outrageous, unfounded, ~ e a s o n a b l e ~  a d  in conscious disregard of the plaintiffs property rights. 
See, eg., Walter E. Wilhige Resrocibbe Living Trust v. Northwest Yea* iMceting Pension Fund 128 
Idaho 539,548,916 B.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). Where a trespassiarr; defendant has notice that his 
activities constitute a ttespass and nonetheless contisaues his treshss, the ~ando~mer p1aintiRmay 
be entitled to ~ m i t i v e  dmages. See Aztec Ltd. Bnc. v. Creekside Inv, Co., 100 Idaho 566.570.602 
P.2d 64,68 (f979). We revGw an award ofpunitive damages to deternine whether the ricori  
contains substmtid evidence to support the judge's finding ofextreme1$1 measonable and 
malicious conduct. Magic Valley Radiolog Assocs., PPA. sr. Profk Bug. Servs., Im., 119 Idaho 558, 
561,808 P.2d 1303,1306 (1991). 
U S ]  Hete, the rewrd contaifis sunbstmtial evidence that Stafford's conduct was m extreme deviation from 
reasonablle conduct. For exatmpk, in the fall of I994 epa spring of 1995, Staf~ford removed the origina1 fence a d  
filled in the origind dirt ditch located between the cement ili~igation ditch on Lot 16 and the surveyed borndm 
line. St&ford made no measwemefits or any documenky record regarding the location ofthe origiinal fence 
md dirt ditch, j[n ApdA 1995, the boundary k&%veen Lo4 14 md the Stafford property was established by 
licensed survey and was determined to be in the location of the origir~d dirt ditch. In the fall of 1995, Stafford 
proceeded to erect a new fence on Lot 14 wlmich Skinner's November 1996 survey established encroached upon 
Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a a.aximm of 10.2 feet. 1rr1 March of 1997, Stafford excavated a new 
dirt ditch ova Lot 46 in approximately the same 1ocation as the encroackuirng new fence. Stdhrd admitted at trial 
that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stdfoird thus erected the new fence 
and excavated the new ditch on Lot 44 with f d l  howledge of the bowaday between Lot 86 a d  the Stafford 
property? demon- 
strating willhi di.sregad for Weaver's property rights. We therefore !n.old substantial and compet&t evidence 
sffi~pprts the district jtldgeqs punitive damages awwd to Weaver. 
I 
Page 9 of 10 
I 
SLANDER OF TITLE 
Owyhee Village alleged ~bfforrd slandered its title to Lot 16 by falsely and m a l i ~ i ~ ~ ~ l y  asserting an 
easement or omership interest in Lot 16 which caused Weaver to witM~.oEd payment $0 Owybee Village. 
Owyhee Village also alleged it incurred legal expenses in defense of Stafforas claims to Lot 16. Stafford argues 
th,e district judge emed by basing his slander of title conclusion on Stafford's failme to prevail on his affirmative 
defenses. Stafford asserts the distrf.ct judge should have focused on Stafford's reasonable belief that he owned 
the prrope~rty up to where he placed the new fence md that such belief negated the malice element of sllandeir of 
title. The district judge, however, did not rely solely upon Stafiford's failed affirmative defenses to find slander 
of title and instead set out the elements of slander of title m d  aticulated the substantial evidence in supjport of 
his finding. 
[%-29] A cwse of action for slmder of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the following: (U) uttering 
or loublishing of slmderou$ statements; (2) when the statements were fdse; (3) with malice; aad (4) resultin@ in 
specid damages. See Matheson v. HarrZs, 98 Id&o 758, 760-62,572 P.2d 861,84343 (1977). Here, Stafford's 
jpleadimgs assert a n  iantsrest in Lot 16 and gnus satisfy the publication element of slander of title. Stafford's 
repeated asseaion of an interest in Lot 14 was clearly false in light ofthe deed which set the boundw between 
Lot 86 and Stadford property a d  Stafford's deswction of the original did diBn which corresponded to the 
boundary. Moreove~ Staflord admii3ed that he excavated the new ditch on Lot 14 without Weaver's pemission. 
Malice !mas been geoerally defined by ygidaho courts as a reddess dis~egud for the truth or fdsity of a statement. 
See Bandeli@ v. Pietsch, 998 B&o 337,342,563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). An action will mt lie where a statement 
in slander oft&, al&ough false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues 
he believed the original fence was &:e boundaq between Lot I6 and the Stafford propew. Upon removing the 
original fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith eEoa to record the location of the original !fence orr 
to place the new fence or new ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence was 
where the original fence bad been only i ~ 1  places. Qhffforbgss conduct in ereding &e new fence m d  excavating 
the new ditch on Lot 16 &us belie my god faith belief in his otwnership interest h Lot 16. Finally, O y h e e  
Village bas incmed specid damages in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment md the legal expenses 
incumed in defending Stafford's cl.aims. We therefore hold the district judge's slander of title determination is 
suppogaed by snbskmtia~ md competent evidence. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
i[3@1] Weaver requests attorney fees on appeal under 1.C. 5 12-121. Attorney fees are proper when the appeal 
was brought Ebvo1ously, umeasonaably, or without fomdion.  Turpn v. Granie~i, 133 %d&o 244,249,985 
P.28 669, 674 (1999). Maough Stafford predominantly raises factual issues upon which8nicka, at best, there was 
disputed evidence before the district court, he does raise some novel arguments concerning the meaning and use 
of the term mormument for pwposes of inteqmting a deed and coacerniing color of title as an afGrmative defense 
to trespass. Stafford's appeal, therefore, does not lack foundation md we decline to award Weaver attorney fees 
on appeal pursuant to 1.C. 8 12-121. 
CDwyhee Vllage requests attorneyfees on appeal pursuant to I.C. 12-P20,I.C. 8 12-121 m d  I.A.R. 4%. We 
find n,o basis for an award of fees under B.C. 5 12-120. As to an award of fees under B.C. $ 12-124, we find 
sufficient merit to the question relating to slander of title to wid,hsnaWad an award of fees. 
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The district judge's decision finding Staay"ord trespassed upon Weaveh Lo& 16 and slandered the title of 
Owyhee Village is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to Weaver a d  OwyIniee Village. 
Justices SIILAK, SCWROEEW, WAL'FERS and KlDWEILL concur. 
Lawriter Corpowtion. All rights wsewed. 
The Casemaker Online database is a compiletion exclraaively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is 
provided for use under the terms, notices end conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement 
to which all users assent in order to access We database. 
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Bobbie EGJOVHCH9 PlaintiffiAppellmt9 v. FIRST WESTERN NVESTMENTB, JNC., an lddio Corporation 
and Mmagement No~t7rnwest, Inc., a Washington Corporation doing business in the State of Ed&o, Defendants- 
Respondents, and Tbili$aRay$ess$ Inc., a CaHifomda Coqpration doing business in the State of Idaho, Pewnie 
Galland, Wayne Gallmd and Mike Froemming, d/b/a R & R Constmction, md J o h  Does I-EV, inclusively$ 
whose names are umhom, Defendants. 
[Cite as Regjovich v. First Western lnvesments, Inc., 134 Tddfio 1541 
No. 24444. 
Supreme C o w  of Idaho, Coew d'AR.ene, October 2000 Tern. 
Pedestriaa who was injured in fall on sidewalk outside store brrought suit against numerous defendants, 
iricluding related corporate entities which allegedly omed premises. The First Judicial District Court, Kootemi 
County, J m e s  IF. J d d ,  J, grated smma~judgmen t  to defendants. Plai~ntiffappealed. The Supreme Court, 
Schoedc, L, held that: (1) plaint,ifff lacked good cause for failure to serve s ns and complaint on one of 
defendants within six mon~ths of filing ofcomplaiaa&, as would preclude d i s ~ s s a 1  without prejudice as to that 
defendmt; (2) plaintiff had ability with reasonable diligence to determine true o m e r  of propedy, so that 
defendad who did not in fact own property was not equitably estopped by insurer's representation as to 
owfiership from asserting defense ofnon~mership~ md actud owaer subseque~atly added as defe~~da~7.t was not 
estopped from asserting limitations defense; md (3) amended complaht addimg actual omer  did not relate back 
for h!rnitations pwoses. 
Michael J. Verbillis, Coew dfAlene, for appellant, 
Cosho$ Hmphrey, Greener* & welsh, Boise, for respondents. ~ h i s t ~ p ~ ~ ~  6;'. Burke argued.
SCHROEDER, Justice. 
Bobbie Redovkch (Redovich) appeals Byme district wwtqs grant of s u m a v  judgment on her chims against 
First Western investments, hc., (FWH), Mmagemed Northwest, Inc., (IM3W)9 and First Westen1 Deve8opment 
Association of Washington V, L.P., (FWD-V). Regjovich alleged that she suffered personal injuries in a slip- 
and-fall that occurred on the sidewalk outside the Payless Drug Store in Coeur dPAlene~ The district court 
concluded that F W  b.ad no legal responsibiliq because (1) F W  was not the omer  ofthe real property inn 
question, (2) F W  was not estopped from denying property omer"p, and (3) IFWI owed no duty of care to 
Regjovich. The district court dismissed Regjovich's cUaims against M N W  md FWD-V for failure to tirmely 
sewe a complaint md swmons within six months pursuant to Rule sj(a)(2) ofthe lddmo Rules of Civil 
~rocedare (1.R.C.P). "re district court dismissed claims against ThiftyRayless, Hnc. (Tbrif?$JD5 Pennie Galhand, 
Wayne Gdlmd md Mike Froemming &/a R & R Consmction, for filuire to timely sewe the complaint as 
provided by 1Kule 4Qa)(2), I.R.C.P. Redovich appeals the dismissal of the claims against FW9, W W ,  and 
FWD-V. 
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IIBmCKGROWD AND PWJIOR PROCEEDINGS 
FWI, W W ,  m d  FWD-V me business entities that shmed some cornon ow~rnership am.oing tile pincipals at 
the times that are relevant in this case. F w  is an Idaho coporation whose sfhmeho~ders were George E. Barber 
(Barber), Michael J. Hess (Hess), Scott S h d s  (Shanks) and Mar!< 0. Zenge~ (Zer~ger)~ Zenger was president of 
FWI. M W  is a Washin@on copora~on. Prior to Mmch 1995, the shareholders of MNW were Bmber, Iirless, 
Shanks, a d  Zenger* After March 1995, the shareholders in MNW were Mack H. Debose (Debose), Hess, md 
ShaisEhs. Since Mach 1995, the shareholders in W W  have acted in various capacities as cowmate office~rs of 
WWui .  FWD-V is a limited partnership organized mder Washington law. ~lneienem1 partnirs of FWD-V were 
Bwber. Hess. Shanks. md Zenger. The limited owtuner was Debose. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Comomv 
On December 220, 1996, Wegjovich filed a complaint n m h g  FWl[? Thrifty, MNW, Pemie Gallad, Wayne 
Gai1m.d and Mike Froemming &bdi W & W Cons&iruction md John Does I-IV as defenda~~ts. No summonses 
*were issued until May 20, 1997. 
IFWI was sewed with process on May 21, 1997, within the six-month period provided by Ride 4(a)(2). MNW 
was not s e d  within the six-month period. FWD-V was not named as a defendant in the complaint but was 
served with a John Doe summons on July 21,1997. 
The district court granted summay judgments in favor of IFWII, MNW, and FWD-V, dismissing Repjovich's 
complaint. Regjovich appealed the judgments entered against her. 
11-31 Rule 4(a)(2) requires a panty to serve the s n m o n s  a d  complaint within six months of filing the 
complaint. Unless a paty c m  show good cause for failwe to sene within those six months, a coenirt must 
dismiss the action without prejudice. I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). A determination off whether good cause exists is a factual 
one Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Coy., 132 Idaho 531,533,996 P.2d 457,459 (8999). 
Consequently, when reviewhg a decision dismissing a case mder the d e ,  "the appropriate standard of review 
is the same as that used to review an order granting s u m q  judgment." Werco Minerals Co. v. Morrison 
K~udsen Corp., 132 1d&o 531,533,976 P.2d 457,459 (1999). However> ''where timere is n.o dispute as to the 
f a c u l  circumstances, our review consists off ascertaining tine effect of applicable law on tile undisputed facts~" 
Martin v. Hoblit, 833 Idaho 372,987 P.2d 284 (1999). 
THE DIISTWJICT COURT'S DJECIISION TWAT WGJOWCH DID NOT SIBTOW GOOD CAUSE FOR 
LATE SERVIICE OF TIRE SUMMONS ON MNW US SUPPORTED BY TIHE lRECOmo 
The version o f ~ d ~ o  Rules of Civil! Procedure 4(a)(2) in effect at the t h e  IRegjovich filed her complaint 
provide& 
If a sewice of d3e smmons and complaint is not made upon 62 defendant within six (6) months 
aRer eBnR filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such sembe was required c m o t  
show good cause why such sewice was not made within that period, the action s B 1  be dismissed 
as to that defendat without prejudice upon the court's o v i  inGtiative without notice to such p a w  or 
upon motion. 
- 
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1.X.C.P. 4(a)(2). 
f4j Regjovich filed the complaint on December 20, 1996. Sewice of ~orocess on W W  did !mot occur until 
July 21, 1997. Regovich asserts that there was good cause for the late sewice of process on the basis o:F 
negotiations with the hswance carrier p~ridpr to the filing of the comp1aiint aimd the fact that she was medically 
unstable, making settlement impractical until her find condition becme Pmom. 
/[5] The relevant time in question is the six month period following the filing off the complaint. Idartin, 133 
Idaho 372,987 P.2d 284; Sammfs v. Magne8elz; 130 Idaho 342$346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997). The settlement 
negotiations &at took place before the complaint was filed are irrelevant in detem.injng good cause. !in Mmtin 
v. BlobBit, 1133 Idaho 372,9819 P.2d 284, tiis Coua detemined that settlement negotiations between tilie parties 
do not provide justifiwtion for delay of sewice and do not in and ofthemselves constitute cause for non- 
complimce with Rule 4(a)(2). The settlement negotiations in this case that occmed prior to filling &?me complaint 
'do not constitute good cause for the late sewice of process. 
The fact that Regjovic!n9s med.ica1 wndition had not stabilized does not constitute good cause for failure to 
serve the s u m o n s  ad compU&nad. There was nothing in her condition that pswvented service of process. The 
question of whether resolution of her cBai,m should await stabilization of ha medical condition was one that 
couRd have been. add~ssed  in h e  litigation following service of process. 
TWIE DLISTWllCT COURT CORmCTLY DETEmIINED TIHIAT EQUHTABLE ESTOPPElL WAS NOT 
APPLHCABLL 
A, S~tamdard off Review 
[63j On an appeal corn an order granting s m . g i  judgment, this Count's sfan- 
dard of review is &he same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for SWEWTQJ 
judgment. State V, WPzdbbermaid IBIZC., 129 Idaho 353,355-56,924 P.2d 615,6119-618 (1996). The Corn must 
liberally &onstme facts in the existing record in favor of @qe nomoving party and draw all reasonable inferences 
kom the record ia favor of the nomoving party. RubbermaiGJ, 129 Idaho at 356,924 P.2d at 618. Ifthere are 
conflicting inferences contained in the record? or if reawnable minds might reach diffwent conclusions, 
summw judgment must be denied. Bonz v. S u d ~ e e h ,  % 19 Idaho 539, 541,808 P.2d 896,878 (9981). Wwn 
questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review md 3s m t  bomd by findings of the dist~ric? court 
but is kee to draw its own concIusS?ions from the evidence presented. Mutual ofEnumclsaw v. BoxX 227 lidaho 
851,2352,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). 
FWil was named in the complaint as the omer  ofthe propee in issue but in fact was not the owner. 
Coinsequently, FWI had no Iegd responsibility for Regjovicla's injuries unless FWI was estopped &om raising 
the defense of non-omership~ FWD-V, not FWI, was in fact the owner ofthe property in issue in this case but 
was ]mot nmed in the complaint md was not sewed with process until &er the statute of limitations had mn. 
Re&opnich mainta.ins &at FWP should be estopped fuom denying omership ofthe property and FWD-V should 
be estoploed from asserting the statute of limitations defense because an employee of Wausau, w!~.ich insured 
both FW md FWD-V, told Regjovich &at FWI was the owner oftbe property. Relying on tb.is com.~rnunicati0~11, 
Regjovich named P W  in the complaint as the owner of the property and served F W  with.in six months of filing 
the  complaint^ 
- 
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[I@, 111 Equitable estoppel isbased on the concept that it would be inequitable to dlow a 10erson to induce 
reliance by taking a certain position and, thereafter, take m inconsistent position w h  it becomes advmtageous 
to do so. Ggf$e?r.d v. State, 127 Idaho 472,903 P.28 61 (1985). The elements of equitable estwppel we: 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actbd or coi~skmctive knowledge of 
the truth, (2) the party assenting estoppel did not BMImow or could ;lot discover the truth, (3) the false 
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, asad (4) the person to 
whom fie representation was made or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon 
the representation or coii~cealment o his [or her] prejudice. 
[%2] The district court detemined that Wanmu made a ffdse representation in the letter to Regjovich on 
March 14, i 995, and that hhe false repreentaeon was intended to be relied upon. Ei[owever, the district coM 
conchnded &at "in &awing all reasonable inferences in favor of Regovich, I find &at had Re@ovicWs attorney 
exercised reasonable diligence, he would have discovered that FW was not the owner off ]Lot 3A prior to P~..] 
filing his Complaint on December 20, 1996." 
113, naj All factors of equitable estoppel we of equal importance, and there can be no estoppel absent any of 
the elements. Tomneerep Y. Abbertsonk, IEC., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1880) (overrufedon other grounds by 
Harrison Y. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)) Iddm couxts haw long determined that one may not 
assert estoppel based upon mother's misrepresentation if the one claiming estoppel had readily accessible 
means to discover the truth. Consequmtky, if Redovich either h e w  or had the ability with reasonable diligence 
to determine the true owner of the propex4y3 &e second element of equitable estoppel is lacking. 
In this case the letter from Wausau to Xegjovich was dated March 14, 8995. The complaint was filed 
December 20, 1896, approxhwnately twenty months later. There was over a y e a  a d  a half to discover the true 
omerr prior to filing the complaint. The ownership ofthe property was a matter ofpub1ic record accessible to 
Redovich. Para- 
graph VjI ofthe complaint recognized that FWJ might not be the owner of the propem: 
Defendant, J Q P i  DOE, I, is nmed as a Defendant in the event the real property was not owned by 
FIRST W S T I E N  INVESTMENTS3 WC. at times material. JOHN DOE I was the lawful owner 
of the premises described in Paragraph HH herein. 
[ng The requiremer@ts of equitable estoppel were not intended to create a trap for the unwary. It is 
troublesome that Waausaiaa misstated dRne ownership ofthe propeq, but. it is clear that Regjovich had the time nnd 
means to discover the identity ofthe omer  with reasonable diliggnce. The concern noted in the complaiiiat t d  
iFWI might not be the owner ofthe propern required that a reasonable effort be made to determine the o m e r  
prior to expiration of the statute oflimitatiom. An essential dement of equitable estoppel is missing. 
1 TETLE DESTNCT COURT DID NOT ERR lIN DEWmG mGJOVICHvS MCDTUON TO AMEND TME 
COMPLAENT AGAENST FWD-Vo 
Redovich argues that the Co& shodd have &lowed amendment ofthe complaint to rime FWD-V as a 
defendant wKnen she discovered that lFW was not the true owner. Pmrsuant to Rule 15Qc) am mendm.ent to the 
complaint arising f m  the same wnduct alieged in the compi*.int relates back b the date ihe o ~ g ~ ~ ; " f ~ u a  
- 
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was filed if 
witiiin the period provided by law for com~encing the action against the p-, the paT* to be 
brought ia by mendmenr8 (8) has received such notice ofthe instinahion ofthe action &at the pa%y 
will not be prejudiced h maintaiahg a defense on the merits, and (2) Emew or should have !mown 
that* but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper par@, the action would have been 
brought against the party.... 
[ll6] The dist~tict come concluded that since Regjovich failed to timely sewe FWD-V within the six  months 
as required by 1.R.QI.P. 4(a)(2)9 that it need not address the motion to mend  the complaint. It is correct rhat 
FWD-V was not sewed within six months from the filing ofthe compl&i. However, if the men&nent to n m e  
FWD-V were allowed, it is arguable that the six-month period for sewice from the filing of the complaint 
would not cominnence at the time the initial complaint was Gled but at a later time. Consequentny, the Court will 
address the issue of whether an amendment should have been allowed. 
Re~ovich rnainRains that FWD-V had notice of the complaint prior to the expiration oif the statute of 
limitations because Wausau h2ew that Regjovich was gohg to file a complai~mt. According to Regjovi~!8.~ since 
Wausau was the insurance conanpamy for F W 9  FWD-V and lWNW, FWD-V must have been put on notbe about 
the complaint filed on December 20, 8996 However, the fact that the attorney for Regjovich advised the 
adjuster for Wausau that he wodd file a complaint to protect the sbtwae of limitations D not s&ificient to put 
PWD-V on notice that a complaint which might implicate it was filed later. 1t was not until the latter p& of 
Feb~mxgr 1997 that the adjuster for Wauaa leaned that a complaiimt had in fzict been f i ld  This was after 
expiration ofthe statute of limi&tions. Consequently, the conditions of Rule 1 5(c) were not met. 
[I71 This Court has allowed m exception to permit the 
amendment of a complaint designating the 'me name of a fictitiously described pax@ bo relate back 
to the GRinag of the original complaint nogltho@U meUhg the reqairemmds ofRaaUe n5'fc) if it can be 
established that the mending party procwded with due diligence to discover the true identity ofthe 
fictitious paiy m d  pmmptly rmoved to mend and sewe process upon the prev.iously fictitiousRy 
described party. 
Neuco Minerals Co. v. Morrison K8udu"en KRS., 132 Idaho 531,976 P.2d 459 (1999). BS$gjovic!~n's claim agai~st 
FWD-V is 11638. saved by the exception in Nerco hfi~&i"du" Co. because Redovich did not proceed with due 
diligence to discover the identity of the fictitious Job Doe paty she had designated as a possi3sQe owner ofthe 
propem. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the district c o d  granting s u m w  judgments to the respondents are affirmed. The 
respondents we awwdded costs. No attorney fees are duowed. 
Chief Justice ?TROUT m d  Justices SIILAK, WAILTERS, and XJ;i[DmLlL, concur. 
- 
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Defendants Todd Green and Steven R. 
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Andrew M. Schwam, Moscow, ID 
Robert M. Magyar, Moscow, ID 
Defendants. 
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1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. 
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R. ) 
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE ) 
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and 
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, 1 
Counter-Plaintiffs, ) 
VS. 
1 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. ) 
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & ) 
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
Counter-Defendants. ) 
................................................................. 
Subject of Proceedings: COURT TRIAL - DAY FIVE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court 
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties. 
On motion Mr. Schwam, there being no objection from Mr. Brown, the testimony of 
Thomas Richards was interrupted to call some witnesses out of order to accommodate 
their schedules. 
Harley Wright was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross 
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. 
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down. 
Gerald Wright was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross 
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. The witness stepped down. 
Michael O'Neal was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross 
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. 
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down. 
Court recessed at 11:38 A.M., reconvening at 11:41 A.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Willemina Kardong was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross 
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. 
Neither counsel wished to examine the witness on the Court's questions. The witness 
stepped down. 
Court recessed at 12:12 P.M., reconvening at 1:22 P.M., Court, counsel and the 
parties being present as before. 
Linda Fox was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross examination by 
Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. The witness stepped down. 
Thomas Rogers was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross 
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. 
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. Court questioned the witness. The 
witness stepped down. 
Thomas Richards resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the 
defendants. Mr. Schwam resumed his redirect examination of Mr. Richards. Recross 
examination by Mr. Brown. Court questioned the witness. Mr. Schwam examined the 
witness on the Court's questions. Mr. Brown examined the witness on the Court's 
questions. The witness stepped down. 
Court recessed at 3:00 P.M., reconvening at 318 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties 
being present as before. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
n-r in- r rrr ir  -0 I, 
Mr. Schwam requested that the Court take judicial notice of the Affidavit of Susan 
Ripley. Mr. Brown objected. Court sustained the objection. 
Susan Ripley was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. No cross 
examination. The witness stepped down. 
Defendant rested. 
Steven Ely was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal. No cross 
examination. The witness stepped down. 
Dean Balcamp was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal. Cross 
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from 
counsel, the witness was excused. 
Tory Eugene Lawrence was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal. 
Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Court questioned the witness. Neither counsel 
wished to examine the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down. 
Plaintiff rested. 
No surrebuttal. 
Court stated that it finds briefing unnecessary. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, neither counsel presented closing argument. 
Court considered the matter as having been fully submitted and took the case under 
advisement. 
Court recessed at 408 P.M., Subject to Call. 
APPROVED BY: 
J ~ H N  R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
-- ----. *---.-%" " 
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) Case No. CV-0400080 
1 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION1 
) 
This Court is aware that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in all matters "tried upon the facts without a jury." This Memorandum 
Decision constitutes this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Oftentimes, findings of 
facts and conclusions of law are set out separately and distinctly even though they are not always 
separate and distinct. Other times conclusions of law are set out after the findings of fact as if they 
somehow flow from the findings. However, it is sometimes necessary to ascertain the law 
applicable before determining the facts. This Court believes it preferable to intersperse findings of 
fact and conclusions of law (and not necessarily in that order) to make the decision and analysis 
more easily read and understood. 
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This case involves a boundary dispute in rural Latah County. The property in 
question constitutes a portion of what is comoidy  referred to as Moscow Mountain. The 
dispute involves two adjoining quarter sections of land. The property in dispute lies 
within the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise 
Meridian. Todd and Tonia Green purchased the quarter section in question on August 1, 
2002. The quarter section to the north of the disputed property is owned together by 
Gerald and Consuelo Weitz and Weitz & Sons, LLC. Gerald and Consuelo Weitz, 
husband and wife, own the eastern half of the quarter section to the north of the disputed 
property. The western half of the quarter section is owned by Weitz & Sons, LLC. The 
members of Weitz & Sons, LLC, are Gerald and Consuelo Weitz and their two sons, 
Gerald Rockford Weitz and Dustin Fr~drick Weitz. The Weitzes will be collectively 
referred to as the Weitz family in this decision. (Attached to this Memorandum Decision 
is a copy of Exhibit 0 which was admitted in evidence. The area in dispute has been 
highlighted in yellow on that Exhibit.) 
The Greens, after purchasing the property, subdivided it into four parcels. Three 
of the four parcels border the Weitz family's quarter section and thus contain property 
which is in dispute. The Greens sold one of the four parcels to Danial and Catherine 
Castle (Tract 1 on Exhibit 0); they sold another to Steven and Mary Shook (Tract 2 on 
Exhibit 0). The third parcel impacted by this boundary dispute was retained by the 
Greens (Tract 4 on Exhibit 0). The Castles, Shooks and Greens are all parties to this 
litigation. 
Todd and Tonia Green purchased what they thought was a quarter section, or 160 
acres, from the Rogers' Family Trust. The Greens agreed to pay $2,000 per acre for the 
property. Prior to purchasing the property, Todd Green spent considerable time 
traversing the property. He had located a quarter section marker at the northeast corner 
of the property, which had been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands in 1988. The 
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property purchased by the Greens contains a trail, sometimes referred to as a road, which 
runs generally east to west through the disputed property. The road was the subject of 
considerable testimony at hid. Prior to the Greens' purchase in 2002, the trail was 
capable of handling, for much of its length, a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle. For at least a 
year prior to the Greens' purchase of the property, the trail was partially blocked because 
a tree had fallen across it. The tree blocked any motorized vehicle from driving the length 
of the trail. In order to travel the length of the trail, motorcyclists and hikers had created a 
detour by which they could bypass the tree that had fallen across the trail. 
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron Monson, a land 
surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson began his work in August 2002. In 
the process of surveying, he hung surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating that he 
was in the process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the surveyor's 
actions, the Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a nephew of Gerald Weitz, went 
up and cut out the log that had fallen across the trail, thereby enabling motorized travel 
the length of the trail without detour. Gerald Weitz, the Weitz family patriarch, took his 
Caterpillar tractor to the property and on at least two different instances bladed the trail 
in such a way as to convert it from an overgrown trail to one which would allow a four- 
wheel-drive pickup truck to travel from one end to the other. 
Mr. Green, believing the property to be his and his wife's, telephoned Consuelo 
Weitz, the Weitz family matriarch, to find out why the trail bad been bladed without his 
consultation or permission. Mrs. Weitz informed Mr. Green that she considered the 
property to be hers and that she did not need permission to do what she considered to be 
rightfully within her power to do. Mr. Green learned at that time that the Weitz family 
claimed ownership of the northernmost portion of the quarter section he had purchased. 
The claim of ownership extended from the northern boundary of the Greens' quarter 
section to an old fence line that ran essentially the width of the property in an east-west 
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direction and would, if acknowledged as a boundary, result in a little more than eight 
acres being lopped off of the northern portion of the Greens' property. 
The Weitz family claims ownership of the disputed property because of Consuelo 
Weitz's family history and association with the property. Mrs. Weitz's father, Harold 
Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin, previously ran dairy cattle on the 
disputed property. It appears this was done until about 1975. Prior to that time the 
Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own. They graded the trail in question 
at will and connected it with numerous other roads traversing their property to the north. 
They maintained the fence, which encroached on the Rogers' property. During the 1970's 
Homer Ferguson leased the Rogers' property from Inez Rogers, the Rogers' family 
matriarch, to run cattle on it, Mr. Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers told him in the mid- 
1970's that the fence, which borders the disputed property, constituted the boundary 
.between the Schoepflin's property and the Rogers' propeky. However, Mys. Rogers' son, 1 
Thomas Rogers, undermined the testimony attributed &I his mother when he testified that 
he doubted his mother had ever seen the fence in question. He also testified his mother 
died in 2001 and he managed the property as the trustee for his family's trust following 
her death. He also testified he considered the property boundary to be the quarter section 
line, not the disputed fence. 
After learning of the dispute regarding their property, Mr. and Mrs. Green made a 
claim against the Rogers' Family Trust for the loss the Greens maintained they suffered as 
a result of the warranty deed not conveying clear title to the disputed property. As a 
result of the Greens' claim, the Rogers' Family Trust reduced the purchase price of the 
quarter section Mr. and Mrs. Green purchased by $46,247.16. However, in negotiating 
the sale of property to the Shooks and Castles, the Greens undertook an obligation to 
convey clear title to the disputed property and, in the event the Weitz family did not 
! 
pursue a quiet title action to the disputed property, the Greens agreed to institute a quiet 
I 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 4 
title action themselves. In addition, the Greens agreed to compensate the shooks and the 
Castles for the loss of the disputed property in the event title was quieted in the Weitz 
family. 
The Weitz family seeks to quiet title in the disputed property by asserting a claim 
of boundary by agreement. In order to establish a boundary by agreement, the Weitz 
family must establish two things by clear and convincing e~idence.~ First, they must 
prove an uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent properties; and second, they 
must prove a subsequent express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Cox v. 
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495,50 P.3d 987,990 (2002) (citing GrlTel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 
400,34 P.3d 1080,1083 (2001)). 
Clearly there exists in this case a disputed boundary involving adjacent properties. 
However, as to the express or implied agreement, the Weitz family's has failed to make 
its case by clear and convincing evidence. In 1988, the Idaho Department of Lands put up 
a marker on the northeast corner of the Rogers' property. That boundary marker 
constituted notice that the true property line between the Weitz family property and the 
Rogers' property was north of the fence in question. Thomas Rogers, the Rogers' family's 
property manager, testified that the boundary was not the dilapidated fence, but rather 
the corner established in 1988 by the Idaho Department of Lands. The only testimony 
that the Rogers family agreed to the boundary was a thirty-year old statement attributed 
2 When a party seeks to prove boundary by agreement, the majority rule is that the party must show the 
agreement "by such a preponderance of the evidence, often designated as clear and convincing evidence, as 
will entitle him or her to the boundary claimed." See 12 AM JUR 20, Boundaries § 104 (1997) (citing, e.g., Davis 
v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657 (Me. 1993)(clear and convincing evidence); Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298 
(Minn. 1980) (clear, positive, and unequivocal evidence); Stone v. Rhodes, 752 P.2d 1112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) 
(clear and convincing evidence); Knutson v. Jensen 440 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1989) (clear and convincing 
evidence); Heriot v. Lewis, 668 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983 )(clear, cogent, and convincing evidence)). 
Because there is no definitive law in ldaho on the burden of proof on a claim of boundary by agreement, this 
Court concludes that the majority rule of proof by clear and convincing evidence should apply. Also, as noted 
at page 6 infra, the burden of proving a prescriptive easement in ldaho is clear and convincing evidence. It 
would be incongruous to require a plaintiff seeking to establish a prescriptive easement to do so by clear and 
convincing evidence, but require proof of a boundary by the lesser standard of a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
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to Mrs. Rogers, who apparently 11ad little familiarity with the property. 
Todd Green, in trying to find property to purchase, located the corner that had 
been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands. The fence, which the Weitz family relies 
011, was, in 2002, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. In the summer of 2005, when 
this Court walked the length of the "fence," it would have been more descriptive to refer 
to it as the remains of a fence than to refer to it as a "fence." It must have been many years 
between the time this Court observed the "fence" and the time it served as a barrier to 
roaming cattle. As between the "fel~ce" and the quarter section marker placed by the 
Idaho Deparlment of Lands, the latter served as notice to the world where the true 
property boundary lay; the "fence" would not have constituted notice of anything to 
anyone. Consequently, the Weitz family's claim to a boundary by agreement fails. 
The next issue that must be addressed is the claim by the Weitz family to a 
prescriptive easement to the trail that traverses the disputed property. A prescriptive 
easement must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2003). In order to prove a prescriptive easement, the 
Weitz family must demonstrate that its use of the trail was as follows: 
(1) open and notorious, 
(2) continuous and uninterrupted, 
(3) adverse and under a claim of right, 
(4) wit11 the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, 
and 
(5) for the statutory period of five years. 
Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997) (citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 
550,557,511 P.2d 1326,1333 (1973); I.C. 9 5-203). 
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz family's exhibits 
to be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the Weitz family's property, it did not appear 
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to be so at the time the Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when the Greens 
purchased the property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a motorcycle or a 
four-wlieel, all-terrain vehicle (except where the log had fallen across the pathway and 
necessitated passage by some other means). Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had 
been most recently bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father around 1994. For the eight years prior 
to the Greens' purchase, the trail had fallen into disuse. It did not appear, on the ground, 
to be part of a seamless web of roadways extending onto the Weitz family's property. 
Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had not been used by the Weitz family in a 
continuous fashion for the required five years. Although there was evidence the Weitz 
family and their friends used the trail periodically during the period in question, the use 
was not continuous. Consequently, the Weitz fainily has failed to establish the elements 
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement to the trail. 
An additional impediment to the Weitz family establishing a prescriptive easement 
to the road is that they cannot establish exclusive use of that road. In Simmons V .  Perkins, 
63 Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court held: "[a]n individual using 
land as a road in corn011 with the public cannot acquire a prescriptive right of way 
against the owner." Id. at 144,118 P.2d at 744. Numerous individuals, unconnected with 
the Weitz family, used the trail during the time in question. Because it is necessary to 
establish exclusive use in order to prove a prescriptive easement, this is yet another 
reason why the Weitz family's claim of a prescriptive easement must fail. 
The next issue that needs to be addressed is whether the Greens were bona fide 
purchasers. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Claim that Defendants Are Not 
Bona Fide Purcliasers for Value. "One who relies for protection upon the doctrine of 
being a bona fide purchaser must show that at the time of the purchase he paid a valuable 
consideration and upon the belief and validity of the vendor's claim of title without 
notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse right of another." lmig v. 
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McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318, 291 P.2d 852, 855 (1955) (citations omitted). This Court, 
having had the opportunity to physically' walk the fence line and hear the testimony at 
trial, is persuaded that the Greens were bona fide purchasers of tlte disputed property. 
Much testimony was elicited regarding the "fence," To characterize the remnants of what 
once constituted a fence as a fence is a misnomer. The barbed wire has not held cattle for 
thirty years. The "fence" has lain on its side for a significant number of years, i f not 
decades. It is more accurately referred to as the remains of a fence, not as a fence. The 
trail on the property was really nothing more than a footpath. It would not have put a 
reasonably observant purchaser on notice that someone other than the deeded owner of 
the property claimed title to the disputed property. The Weitz family also made much of 
an old shack on the disputed property as well as a sign placed on the property by either 
Mrs. Weitz's father or grandfather. The shack is a dilapidated structure that has not been 
used in decades. To the extent it was seen prior to purchase, it would not have put a 
purchaser on notice of a contrary claim to ownership. Likewise the sign placed on a tree 
with the word "LINE emblazoned on it would not have put a bona fide purchaser on 
notice that the roughly eight acres in question were claimed by another. Consequently, 
tlte Greens qualify as bona fide purchasers of the property. 
The Weitz family also contends that the Greens should be estopped from asserting 
title to the disputed property. The basis for this assertion is the fact that the Greens made 
a claim against the Rogers' Family Trust and effected a reduction in price of the quarter 
section in question because of the cloud on the title to the disputed property. The Weitz 
family argues two forms of estoppel: equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel. 
In order to establish equitable estoppel, the Weitz family must establish the 
following: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and 
could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or 
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concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the 
misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice. Willig v. State, Dept. of Health b 
Werfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971 (1995) (citations omitted). 
Equitable estoppel does not apply to these facts. The Greens have not engaged in 
either a false representation or a concealment of a material fact. The fact that the Rogers' 
Family Trust reduced the purchase price to the Greens as a result of this dispute has never 
been concealed from the Weitz family nor has there been a false representation. Further, 
there is no prejudice which has inured to the Weitz family, even if one were to assume for 
purposes of argument that there has been a concealment of a material fact. The Weitz 
family has not changed its position in reliance on anything the Greens have done. They 
continue to maintain, as they did prior to the Greens' settlemeirt with the Rogers Family 
Trust, that they are the rightful owners of the property. There simply is nothing in these 
facts to establish equitable estoppel as a basis for the Weitz family to challenge the Greens' 
purchase of the disputed property. 
The Weitz family also argues that quasi-estoppel should prevent the Greens from 
claiming ownership to the disputed property. "The doctrine of quasi-estoppel may be 
invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a position previously taken 
by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of the person seeking 
to apply the doctrine." Young v. Idaho Dep't of Law Enfo~cement, 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 
P.2d 615, 620 (Ct. App. 1993). "Quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation. 
Rather, it is a doctrine designed to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable 
advantage by changing positions." Record Steel b Const., Inc. v. Martel Consf., Inc., 129 
Idaho 288,292,923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
The essence of quasi-estoppel is unconscionability. This Court is unpersuaded 
that the actions of the Greens, in dealing with this dispute, should be construed as 
unconscionable. While it is true that the Greens asserted a claim against the Rogers' 
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Family Trust and obtained a sigiuficant reduction in the purchase price for the property 
because of the cloud on the title, the Rogers' Family Trust had an unqualified obligation 
to defend the Greens' title to the property, having given the Greens a warrangr deed. 
The Greens did nothing more than assert their rights. While it may appear to some that 
the Greens have obtained a windfall by being able to obtain a reduction of the price of the 
property and, at the same time, get all they bargained for, it should be remembered that 
the Greens have a contractual obligation to defend the titles conveyed to the Shooks and 
Castles and, i f unsuccessful, compensate the Shooks and the Casties for the corresponding 
reduction in the value of their property. The Rogers' Family Trust, in an effort to control 
its risk, essentially assigned its obligation to defend the Greens' title to the Greens for a 
reduction in the price of the property. The Greens have assumed that risk and have not 
engaged in any unconscionable behavior by undertaking that risk. It may be that the 
Greens' decision was a good move lrom a business standpoint; however, that is not the 
stuff of which unconscionability is made. Consequently, this Court concludes that quasi- 
estoppel should not prevent the Greens from claiming title to the property. 
The Castles, Greens, and Shooks also claim that the Weitz family owes them 
damages for timber trespass. The basis for tl2s claim is as follows. After Mr. And Mrs. 
Weitz learned that the Greens had obtained a settlement from the Rogers' Family Trust, 
they hired an arborist, Dana Townsend, to replace the downed fence with one that would 
create a barrier between their perceived property line and the property line of the Castles, 
Greens and Shooks. Mr. Townsend cut down various trees of small diameter in order to 
build a new fence. It is these trees that were downed, at the behest of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz, 
for which the Castles, Greens and Shooks seek compensation. While there was testimony 
from Mr. Shook, one of the property owners, that Mr. Townsend in effect created a 
"utility easementN across the property, that testimony was a gross overstatement of the 
damage to the property. Dean Balcamp, a real estate agent, testified that the value of the 
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properties had not been impaired by Mr. Townsend's timber trespass. Mr. ~alcamp's 
testimony was far more credible than Mr. Shook's as to the damage to the properties. 
While this Court concludes that the marketability of the parcels owned by the Castles, 
Greens and Shooks has not been diminished by the arborist, that is not the measure of 
damages. "In an action for timber trespass, the measure of actual damages is based upon 
the amount of the trees taken and the market value of the trees in that area at the time of 
the taking." Bumgarner v. Burngarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d 321,332 (Ct. App. 1993). 
While the trees cut were not marketable in the sense that they could be milled and cut 
into dimension lumber (with the exception of one tree), they nevertheless had some 
market value. The Court concludes that the Castles, Greens and Shooks should each 
receive $500.00 for the market value of the timber trespass by Mr. Townsend at the 
request of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz. 
The Castles, Greens and Shooks also seek treble damages for the timber trespass. 
"Although not stated in the statute, LC. 5 6-202 applies only where the alleged trespass is 
shown to have been willful and intentional. " Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639, 
862 P 2d 321, 331 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). This Court cannot find that the 
timber trespass attributable to Mr. and Mrs. Weitz through Mr. Townsend was willful or 
intentional. When Mr. and Mrs. Weitz hired Mr. Townsend, they reasonably thought that 
the property dispute had been resolved by the Greens' settlement with the Rogers' Family 
Trust Consequently, the trespass engaged in by Mr. Townsend is not subject to trebling. 
The final issue remaining for decision is the claim by the Castles, Greens and 
Shooks that the title to their property has been slandered by the Weitz family. There are 
four essential elements to a slander of title action. These include: "(1) The uttering and 
publication of the slanderous words by the defendant [sic]; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) 
malice, and (4) special damages . . . ." Matheson v. Ham's, 98 Idaho 758,759,572 P.2d 861, 
862 (1977). Based on the evidence presented, this Court cannot conclude that the Weitz 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 11 
family was, in any way, malicious with regard to its statements. The Weitz family had a 
good faith belief it had a valid claim to the disputed property. Consequently, malice has 
not been shown. 
Counsel for the Castles, Greens and Shooks are directed to submit judgments that 
will quiet title in the disputed property to them and award $500.00 each to the Castles, 
Greens and Shooks for the timber trespass they experienced. Judgment in these amounts 
should be against Mr. and Mrs. Weitz since the evidence was that they hired Mr. 
Townsend. 
DATED this ___ q TaY of January 2006. . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 12 
District ~udge  
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DEFENDANTS'ICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO CLARIFY, CORRECT 
AND RECONSIDER 
COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS, by and throiigh tlietr attorneys of 
1 record, and Move the Court to clarify, correct 'and ~xconsider the Court's findings of fact and 
I conclusions of law which appear in llle Co~irt's Memorandum Decision filed January 9,2006. 
! 
MOITION 7'0 CLIIKIFY. C:OKRECT 
AND RI~CONSIDl?lI - 1 
Because it is anticipated that this Memorandum Decision will be appealed, ~navants also 
request that the Court render its final decision by enteringfindings of fact and conclusions of law, so 
that all possible findings of the trial court at-e available to the appellate court, thus reducing the 
likelihood the case will be rernanded for further findings. 
Well prior to the hearing d t h i s  Motion, DefendantsICounterplaintifs will .file with thecourt 
their proposed findings of l~'act and conclusions of law. De'endantsICoui~terplai~~tiFfs also expect to 
file a short brief listing cases already provided to the Court. Defendants/Counterplaintiffs have 
noticed this Motion for a hearing at which DeCeiidantslCounterplaintiffs will support this Motion 
with oral argument. This Motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. I l(a)(2)(B), 
DATED this 23'd day uf January, 2006. 
&/"r~y-.% 
Robert M. Magyar 4'
Attorney for Defe~idantsiCounterplaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23"' day of January, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
rorego~ng MOTION TO CLARIFY, CORRECT AND RECONSIDER to be served on the follo\h/lng 
in  the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewislon, ID 83501 
&fih- 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
U.S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS' 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 1 MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
v. 1 REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
) INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) OF COSTS 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
\ 
COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS, by and through their attorneys 
of record, and Move the Court to award Defendants/Connterplaintiffs their reasonable attorney 
fees to be deemed as costs. and included in their memorandum of costs. 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 1 
This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 6-202, and I.R.C.P. 54, 
and for the following reasons. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs assert that they are the prevailing party in this matter, and 
as such are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees that they have incurred in 
defending against Plaintiffs' claims, and in prosecuting their own claims against 
PlaintiffsICounterdefendants. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs assert that Plaintiffs' case against Defendants was brought 
and/or pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs assert that they have proved a timber trespass and slander of 
title by Plaintiffs, and as such are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees under 
I.C. § 6-202 and as special damages resulting from slander of title. 
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs have filed herewith their Verified Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees in support of this Motion, including the affidavits of their attorneys of record. 
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs have noticed this Motion for a hearing at which 
Defendants/Countefplaintiffs request that they be permitted lo argue in support of this Motion. 
DATED this 31d day of April, 2006. 
Wly& 
Robert M. Magyar ' 
Attorney for l%fendants/~ounterplaintiffs 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS to be served on the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
mflfi- 
Robert M. Magyar 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) US. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
00 Hand Delivery 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES 
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 3 
MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5 
P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwam #I573 
5 14 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants/CounterplaintBs: Greens, S11ooks and Castles 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
G E M D  E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife,and WEITZ ) Case No. CV-04-000080 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 1 
1 
PlaintiffsfCounterdefendants, ) AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW SCHWAM 
v. ) 
) RE: ATTORNEY FEES 
TODD A. GXEEN and TOMA L. GREEN? ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERWE ) 
C CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., ) 
) 
Defendants/CounterpIaintiffs. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
ANDREW SCHWAM, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW SCHWAM RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
2. I have practiced law for more than 30 years. 
3. A copy ofthe comprehensive bill submitted to my clients in this case has been attached 
to and incorporated in the Memorandum of Costs filed in this case. 
4. All services and disbursements listed in the March 3 1, 2006 comprehensive bill 
submitted to my client were performed or expended and were necessary to properly represent my 
clients. 
5. With the exception of the Febniary 2004 work which was billed at flat rate, all other 
work was billed by the hour at a rate of $150.00 per hour with a minimum billing interval of 1110th 
of an hour. This hourly rate is reasonable considering the nature of the case tried and the fact that 
my hourly rate is somewhat lower than the rates charged by many attorneys in this geographic area 
with experience similar to mine. 
6. It should be noted that in addition to the entries shown in the attachment to the bill 
at no charge with a 0.0 time or NIC, many of the entries were billed at less time than they took and 
many interactions with clients, co-counsel, and witnesses were not billed at all. Thus the total hours 
billed represent a minimum figure materially less than the total time actually expended. 
DATED t h i s L  day of 2006, 
Andrew Schwam 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 1 ST day of &@I,L ,2006 
P t h  
Notary Public for &ago, 
Residing at Y%~L~JCJI L.J ,Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: or- a)-- o r  
AFTDAVIT OF ANDREW SCHWAM RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
CERTIFICAE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2 of /ao& c ,2006, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the fdllowing in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Brown 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) U. S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
@) Hand Delivery 
m & L  
Robert M. Magyar 0 ' 
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM 
Robert M. Magyar #I667 
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P.O. Box 8074 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882- 1906 Telephone 
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile 
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SCI-IWAM LAW FIRM 
Andrew Schwarn #I573 
514 South Polk Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 882-4190 Telephone 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO ) 
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ ) 
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company, 1 
1 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
v. ) 
1 
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN, ) 
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK ) 
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, ) 
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE ) 
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A., 1 
1 
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs. 1 
Case No. CV-04-000080 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M.MAGYAR 
RE: ATTORNEY FEES 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
ss: 
County of Latah 1 
ROBERT M. MAGYAR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. I represented Defendants/CounleyIaintiffs herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. IV1AGYAR - 1 
i t 
3. I have practiced law in Idaho for more than 30 years. 
4. A copy of the coinprehensive billing history submitted to my clients in this case has 
been attached to and incorporated in the Memorandum of Costs filed in this case. 
5. All services and disbursements listed in the November 22,2005 and April 1,2006 
billing histories submitted to my clients were performed or expended and were necessary to properly 
represent my clients in this matter. 
6. All work was billed by the hour at a rate of $125.00 per hour for out of court work, 
and $150.00 per hour for in court work, with a minimum billing interval of 1110'~ of an hour. This 
hourly rate was charged pursuant to an Employment Agreement entered into with my clients. This 
hourly rate is reasonable considering the nature of the case tried and the fact that my hourly rate is 
somewhat lower than the rates charged by many attorneys in this geographic area with experience 
similar to mine. 
7. It should be noted that in addition to the entries shown in the comprehensive billing 
history at no charge, many of the entries were billed at less time than they took, and many 
interactions with clients, co-counsel and witnesses, as well as trial and case preparation, were not 
billed at all. Thus, the total hours billed represent a minimum figure materially less than the total 
time actually expended on behalf of my clients in this case. 
DATED this 3/LP day of April, 2006. 
Lw4&f- 
Robert M. Magyar 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this & day of April, 2006. 
P ! y b ~ ' ~ n /  
NO& y Public in and for the State of Idaho, 
res~dng in Moscow, Idaho. 
My Commission Expires: 05 - I I - 7&(0 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3 day of kpril, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoiilg AWIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below: 
Charles A. Browil 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1225 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
M h  A- 
Robert M. ~ a ~ ~ d  
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MAGYAR - 3 
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@ Hand Delivery 
